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352 Phil. 440


[ G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998 ]




Before the Court is pleading filed on March 4, 1998 in behalf of petitioner and denominated as a Motion for Leave to file Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of September 10, 1997. This resolution does not in the least depart from or enervate the specific prohibition against second motions for reconsideration[1] Which are applicable thereto. Considering however, the increasing practice by defeated parties of conjuring scenarios which they blame for their debacle instead of admitting the lack of merit in their cases, the Court is constrained to once again express its displeasure against such unethical disregard of the canons for responsible advocacy, with the warning that this insidious pattern of professional misconduct shall not hereafter be allowed to pass with impunity.

Indeed, petitioner has gone to the extent of attributing supposed errors and irregularities in the disposition of this case to both the Court of Appeals and this Court, with particular allusions amounting to misconduct on the part of counsel for respondent private corporation and with specific imputations against retired Justice Teodoro Padilla in connection therewith. These will hereafter be discussed in light of the records of this Court and the vigorous disclaimer of counsel for said private respondent.

Petitioner's unbridled remonstrations are directed at the fact that its petition for review on certiorari of the adverse decision of respondent Court of Appeals[2] was denied by this Court for failure to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment.[3] This was arrived at after due consideration by the Second Division of this Court of the merits of the challenged decision and the extended resolution of respondent court denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof, the arguments of petitioner in his present petition for review on certiorari, the joint comment of respondents, the reply of petitioner, and the joint rejoinder of respondents, as well as the respective annexes of said pleadings. Indeed, the parties had all the opportunity to expound on and dissect the issues in this case, and in some instances even the non-issues, through the liberal admission by this Court of such pleadings.

Petitioner then filed a 24-page motion for reconsideration, and this Court required respondents to comment thereon, after which petitioner’s reply filed without leave was nonetheless admitted, and to which, on leave sought and granted, respondents filed a joint rejoinder. All these pleadings, just like those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, were so extensive, to the point of even incorporating new and modified issues, as to cover all possible aspects of the case to subserve the partisan views of the parties. Since no additional and substantial arguments were adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought, the Court resolved to deny the motion on January 26, 1998.[4]

It defies explanation, therefore, why petitioner would still insist that the parties should further have been allowed to file memoranda, an obvious ploy to justify a resolution giving due course to its petition, while simultaneously insinuating that its pleadings were not read. Indeed, petitioner would even dictate how this Court should have acted on its petition, with the improbable theory that because the case had progressed to the rejoinder stage, the petition must be given due course and a decision be rendered thereafter in its favor. This it tries to buttress by the palpably erroneous submission that since respondent court reversed the decision of the court a quo, this Court is duty bound to determine the facts involved. Firstly, this is a deliberate misstatement of our jurisprudence which merely holds that, in such a case, this Court may at its option review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals instead of being bound thereby. Secondly, and worse for petitioner, there is no conflict in the factual findings of the two lower courts as the Court of Appeals actually adopted the findings of fact of the trial court.

In its second motion for reconsideration, petitioner now tries a different tack by lecturing this Court on its theory that the “minute resolutions” it assails are supposedly in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the present Constitution. In characteristic fashion, it insinuates that such procedure adopted by this Court is a culpable constitutional violation and can be subject of impeachment proceedings. Petitioner is, of course, free to believe and act as it pleases just as this Court may likewise be minded to take the appropriate sanctions, for which purpose it would do well for all and sundry to now imbibe the consistent doctrines laid down by this Court.

As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al,[5] it has been stressed that these “resolutions” are not “decisions” within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ decision.

This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al.,[6] and further clarified in Munal vs. Commission on Audit, et al.[7] that the constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases “submitted for decision,” i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefore stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court’s decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.[8]

For, as expounded more in detail in Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, et al.:[9]

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta (148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987]), “[T]he Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case” (Italics supplied). This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly discharge its constitutional functions. x x x.

x x x

In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional provision which states that, “No petition for review x x x shall be refused due course x x x without stating the legal basis therefor” (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

The course of action adopted by the Court in disposing of this case through its two resolutions, after a thorough review of the issues and arguments of the parties in the plethora of pleadings they have filed, is not only in accord with but is justified by this firm and realistic doctrinal rule:

x x x The Supreme Court is not compelled to adopt a definite and stringent rule on how its judgment shall be framed. It has long been settled that this Court has discretion to decide whether a “minute resolution” should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case and that a minute Resolution of dismissal of a Petition for Review on Certiorari constitutes an adjudication on the merits of the controversy or subject matter of the Petition. It has been stressed by the Court that the grant of due course to a Petition for Review is “not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.” A minute Resolution denying a Petition for Review of a Decision of the Court of Appeals can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, in other words that the decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct.[10]

That this Court was fully justified in handing down its minute resolution because it “agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals” since “the decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct,” is best demonstrated and appreciated by reproducing the salient pronouncements of respondent court on the real issues actually involved in this case. The material holdings in its decision[11] of June 28, 1996 are as follows:

“The facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:

“Sometime in 1975, NIDC granted KIPI a direct loan of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) and a Two Million ((P2,000,000.00) guarantee to secure PNB. (Exh. “M” of petitioner and Exh. “22” of respondent PNB and intervenor SLDC, T.S.N. October 14, 1992 pp. 19-28). As security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated April 24, 1975 was executed by Petitioner KIPI in favor of NIDC, covering, among others, a parcel of land with all its improvements embraced in and covered by TCT NO. 469737 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal (now Makati, Metro Manila). At the instance of Respondent PNB and with the conformity of its subsidiary, NIDC, in order to secure the obligation of Petitioner KIPI under Respondent PNB’s deferred letter of credit for US$1,564,826.00 in favor of Toyota Tsusho Kaisha Ltd., Japan, Petitioner KIPI executed an Amendment of Mortgage Deed dated June 21, 1978 covering the same parcel of land and its improvements under TCT No. 469737 on a pari passu basis in favor of Respondent PNB and NIDC. (Exhibit “H”, “H-1” to “H-9”). Upon full payment of Petitioner KIPI’s account with NIDC and the P2.0 M Credit Line with Respondent PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage[12] dated January 7, 1981 releasing the mortgage on TCT No. 469737 (Exhibit “1” to “1-4” of Petitioner and Exhibits “7” to “7-D” of Respondent PNB and Intervenor SLDC). In this Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, it is provided among the whereases that “Whereas, the credit accomodations had been fully paid by the Borrower to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and NIDC”. (Exh. “1-5”). By virtue of this full payment and the execution of the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, NIDC returned the owner’s copy of the TCT No. 469737 of the petitioner and accordingly the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage was registered with the Registry of Deed on January 28, 1981. (Exhibits “E” to “E-5”) (sic) that there were some accounts chargeable to Petitioner KIPI on deferred letters of credit opened and established in 1974 and 1975 settled by Respondent PNB with the foreign suppliers in 1978 and 1979 but came to the knowledge of Respondent PNB only in 1981 and 1982 (Exhibits “21-1” to “21-L”. T.S.N. May 20, 1992 pp. 16-30).

“In a letter to Petitioner KIPI dated March 31, 1992, Respondent PNB requested for the return of the owner’s copy of TCT No. 469737 (Exh. “22”). On July 7, 1982 in a letter addressed to Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, then President of Petitioner KIPI, Respondent PNB reiterated for the return of the aforesaid TCT NO. 469737 (Exh. “22-A”) and the said title was returned to Respondent PNB.

“On May 7, 1982, Respondent PNB filed a “Petition for Correction of Entry and Adverse Claim” with the office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila and was able to have the same annotated at the back of TCT No. 469737 (Exh. “9” joint exhibit of Respondent PNB and Intervenor SLDC).

“On November 2, 1983, Respondent PNB filed with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Makati, Metro Manila a Petition of Sale Under ACT 1508, as amended by P.D. 385 to extra-judicially foreclose various properties belonging to Petitioner by virtue of a Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney dated June 21, 1978 (Exhibits “J” to “J-4”).

“On November 25, 1983, Petitioner KIPI received an undated Notice of Sheriff’s Sale to the effect that the land covered by TCT No. 469737 would be foreclosed extra-judicially on December 19, 1983 at 9:00 a.m. (Exh. “K” to “K-2”).”

x x x

Simplifying and summing up all the assigned errors of both appellants Philippine National Bank and Santiago Land Development Corporation, there are actually three main issues to be resolved in this appeal, to wit: (1) Whether the “Deed of Release” dated January 7, 1981 executed by the National Investment and Development Corporation in favor of appellee Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc. [Exhibit “I”, p. 76 Record – Vol. I; Exhibit “7”, p. 1494 Record – Vol. IV], had the effect of releasing the real estate mortgage in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank, as embodied in the “Amendment of Mortgage Deed” dated June 21, 1978 [Exhibit “H”, p. 64 Record – Vol I; Exhibit “6”, p. 1482 Record - Vol. IV]; (2) Whether the foreclosure of appellee’s property conducted on May 17, 1984 is valid; (3) Whether there is legal and/or factual basis for the awards of damages in favor of the appellee.
Anent the first issue, We rule that the “Deed of Release” dated January 7, 1981 executed solely by the National Investment and Development Corporation in favor of the appellee Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc., did not operate to release the real estate mortgage executed in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank as embodied in the “Amendment of Mortgage Deed” dated June 21, 1978. Said “Deed of Release” is not binding upon the appellant Philippine National Bank which was not a signatory to it and has not ratified the same.
It is axiomatic under Our law on obligations and contracts that contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs (Art. 1311, New Civil Code). The characteristic of “relativity of contracts” renders it binding only upon the parties and their successors. [Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Paras, Vol. IV 1994 ed., pp. 550-552]. A contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it [Civil Code of the Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995 ed., p. 428 citing Lopez vs. Enriquez, 16 Phil. 336, Ibañez vs. Rodriguez, 47 Phil. 554, etc.] even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof [Civil Code of the Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995, p. 428 citing Manila Port Service et al. vs. Court of Appeals et al. 20 SCRA 1214]. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the act, declaration, or omission of another, and proceedings against one cannot affect another, except as expressly provided by law or the Rules of Court [Civil Code of the Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995 ed., p. 428 / Rule 123 sec. 10 Rules of Court].
We accordingly find no legal basis for the court’s ruling that the “Deed of Release” dated January 7, 1981, had the effect of releasing the mortgage in favor of appellant bank despite the fact that it was executed solely by the National Investment and Development Corporation without any conformity or authority whatsoever of its joint mortgagee, the appellant Philippine National Bank. It is not disputed that PNB is a corporation with a separate and distinct personality from that of NIDC. The court a quo erred in holding that PNB recognized the release of the mortgage as shown by its Exhibit “22” wherein Vice President Ramirez stated in his memo to the Litigation and Collection Division of the PNB that upon discovery of the aforecited release of the mortgage, “we immediately wrote NIDC informing them that KIPI effected the release of PNB’s mortgage using NIDC’s Deed of Release”. The same memo stated that PNB requested KIPI to return the title for the reannotation of PNB’s mortgage “which was erroneously cancelled” (p. 1712, Record). Accordingly, the same exhibit indubitably showed that PNB promptly objected to the erroneous cancellation of the mortgage in its favor. Moreover, as above pointed out, an agreement cannot bind one who is not a party even if he had knowledge of the agreement and had acted on the basis thereof.
Moreover, a reading of the Amendment of Mortgage Deeds executed by Komatsu, PNB and NIDC, will show that it covered not only the credit accommodations obtained by Komatsu with NIDC as described in the first whereas clause, but also another obligation arising from the establishment of a deferred letter of credit for US$1,564,826.00, and other credit accommodations. We quote from the said Amendment:

“NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Deed of Mortgage in favor of NIDC referred to in the first ‘Whereas’ clause hereof shall be as it is hereby amended in the sense that the mortgage shall be in favor of PNB and NIDC, their successors and assigns on a pari-passu basis to secure the respective obligations of the Mortgagor to PNB and NIDC as follows:

NIDC      : a) Direct loan of P8,000,000.00

              : b) Guarantee in the amount of P2,000,000.00 issued in favor of PNB to secure the Credit Line of the MORTGAGOR with PNB

PNB       : US $1,564,826.00 or equivalent in Philippine Currency by way of deferred Letter of Credit issued by PNB in favor of Toyoda Tsusho Kaisha Ltd., Japan, thru Republic National Bank of New York, N.Y.

plus interest and charges as well as all other obligations, whether direct or indirect, primary or secondary, as appearing in the respective Books of Account of NIDC and PNB and other reasonable expenses and charges arising thereunder, whether such obligations have been contracted before, during or after date hereof. Subject to condition No. 4 hereinbelow, in case the MORTGAGOR execute subsequent promissory note or notes either as renewal of the former note, an extension thereof, as new loan, or is given any kind of accommodations such as overdraft, letters of credit, acceptance and bills of exchange, release of import shipments, on trust receipts etc., this mortgage shall also stand as security for the payment of said promissory notes or notes and/or accommodations without necessity of executing new contract and this mortgage shall have the same force and effect as if the said promissory notes or notes and/or accommodations were existing on the date hereof. However, if the MORTGAGOR shall pay to the MORTGAGEES, their successors or assigns the obligations secured by this mortgage, together with interest, costs and other expenses on or before the date they are due and shall keep and perform all the covenants and agreements herein contained for the MORTGAGOR then this mortgage shall be null and void, otherwise, it shall remain in full force and effect.” (pp. 65-66, Record).

It is clear that the reference to the credit accommodations consisting of P8,000,000.00 direct loan and P2,000,000.00 guarantee mentioned in the third “whereas” clause of the Deed of Release “as having been fully paid by the borrower” was to these two obligations obtained from NIDC, and not to the other obligation described in the Amended Mortgage as pertaining to PNB directly, arising from the issuance of the deferred letter of credit in the amount of US $1,564,826.00, the express inclusion of which obligation in the Amended Mortgage cannot be ignored. It is equally clear that NIDC was in no position to state that Komatsu’s direct obligation to PNB has been fully paid. And on the basic proposition above-stated that the deed of release executed by NIDC cannot bind its joint mortgagee, which is an entirely different entity, We find that the court a quo erroneously invoked the 3rd whereas clause stating that “the credit accommodations had been fully paid by the Borrower to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and NIDC”.
We are thus unable to accept the trial court’s reasoning that the release executed by NIDC will “necessarily include” the mortgage to PNB. The hypothesis that NIDC being a wholly owned subsidiary of its joint mortgagee could not have executed the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage without the knowledge and consent of respondent PNB, “its mother company”, has no support in law and jurisprudence. Neither does the evidence of record show that any confirmation or ratification of the release of mortgage was made by the PNB. Nothing short of an actual payment of the debt or an express release will operate to discharge a mortgage (55 Am. Jur. 394).
Defendants-appellants also question the trial court’s ruling that even granting that PNB’s claim is correct that insofar as it is concerned, the mortgage was not released it being separate entity and the mortgage being on a pari passu basis, the extrajudicial foreclosure should be to the extent only of its proportionate credit.
We do not agree that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole Pasong Tamo property is null and void. A mortgage is indivisible in nature, so that payment of a part of the secured debt does not extinguish the entire mortgage (See Paras, Civil Code Anno., 1995 ed., Vol. V, p. 1044; Art. 2089, Civil Code). There is also no language in the mortgage instrument to indicate otherwise, i.e. that the mortgage of the Pasong Tamo property is divisible, so that in case of the payment of the obligation to one mortgagee the mortgage would subsist only to the extent of the remaining lien of the other mortgagee. The mortgage instrument contemplated not only obligations existing on the date thereof, but also future obligations or accommodations appearing in the respective Books of Account of NIDC and PNB, thus rendering it unlikely and impractical for the parties to have intended a division of the mortgaged property in accordance with the proportionate credits of the two joint mortgagors.
The case of Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 46) cited by the court a quo is not in point. It refers to a mortgage of one parcel of land in favor of one mortgagee, where there was a failure of consideration, i.e., the entire amount of the loan was not released to the mortgagor and the mortgage was thus held to be enforceable only to the extent of the amount of the loan that was released. The factual situation in this case is obviously different. The mortgage here is not being enforced for more than the actual sum due.
With respect to the court’s pronouncement that the “Petition for Correction of Entry or Adverse Claim” cannot be made as basis of any foreclosure proceeding, suffice it to point out that the records bear out defendants-appellants’ claim that the PNB filed a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135 pursuant to the provisions of the Amendment of Mortgage Deed (Records, pp. 1482 to 1493). The Petition for Sale under Act No. 3135, as amended, dated October 8, 1983, was made the basis for the issuance of the Notice of Sheriff’s sale (Exhs. “9” to “9-d”, “9-e” to “9-bbb”, “9-ccc – Komatsu; Exhs. “10”, “14” to “14-b”, “15”, “17” – PNB,/SLDC). The plaintiff-appellee has not controverted the veracity of these documents either in the court below or in its Appellee’s brief. Accordingly, We rule that since the mortgage in favor of PNB is still subsisting, the sheriff’s sale on the basis of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure is valid.
Finally, consistently with Our above ruling relative to the validity of the foreclosure proceedings and the non-binding effect of the Deed of Release executed by the National Investment and Development Corporation in so far as the mortgage in favor of the appellant Philippine National Bank is concerned. We rule that the appellee Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc. is not entitled to any award of damages pursuant to the principle of damnum absque injuria, i.e. there might have been a loss (on the part of the appellee-mortgagor) arising from the foreclosure but said loss does not create a ground of legal redress. A loss or damage which does not constitute the violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is damnum absque injuria [Huyong Hian vs. Court of Appeals, 59 SCRA 134; Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 548]. (Italics supplied)

Consequently, respondent court reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case NO. 5957 and declared legal and valid the First Notice of Sheriff’s Sale dated November 12, 1983, the Second Notice of Sheriff’s Sale dated April 6, 1984, the Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings held and conducted thereunder, the Certificate of Sale dated May 17, 1984 and the registration thereof, the Final Deed of Sale, its registration and the Transfer Certificate of Title issued to respondent Philippine National Bank as the highest and lone bidder, the Deed of Sale in favor of and the Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the intervenor Santiago Land Development Corporation.

Petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court in its resolution[13] of January 14, 1997, from which we quote the following pertinent excerpts:

The motion for reconsideration has no merit.
We reiterate our ruling that the “Deed of Release” executed solely by National Investment and Development Corporation did not operate to release the real estate mortgage executed in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank as embodied in the “Amendment of Mortgage Deed”. This issue was fully discussed in our decision and We find no substantial argument in the motion for reconsideration, the petitioner-appellee’s memorandum or at the hearing, that would warrant a reversal of our previous findings.
It is evident that the “Deed of Release” pertains only to the mortgage executed in favor of the National Investment and Development Corporation whose credit has been fully paid. Insofar as the mortgage executed in favor of PNB is concerned, the same subsists as the credit in the amount of $1,564,826.00 remained unpaid. Contrary to appellee’s submission, the “Deed of Release” executed by the National Investment and Development Corporation is not an exercise in futility for said document actually released the indebtedness due to the National Investment and Development Corporation consisting of an P8,000,000.00 direct loan and P2,000,000.00 guarantee loan.
Petitioner-appellee submits that in the light of Article 2089 of the Civil Code, the “Amendment of Mortgage Deed” is null and void, and there was no valid mortgage in favor of PNB. Hence when the “Deed of Release” cancelled the only valid mortgage in favor of National Investment Development Corporation, there was no more mortgage left to be foreclosed by Philippine National Bank.
We do not agree.
At the outset, We note that the legality and validity of the “Amendment of Mortgage Deed” was never put in issue before the trial court nor was it raised in the appeal proper. “If well recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court” [Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 303].
At any rate, We are not inclined to uphold appellee’s contention that the “Amendment of Mortgage Deed” (which is the basis of the mortgage in favor of the PNB) is null and void on the argument that Article 2089 of the Civil Code “prohibits a situation where two or more creditors, with separate and distinct credits secured a mortgage over a single property”.
There is nothing in Article 2089 of the Civil Code that prohibits the mortgagor from mortgaging the same property for a separate and distinct debt in favor of another creditor. In this jurisdiction, the mortgagor is allowed to obtain subsequent loans by means of subsequent and successive mortgages on the same property. We further agree with appellant that “if an owner-mortgagor can enter into second and further mortgages, there is no law that prohibits the mortgagor and the mortgagee from agreeing that the mortgages would be pari-passu.” What is proscribed by Article 2089 is for a debtor who has mortgaged his property to secure a debt, to demand that the mortgage be released in proportion to the amount of the debt he has paid. Under the said article, the mortgagor has to pay the debt in full before he can ask for the release of the mortgage. This is compatible with the principle that a mortgage is indivisible.
Our ruling that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole Pasong Tamo property is valid since the mortgage is indivisible in nature is not inconsistent with our statement that “the Deed of Released executed solely by National Investment and Development Corporation did not operate to release the real estate mortgage executed in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank”. The fact that the Deed of Release executed by the National Investment and Development Corporation did not operate to release the real estate mortgage in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank, does not render the mortgage divisible. Indeed, foreclosure of the property in its entirety by Philippine National Bank is necessary because of the indivisible nature of a mortgage. The fact that there are two obligations secured by the same mortgaged property does not render the mortgage divisible. “The indivisibility of the mortgage or pledge does not affect the divisibility of the principal obligation. When the same thing is pledged or mortgaged to several creditors, the indivisibility of the pledge or mortgage entitled each and every creditor to the same action against the thing which is liable in its entirety for the individual share of each creditor.” [Civil Code of the Philippines, by Tolentino, Vol. V, pp. 538-539, 1992 Ed.].
The rest of the arguments of the appellee in its motion for reconsideration are mere rehash of what have been raised in its brief and were already fully considered and discussed in our decision. (Emphasis ours)

In the same manner, we readily found that, despite the lengthy and repetitious submissions of petitioner in its pleadings filed with this Court as earlier enumerated, all the arguments therein are also mere rehashed versions of what it posited before respondent court. We have patiently given petitioner’s postulates the corresponding thorough and objective review but, on the real and proper issues so completely and competently discussed and resolved by respondent court, petitioner’s obvious convolutions of the same arguments are evidently unavailing. It must be noted that its recourse to respondent court was by appeal on writ of error, hence the preceding quotation in extenso of said court’s decision readily shows how the real issues were correctly particularized and summarized to meet petitioner’s assignment of errors, and then ably adjudicated on both evidential and legal grounds.

Petitioner has come to this Court this time on appeal by certiorari and it must be aware of the elementary rule that, as emphasized in the decisions previously cited, a review thereunder is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor.[14] Here, there is no novel question of substance nor has respondent court decided the case contrary to law or our applicable decisions. On the contrary, it acted with commendable fealty to the same, and that is the other reason why we extensively reproduced the pertinent discussions in its challenged decision.

All these notwithstanding, petitioner still comes up with another supposed issue, this time faulting respondent court for allegedly not resolving the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to redeem its foreclosed property from respondent Philippine National Bank in the event the foreclosure thereof is held to be valid. We agree with respondents’ observation that this matter is not proper at this stage of the case since it was never raised in the complaint or admitted as an issue at the pre-trial, but was raised only in petitioner’s memorandum before the trial court.[15] Also, respondents point out that the period of redemption had long lapsed since the sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered on May 17, 1984 and, citing applicable authorities, the one-year redemption period is not suspended by an action for nullification of the auction sale.

What is more telling against petitioner’s new proposition, however, is the documented fact that as early as April 17, 1985, it executed a Deed of Assignment of Right of Redemption over the property in question in favor of Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing.[16] In fact, the exercise of such right of redemption by the assignee is involved in Civil Case No. 105 of the Regional Trial court of Makati, and the side issue of the right of respondent Santiago Land Development Corporation to intervene therein was decided by this Court in G.R. NO. 106194. On both substantive and procedural considerations, therefore, petitioner’s presentation of that so-called issue in the present appellate stage is an undue imposition on the time of this Court.

We have stated, at the outset, that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration could have been correctly rejected outright. But, as further noted, petitioner has distressingly adopted the lamentable technique contrived by losing litigants of resorting to ascriptions of supposed irregularities in the courts of justice as the cause for their defeat. Here, petitioner speaks of pressure having been employed by respondents against the trial court. It then proceeds to insinuate anomalous haste on the part of respondent court in reversing the trial court, pointing to the supposed short period of time it took the former to come out with its decision. It never even bothered to mention that the issues are actually very simple, that the evidence is basically documentary, and that the questions raised are easily answered by applying settled doctrines of this Court.

On top of that, it now veers towards this Court, spinning the yarn that retired Justice Teodoro Padilla first approached the ponente to whom its petition had been raffled, and asked for a disposition in favor of respondents as a “birthday and parting gift”; that said ponente declined and unloaded the case such that it was again raffled to a good friend of Justice Padilla. The records, however, show that this case was directly raffled to the Second Division on January 28, 1997 and there was no prior ponente to whom it was assigned who then supposedly unloaded it; and under the internal rules of this Court, when a case is unloaded, there is no need for holding a second raffle.

Petitioner could have rendered a signal service to the judiciary if it had only verified and proved the facts it purveyed but which are now belied even just by the internal rules of this Court, of which petitioner appears to be ignorant hence the valor of his denunciation. The members of the Second Division of this Court vehemently deny and denounce the animadversion on their allegedly having been approached by Justice Padilla regarding this case. The Padilla Law Office, counsel for respondent private corporation, has submitted its response to the imputations against it, thus calling for petitioner to prove its charges. The same burden is also imposed upon petitioner to prove its charges. The same burden is also imposed upon petitioner for the aspersions it has cast upon respondent Court of Appeals. We, therefore, leave it to the aforesaid law firm, Justice Teodoro Padilla and the Court of Appeals, on the one hand, and to herein petitioner, on the other, to decide for themselves whether to further pursue this incident in the proper proceedings.

On such contingency, this Court will content itself for the nonce with a stern admonition that petitioner refrain from conduct tending to create mistrust in our judicial system through innuendos on which no evidence is offered or indicated to be proffered. Responsible litigants need not be told that only pleadings formulated with intellectual honesty on facts duly ascertained can subserve the ends of justice and dignify the cause of the pleader.

WHEREFORE, petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and EXPUNGED as an unauthorized pleading. This resolution is immediately final and executory, and no further pleadings or motions will be entertained.


Melo, Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

[1] Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to Section 4, Rule 56, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This is the reiteration of the same prohibition in Paragraph 7 of the Resolution En Banc of April 7, 1988.

[2] CA-G.R. CV No. 48734; penned by Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, with the concurrence of Justice Ramon U. Mabutas, Jr. and Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.

[3] Rollo, 111.

[4] Ibid., 217.

[5] G.R. Nos. L-21098, May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 279, citing In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 and Mendoza vs. CFI, 51 SCRA 369. See also Commercial Union Assurance Co., Ltd, et al. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., et al., G.R. No. L-43342, October 30, 1978, 86 SCRA 279.

[6] G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 160.

[7] G.R. No. 78648, January 24, 1989, 169 SCRA 356.

[8] Cadiente vs. Narisma, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-91-576, En Banc Resolution, March 11, 1993.

[9] G.R. No. 82273, June 1, 1990, 186 SCRA 1.

[10] Smith Bell & Co. (Phil), Inc., et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56294, May 20, 1991, 197 SCRA 201.

[11] Rollo, 46-60.

[12] This was only a deed of release (without cancellation of mortgage) of NIDC’s “rights, interests, title and participation vested to and acquired by NIDC under and by virtue of the Security Device Agreements heretofore described and enumerated” (Annex 3 of respondents’ Rejoinder; Rollo, 126-130).

[13] Ibid., 62-67.

[14] Section 6, Rule 45, Rules of Court.

[15] Petitioner’s practice of raising issues for the first time on appeal was also noted by respondent Court of Appeals, in its aforequoted resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, on the matter of the validity of the Amendment of Mortgage Deed.

[16] Annex 1, Joint Rejoinder of Respondents; rollo, 215A-216.

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