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808 Phil. 1025

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 217189, April 18, 2017 ]

NINI A. LANTO, IN HER CAPACITY AS THEN DIRECTOR II OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH, NOW DIRECTOR IV OF THE PRE-EMPLOYMENT SERVICES OFFICE OF THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, NOW REPRESENTED BY CHAIRPERSON REYNALDO A. VILLAR, COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., AND ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER DIVINIA M. ALAGON, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

At issue is the personal liability of the petitioner for the disallowed payment of the salaries and benefits of a dismissed public employee corresponding to the period after the latter's dismissal.

By petition for certiorari, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the same Commission on Audit (COA) decision No. 2009-121 dated October 29, 2009[1] that affirmed Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-002 dated January 18, 2006 assailed in Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit.[2]

In addition, the petitioner challenges the COA's Notice of Finality of Decision dated January 7, 2010, and the Orders of Execution dated October 26, 2011 and November 25, 2013, whereby she was held personally liable in her capacity as Director II of the Administrative Branch of the PreĀ­-Employment Services Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to refund to the Government the amount of P1,740,124.08 representing the salaries and benefits corresponding to the period from August 1999 until March 2004 unduly received by Leonel P. Labrador (Labrador) despite his having been dismissed from the service by virtue of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan on August 31, 1999.

Antecedents

For purposes of this resolution, we borrow the following factual antecedents from Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit:[3]
Labrador was the former Chief of the POEA's Employment Services Regulation Division (ESRD). On May 2, 1997, then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Quisumbing) ordered his dismissal from service as he was found to have bribed a certain Madoline Villapando, an overseas Filipino worker, in the amount of P6,200.00 in order to expedite the issuance of her overseas employment certificate. Labrador's dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) through CSC Resolution No. 03-0339 dated March 12, 2003, and his subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied through CSC Resolution No. 040547 dated May 17, 2004.

Aside from the foregoing administrative proceedings, a criminal case for direct bribery was instituted against Labrador in view of the same infraction. Consequently, on August 31, 1999, the Sandiganbayan (SB) promulgated a Decision, convicting him of the aforementioned crime and thereby sentenced him to: (a) suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision correccional, as maximum; (b) pay a fine of P3,000.00; (c) suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification from public office; and (d) pay costs. Labrador's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 17, 1999, prompting him to elevate the matter to the Court.

In a Resolution dated January 26, 2000 (January 26, 2000 Resolution), the Court affirmed Labrador's conviction and subsequently denied his motion for reconsideration with finality on March 15, 2000. Likewise, in a Resolution dated June 28, 2000, the Court denied Labrador's motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration with motion for new trial and prayer for referral to the Court En Banc, resulting in the January 26, 2000 Resolution's entry of judgment. On October 26, 2000, the SB received copies of the same resolution and its corresponding entry of judgment through a Letter of Transmittal dated August 23, 2000 which contained an explicit directive from the Court for the SB to submit proof of execution within fifteen (15) days from receipt. As such, the SB immediately set the case for this purpose.

On February 26, 2001, Labradors counsel de oficio, Atty. Vicente Espina, manifested in open court that Labrador desires to apply for probation in accordance with Presidential Decree No. (PD) 968, as amended by PD 1990 (Probation Law). Thus, in an Order of even date, the SB resolved to accord Labrador a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file such application, and, in the meantime, suspended the execution proceedings.

Eventually, upon favorable recommendation of the Parole and Probation Office, the SB, in a Resolution dated September 28, 2001, granted Labradors application for probation and likewise cancelled the bail bond he posted for his provisional liberty.

Thereafter, at the end of Labradors probation period, a Probation Officers Final Report dated November 4, 2003 was issued, recommending that his probation be terminated and that he be discharged from its legal effects. The SB, however, withheld its approval and, instead, issued a Resolution dated March 2, 2004 (March 2, 2004 Resolution), stating that Labradors application for probation was, in fact, erroneously granted due to his previous appeal from his judgment of conviction, in violation of Section 4 of the Probation Law. Further, owing to the probation officers finding that Labrador continued to hold the position of POEA ESRD Chief despite him having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification from office, the SB directed that copies of the March 2, 2004 Resolution be furnished to Dimapilis-Baldoz, as POEA Administrator, as well as to the CSC Chairman for their information.

On March 9, 2004, Dimapilis-Baldoz received a copy of the said resolution and thereupon issued a Notice/Order of Separation dated March 11, 2004 (Separation Order), relieving Labrador of his duties, viz.:
NOTICE/ORDER OF SEPARATION

TO : MR. LEONEL P. LABRADOR
       No. 8 Luciano Street
       Phase 5, Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision
       Molino, Bacoor
       4102 Cavite

Anent Notice of Resolution dated 02 March 2004 Re: Criminal Case No. 19863 issued by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, Quezon City, resolving the finality and execution of the Courts August 31, 1999 decision carrying among other penalties temporary special disqualification from office, please be informed that effective today, you are hereby considered dropped from the rolls and separated from the service.

As such, you are further instructed to turn over your duties and responsibilities and clear yourself of all property and money accountabilities with this Office.

For strict compliance.

Mandaluyong City, 11 March 2004.

Sgd. ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ
Administrator
Incidents Before the COA

Almost a year later, or on February 7, 2005, COA State Auditor IV, Crescencia L. Escurel, issued Audit Observation Memorandum No. 2005-011 dated February 7, 2005 (COA Audit Memo) which contained her audit observations on the various expenditures of the POEA pertaining to the payment of salaries and benefits to Labrador for the period covering August 31, 1999 to March 15, 2004. The pertinent portions of the COA Audit Memo read as follows:
The accounts Government Equity and Salaries and Wages-Regular, Additional Compensation, Representation and Transportation Allowances and Other Personnel Benefits are overstated by P1,626,956.05, P57,143.03, P3,000.00, P16,050.00 and P11,800.00, respectively due to payment of salaries and wages, additional compensation, allowances and other benefits to an official from August 31, 1999 to March 15, 2004, contrary to the Sandiganbayan Decision dated August 31, 1999.

x x x x

In view thereof, justification is desired why Mr. Leonel Labrador, formerly Chief General Services Division and Employment Services Regulation Division was allowed to continue in the service and receive his salaries, additional compensation, RATA and other personnel benefits from August 31, 1999 to the time he was terminated from office effective March 9, 2004 (Note: The last salary received was even up to March 15, 2004) in the total amount of P1,714,949.08, including other emoluments such as allowances, 13th month pay and other personnel benefits granted him such as medical and rice allowances, incentive allowances, etc. in the amount of P565,795.05. Pursuant to the August 31, 1999 judgment of conviction, which had long become final and executory, Mr. Labrador is considered terminated from the service and is no longer entitled to continue to draw his salaries thereafter up to March 15, 2004. x x x

Corollary to this, Book V Title I Subtitle B Chapter 9, Sec. 52, EO 292 and Sec. 103 PD 1445 provides that expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefore. (Underscoring and italics in the original)
Based on these observations, the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance (Notice of Disallowance) on January 18, 2006, finding Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA employees, personally liable for the salaries and other benefits unduly received by Labrador in the amount of P1,740,124.08, paid through various checks issued from August 1999 to March 15, 2004.

Through a letter dated March 3, 2006, Dimapilis-Baldoz sought the reconsideration of the Notice of Disallowance, asserting that the POEA should not be held liable for the refund of the foregoing amount since Labrador's employment was fully and promptly terminated upon receipt of the SB's March 2, 2004 Resolution.

However, on October 29, 2009, the COA issued Decision No. 2009-121 (COA Decision) which affirmed the Notice of Disallowance and reiterated that the amount covering the salaries and benefits of Labrador should not have been paid to him from August 1999 to March 31, 2004 pending final resolution of the criminal case against him. The COA pointed out that Labrador should not have reported for work while he was under probation since his probation did not obliterate the crime for which he was convicted, more so his penalty of dismissal from the service.

On January 26, 2010, the POEA moved for the reconsideration (POEA's Motion for Reconsideration) of the COA Decision. On even date, POEA Administrator Jennifer Jardin-Manalili (Jardin-Manalili), who took over the post of Dimapilis-Baldoz, wrote a letter to Audit Team Leader Evelyn V. Menciano, requesting that the execution of the COA Decision be held in abeyance pending resolution of the POEA's Motion for Reconsideration. In a letter dated May 31, 2000, the COA, however, no longer entertained the said motion in view of the issuance by the COA Secretary of a Notice of Finality of Decision dated January 7, 2010, stating that the COA Decision had already become final and executory since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed within the reglementary period.

Undaunted, Jardin-Manalili, through a letter dated June 21, 2010, again implored the COA to resolve POEA's Motion for Reconsideration on its merits and not to deny it outright on a technicality. Yet, the COA no longer responded to the said plea, prompting Dimapilis-Baldoz to file [a] petition for certiorari.
In order to enforce its Decision No. 2009-121, the COA subsequently issued the Order of Execution on October 26, 2011.[4]

On July 16, 2013, the Court promulgated the ruling in DimapilisĀ­-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-002 dated January 18, respondent Commission on Audit is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, (a) deleting the portions pertaining to petitioner Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz's personal liability; and (b) adjusting the proper period of disallowance from the date of Leonel P. Labrador's dismissal on May 2, 1997. The foregoing is without prejudice to any subsequent action or proceeding to recover any undue amount/s received by Labrador.

SO ORDERED.[5]
The entry of judgment in Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit was made on August 13, 2013.[6] On November 25, 2013, the COA issued its assailed Order of Execution to enforce its decision against other responsible officers of the POEA except the petitioner in Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit.[7]

The petitioner, having become aware of the foregoing developments, wrote a letter dated January 2, 2014 to COA Chairperson Grace Pulido-Tan seeking the reconsideration of the November 25, 2013 Order of Execution on several grounds, namely: lack of due process as far as she was concerned; regularity in the performance of her official duties; and her good faith.[8]

In the Memorandum dated January 7, 2015,[9] the COA denied the petitioner's request for reconsideration.

Hence, the petitioner has come to the Court raising the following issues for consideration and resolution, namely:
I

RESPONDENT COA, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN ISSUING AOM NO. 2005-011 AND ND 2006-002 AND THEREAFTER FINDING THE PETITIONER PERSONALLY LIABLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT SHE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH DUE DILIGENCE IN THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF HER DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS AS THE FORMER DIRECTOR II OF THE POEA ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH IN CERTIFYING THAT THE PAYROLL IS CORRECTLY STATED AND THAT SERVICES HAVE BEEN DULY RENDERED BY LEONEL P. LABRADOR, FORMER CHIEF OF THE POEA EMPLOYMENT SERVICES AND REGULATION DIVISION, FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LATTER'S SALARIES, WAGES AND OTHER BENEFITS FROM 16 SEPTEMBER 2002 TO MARCH 2004.

II

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COA, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN DISALLOWING THE SUBJECT PAYMENTS AND MAKING THE PETITIONER PERSONALLY LIABLE TO PAY THE CORRESPONDING AMOUNTS FROM 16 SEPTEMBER 2002 TO MARCH 2004, WITH FURTHER DIRECTIVE TO WITH[H]OLD THE PAYMENT OF SALARIES DUE TO THE PETITIONER FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF HER LIABILITY AS STATED IN THE ND NO. 2006-002.

TO SUSTAIN THE SUBJECT COA'S ND WOULD RESULT IN THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER AS SHE WAS NEITHER DULY NOTIFIED OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MR. LEONEL LABRADOR WIDLE HE WAS WORKING AT THE POEA NOR DID SHE RECEIVE ANY NOTICE/ORDER THAT MR. LABRADOR BE DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE AT THE TIME SHE CERTIFIED THE PAYROLLS FROM 16 SEPTEMBER 2002 TO MARCH 2004. MORESO, PETITIONER WAS NOT FURNISHED COPIES OF DECISION NO. 2009-121 DATED OCTOBER 29, 2009 AND NOTICE OF FINALITY OF DECISION DATED JANUARY 7, 2010 AND RESPONDENT COA ORDER OF EXECUTION DATED OCTOBER 26, 2011.
[10]
The petitioner argues that she acted in good faith and with due diligence in certifying to the correctness of the payrolls for the period September 16, 2002 to March 2004; that Labrador had rendered service during said period based on his daily time records duly signed by his supervisor, but whose copies were no longer available for presentation, as certified by Julie Ann J. Aguila, Chief of the POEA Human Resource Development Division;[11] that in lieu of such records, she was submitting other documents to show that Labrador had rendered service in the period from September 16, 2002 to March 2004, specifically: (a) a certified true copy of Labrador's Service Record covering his employment from December 6, 1983 to March 11, 2004;[12] (b) his Record of Leaves of Absence from September 2002 to February 2004;[13] (c) his Performance Evaluation Reports for the years 2002 and 2003 (those for the year 2004 were excluded because he had been separated from the service on March 11, 2004);[14] and (d) the Special Orders issued by the POEA from 1999 to 2002 showing Labrador's assignment to various offices of the POEA.[15]

The petitioner insists that during her tenure as Director II of the POEA she had no information, document or record showing that there had been a pending criminal case against Labrador, and that he had been discharged from the service.[16] She also maintains that the POEA was not furnished with copies of the various notices and orders, decisions or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan; hence, she had no basis or authority to stop the payment to Labrador of the disallowed salaries, wages and other benefits until the POEA's actual receipt of the resolution dated March 2, 2004 on March 9, 2004 from the Sandiganbayan.[17] She points out that she was on foreign assignment, specifically deployed to the Philippine Overseas Labor Office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in the period from October 2008 to October 31, 2010;[18] and that she was not notified and had no information that the COA had issued Decision No. 2009-121 dated October 29, 2009, the Notice of Finality of Decision dated January 7, 2010, and the Order of Execution dated October 26, 2011.[19]

In their comment, the respondents assert that the petitioner was not denied due process because the copy of Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-002 forwarded by POEA Administrator Hans Leo J. Cacdac to the Audit Team Leader contained her signature across her name, thereby indicating that she had been properly served in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules of Court;[20] that the POEA filed a motion for reconsideration dated March 3, 2006 in her behalf to seek, among others, the reversal of Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-002, and another motion for reconsideration dated February 2, 2010 vis-a-vis Decision No. 2009-121;[21] that she could no longer assail Decision No. 2009-121 because the Court had affirmed it with finality in Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit;[22] and that an error of judgment was not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari.[23]

On April 14, 2015, the Court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondents from enforcing the assailed Orders of Execution dated October 26, 2011 and November 25, 2013.[24]

Issue

Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner personally liable to refund the disallowed salary payments?

Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is partly meritorious.

The petitioner is essentially assailing Decision No. 2009-121 and the Order of Execution dated November 25, 2013 she had received on December 18, 2013.

Does she do so in a timely manner?

The time within which an aggrieved party may seek the review of an adverse judgment or final order or resolution through the special civil action governed by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is fixed in Section 3, which states:
Section 3. Time to file petition. - The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
Considering that the petitioner dispatched her letter to COA Chairperson Pulido-Tan seeking the reconsideration of the November 25, 2013 Order of Execution on January 2, 2014, or 15 days from her receipt of the Order of Execution on December 18, 2013, and further considering that she received the Memorandum denying the letter of reconsideration on February 12, 2015, she had only 16 days remaining, or until February 28, 2015, within which to file the petition for certiorari under Rule 64.

Yet, because she actually filed the petition only on March 31, 2015, or 31 days beyond the reglementary period, the petition would be dismissible for being filed out of time, with the result of rendering the Order of Execution dated November 25, 2013 unassailable and immutable as to her. Also, and more significantly, Decision No. 2009-121 had by then attained finality and become immutable. As such, the present recourse might not avail her anymore, for a decision or final order that has acquired finality may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it is made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act that violates this principle of immutability must be immediately struck down.[25] The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment or order serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrine is not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law.[26] The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; and (3) void judgments.[27]

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several justifications to suspend the strict adherence with rigid procedural rules like the doctrine of immutability, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[28]

Upon careful appreciation of the records, the Court considers justifications (a), (b) and (c) to have relevance to the petitioner's situation.

First of all, the adverse result would surely make her personally liable for a substantial sum of monetary liability from which she had not directly benefited, thereby prejudicing her right to property.

Secondly, the petitioner's good faith in certifying to the correctness of the payrolls based on available records about Labrador having actually reported to work, and on her absolute lack of knowledge of his having been dismissed and of the pendency of the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan constituted compelling circumstances that justified applying the exception in her favor. At the time she made the certifications of the payrolls she relied on the relevant public and official documents showing that Labrador had rendered actual service during the periods concerned.[29] Her honest belief that Labrador was legally entitled to the salary payments thereby became established.[30] Moreover, Labrador's 201 File did not contain any indication of the criminal case pending against him in the Sandiganbayan. Her claim of having been actually apprised of his criminal case only on March 9, 2004 after the POEA received the copy of the March 2, 2004 resolution of the Sandiganbayan has not been rebutted.

Only convincing proof of the petitioner's malice or bad faith in the performance of her duties could have warranted the rejection of her plea of good faith. The Court has emphatically stated in Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit,[31] viz.:
It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties, such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may result from the performance of an official duty. Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears the burden to convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public officer's performance of his duties.
But the COA did not adduce proof of her malice or bad faith. At any rate, not extending the benefit of good faith and regular performance of duty to the petitioner herein would be unfair and unjust if the Court absolved the petitioner in Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit from personal liability for the same disallowed salaries of Labrador on the basis of good faith.

And, thirdly, the fact that the petitioner was on foreign assignment when the COA rendered the assailed issuances plausibly explained why she did not seasonably assail or oppose the disallowances. We point out that the insistence of the COA that the POEA had filed in her behalf a motion for reconsideration during her absence from the country on a foreign assignment without the indication that she had expressly authorized the POEA to do so did not suffice to now defeat her right to be heard. Verily, only she could have exercised the right to be heard upon a matter that would subject her under the law to personal liability.

In light of the foregoing circumstances, the COA's directive to withhold the petitioner's salary was void and produced no legal effect. As such, the assailed COA issuances did not attain finality and immutability as to her. Such consequence became unavoidable, as the Court has aptly declared in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla:[32]
A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.

In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System v. Sison, this Court held that:
x x x "[A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgments. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in before the trial."
Accordingly, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for certiorari; and AFFIRMS Decision No. 2009-121 dated October 29, 2009 rendered by the Commission on Audit affirming Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-002 dated January 18, 2006, the Notice of Finality of Decision dated January 7, 2010, and the Orders of Execution dated October 26, 2011 and November 25, 2013 subject to the MODIFICATION that the portion pertaining to the personal liability of petitioner Nini A. Lanto is DELETED.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Casillo, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza,* Caguioa, and Tijam, JJ., concur.
Martires, J., no part prior OSG acion.



NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 18, 2017 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on August 16, 2017 at 9:30 a.m.


Very truly yours,



(SGD)

FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA
 
Clerk of Court


* No part.

[1] Rollo, pp. 51-56.

[2] G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013, 701 SCRA 318.

[3] Id. at 322-328.

[4] Rollo, pp. 67-68.

[5] Supra note 2, at 339-340.

[6] Rollo, p. 8.

[7] Id. at 69-71.

[8] Id. at 72-75.

[9] Id. at 80-81.

[10] Id. at 18-19.

[11] ld. at 132.

[12] Id. at 133.

[13] Id. at 135-139.

[14] Id. at 140-150.

[15] Id. at 151-153.

[16] Id. at 22.

[17] Id. at 24.

[18] Id. at 154-159.

[19] Id. at 28-29.

[20] Id. at 190.

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 191-192.

[23] Id. at 193-194.

[24] Id. at 162-163.

[25] FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 50, 56.

[26] Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 200, 213-214.

[27] Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 178366, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 362, 373.

[28] Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010,632 SCRA 727,761, citing Barnes v. Padilla, G.R. No. 160753, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 675, 686-687.

[29] Rollo, pp. 133-153.

[30] Manila International Airport Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 194710, February 14, 2012, 665 SCRA 653, 678.

[31] Supra note 2, at 337 (the italicized portions in bold are in the original text).

[32] G.R. No. 194168, February 13, 2013, 690 SCRA 610, 618-619.

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