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541 Phil. 312

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. NO. 166507, January 23, 2007 ]

AMKOR TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES, INC., ANTHONY MICHAEL PETRUCCI AND ROSEMARIE S. KATALBAS, PETITIONERS, VS. NORY A. JUANGCO, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by petitioners of our Decision promulgated on September 27, 2006 denying their petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76121, entitled “Nory A. Juangco, petitioner v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., respondents.”

In our Decision of September 20, 2006, we affirmed with modification the Decision dated October 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals finding that Nory A. Juangco, respondent, was illegally dismissed from her position as Executive Director of Amkor Technology Philippines, Inc., petitioner. We upheld the appellate court’s ruling that respondent is entitled to separation pay, backwages and other privileges and benefits. However, we deleted the awards for moral and exemplary damages for lack of basis.

Petitioners anchored their motion for partial reconsideration on our recent Decision in Domondon v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al,[1] penned by then Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, now Chief Justice. A second hard look at this case is deemed in order.

While it is not the function of this Court to re-examine the evidence submitted by the parties in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, we are constrained to determine anew the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, considering that they are in conflict with those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC, relying on the affidavits of the officers of petitioner-company, found that respondent was not coerced into signing the notice of voluntary retirement. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals found that respondent was coerced to retire. When the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals clash with those of the voluntary arbitrator or the NLRC, we are compelled to go over the records of the case as well as the submission of the parties.[2]

Records show that due to business losses, petitioner-company saw the need to reduce its existing manpower complement. Several meetings were held among its officers and department heads to discuss actions to be taken to implement the same. Sometime in October, 2001, petitioner-company convened its key officers and department heads, including respondent, to finally decide whether to implement a voluntary retirement/voluntary separation program or a retrenchment program. During the meeting, respondent expressed her interest and volunteered to personally participate in the downsizing program of the company’s personnel.

To formalize her decision to retire from the company, respondent submitted an undated letter signifying her intention to avail of the Voluntary Retirement Program of the company, effective 15 November 2001, subject to the following terms and conditions:
  1. I shall receive a separation package equivalent to 1.25 months for every year of service of my current basic monthly salary. I shall also receive an additional one-time 2 months pay, inclusive of the 30 day notice provided for by law.
A week thereafter, or on November 22, 2001, pursuant to her proposition, respondent received her voluntary retirement package in the amount of Three Million Seven Hundred Four Thousand Five Hundred Seventeen Pesos and 98/100 (P3,704,517.98) inclusive of an additional two (2) months pay. Respondent signed a Receipt and Release Waiver and Quitclaim on the same date.

The core of the controversy is whether or not respondent voluntarily retired from her position as Executive Director in petitioner-company.

Respondent denied the due execution of her Release Quitclaim and Waiver, alleging that she signed the same under duress and intimidation. She claimed that she was threatened that she will receive nothing if she will not sign it. With the prospect of receiving nothing, she consented to sign the waiver.

Petitioners maintain that respondent’s resignation was voluntary, perforce, there could be no illegal dismissal.

There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled to give his consent by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants.[3] A re-examination of the records of the case convinced us that respondent was not coerced or intimidated into signing her retirement letter. The voluntariness of her retirement is attested and confirmed by top ranking officials of petitioner- company then present during the meeting in October 2001. She failed to present evidence to contradict their statements.

Respondent is a well-educated woman holding a managerial position. It is highly improbable that with her employment stature and educational attainment, she could have been duped into signing a retirement letter against her will. In signifying her intention to retire, she even made a proposition as to the amount she believed she was entitled to. Being a woman of high educational attainment and qualifications, she is expected to know the import of everything she executes.[4] Having been granted a retirement package which is very much higher than the amount being received by an employee terminated for an authorized cause under Article 283 or one who retires under Article 287 of the Labor Code, we are not swayed by her argument that she was intimidated or coerced in signing her retirement letter. Indeed, it is safe to conclude that such retirement package was the reason why she opted to retire.

In Domondon, where the factual setting is similar to the instant case, the Court held:
Assuming that private respondents prepared the letter of resignation for petitioner to sign as claimed, the Court is not convinced that petitioner was coerced and intimidated into signing it. Petitioner is no ordinary employee with limited education. He has a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Economics from the University of Santo Tomas, has completed academic requirements for Masters of Business Economics from the University of Asia and the Pacific, and studied law for two (2) years at Adamson University. He also has a good professional record, which highlights his marketability.”
Similarly, in Callanta v. National Labor Relations Commission,[5] we ruled:
It is highly unlikely and incredible for a man of petitioner’s position and educational attainment to so easily succumb to private respondent company’s alleged pressures without even defending himself nor demanding a final audit report before signing any resignation letter. Assuming that pressure was indeed exerted against him, there was no urgency for petitioner to sign the resignation letter. He knew that nature of the letter that he was signing, for as argued by respondent company, petitioner being “a man of high educational attainment and qualification, x x x he is expected to know the import of everything that he executes, whether written or oral.”
Respondent received her retrenchment backwage a week after she submitted her resignation paper. She had ample time to mull over what courses of action to take if indeed she was illegally dismissed. Instead, she returned to the company to sign the Receipt and Release Waiver and Quit Claim and to receive her retirement package. Thereafter, she looked for employment in other companies. She filed her complaint for illegal dismissal only on April 25, 2002, or after almost six (6) months from her separation from petitioner-company. It is thus clear that the filing of the complaint was merely an afterthought when she failed to find another employment. If indeed she was made to resign against her will, she should not have allowed a considerable length of time to elapse before enforcing her rights allegedly violated.

While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be expected that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.[6]

WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration and RECONSIDER our Decision dated September 27, 2006. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76121 finding that petitioner coerced respondent to retire is REVERSED. The Decision dated October 1, 2001 of the NLRC in NLRC NCR 30-04-02141-02 dismissing the complaint is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Corona, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concur.



[1] G.R. No. 154376, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 559.

[2] Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation v. Chrysler Philippines Labor Union, et al., G.R. No. 148738, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 206.

[3] Article 1335, Civil Code of the Philippines.

[4] Callanta v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 105083, August 20, 1993, 225 SCRA 526.

[5] Id.

[6] Sosito v. Aguinaldo Development Corporation, No. L-48926, December 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 392.

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