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424 Phil. 291

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 136751, January 15, 2002 ]

NATIVIDAD CANDIDO AND MARIVELES PAWNSHOP, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. RICARDO CAMACHO AND MARILOU HERNANDEZ, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari impugning the May 25, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1]  which dismissed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioners NATIVIDAD CANDIDO and MARIVELES PAWNSHOP, INC. and affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court enjoining the immediate execution of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in the forcible entry case.

The records show that in November 1994, petitioner NATIVIDAD CANDIDO, as a representative of Mariveles Pawnshop, Inc., filed a forcible entry case before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Balanga, Bataan, against respondents RICARDO CAMACHO and MARILOU HERNANDEZ. In her complaint, petitioner alleged that on July 21, 1994, she was excluded by the respondents from physical possession of the Mariveles Pawnshop stall in Bataan, by means of strategy and stealth when the respondents padlocked the pawnshop premises and took control and possession thereof.  In December 1994, after respondents filed their Answer, the case was submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings.

In February 1995, respondents filed a Motion To Dismiss alleging that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it involves an intracorporate dispute and jurisdiction belonged with the SEC.  On March 8, 1995, the MTC judge denied petitioner’s motion to set the case for hearing the motion to dismiss.

On April 16, 1997, the MTC of Balanga, Bataan, rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner in the forcible entry case (Civil Case No. 1701),  thus:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and their representatives to immediately vacate the premises of Mariveles Pawnshop, Inc., located at the Plaza Arcade, Balan, Bataan, and to restore to plaintiff Natividad Candido the full possession thereof including all articles and money found therein, valued at P2,000,000.00 and to pay rental which is fixed at P8,000.00 per month beginning July 21, 1994.

“The counterclaim of the defendants are hereby dismissed, they not being substantiated by evidence.

“Cost against the defendants.

“SO ORDERED.”[2]
On May 13, 1997, petitioner Candido filed a motion for immediate execution of the MTC decision.   On May 9, 1997, upon receipt of the MTC Decision, respondents filed a notice of appeal[3]  with the MTC and  requested that all court records be forwarded to the RTC of Bataan.  On May 22, 1997, respondents filed their Opposition to the motion for execution on the ground, inter alia, that the MTC could no longer grant the immediate execution as the filing of their notice of appeal stayed execution.

In its Order,[4]  dated June 5, 1997, the MTC of Bataan granted petitioner’s motion and directed the immediate execution of its decision for failure of the respondents to post a supersedeas bond.

In the meantime, petitioner Mariveles Pawnshop, Inc. and one Nelson Rodriguez filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition,[5]  dated May 30, 1997, for accounting, injunction, attachment, receivership and declaration of constructive trust attachment against petitioner Candido, et al.

On June 9, 1997, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan, a petition for certiorari (Civil Case No. 6651),[6]  with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order, assailing both the decision of the MTC in the forcible entry case and the Order granting immediate execution. Accordingly, in an Order dated June 30, 1997, presiding RTC Judge Lorenzo R. Silva, Jr., issued a preliminary injunction against the MTC restraining the enforcement of its writ of execution.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus[7]  with the Court of Appeals assailing the injunction order issued by the RTC on the following grounds:  (1)  the certiorari petition filed by the respondents with the RTC cannot substitute for the appeal respondents had earlier made and did not withdraw;  (2)  the same certiorari petition should not have prospered as they already made an appeal and this plain, speedy and adequate recourse is available;  and (3)  private respondents were guilty of forum-shopping.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated March 25, 1998,[8]  dismissed the petition on two grounds: First, petitioners failed to move for reconsideration of the RTC Order enjoining the immediate execution of the MTC Decision.  Second, the RTC judge did not abuse his discretion in issuing the injunction Order because the MTC, in awarding the amount of P2,000,000.00 exceeded what can be properly awarded as damages. Citing the case of Hualam Construction Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[9]  the Court of Appeals held that the damages recoverable in an ejectment case cover only the reasonable rent for the loss of the use or occupation of the premises.  It ruled that the amount of P2,000,000.00 in the MTC decision representing the value of pawned articles inside the padlocked pawnshop could not be subsumed under the concept of damages for purposes of inclusion in the supersedeas bond. It held that the filing of the supersedeas was unnecessary to stay execution pending appeal.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.  Hence, this petition for review on the following grounds:
I

The general rule in ejectment cases is (to grant) execution pending appeal.  Such execution can only be stayed by the posting of a supersedeas bond equal to the amount of accrued rentals and damages directly affecting the loss of material possession.

II

Even if the requisite supersedeas bond has been posted, execution shall nevertheless issue if subsequent rentals are not deposited in court Sec. 8 (now Sec. 19), Rule 70.

III

Respondents’ multiple resort to the RTC Balanga – through appeal and then certiorari – and at the same time invoking the jurisdiction of the SEC to obtain the same relief, to wit:  enjoin the execution of the MTC Balanga Decision, is a glaring case of forum-shopping.

IV

The CA should have struck down respondents’ resort to certiorari after having invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the RTC of Balanga.
We find merit in the petition.

At the outset, there is a need to discuss a procedural matter which, although not raised in the petition before this Court, is relevant to the full disposition of the case at bar.

One of the grounds relied by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition before it was petitioners’ failure to move for a reconsideration of the impugned RTC injunctive order.  This omission is not fatal. We have ruled that “(a) prior motion for reconsideration is not indispensable for commencement of certiorari proceedings if the errors sought to be corrected in such proceedings had been duly heard and passed upon or were similar to the issues already resolved by the tribunal or agency below. Accordingly, the Court has excused the non-filing of a motion for reconsideration when such a motion would be basically pro-forma in nature and content, and where x x x the questions raised are essentially legal in nature.”[10]  In the case at bar, the parties have argued their positions and have been duly heard by the RTC before it issued the assailed injunction order. Moreover, as the issues involved therein are essentially legal, the filing of motion for reconsideration assailing the RTC’s injunction order may be properly dispensed with.

We now go to the legal issues.

Anent the first two issues, Section 8, Rule 70 of the old Rules of Court provides that to stay the execution of the MTC decision in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment case, the defendant must:  (1) perfect his appeal, (2) post the supersedeas bond, and  (3) periodically deposit the rentals accruing during the pendency of his appeal.  Compliance with all three requisites is mandatory to stay execution.

The respondents contend that the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the RTC order enjoining the immediate execution of the MTC Decision as the amount of two million pesos damages in the supersedeas bond was improperly adjudged.  It is urged that the amount of damages recoverable in an ejectment case is limited only to the fair value of the rent for the loss of the use of the premises.  Thus, respondents posit their theory that as the amount of two million pesos adjuged by the MTC was struck down as damages in the ejectment case, they were relieved of their duty to post a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the MTC decision.

We disagree.

We are in accord with the Court of Appeals decision insofar as it held that the supersedeas bond in the amount of two million pesos, representing the value of the pawned articles, was incorrectly included as damages in the ejectment case as the damages recoverable are limited only to the fair rent for the use of the premises.  However, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that as the two million pesos was improperly adjudged as damages, immediate execution may be enjoined without need of posting a supersedeas bond.

In the case at bar, the MTC decision in the forcible entry case ordered the posting of the supersedeas bond in the following amount:  two million pesos as damages (representing the value of the pawned articles and operating capital inside the pawnshop) and payment of rentals in the amount of P8,000.00 per month reckoned from July 21, 1994 (the date when petitioner was first deprived possession of the pawnshop).  The respondents filed a notice of appeal with the MTC but did not pay the damages and rentals adjudged.  Instead, they went to the RTC on certiorari and assailed the fixing of the two million pesos as damages.

The failure of the respondents to post the supersedeas bond to the extent of the amount of the back rentals as adjudged in the MTC decision rendered said decision immediately executory. The fact that the respondents assailed the inclusion of the two million pesos in the supersedeas bond as damages does not excuse them from posting the bond to the extent of the back rentals adjudged.  To be sure, the supersedeas bond consists not only of the damages adjudged as it also includes the back rentals mentioned in the MTC decision.[11]  Thus, for failure to post the supersedeas bond to the extent of the amount of the unpaid rentals, the MTC decision became immediately executory.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that, as the damages was improperly awarded, the respondents need not post a supersedeas bond.

Anent the third and fourth issues, respondents contend that they did not engage in forum-shopping as their notice of appeal and petition for certiorari before the RTC involved different issues --- the former was filed to assail the MTC decision on the main case, and the latter, to impugn the RTC injunction order.

We find their contention untenable.

There is forum-shopping when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies in different venues, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances, all raising substantially the same issues and involving exactly the same parties.[12]

In the case at bar, the remedy of the respondents is to file an appeal within the reglementary period after the issuance of the MTC decision.  However, insofar as assailing the MTC’s order of execution, we hold that the respondents’ appeal thereof would be too slow and inadequate to prevent the injurious effect of respondents’ imminent dispossession of the property.[13]  Thus, respondents’ filing of a petition for certiorari to assail the MTC’s order for immediate execution of its decision is proper.  However, we note that respondents’ petition for certiorari was not limited for said purpose as they likewise assailed the main decision of the MTC in the same petition.  This is improper as appeal is still their appropriate remedy under the former Rules of Court  (Section 1, Rule 40 -- Appeal from Inferior Courts to Courts of First Instance). What compounded the matter is that the respondents had already a pending notice of appeal with the MTC to assail its decision in the forcible entry case.  Clearly, by also assailing the decision of the MTC in the forcible entry case in their subsequent petition for certiorari, respondents are guilty of forum-shopping which carries the sanction of dismissal of both the petition for certiorari and the appeal filed by the respondents with the RTC.[14]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED.  The impugned Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 25, 1998, and its Resolution, dated December 9, 1998, in C.A. G.R. No. 44633 are SET ASIDE. The preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court in its Order, dated June 30, 1997, in Civil Case No. 6651 against the immediate execution of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in the forcible entry case is LIFTED AND SET ASIDE.  In addition, both the appeal and the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan in Civil Case No. 6651 are DISMISSED for violation of the non-forum-shopping rule.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.



[1]  First Division, penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Associate Justices (now Supreme Court Justice) Arturo B. Buena and Portia Ali?o-Hormachuelos;  Rollo, pp. 75-84.

[2]  Rollo, p. 38;  penned by Balanga, Bataan MTC Judge Rodolfo S. Gatdula.

[3]  C.A. Rollo, p. 37.

[4]  Rollo, pp. 41-42.

[5]  Rollo,  pp. 102-110.

[6]  Rollo, pp. 43-56.

[7]  Docketed as C.A. G.R. No. 44633, Rollo at pp. 59-72.

[8]  Rollo, pp. 75-84.

[9]  214 SCRA 612 (1992).

[10]  Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. vs. Palmos, 232 SCRA 448 (1994).

[11]  Aznar Bros. Realty Company vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 327 SCRA 359 (2000), citing Once vs. Gonzales, 76 SCRA 258, 261 (1977).

[12]  Sps. William and Jane Jean Diu vs. Ibajan, et al., G.R. No. 132657, 322 SCRA 452 (2000).

[13]  Hualam Construction and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612, 628 (1992).

[14]  Administrative Circular No. 04-94; Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 614 (1996).

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