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557 Phil. 668

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007 ]

ADELAIDA INFANTE, PETITIONER, VS. ARAN BUILDERS, INC., RESPONDENT.*

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on August 12, 2002, which upheld the Order dated September 4, 2001, issued by the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (RTC).

The undisputed facts and issues raised in the lower courts are accurately summarized by the CA as follows:
Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (or "Muntinlupa RTC"; Branch 276), presided over by Hon. Norma C. Perello (or "respondent judge"), was an action for revival of judgment filed on June 6, 2001 by Aran Builders, Inc. (or "private respondent") against Adelaida Infante (or "petitioner"), docketed as Civil Case No. 01-164.

The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (or "Makati RTC"; Branch 60) in an action for specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 15563.

The Makati RTC judgment, which became final and executory on November 16, 1994, decreed as follows:
  1. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
26.1 The defendant ADELAIDA B. INFANTE is ordered to do the following within thirty (30) days from finality hereof:

26.1.1. To deliver to the plaintiff ARAN BUILDERS, INC. the following: (a) the complete plans (lot plan, location map and vicinity map); (b) Irrevocable Power of Attorney; (c) Real Estate Tax clearance; (d) tax receipts; (e) proof of up to date payment of Subdivision Association dues referred to in the "CONTRACT TO SELL" dated November 10, 1986 (Exh. A or Exh. 1);

26.1.2. To execute the deed of sale of Lot No. 11, Block 9, Phase 3-A1, Ayala Alabang Subdivision covered by TCT No. 114015 for P500,000.00 in favor of the plaintiff;

26.1.3. To pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamp taxes and other taxes which the Bureau of Internal Revenue may assess in connection with the sale mentioned in the preceding paragraph and to submit to the plaintiff proof of such payment;

26.1.4. To secure the written conformity of AYALA CORPORATION to the said sale and to give such written conformity to the plaintiff;

26.1.5. To register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to AYALA CORPORATION the certificate of title issued in the name of plaintiff pursuant to such registration;

26.2 Upon the compliance of the defendant with the preceding directives, the plaintiff must immediately pay to the defendant the sum of P321,918.25;

26.3 The defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;

26.4 The Complaint for moral and exemplary damages is DISMISSED;

26.5 The COUNTERCLAIM is DISMISSED; and

26.6 Cost is taxed against the defendant.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival of judgment) on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was improperly laid. Private respondent opposed the motion.

On September 4, 2001, the Muntinlupa RTC issued an order which reads:
The MOTION TO DISMISS is denied.

Admittedly, the Decision was rendered by the Makati Regional Trial Court, but it must be emphasized that at that time there was still no Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City, then under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts, so that cases from this City were tried and heard at Makati City. With the creation of the Regional Trial Courts of Muntinlupa City, matters involving properties located in this City, and cases involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered to be litigated before these Courts.

The case at bar is a revival of a judgment which declared the plaintiff as the owner of a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City. It is this judgment which is sought to be enforced thru this action which necessarily involves the interest, possession, title, and ownership of the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa city and adjudged to Plaintiff. It goes without saying that the complaint should be filed in the latter City where the property is located, as there are now Regional Trial Courts hereat.

Defendant may answer the complaint within the remaining period, but no less than five (5) days, otherwise a default judgment might be taken against her.

It is SO ORDERED.
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied per order dated September 28, 2001, petitioner came to this Court [CA] via the instant special civil action for certiorari. She ascribes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent judge for "erroneously holding that Civil Case No. 01-164 is a revival of judgment which declared private respondent as the owner of a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City and (that) the judgment rendered by the (Makati RTC) in Civil Case No. 15563 sought to be enforced necessarily involves the interest, possession, title and ownership of the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City."

Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a personal action and, therefore, the suit to revive the judgment therein is also personal in nature; and that, consequently, the venue of the action for revival of judgment is either Makati City or Parañaque City where private respondent and petitioner respectively reside, at the election of private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent maintains that the subject action for revival judgment is "quasi in rem because it involves and affects vested or adjudged right on a real property"; and that, consequently, venue lies in Muntinlupa City where the property is situated.[2]
On August 12, 2002, the CA promulgated its Decision ruling in favor of herein private respondent. The CA held that since the judgment sought to be revived was rendered in an action involving title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, the action for revival of judgment is then an action in rem which should be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the real property is located. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision but the motion was denied per Resolution dated January 7, 2003.

Hence, herein petition. Petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding that the complaint for revival of judgment is an action in rem which was correctly filed with the RTC of the place where the disputed real property is located.

The petition is unmeritorious.

Petitioner insists that the action for revival of judgment is an action in personam; therefore, the complaint should be filed with the RTC of the place where either petitioner or private respondent resides. Petitioner then concludes that the filing of the action for revival of judgment with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, the place where the disputed property is located, should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.

Private respondent is of the opinion that the judgment it is seeking to revive involves interest over real property. As such, the present action for revival is a real action, and venue was properly laid with the court of the place where the realty is located.

Thus, the question that must be answered is: where is the proper venue of the present action for revival of judgment?

Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the lapse of five (5) years from entry of judgment and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in which court the action for revival of judgment should be filed.

In Aldeguer v. Gemelo,[3] the Court held that:
x x x an action upon a judgment must be brought either in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general. (Emphasis supplied)[4]
but emphasized that other provisions in the rules of procedure which fix the venue of actions in general must be considered.[5]

Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

x x x x

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place where the real property is located. If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a personal action that may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.

In support of her contention that the action for revival of judgment is a personal action and should be filed in the court of the place where either the plaintiff or defendant resides, petitioner cites the statements made by the Court in Aldeguer v. Gemelo[6] and Donnelly v. Court of First Instance of Manila[7]. Petitioner, however, seriously misunderstood the Court's rulings in said cases.

In Aldeguer, what the Court stated was that "[t]he action for the execution of a judgment for damages is a personal one, and under section 377 [of the Code of Civil Procedure], it should be brought in any province where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff"[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied). Petitioner apparently took such statement to mean that any action for revival of judgment should be considered as a personal one. This thinking is incorrect. The Court specified that the judgment sought to be revived in said case was a judgment for damages. The judgment subject of the action for revival did not involve or affect any title to or possession of real property or any interest therein. The complaint filed in the revival case did not fall under the category of real actions and, thus, the action necessarily fell under the category of personal actions.

In Donnelly, the portion of the Decision being relied upon by petitioner stated thus:
Petitioner raises before this Court two (2) issues, namely: (a) whether an action for revival of judgment is one quasi in rem and, therefore, service of summons may be effected thru publication; and (b) whether the second action for revival of judgment (Civil Case No. 76166) has already prescribed. To our mind, the first is not a proper and justiciable issue in the present proceedings x x x. Nevertheless, let it be said that an action to revive a judgment is a personal one. (Emphasis supplied)[9]
The Court clearly pointed out that in said case, the issue on whether an action for revival of judgment is quasi in rem was not yet proper and justiciable. Therefore, the foregoing statement cannot be used as a precedent, as it was merely an obiter dictum. Moreover, as in Aldeguer, the judgment sought to be revived in Donnelly involved judgment for a certain sum of money. Again, no title or interest in real property was involved. It is then understandable that the action for revival in said case was categorized as a personal one.

Clearly, the Court's classification in Aldeguer and Donnelly of the actions for revival of judgment as being personal in character does not apply to the present case.

The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine whether it is a real action or a personal action.

The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final and executory judgment has ordered herein petitioner to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of herein private respondent; pay all pertinent taxes in connection with said sale; register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala Corporation the certificate of title issued in the name of private respondent. The same judgment ordered private respondent to pay petitioner the sum of P321,918.25 upon petitioner's compliance with the aforementioned order. It is further alleged that petitioner refused to comply with her judgment obligations despite private respondent's repeated requests and demands, and that the latter was compelled to file the action for revival of judgment. Private respondent then prayed that the judgment be revived and a writ of execution be issued to enforce said judgment.

The previous judgment has conclusively declared private respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private respondent has an established interest over the lot in question; and to protect such right or interest, private respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole reason for the present action to revive is the enforcement of private respondent's adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of a real action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real property.

The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is located.

Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. - The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of the different parts of the region and making the attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over a particular territory defined by the Supreme Court. Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts. However, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7154, entitled An Act to Amend Section Fourteen of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Otherwise Known As The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect on September 4, 1991. Said law provided for the creation of a branch of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is now the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly issue orders and processes concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.

Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 when it denied petitioner's motion to dismiss; and the CA did not commit any error in affirming the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 12, 2002 and Resolution dated January 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.



* The Court of Appeals was originally impleaded as respondent. Per Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals is deleted from the title of the case.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Hilarion L. Aquino and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring, rollo, pp. 19-26.

[2] Rollo, pp. 19-23.

[3] 68 Phil. 421 (1939).

[4] Id. at 424-425.

[5] Id. at 423.

[6] Supra note 3.

[7] 150-A Phil. 167 (1972).

[8] Supra note 3, at p. 423.

[9] Donnelly v. Court of First Instance of Manila, supra note 7, at 169.

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