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470 Phil. 527
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 142899, March 31, 2004 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. CESAR GLORIOSO LAGRONIO PADILLA, A.K.A. ERICK PADILLA, APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision[1] dated March 9, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon, in Criminal Case No. 2156 finding Cesar Glorioso Lagronio Padilla (a.k.a. “Erick Padilla”), appellant, guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to pay the victim P75,000.00 “as actual or compensatory.”
The Amended Information[2] filed against appellant reads:
During the pre-trial, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, among which are the following: (1) Laiza Mallorca-Salvador, the victim was born out of wedlock to Larry Salvador and Elisa Mallorca at Barangay Agbaluto, Romblon, Romblon; (2) in 1993, Larry and Elisa separated; (3) in August 1996, Elisa and appellant started living together as common-law husband and wife at barangay Palje, Romblon, Romblon continuously until April 18, 1999 when the instant crime was committed; and (4) during the live-in relationship of Elisa and appellant, Laiza was under their care and custody.[4]
Upon termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution reveals that in the morning of April 18, 1999, Laiza, a 9-year old Grade 3 pupil, was left alone with appellant in their house at barangay Palje, Romblon, Romblon. At that time, her mother Elisa was away looking for coconut to be used for making bukayo.[5] Laiza. was then washing the plates in the kitchen located outside their house when appellant commanded her to go inside. She did not readily obey him because she was scared that he would rape her again just what he did to her several times when she was in Grades 1 and 2.[6] He reacted violently, drawing his balisong as he repeated his command. This time she nervously went inside the house.[7] He followed her. Once inside, he ordered her to lie down. He then removed her underwear.[8] When he held her vagina, she felt pain and struggled to free herself, but again, he drew his balisong. He went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. She shouted for help as she felt excruciating pain.[9] But no one heard her desperate cries since they have no neighbors. Feeling helpless, she just cried. After sometime, he stood and she noticed a sticky substance coming out of his penis. Before he left, he threatened to kill her and her clan if she would reveal the incident to anyone. She just sat down crying as she noticed her vagina bleeding. Then she put on her underwear.[10]
Due to extreme pain of her vagina, Laiza mustered enough courage to report this harrowing incident to her mother. Without delay, they went to the police and filed a complaint against appellant. Laiza also submitted herself to a medical examination.[11] During the trial, she positively identified appellant as the one who raped her on April 18, 1999.[12] She declared that he is a wicked person, a rapist,[13] and that he should be punished with death.
On April 20, 1999, Dr. Victorino F. Benedicto, Municipal Health Officer of Romblon, examined Laiza[14] and issued a Medico-Legal Certificate[15] stating that her hymen was already ruptured with a healed laceration at 2:00 o’clock position. The laceration may have been caused by the penetration of an erect penis.[16] He noticed that the laceration was not fresh. He could not determine with certainty the exact date the laceration was inflicted.
Manuela R. Musa, Assistant Registration Officer of the Municipal Registrar of Romblon, presented to the trial court Laiza’s Certificate of Live Birth[17] showing that she was born to Elisa Mallorca and Larry Salvador on February 23, 1990 at barangay Agbaluto, Romblon, Romblon.[18]
Appellant, on the other hand, had a different story to tell. According to him, when he woke up in the morning of April 18, 1999, he was watching Elisa, his common-law wife, while washing clothes. Beside him was Laiza playing with her toys. Suddenly, Laiza climbed on his back with her right thigh on his right shoulder and her left thigh on his left shoulder. She was holding his head. When he stood, she lost her balance, but he quickly caught her with his hand which accidentally hit her vagina. This caused injury to her sex organ. Elisa immediately approached them and checked Laiza’s condition. She removed Laiza’s underwear and bathed her despite his objection since the injury in her vagina might get infected. Two days after, or on April 20, 1999, Laiza had fever due to infection. Thus, he instructed Elisa to bring Laiza to a doctor. Dr. Victorino F. Benedicto attended to Laiza.[19]
Appellant further testified that on April 23, 1999, while working at the construction site, he was arrested by the police on account of Laiza’s complaint that he raped her[20] which he denied.[21] He claimed that Elisa and Laiza had ill-motive in filing the rape charge because she (Elisa) found that he was courting a lady in their place.[22]
The defense also presented Dr. Victorio F. Benedicto as its witness to prove that Laiza had infection on her vagina when he examined her on April 20, 1999. Dr. Benedicto, however, testified that on such date, Laiza and a companion went to his clinic for consultation because of her (Laiza’s) complaint that she was raped and not because her vagina got infected. He was not even informed that Laiza was accidentally injured. When he examined Laiza, he did not notice any infection in her vagina.[23]
On March 9, 2000, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting the appellant of rape, thus:
The same provisions likewise categorized rape as either simple or qualified. It is qualified only when any of the qualify ing/aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the crime is alleged in the Information and proven during trial, as for instance the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.[26]
Appellant’s lone assignment of error is anchored on Dr. Benedicto’s testimony that when he examined Laiza on April 20, 1999, or two days after the incident, he found that the laceration in her hymen was not fresh, and that he could not determine with certainty the exact date it was inflicted. According to appellant, “the prosecution failed to indubitably prove” that Laiza was raped on April 18, 1999, and that he was the author of the crime.[27]
The Solicitor General, in his Brief, counters that appellant’s contention is devoid of merit since the absence of fresh hymenal laceration is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape. It is Laiza’s testimony that she was sexually molested by appellant that is essential.[28]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in cases of rape, the victim’s testimony is crucial in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime in which only two persons are normally involved. He may be convicted on the basis of her lone, uncorroborated testimony provided it is clear, positive, convincing, and consistent with human nature.[29] Thus, her testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution.[30]
We have assiduously reviewed the records and found that Laiza categorically and positively identified the appellant as the one who had carnal knowledge of her by using force and intimidation on April 18, 1999. An extract from Laiza’s testimony, quoted hereunder, indubitably shows such fact:
It is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a child-victim is given full weight and credence,[35] considering that when a woman, specially a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.[36] Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.[37]
We find unmeritorious appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to indubitably establish that he raped Laiza on April 18, 1999, simply because Dr. Benedicto, when he examined her two days after, had found healed/old (not fresh) laceration in the victim’s hymen and he could not determine the date when such laceration was inflicted.
It should not surprise appellant that the laceration in Laiza’s hymen is no longer fresh. It could be explained by the fact that, as testified by her, he sexually assaulted her when she was in Grades 1 and 2, the last time of which was on April 18, 1999.
In any event, it bears stressing that the medical findings of injuries or hymenal lacerations in the victim’s genitalia are not essential elements of rape.[38] To be sure, even the absence of such injuries does not negate rape. What is indispensable is that there was penetration of the penis, however slight, into the labia or lips of the female organ.[39] In the case at bar, Laiza convincingly testified that appellant, through force and intimidation, inserted his penis into her vagina on April 18, 1999.
As against the positive and categorical testimony of Laiza, appellant could only proffer the defense of denial by narrating a totally different version of what actually happened in the morning of April 18, 1999 in their house. He merely speculated that Laiza’s hymen may have been ruptured not because he raped her but because it was accidentally hit by his hand when he tried to hold her while falling down.
Such defense burdens the imagination, to say the least. It is utterly preposterous, if not incredible. Dr. Benedicto, his own witness, contradicted appellant’s theory as he found no sign of infection on Laiza’s vagina. He even declared that she submitted herself to a physical examination because she complained of being raped, not on account of any alleged accidental injury. We have consistently held that the defense of denial, as in the instant case, is inherently weak, and it becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor.[40]
Appellant, nonetheless, imputes ill-motive on Laiza and her mother Elisa in charging him with rape contending that the latter was jealous when she found that he was courting a woman in their place.
Again, appellant’s excuse is simply too frail to cause resentment and ill will on the part of Laiza and her mother against him. Though one may be consumed with much hatred and revenge, it takes nothing less than psychological depravity for a mother to concoct a story too damaging to the welfare and well-being of her own daughter.[41] Certainly, no mother in her right mind would possibly wish to stamp her child with the stigma that follows a despicable crime of rape.[42] We are convinced that the victim and her mother boldly initiated the present case to seek justice for the abominable act committed by appellant.
In sum, the trial court correctly found that appellant committed the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
We likewise sustain the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty upon appellant being in accordance with Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, quoted earlier. The qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the appellant have been specifically alleged in the Amended Information and duly proved during trial with equal certainty as the crime itself.[43] Laiza’s Certificate of Live Birth shows that she was born on February 23, 1990. She was thus nine years old when she was raped by appellant on April 18, 1999. Also, appellant himself admitted in open court that he is the live-in partner or common-law spouse of Laiza’s mother, Elisa Mallorca.[44]
With respect to appellant’s civil liability, the trial court erroneously awarded the victim “P75,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages x x x.” No proof was introduced by the victim to justify such an award.[45] Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: “Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proven. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.”
We have held that where, as here, the rape is perpetrated with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the victim shall be awarded the following: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto - which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape;[46] P75,000.00 as moral damages, even without need of proof since it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries;[47] and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to curb this disturbing trend of incestuous rape and to set as an example for the public good.[48]
Three (3) members of this Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated March 9, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon, in Criminal Case No. 2156, finding that appellant CESAR GLORIOSO LAGRONIO PADILLA, a.k.a. Erick Padilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that he is ordered to pay the victim, Laiza Mallorca Salvador, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of its pardoning power pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA 7659.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur. Vitug, J., on official leave.
[1] Penned by Judge Placido C. Marquez; RTC Records at 90-103.
[2] Dated June 4, 1999; RTC Records at 10.
[3] RTC Records at 12.
[4] Pre-Trial Order dated October 7, 1999, RTC Records at 45-49.
[5] Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), November 15, 1999 at 7.
[6] TSN, November 16, 1999 at 10-11.
[7] Id. at 3-6.
[8] TSN, November 15, 1999 at 9.
[9] Id. at 7-8, 10.
[10] Id. at 11.
[11] Id. at 13-14; TSN, November 16, 1999 at 14-15.
[12] TSN, November 15, 1999 at 5-6.
[13] TSN, November 16, 1999 at 16.
[14] TSN, November 17, 1999 at 15.
[15] Exhibit “D,” RTC Records at 69.
[16] TSN, November 17, 1999 at 23.
[17] Exhibit “F,” RTC Records at 71; TSN, November 22, 1999 at 2.
[18] TSN, November 18, 1999 at 3.
[19] TSN, November 23, 1999 at 4-7.
[20] Id. at 17.
[21] Id. at 11-12.
[22] Id. at 21.
[23] TSN, November 24, 1999 at 3-4.
[24] RTC Records at 103.
[25] Appellant’s Brief, Rollo at 59.
[26] People vs. Pancho, G.R. Nos. 136592-93, November 27, 2003, citing People vs. Bartolome, 323 SCRA 836 (2000).
[27] Appellant’s Brief, Rollo at 68.
[28] Appellee’s Brief, Rollo at 110-111.
[29] People vs. Belga, 349 SCRA 678 (2001).
[30] People vs. Orquina, G.R. No. 143383, October 8, 2002, 390 SCRA 510; People vs. Carlito Marahay, G.R. Nos. 120625-29, January 28, 2003, citing People vs. Amante, G.R. Nos. 149414-15, November 18, 2002.
[31] TSN, November 15,1999 at 5-8.
[32] TSN, November 16, 1999 at 5-6.
[33] TSN, November 15, 1999 at 8-13.
[34] TSN, November 16, 1999 at 9-14, 16.
[35] People vs. Rosario, G.R. No. 144428, August 6, 2003, citing People vs. Panganiban, 359 SCRA 509 (2001).
[36] Id. citing People vs. Marino, 352 SCRA 127 (2001).
[37] Id. citing People vs. Nardo, 353 SCRA 339 (2001).
[38] People vs. De Taza, G.R. Nos. 136286-89, September 11, 2003, citing People vs. Villadares, 354 SCRA 86 (2001).
[39] Id., citing People vs. Vidal, 353 SCRA 194 (2001); People vs. Libo-on, 358 SCRA 152 (2001); People vs. Osing, 349 SCRA 310 (2001): People vs. Sambrabo, G.R. No. 143708, February 24, 2003, 398 SCRA 106, citing People vs. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000, 329 SCRA 270, 282.
[40] People vs. Losano, G.R. No. 127122, July 20, 1999, 310 SCRA 707.
[41] People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 (1996).
[42] People vs. Savelrina, 238 SCRA 492 (1994).
[43] People vs. Alfaro, G.R. Nos. 136742-43, September 30, 2003, citing People vs. Padilla, 355 SCRA 741 (2001).
[44] TSN, November 23, 1999 at 2-5.
[45] People vs. Ereno, 326 SCRA 157 (2000).
[46] People vs. Junas, G.R. Nos. 144972-73, September 12, 2003, citing People vs. Reyes, 386 SCRA 559 (2002); People vs. Rodavia, G.R. No. 133008, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 320.
[47] People vs. Soriano, G.R. Nos. 142779-95, August 29, 2002, 388 SCRA 140; People vs. Sambrano, supra; People vs. Santiago, 319 SCRA 653; People vs. Fuertes, 296 SCRA 602.
[48] People vs. Montemayor, G.R. No. 124474 and G.R. Nos. 139972-78, January 28, 2003; People vs. Belonghilot vs. RTC ofZamboanga City, G.R. No. 128512, April 30, 2003.
The Amended Information[2] filed against appellant reads:
“The undersigned (prosecutor) accuses CESAR GLORIOSO LAGRONIO PADILLA, a.k.a. Erick Padilla, of the crime of rape as penalized under Republic Act No. 7659, in relation to Republic Act No. 8353, committed as follows:Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, Atty. Cesar M. Madrona of the Public Defender’s Office, pleaded “not guilty” to the charge.[3]
“That on or about the 18th day of April 1999, in barangay Palje, municipality of Romblon, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being the live-in partner of her mother, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one LAIZA MALLORCA-SALVADOR, an 8 year-old girl, and against her will.
“Contrary to law.”
During the pre-trial, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, among which are the following: (1) Laiza Mallorca-Salvador, the victim was born out of wedlock to Larry Salvador and Elisa Mallorca at Barangay Agbaluto, Romblon, Romblon; (2) in 1993, Larry and Elisa separated; (3) in August 1996, Elisa and appellant started living together as common-law husband and wife at barangay Palje, Romblon, Romblon continuously until April 18, 1999 when the instant crime was committed; and (4) during the live-in relationship of Elisa and appellant, Laiza was under their care and custody.[4]
Upon termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution reveals that in the morning of April 18, 1999, Laiza, a 9-year old Grade 3 pupil, was left alone with appellant in their house at barangay Palje, Romblon, Romblon. At that time, her mother Elisa was away looking for coconut to be used for making bukayo.[5] Laiza. was then washing the plates in the kitchen located outside their house when appellant commanded her to go inside. She did not readily obey him because she was scared that he would rape her again just what he did to her several times when she was in Grades 1 and 2.[6] He reacted violently, drawing his balisong as he repeated his command. This time she nervously went inside the house.[7] He followed her. Once inside, he ordered her to lie down. He then removed her underwear.[8] When he held her vagina, she felt pain and struggled to free herself, but again, he drew his balisong. He went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. She shouted for help as she felt excruciating pain.[9] But no one heard her desperate cries since they have no neighbors. Feeling helpless, she just cried. After sometime, he stood and she noticed a sticky substance coming out of his penis. Before he left, he threatened to kill her and her clan if she would reveal the incident to anyone. She just sat down crying as she noticed her vagina bleeding. Then she put on her underwear.[10]
Due to extreme pain of her vagina, Laiza mustered enough courage to report this harrowing incident to her mother. Without delay, they went to the police and filed a complaint against appellant. Laiza also submitted herself to a medical examination.[11] During the trial, she positively identified appellant as the one who raped her on April 18, 1999.[12] She declared that he is a wicked person, a rapist,[13] and that he should be punished with death.
On April 20, 1999, Dr. Victorino F. Benedicto, Municipal Health Officer of Romblon, examined Laiza[14] and issued a Medico-Legal Certificate[15] stating that her hymen was already ruptured with a healed laceration at 2:00 o’clock position. The laceration may have been caused by the penetration of an erect penis.[16] He noticed that the laceration was not fresh. He could not determine with certainty the exact date the laceration was inflicted.
Manuela R. Musa, Assistant Registration Officer of the Municipal Registrar of Romblon, presented to the trial court Laiza’s Certificate of Live Birth[17] showing that she was born to Elisa Mallorca and Larry Salvador on February 23, 1990 at barangay Agbaluto, Romblon, Romblon.[18]
Appellant, on the other hand, had a different story to tell. According to him, when he woke up in the morning of April 18, 1999, he was watching Elisa, his common-law wife, while washing clothes. Beside him was Laiza playing with her toys. Suddenly, Laiza climbed on his back with her right thigh on his right shoulder and her left thigh on his left shoulder. She was holding his head. When he stood, she lost her balance, but he quickly caught her with his hand which accidentally hit her vagina. This caused injury to her sex organ. Elisa immediately approached them and checked Laiza’s condition. She removed Laiza’s underwear and bathed her despite his objection since the injury in her vagina might get infected. Two days after, or on April 20, 1999, Laiza had fever due to infection. Thus, he instructed Elisa to bring Laiza to a doctor. Dr. Victorino F. Benedicto attended to Laiza.[19]
Appellant further testified that on April 23, 1999, while working at the construction site, he was arrested by the police on account of Laiza’s complaint that he raped her[20] which he denied.[21] He claimed that Elisa and Laiza had ill-motive in filing the rape charge because she (Elisa) found that he was courting a lady in their place.[22]
The defense also presented Dr. Victorio F. Benedicto as its witness to prove that Laiza had infection on her vagina when he examined her on April 20, 1999. Dr. Benedicto, however, testified that on such date, Laiza and a companion went to his clinic for consultation because of her (Laiza’s) complaint that she was raped and not because her vagina got infected. He was not even informed that Laiza was accidentally injured. When he examined Laiza, he did not notice any infection in her vagina.[23]
On March 9, 2000, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting the appellant of rape, thus:
“WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused CESAR GLORIOSO LAGRONIO PADILLA, a.k.a. “ERICK PADILLA,” GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentences him to suffer the extreme penalty of death, as well as to pay the victim Laiza M. Salvador the sum of P75,000.00 as actual or compensatory, not moral, damages.Appellant, in his Brief, assails the Decision of the court a quo, contending that:
xxx
“SO ORDERED.”[24]
“THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.”[25]The Amended Information alleges that the crime was committed on April 18, 1999. Thus, the law applicable to the case at bar is Republic Act No. 8353 (otherwise known as “The Anti-Rape Law of 1997”), Section 2 of which provides:
“Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:The elements of rape under the above-quoted provisions are: (1) the offender is a man who had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented.“Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:a) Through force, threat or intimidation;“Art. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxx
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
x x x.” (Underscoring supplied)
The same provisions likewise categorized rape as either simple or qualified. It is qualified only when any of the qualify ing/aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the crime is alleged in the Information and proven during trial, as for instance the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.[26]
Appellant’s lone assignment of error is anchored on Dr. Benedicto’s testimony that when he examined Laiza on April 20, 1999, or two days after the incident, he found that the laceration in her hymen was not fresh, and that he could not determine with certainty the exact date it was inflicted. According to appellant, “the prosecution failed to indubitably prove” that Laiza was raped on April 18, 1999, and that he was the author of the crime.[27]
The Solicitor General, in his Brief, counters that appellant’s contention is devoid of merit since the absence of fresh hymenal laceration is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape. It is Laiza’s testimony that she was sexually molested by appellant that is essential.[28]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in cases of rape, the victim’s testimony is crucial in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime in which only two persons are normally involved. He may be convicted on the basis of her lone, uncorroborated testimony provided it is clear, positive, convincing, and consistent with human nature.[29] Thus, her testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution.[30]
We have assiduously reviewed the records and found that Laiza categorically and positively identified the appellant as the one who had carnal knowledge of her by using force and intimidation on April 18, 1999. An extract from Laiza’s testimony, quoted hereunder, indubitably shows such fact:
During cross-examination, Laiza remained steadfast in her testimony, thus:
“PROSECUTOR BENEDICTO: Q A Q A Q A Q INTERPRETER: Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q ATTY. MADRONA PROSECUTOR BENEDICTO: Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A
Laiza’s foregoing testimony bears the hallmark of truth. She testified in a straightforward, candid and convincing manner, leaving no room for doubt that, on the day in question, she was indeed ravished by appellant, her mother’s live-in partner or common-law husband. Not even the information given her by appellant’s counsel that appellant could be meted the penalty of death because of her testimony, could change her account. At a tender age of 9, living in a remote barrio and absolutely inexperienced in the ways of the world, she could not have narrated in a spontaneous manner the sordid details of her horrifying ordeal in the hands of appellant had it not really happened to her. Appellant, by wielding his balisong and threatening her with death just before and after he deflowered her, clearly employed force and intimidation in consummating his bestial act.
“ATTY. MADRONA: Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q PROS. BENEDICTO: ATTY. MADRONA Continuing: Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A
It is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a child-victim is given full weight and credence,[35] considering that when a woman, specially a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.[36] Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.[37]
We find unmeritorious appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to indubitably establish that he raped Laiza on April 18, 1999, simply because Dr. Benedicto, when he examined her two days after, had found healed/old (not fresh) laceration in the victim’s hymen and he could not determine the date when such laceration was inflicted.
It should not surprise appellant that the laceration in Laiza’s hymen is no longer fresh. It could be explained by the fact that, as testified by her, he sexually assaulted her when she was in Grades 1 and 2, the last time of which was on April 18, 1999.
In any event, it bears stressing that the medical findings of injuries or hymenal lacerations in the victim’s genitalia are not essential elements of rape.[38] To be sure, even the absence of such injuries does not negate rape. What is indispensable is that there was penetration of the penis, however slight, into the labia or lips of the female organ.[39] In the case at bar, Laiza convincingly testified that appellant, through force and intimidation, inserted his penis into her vagina on April 18, 1999.
As against the positive and categorical testimony of Laiza, appellant could only proffer the defense of denial by narrating a totally different version of what actually happened in the morning of April 18, 1999 in their house. He merely speculated that Laiza’s hymen may have been ruptured not because he raped her but because it was accidentally hit by his hand when he tried to hold her while falling down.
Such defense burdens the imagination, to say the least. It is utterly preposterous, if not incredible. Dr. Benedicto, his own witness, contradicted appellant’s theory as he found no sign of infection on Laiza’s vagina. He even declared that she submitted herself to a physical examination because she complained of being raped, not on account of any alleged accidental injury. We have consistently held that the defense of denial, as in the instant case, is inherently weak, and it becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor.[40]
Appellant, nonetheless, imputes ill-motive on Laiza and her mother Elisa in charging him with rape contending that the latter was jealous when she found that he was courting a woman in their place.
Again, appellant’s excuse is simply too frail to cause resentment and ill will on the part of Laiza and her mother against him. Though one may be consumed with much hatred and revenge, it takes nothing less than psychological depravity for a mother to concoct a story too damaging to the welfare and well-being of her own daughter.[41] Certainly, no mother in her right mind would possibly wish to stamp her child with the stigma that follows a despicable crime of rape.[42] We are convinced that the victim and her mother boldly initiated the present case to seek justice for the abominable act committed by appellant.
In sum, the trial court correctly found that appellant committed the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
We likewise sustain the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty upon appellant being in accordance with Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, quoted earlier. The qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the appellant have been specifically alleged in the Amended Information and duly proved during trial with equal certainty as the crime itself.[43] Laiza’s Certificate of Live Birth shows that she was born on February 23, 1990. She was thus nine years old when she was raped by appellant on April 18, 1999. Also, appellant himself admitted in open court that he is the live-in partner or common-law spouse of Laiza’s mother, Elisa Mallorca.[44]
With respect to appellant’s civil liability, the trial court erroneously awarded the victim “P75,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages x x x.” No proof was introduced by the victim to justify such an award.[45] Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: “Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proven. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.”
We have held that where, as here, the rape is perpetrated with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the victim shall be awarded the following: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto - which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape;[46] P75,000.00 as moral damages, even without need of proof since it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries;[47] and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to curb this disturbing trend of incestuous rape and to set as an example for the public good.[48]
Three (3) members of this Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated March 9, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon, in Criminal Case No. 2156, finding that appellant CESAR GLORIOSO LAGRONIO PADILLA, a.k.a. Erick Padilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that he is ordered to pay the victim, Laiza Mallorca Salvador, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of its pardoning power pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA 7659.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur. Vitug, J., on official leave.
[1] Penned by Judge Placido C. Marquez; RTC Records at 90-103.
[2] Dated June 4, 1999; RTC Records at 10.
[3] RTC Records at 12.
[4] Pre-Trial Order dated October 7, 1999, RTC Records at 45-49.
[5] Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), November 15, 1999 at 7.
[6] TSN, November 16, 1999 at 10-11.
[7] Id. at 3-6.
[8] TSN, November 15, 1999 at 9.
[9] Id. at 7-8, 10.
[10] Id. at 11.
[11] Id. at 13-14; TSN, November 16, 1999 at 14-15.
[12] TSN, November 15, 1999 at 5-6.
[13] TSN, November 16, 1999 at 16.
[14] TSN, November 17, 1999 at 15.
[15] Exhibit “D,” RTC Records at 69.
[16] TSN, November 17, 1999 at 23.
[17] Exhibit “F,” RTC Records at 71; TSN, November 22, 1999 at 2.
[18] TSN, November 18, 1999 at 3.
[19] TSN, November 23, 1999 at 4-7.
[20] Id. at 17.
[21] Id. at 11-12.
[22] Id. at 21.
[23] TSN, November 24, 1999 at 3-4.
[24] RTC Records at 103.
[25] Appellant’s Brief, Rollo at 59.
[26] People vs. Pancho, G.R. Nos. 136592-93, November 27, 2003, citing People vs. Bartolome, 323 SCRA 836 (2000).
[27] Appellant’s Brief, Rollo at 68.
[28] Appellee’s Brief, Rollo at 110-111.
[29] People vs. Belga, 349 SCRA 678 (2001).
[30] People vs. Orquina, G.R. No. 143383, October 8, 2002, 390 SCRA 510; People vs. Carlito Marahay, G.R. Nos. 120625-29, January 28, 2003, citing People vs. Amante, G.R. Nos. 149414-15, November 18, 2002.
[31] TSN, November 15,1999 at 5-8.
[32] TSN, November 16, 1999 at 5-6.
[33] TSN, November 15, 1999 at 8-13.
[34] TSN, November 16, 1999 at 9-14, 16.
[35] People vs. Rosario, G.R. No. 144428, August 6, 2003, citing People vs. Panganiban, 359 SCRA 509 (2001).
[36] Id. citing People vs. Marino, 352 SCRA 127 (2001).
[37] Id. citing People vs. Nardo, 353 SCRA 339 (2001).
[38] People vs. De Taza, G.R. Nos. 136286-89, September 11, 2003, citing People vs. Villadares, 354 SCRA 86 (2001).
[39] Id., citing People vs. Vidal, 353 SCRA 194 (2001); People vs. Libo-on, 358 SCRA 152 (2001); People vs. Osing, 349 SCRA 310 (2001): People vs. Sambrabo, G.R. No. 143708, February 24, 2003, 398 SCRA 106, citing People vs. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000, 329 SCRA 270, 282.
[40] People vs. Losano, G.R. No. 127122, July 20, 1999, 310 SCRA 707.
[41] People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 (1996).
[42] People vs. Savelrina, 238 SCRA 492 (1994).
[43] People vs. Alfaro, G.R. Nos. 136742-43, September 30, 2003, citing People vs. Padilla, 355 SCRA 741 (2001).
[44] TSN, November 23, 1999 at 2-5.
[45] People vs. Ereno, 326 SCRA 157 (2000).
[46] People vs. Junas, G.R. Nos. 144972-73, September 12, 2003, citing People vs. Reyes, 386 SCRA 559 (2002); People vs. Rodavia, G.R. No. 133008, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 320.
[47] People vs. Soriano, G.R. Nos. 142779-95, August 29, 2002, 388 SCRA 140; People vs. Sambrano, supra; People vs. Santiago, 319 SCRA 653; People vs. Fuertes, 296 SCRA 602.
[48] People vs. Montemayor, G.R. No. 124474 and G.R. Nos. 139972-78, January 28, 2003; People vs. Belonghilot vs. RTC ofZamboanga City, G.R. No. 128512, April 30, 2003.