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815 Phil. 233
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 189493, August 02, 2017 ]
FCA SECURITY AND GENERAL SERVICES, INC., AND/OR MAJ. JOSE LAID, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. SOTERO M. ACADEMIA, JR. II, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
An employer who alleges an employee's voluntary resignation bears the burden of proving such allegation by clear, positive and convincing evidence. On the other hand, an employee who works as a security guard carries the burden of proving his allegation that he was placed on indefinite floating status, or was constructively dismissed.
The Case
The respondent, a security guard, instituted his complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners FCA Security and General Services, Inc. (FCA) and its general manager, Maj. Jose Laid, Jr. (Maj. Laid, Jr.). In his decision issued on February 28, 2005,[1] Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria ruled the petitioners liable for illegal dismissal. However, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the ruling on December 17, 2007, and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.[2]
On certiorari initiated by the respondent, the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated its decision on July 10, 2009 setting aside the decision of the NLRC on the ground that the latter had thereby gravely abused its discretion in reversing the Labor Arbiter, and, accordingly, reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[3] Hence, this appeal.
Antecedents
The NLRC recited the following factual and procedural antecedents:
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter,[7] observing that the respondent had been oddly silent on the incidents leading to his supposed dismissal; that, on the other hand, the petitioners showed that after having been investigated on his altercation with the driver in the bank premises, he was meted the seven-day suspension; that there was sufficient proof of his voluntary resignation because several employees had affirmed such fact under oath; and that the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit was in order. It decreed as follows:
Decision of the CA
As earlier mentioned, the CA granted the petition for certiorari upon finding, from its re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties, that the petitioners had issued an inter-office memo on January 27, 2003 relieving the respondent from his post at the RCBC branch effective January 28, 2003, and directing him to report to the head office for instruction and proper disposition;[10] that the petitioners' investigation report and suspension order were made on February 3 and 5, 2003, respectively, only after the January 27, 2003 memo relieving the respondent from his post had issued; that he had been relieved of his post without any promise of re-assignment, making out a clear case of constructive dismissal, which was bolstered by the fact that he had not been given any re-assignment until the time when he filed the complaint in October of 2003;[11] that the respondent did not voluntarily resign from his employment; that the supposed resignation was belied by his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal considering that any employee who took steps to protest his layoff could not be said to have abandoned his work; that if he had really resigned on February 3, 2005, there would have been no need to issue the February 5, 2003 suspension order; and that there was no proof that he had been notified of the suspension order itself. Accordingly, the CA reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[12]
Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the petitioners brought this appeal.[13]
Issues
Did the CA err in holding that the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the ruling of the Labor Arbiter?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
The respondent alleged in his position paper that he had been placed on floating status for more than six months, viz.:
In contrast, the petitioners submitted the results of the investigation of the respondent. The results included the hand-written explanation on the incident at the RCBC branch as well as the typewritten statement in question-and-answer form, both executed and signed by the respondent himself.[15] It is significant that he did not expressly repudiate his signatures therein, his only objection being solely based on the failure to have the statement sworn to before a notary public as borne out by the blank jurat.
In an illegal dismissal case like this, the employer whose defense is the voluntary resignation of the employee must prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the resignation was voluntary.[16] As the foregoing disquisition indicates, the petitioners fully discharged their burden of proof.
The respondent submits that although the NLRC noted that several employees of FCA had substantiated and corroborated the verbal resignation of the respondent, and observed in that regard that said employees had no reason to testify falsely under oath against him, said employees were not just employees of FCA but were its officers whose testimony served their own best interest.
The respondent's submission does not impress.
To start with, the fact alone that the corroborating employees were officers of FCA did not discredit their confirmation of the verbal resignation of the respondent. The relationship of employment between the witnesses and one of the parties, although a factor to weigh the value of the testimony, is not of itself sufficient to discredit the testimony.[17] Secondly, Maj. Laid, Jr., asserting that the respondent had refused to accept his suspension and had instead offered to resign voluntarily, recalled that the respondent then started to process his necessary clearances. Maj. Laid, Jr.'s recollection was clear, positive and convincing, and was also validated by the respective corroborating affidavits of Virgilio Tangente, the officer assigned to investigate the incident; Nelia De La Torre, the administrative clerk called into the office of Maj. Laid, Jr. when the respondent offered to resign; and Julio Gonzales, Jr., Allan Cruz, and Laudemer Tinaya, FCA's department heads who stated that the respondent had personally gone to each of them individually to seek clearances on his accountabilities and to obtain their signatures on his clearance form. The testimonial competence of said individuals to make the confirmation and the plausibility of their cohesive recollections were unassailable because only the petitioners, the relevant employees and officers of FCA as well as the respondent himself were privy to what had really transpired between the parties. And, thirdly, the submission of the respondent stands on weak legs primarily because his assertion of biased and fabricated testimony against him was not supported by any credible counter-statement of the facts from him.
The CA deemed the failure to promise to the respondent a reassignment to another post a factor adverse to the petitioners. It is easily seen, however, that the latter did not promise any re-assignment precisely because the respondent was then still undergoing the investigation for misconduct. To make the promise at that point would have been imprudent on the part of the petitioners.
The respondent contends that the petitioners committed several lapses in their conduct of his investigation. The first lapse concerned his not being given the opportunity to confront the driver with whom he had the altercation; hence, the allegation about his having drawn and pointed his service firearm at the driver became unsubstantiated. The second lapse was the lack of substantiation of the existence of the company policy that he had violated whereby he could be appropriately meted the 7-day suspension. The third lapse related to the failure to furnish to him a copy of the February 5, 2003 memo imposing the suspension, as borne out by the absence of his signature from the copy of the memo.
The contentions of the respondent are misplaced and undeserving of serious consideration. His voluntary resignation, being established, rendered moot and academic the issue about the propriety of the proceedings at his investigation and the correctness of the adverse outcome of the investigation. Moreover, the validity of the 7-day suspension meted on him had no real bearing on whether or not he was illegally dismissed, considering that his complaint centered on his allegation of having been pulled out from his post without re-assignment. Indeed, the suspension was not carried out because of his voluntary offer to resign before the suspension could be implemented.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on July 10, 2009; and REINSTATES the decision issued on December 17, 2007 by the National Labor Relations Commission.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Jardeleza, Tijam, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on August 2, 2017 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on December 1, 2017 at 10:20 a.m.
[1] Rollo, pp. 71-76.
[2] Id. at 131-138; penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco.
[3] Id. at 30-40; penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, and concurred in by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (later a Member of this Court) and Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican.
[4] Id. at 132-134.
[5] CA rollo, pp. 72-77.
[6] Id at 77.
[7] Id. at 104-110.
[8] Id. at 110.
[9] Id. at 42-43.
[10] Rollo, p. 36.
[11] Id at 37.
[12] Id. at 39.
[13] Id. at 42.
[14] CA rollo, p. 22.
[15] Id. at 37-41.
[16] Grande v. Philippine Nautical Training College, G.R. No. 213137, March 1, 2017.
[17] Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108997, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 600, 608.
The respondent, a security guard, instituted his complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners FCA Security and General Services, Inc. (FCA) and its general manager, Maj. Jose Laid, Jr. (Maj. Laid, Jr.). In his decision issued on February 28, 2005,[1] Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria ruled the petitioners liable for illegal dismissal. However, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the ruling on December 17, 2007, and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.[2]
On certiorari initiated by the respondent, the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated its decision on July 10, 2009 setting aside the decision of the NLRC on the ground that the latter had thereby gravely abused its discretion in reversing the Labor Arbiter, and, accordingly, reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[3] Hence, this appeal.
The NLRC recited the following factual and procedural antecedents:
The complainant alleges that on July 27, 1999, he was hired as a security guard by respondent FCA Security & General Services (FCA for brevity), a company engaged in the business of providing security and other related services. Complainant alleges that prior to his dismissal on January 27, 2004, his last assignment was at the RCBC, Pasay City branch. Complainant claims that "a twist of fate happened on January 28, 2003 when he was asked to report in their office and was pulled out with (sic) his post then in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation Pasay City Branch." Complainant asserts that respondent put him on "floating status" and was not given any assignment for more than six (6) months.As stated, the Labor Arbiter, holding that the respondent had been illegally dismissed; that the seven-day suspension meted on him was uncalled for because he was only performing his duty as a security guard of the bank where he was then assigned when the incident with driver George Chua took place;[5] and that the petitioners did not substantiate their allegations about his having voluntarily resigned, and about offering to reinstate him while he was under floating status, awarded backwages of P200,083.32 and separation pay of P43,200.00 to him.[6]
Hence, this complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary claims.
For their part, respondents admit that in July 1999, they employed complainant as a security guard. His latest assignment was at the RCBC branch in Edsa-Taft, Pasay City. During complainant's stint at the RCBC, he had an altercation with GEORGE CHUA, a driver of Dunking Donuts, wherein complainant drew and pointed his service firearm at CHUA. Consequently, GEORGE CHUA filed a complaint against complainant for grave threats with the Police Community Precinct No. 6, Pasay City Police Office, Southern Police District. Upon respondents' own investigation where complainant was given an opportunity to explain his side, Investigating Officer VIRGILIO D. TANGENTE recommended his suspension for seven (7) days. However, complainant expressed his preference to voluntary [sic] resign rather than receive his suspension. Thus, respondents gave him the clearance form for resigning personnel. Instead of submitting such form, complainant filed the instant case.
In his Reply, complainant asserts that he "was relieved from duty on January 27, 2003 and promised that he will be given post again", as evidence by a copy of respondents' memorandum dated January 27, 2003.
In their own Reply and Rejoinder, respondents stress that complainant conveniently chose not to touch the issues of his altercation with the driver of Dunkin Donut[s], the fact that he was served a suspension order which he refused to receive, and his offer to voluntarily resign from FCA. Contrary to complainant's claim that he was illegally dismissed, respondents presented the affidavit of Major JOSE A. LAID, General Manager, narrating the circumstances leading to complainant's voluntary resignation. Likewise submitted are the separate affidavits executed by three (3) FCA department heads, namely, JULIO D. GONZALES, JR., ALLAN CRUZ, and LAUDEMER TINAY[A], Personnel Officer, Supply Custodian and Property and Materials Officer, respectively, which corroboratively attest to the fact that complainant approached them in connection with his accountabilities, if any, and to facilitate his resignation from the company.
Respondents admit the issuance of memorandum dated January 27, 2003 but they strongly deny that it contained a directive for complainant's reassignment. Respondents stress that the said memorandum explicitly directed complainant "to report at FCA Head Office for instruction and proper disposition." This was necessary in order to investigate the circumstances surrounding the drawing up of firearm and the resulting filing of a complaint for grave threat against herein complainant.
Respondents further stress that subsequent to memorandum dated January 27, 2003, was the issuance of inter-office memorandum dated February 5, 2003, informing complainant of the result of the investigation and the management's decision to suspend him for seven (7) days. Two (2) FCA personnel, namely, VIRGILIO TANGENTE and NELIA DE LA TORRE, issued their respective affidavits both dated February 3, 2004, stating that complainant refused to receive the suspension order/memorandum but instead, he offered to resign. Consequently, Major LAID accepted the verbal resignation of complainant.
In his own Rejoinder, complainant states that "he will never mention other circumstances happened on January 27, 2003 for he only stated what really transpired on said date. The best evidence of what transpired on January 27, 2003 is that stated in the memorandum attached as Annex "A" in complainant's reply." Complainant asserts that there was no investigation whatsoever and that he was never furnished with a copy of the said suspension order. He maintains that he was placed on "floating status" for more than six (6) months, and thus, constructively dismissed.[4]
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter,[7] observing that the respondent had been oddly silent on the incidents leading to his supposed dismissal; that, on the other hand, the petitioners showed that after having been investigated on his altercation with the driver in the bank premises, he was meted the seven-day suspension; that there was sufficient proof of his voluntary resignation because several employees had affirmed such fact under oath; and that the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit was in order. It decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 28, 2005 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.Upon the NLRC's denial of his motion for reconsideration,[9] the respondent assailed the outcome in the CA on certiorari, insisting that the NLRC had thereby gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[8]
As earlier mentioned, the CA granted the petition for certiorari upon finding, from its re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties, that the petitioners had issued an inter-office memo on January 27, 2003 relieving the respondent from his post at the RCBC branch effective January 28, 2003, and directing him to report to the head office for instruction and proper disposition;[10] that the petitioners' investigation report and suspension order were made on February 3 and 5, 2003, respectively, only after the January 27, 2003 memo relieving the respondent from his post had issued; that he had been relieved of his post without any promise of re-assignment, making out a clear case of constructive dismissal, which was bolstered by the fact that he had not been given any re-assignment until the time when he filed the complaint in October of 2003;[11] that the respondent did not voluntarily resign from his employment; that the supposed resignation was belied by his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal considering that any employee who took steps to protest his layoff could not be said to have abandoned his work; that if he had really resigned on February 3, 2005, there would have been no need to issue the February 5, 2003 suspension order; and that there was no proof that he had been notified of the suspension order itself. Accordingly, the CA reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[12]
Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the petitioners brought this appeal.[13]
Did the CA err in holding that the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the ruling of the Labor Arbiter?
The appeal is meritorious.
The respondent alleged in his position paper that he had been placed on floating status for more than six months, viz.:
The complainant started working with the respondent herein on July 12, 1999. The complainant worked with all honest [sic] and dedication.The respondent was bound to adduce sufficient proof of his allegations, but he did not discharge his burden. The only piece of evidence he tendered to substantiate his allegations was the January 27, 2003 memo issued by the petitioners. However, such evidence did not paint a clear picture of what actually transpired in the period from his altercation with Dunkin Donuts' driver up to January 27, 2003, and even after receiving such memo. Indeed, more proof was necessary from him. For sure, the memo alone did not suffice as evidence of his allegations because its text only indicated his being thereby "directed to report at FCA HEAD OFFICE for instruction and proper disposition." It behooved him to show if he actually complied with the directive of FCA to him, and to shed light on what happened after receiving the memo. But he did not discharge his burden because he did not establish how, from the time he received the directive to report to the head office, his situation had devolved into his having been placed on floating status.
A twist of fate happened on January 28, 2003 when asked to report in their office and was pulled out with (sic) his post then in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation Pasay City Branch. The respondent promised that he will be given another duty but until now he is not given duty.
As he felt he was deprived not only property rights but also his right to due process that will maintain his dignity as a person and as employee who observed honesty and good faith in his work that sustains his daily leaving (sic) as well as his family, he was compelled to file this case to this Honorable Office.[14]
In contrast, the petitioners submitted the results of the investigation of the respondent. The results included the hand-written explanation on the incident at the RCBC branch as well as the typewritten statement in question-and-answer form, both executed and signed by the respondent himself.[15] It is significant that he did not expressly repudiate his signatures therein, his only objection being solely based on the failure to have the statement sworn to before a notary public as borne out by the blank jurat.
In an illegal dismissal case like this, the employer whose defense is the voluntary resignation of the employee must prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the resignation was voluntary.[16] As the foregoing disquisition indicates, the petitioners fully discharged their burden of proof.
The respondent submits that although the NLRC noted that several employees of FCA had substantiated and corroborated the verbal resignation of the respondent, and observed in that regard that said employees had no reason to testify falsely under oath against him, said employees were not just employees of FCA but were its officers whose testimony served their own best interest.
The respondent's submission does not impress.
To start with, the fact alone that the corroborating employees were officers of FCA did not discredit their confirmation of the verbal resignation of the respondent. The relationship of employment between the witnesses and one of the parties, although a factor to weigh the value of the testimony, is not of itself sufficient to discredit the testimony.[17] Secondly, Maj. Laid, Jr., asserting that the respondent had refused to accept his suspension and had instead offered to resign voluntarily, recalled that the respondent then started to process his necessary clearances. Maj. Laid, Jr.'s recollection was clear, positive and convincing, and was also validated by the respective corroborating affidavits of Virgilio Tangente, the officer assigned to investigate the incident; Nelia De La Torre, the administrative clerk called into the office of Maj. Laid, Jr. when the respondent offered to resign; and Julio Gonzales, Jr., Allan Cruz, and Laudemer Tinaya, FCA's department heads who stated that the respondent had personally gone to each of them individually to seek clearances on his accountabilities and to obtain their signatures on his clearance form. The testimonial competence of said individuals to make the confirmation and the plausibility of their cohesive recollections were unassailable because only the petitioners, the relevant employees and officers of FCA as well as the respondent himself were privy to what had really transpired between the parties. And, thirdly, the submission of the respondent stands on weak legs primarily because his assertion of biased and fabricated testimony against him was not supported by any credible counter-statement of the facts from him.
The CA deemed the failure to promise to the respondent a reassignment to another post a factor adverse to the petitioners. It is easily seen, however, that the latter did not promise any re-assignment precisely because the respondent was then still undergoing the investigation for misconduct. To make the promise at that point would have been imprudent on the part of the petitioners.
The respondent contends that the petitioners committed several lapses in their conduct of his investigation. The first lapse concerned his not being given the opportunity to confront the driver with whom he had the altercation; hence, the allegation about his having drawn and pointed his service firearm at the driver became unsubstantiated. The second lapse was the lack of substantiation of the existence of the company policy that he had violated whereby he could be appropriately meted the 7-day suspension. The third lapse related to the failure to furnish to him a copy of the February 5, 2003 memo imposing the suspension, as borne out by the absence of his signature from the copy of the memo.
The contentions of the respondent are misplaced and undeserving of serious consideration. His voluntary resignation, being established, rendered moot and academic the issue about the propriety of the proceedings at his investigation and the correctness of the adverse outcome of the investigation. Moreover, the validity of the 7-day suspension meted on him had no real bearing on whether or not he was illegally dismissed, considering that his complaint centered on his allegation of having been pulled out from his post without re-assignment. Indeed, the suspension was not carried out because of his voluntary offer to resign before the suspension could be implemented.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on July 10, 2009; and REINSTATES the decision issued on December 17, 2007 by the National Labor Relations Commission.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Jardeleza, Tijam, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
December 1, 2017
Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on August 2, 2017 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on December 1, 2017 at 10:20 a.m.
| | Very truly yours, |
(SGD) | |
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN | |
Division Clerk of Court |
[1] Rollo, pp. 71-76.
[2] Id. at 131-138; penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco.
[3] Id. at 30-40; penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, and concurred in by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (later a Member of this Court) and Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican.
[4] Id. at 132-134.
[5] CA rollo, pp. 72-77.
[6] Id at 77.
[7] Id. at 104-110.
[8] Id. at 110.
[9] Id. at 42-43.
[10] Rollo, p. 36.
[11] Id at 37.
[12] Id. at 39.
[13] Id. at 42.
[14] CA rollo, p. 22.
[15] Id. at 37-41.
[16] Grande v. Philippine Nautical Training College, G.R. No. 213137, March 1, 2017.
[17] Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108997, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 600, 608.