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859 Phil. 69
EN BANC
[ A.M. No. 13-05-04-SC, August 14, 2019 ]
RE: REQUEST OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ROBERTO A. ABAD FOR SALARY ADJUSTMENT DUE TO LONGEVITY OF SERVICE,
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, C.J.:
The positions he had held in the civil service, and the periods relevant thereto, are as follows:
September 11, 1969 to October 23, 1975 - Technical Assistant, Supreme Court October 24, 1975 to December 31, 1977 - Solicitor, OSG January 1, 1978 to September 17, 1978 - Solicitor II, OSG September 18, 1978 to April 17, 1980 - Solicitor III, OSG April 18, 1980 to December 31, 1981 - Solicitor IV, OSG January 1, 1982 to June 30, 1985 - Solicitor V, OSG July 1, 1985 to July 31, 1986 - Assistant Solicitor General, OSG August 7, 2009 to May 21, 2014 - Associate Justice, Supreme Court
The provision on longevity pay granted to Members of the Judiciary under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1927, states:
Section 42. Longevity pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent (5%) of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.
In its memorandum dated May 8, 2013, the OAS opined that Justice Abad's service in the OSG could not be included in the computation of his longevity pay in order to adjust his salary in the active service because his years in the OSG were deemed service rendered outside of the Judiciary. Nonetheless, the OAS recommended that Justice Abad's OSG employment be included in the computation of his longevity pay upon retirement, or for retirement purposes only, consistently with prevailing jurisprudence and precedent. In making such recommendation, the OAS noted that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9417[1] subsequently extended judicial ranks to various positions in the OSG; and deemed the same to be retroactively applied to Justice Abad. The dispositive portion of the memorandum stated:
In view of the foregoing, [the] Office recommends that your Honor's service in the Office of the Solicitor General be considered as judicial service and to be included in the computation of your Honor's longevity pay upon [his] retirement [or] for retirement purposes only.
In his letter dated May 30, 2013, Justice Abad formally requested the Court to approve the recommendation of the OAS.
The matter was next referred to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO) of the Court for comment.
In its July 5, 2013 comment, the FMBO concluded that Justice Abad's service in the OSG could not be considered for the purpose of entitlement to longevity pay during his incumbency, but recommended that such be considered as judicial service in computing his longevity pay for retirement purposes, and that his salary be adjusted accordingly effective upon his retirement.
Justice Abad retired upon reaching the age of 70 on May 22, 2014. His tenure as an Associate Justice of this Court was only for a period of four (4) years, eight (8) months, and sixteen (16) days, a few months short of the five years required by law to qualify for longevity pay. On September 30, 2014, the Court resolved to defer action on his request pending the resolution of A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, which was consolidated with A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC and A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC, dealing with similar situations and involving the requests of Court of Appeals (CA) Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso, Angelita A. Gacutan, and Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, respectively, to consider their government services rendered outside of the Judiciary in the computation of their longevity pay.
It is noted that Justices Veloso and Gacutan separately sought the crediting of their service as Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the purpose of computing their longevity pay; that Justice Salazar-Fernando sought her service as a Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and as a Commissioner of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) be considered as part of her judicial service; and that their longevity pay be adjusted accordingly.
A very closely divided Court resolved the consolidated matters in its June 16, 2015 resolution. The Court granted the request of Justice Salazar-Fernando with regard to her years of service as Presiding Judge of the MTC, but denied her request with regard to her service as COMELEC Commissioner because of breaks in the continuity of her government/judicial service. The Court denied the request of Justice Veloso due to the fact that RA No. 9347, which granted NLRC Commissioners the rank and salary equivalent to those of Associate Justices of the CA, only took effect in 2006, which was after Justice Veloso had already left the NLRC in 2004; and that given that the law did not provide for retroactivity, Justice Veloso could not claim that he had held the rank of a CA Justice during his stint at the NLRC.
Likewise, the Court initially denied Justice Gacutan's request through the June 16, 2015 resolution by observing that her service in the NLRC as Commissioner was not equivalent to service actually rendered in the Judiciary for the purpose of computing longevity pay under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, which was the law in effect during her incumbency as a CA Justice. Furthermore, in the same resolution, the majority of the Members of the Court were of the view that Section 42 should be construed strictly to refer to actual service in the Judiciary. It was acknowledged in the resolution itself that this view was a departure from earlier rulings, which had allowed service in other government posts granted by law the rank-and-salary equivalent to counterparts in the Judiciary to be credited as judicial service for longevity pay purposes.
Justice Gacutan filed a motion for reconsideration.
The Court resolved the motion for reconsideration on July 26, 2016 by a vote of 10-4 in favor of granting it. In so resolving, the Court adopted the position taken by then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Teresita Leonardo-de Castro in her separate concurring and dissenting opinion submitted in relation to the ruling on the matter on June 16, 2015, and reversed itself by ordering that Justice Gacutan's tenure as NLRC Commissioner from August 26, 2006 (when R.A. No. 9347 took effect) until her departure from the NLRC be included in the computation of her longevity pay. The Court opined that longevity pay under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 should be treated as part of salary, and extended the benefit to certain officials in the Executive Department who were, by law, granted the same rank and benefits as members of the Judiciary.
The following discourse by Associate Justice de Castro in A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA is worth reiterating herein, viz.:
As a rule, therefore, the grant of longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is premised on the rendition of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary. That is the express language of the law.
Nonetheless, there are existing laws which expressly require the qualifications for appointment, confer the rank, and grant the salaries, privileges, and benefits of members of the Judiciary on other public officers in the Executive Department, such as the following:
(a) the Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitor Generals of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG); and
(b) the Chief Legal Counsel and the Assistant Chief Legal Counsel, the Chief State Prosecutor, and the members of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) in the Department of Justice.
The intention of the above laws is to establish a parity in qualifications required, the rank conferred, and the salaries and benefits given to members of the Judiciary and the public officers covered by the said laws. The said laws seek to give equal treatment to the specific public officers in the executive department and the Judges and Justices who are covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and other relevant laws. In effect, these laws recognize that public officers who are expressly identified in the laws by the special nature of their official functions render services which are as important as the services rendered by the Judges and Justices. They acknowledge the respective roles of those public officers and of the members of the Judiciary in the promotion of justice and the proper functioning of our legal and judicial systems.
x x x x
Under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, longevity pay is an amount equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay given to Judges and Justices for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary. It is not only an amount given as an addition to the basic monthly pay but, more importantly, it forms part of the salary of the recipient thereof.
In other words, longevity pay is "salary" and it should not be confused with "rank."
That is how this Court has treated the longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 since 1986, particularly in Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan. It is a treatment which reflects the Court's reading of the text of the law and its understanding of the law's legislative intent.
x x x x
In conferring upon certain officials in the Executive the same salaries, aside from their rank, as those of their respective judicial counterparts, Congress intended to make the salaries of the former at par with the latter. The legislative records support this.
x x x x
Thus, Congress knew, or is presumed to have known, the concept of longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as part of the total salary of members of the Judiciary when it enacted Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, which granted certain officials of the OSG, the NLRC, and the NPS, respectively, the same salary as their respective counterparts in the Judiciary. Moreover, armed with that knowledge, Congress is presumed to have intended to adopt the definition of "salary" (as constituting basic monthly salary plus longevity pay) when it enacted Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, which will be in keeping with the legislative intent to equalize the salary of certain executive officials with members of the Judiciary. To do otherwise will negate the express legislative intent.
As it is part of the salary of a member of the Judiciary, it should perforce be part of the salary of the public officers granted by law with the same rank and salary as their counterparts in the Judiciary. Accordingly, the increase in the salary of Judges and Justices by virtue of the longevity pay should also result in the corresponding increase in the salary of the public officers who, under relevant laws, enjoy the same rank and salary as their judicial counterparts. Otherwise, the law's express language and its intention to grant the same rank and salary of a member of the Judiciary to the said public officers will be defeated.[2]
It is under the foregoing premise that we now determine whether or not Justice Abad's service in the OSG should be credited as judicial service for the purpose of computing longevity pay.
Upon thorough consideration of the relevant legislative and jurisprudential antecedents, the Court finds and considers Justice Abad's request to be meritorious.
As early as 1916, the Administrative Code of the Philippines provided that the qualifications for appointment to the position of Solicitor-General be the same as those prescribed for Judges of the Courts of First Instance.[3] The amendments[4] of the Administrative Code adjusted upward the judicial rank given to the Solicitor-General, First Assistant Solicitor-General, and Assistant Solicitors-General. The amendments made beginning in 1953 also added that the Solicitors would have the same qualifications for appointment and rank as those prescribed for Provincial Fiscals.[5]
P.D. No. 1347,[6] which took effect on January 1, 1978, extended to the Solicitor General the same rank, prerogatives, and privileges as those of the Presiding Justice of the CA, while the Assistant Solicitors General were given the same rank, prerogatives, and privileges as those granted of Judges of the Courts of First Instance. Although silent on the rank of the Solicitors, P.D. No. 1347 it did not repeal previous laws prescribing for the Solicitors the ranks and qualifications of Provincial Fiscals (now called Provincial Prosecutors).
P.D. No. 1726, effective September 26, 1980, upgraded the salaries of the legal positions in the OSG in a manner similar to those approved for the legal positions in the Ministry of Justice.[7]
Afterwards, the Whereas Clauses of Executive Order (EO) No. 780, Series of 1982, further reinforced the intention to align the salaries of the Solicitors and the lawyers in the OSG with those of the lawyers in the Ministry of Justice (now Department of Justice) in the light of new salary rates under P.D. No. 1726. This was because EO No. 780 expressly recognized the close relationship between the qualification requirements for Fiscals, State Prosecutors and State Counsels in the Ministry of Justice (Department of Justice) and Solicitors in the OSG.[8]
R.A. No. 9417,[9] amending P.D. No. 1347, elevated the ranks, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges of Assistant Solicitors General to make them equivalent to those of the Associate Justices of the CA, while the positions of Senior State Solicitor, State Solicitor II, and State Solicitor I were given the same ranks, prerogatives, salaries, and privileges as the Judges of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, respectively.
Later on, the Congress enacted R.A. No. 10071 to grant judicial rank to the lawyers in the Department of Justice's National Prosecution Service in a hierarchy similar to that statutorily prescribed for their counterparts in the OSG, and gave retroactive effect to such grant of judicial rank and alignment of benefits of Prosecutors with members of the Judiciary.[10]
In Re: Request of Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga,[11] the Court clarified that the retroactivity clause contained in R.A. No. 10071 could be availed of not only by the lawyers in the Prosecution Service who had retired prior to the effectivity of the law but also by former Prosecutors who had been appointed to the Judiciary, and who were yet to retire for purposes of computing their longevity pay. We quote the relevant discussion therein, to wit:
A law, as a general rule, is applicable prospectively; thus, it should apply only to those who are presently in the service, who had rendered service and who will retire in the Judiciary after the effectivity of the law. By its express provision, however, [RA 10071] made itself applicable even to those who retired prior to its effectivity; thus, they should also benefit from the upgrading mandated by the law.
From this perspective, the law should clearly apply to the case of Justice Guevara-Salonga who rendered service as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Laguna and who is yet to retire as Associate Justice of the CA. x x x[12]
In the same ruling, we reiterated the enduring practice of including years served outside the Judiciary in positions statutorily given judicial rank in the computation of longevity pay for members of the Bench,[13] which was most recently reaffirmed in the Court's July 26, 2016 resolution promulgated in A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA, 12-9-5-SC and 13-02-07-SC.
The long history of aligned ranks, qualifications, and salaries among the members of the Bench, the members of the Prosecution Service, and the lawyers of the OSG is plainly evident in the various laws and jurisprudential precedents. The rationale for this treatment is not difficult to comprehend. Public officers who have served on the Bench, the Prosecution Service, and the OSG have consistently been acknowledged as integral pillars of our justice system. We fully agree with the OAS and the FMBO that Justice Abad's entire service in the OSG from his appointment as Solicitor until the end of his stint as Assistant Solicitor General could be credited in the computation of his longevity pay through the application of P.D. No. 1347 and the various laws that accorded Solicitors the rank of Provincial Fiscals, which by virtue of the retroactivity provision in R.A. No. 10071 must be considered as a position with judicial rank and, consequently, appointment thereto must be deemed service in the Judiciary.
The Court cannot agree with the OAS and the FMBO's position that Justice Abad's service in the OSG could only be included in the computation of his longevity pay for retirement purposes. To recall, in the resolution promulgated on June 16, 2015 in A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA, 12-9-5-SC and 13-02-07-SC, the Court favorably ruled on Justice Salazar-Fernando's request to include her judicial service prior to her appointment to the CA in the computation of her current longevity pay despite the gap in the two periods of her judicial service. The Court later clarified through the resolution promulgated on July 26, 2016 in the same consolidated administrative matters that Justice Gacutan's service as NLRC Commissioner, a position accorded judicial rank by statute, was properly deemed judicial service from the time that the law granting NLRC Commissioners judicial rank became effective and should be considered in the computation of her longevity pay.
The combined application of the Court's rulings on the situations of Justice Salazar-Fernando and Justice Gacutan leads to the conclusion that Justice Abad's entire service in the OSG (as Solicitor from January 1, 1978 to June 30, 1985 and as Assistant Solicitor General from July 1, 1985 to July 31, 1986) should be included in the computation of his longevity pay not only for his retirement but for all intents and purposes.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the request of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad contained in his letters dated May 3, 2013 and May 30, 2013; and DIRECTS the Office of Administrative Services and the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to include Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad's service in the Office of the Solicitor General in the computation of his longevity pay.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see dissenting opinion.
[1] This took effect on March 30, 2007.
[2] Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for his Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission, A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA, 12-9-5-SC and 13-02-07-SC (Resolution), July 26, 2016, 798 SCRA 179, 186-192.
[3] Section 1278. Chief Officials of Bureau of Justice. - The Bureau of Justice shall have one chief, and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General. There shall also be in this Bureau such number of assistant attorneys as may from time to time be available under current appropriations and as the conditions of the service shall require.
The qualifications for appointment to the positions of chief and assistant chief of the Bureau of Justice shall be the same as those prescribed for judges of Courts of First Instance.
[4] Republic Act 945 (approved: June 20, 1953), Republic Act 2068 (approved: June 13, 1958), Republic Act 3465 (approved: June 16, 1962), Republic Act 3596 (approved: June 22, 1963).
[5] Sec. 1659. Chief Officials of the Office of the Solicitor General. — The office of the Solicitor General shall have one chief to be known as the Solicitor General whose salary shall be the same as that of a justice of the court of appeals. He shall be assisted by one First Assistant Solicitor General who shall have the same salary as that of a judge of the court of first instance.
x x x x
"The rank and qualifications for appointment to the position of Solicitor General shall be the same as an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals; the rank and qualifications for appointment to the position of the First Assistant Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General shall be the same as those prescribed for Judges of Courts of First Instance, and those of Solicitors shall be the same as those prescribed for provincial fiscals."
[6] Section 3. The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General shall also receive the same monthly allowances which are received by the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Judges of Courts of First Instance, respectively, under the regular budget of the judiciary.
[7] Sections 3 and 4 of P.D. 1726 pertinently provide:
Section 3. Ministry of Justice Positions. The positions in the Ministry of Justice shall be upgraded in basic salary so as to reach ultimately at least the following levels, to be implemented on a gradual basis subject to the availability of funds and in conjunction with the program to similarly upgrade all judicial and legal positions in the government:
The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor, Chief Financial Officer, Technical Staff Chief, and the heads of all bureaus/commissions/offices under this Ministry P55,536.00.
The Board of Pardons and Parole Executive Director, the Assistant Chief State Counsels, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, Regional State Prosecutors the officers next in rank to the abovementioned heads of bureaus/commissions offices under the Ministry, and the City Fiscal of Manila and Quezon City P52,848.00.
The NBI Deputy Directors, CID Executive Director, Senior State Counsels, Senior State Prosecutors, Assistant Regional State Prosecutors, CLAO and NBI Regional Directors, Technical Staff Assistant Chiefs, and the Provincial/City Fiscals of First Class A Provinces/Cities and First Assistant Fiscals of Manila and Quezon City P50,292.00.
The Senior Special Assistant to the Minister of Justice, Technical Staff Special Assistants, Board of Pardons and Parole Executive Director, CLAO Supervising Citizens Attorneys and Senior Citizens Attorneys, Boards of Special Inquiry Chairmen, Chief Legal Officers in the LRC, NBI, CID, and Probation Administration, Special Assistant to the LRC Commissioner, LRC Administrative Officer IV, LRC Chief Deeds Registry Inspector, LRC Clerk of Court Division Chief, Registers of Deeds III, First and Second Brackets of State Corporate Attorneys, State Counsels II, State Prosecutors III and IV, Second Assistant City Fiscals of Manila and Quezon City, First Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of First Class A Provinces/Cities, Provincial/City Fiscals of First Class B/C Provinces/Cities P47,856.00.
The Special Assistants to the Minister of Justice, Boards of Special Inquiry Members, Third and Fourth Brackets of State Corporate Attorneys, LRC Senior Research Attorney, LRC Assistant Chief Deeds Registry Inspector, LRC Deputy Clerk of Court, Register of Deeds II, Deputy Registers of Deeds III, Land Registration Special Assistant, CID, and NBI Assistant Chief Legal Officers, NBI and CLAO Chief Research Attorneys, District Citizens Attorneys, Bureau of Prisons Legal Officer II, State Counsels I, State Prosecutors I and II, Third Assistant City Fiscals of Manila and Quezon City, Second Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of First Class A Provinces/Cities, First Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of First Class B/C Provinces/Cities, Provincial/City Fiscals of Second Class Provinces/Cities P43,332.00.
The First and Second Brackets of Trial Attorneys in the OGCC, Deputy Registers of Deeds II, Registers of Deeds I, Supervising Parole Officers, Probation Administration Senior Legal Officer, Fourth Assistant City Fiscals of Manila and Quezon City, Third Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of First Class A Provinces/Cities, Second Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of First Class B/C Provinces/Cities, First Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of Second Class Provinces/Cities, Provincial/City Fiscals of Third/Fourth Class Provinces/Cities P41,232.00.
The Senior Parole Officers, Citizens Attorneys, Deputy Registers of Deeds I, Supervising Deeds Registry Inspector, Bureau of Prisons Legal Officer I, Legal Officer IV in the bureaus and offices under the Ministry of Justice, Senior Research Attorneys in the Office of the Minister and in the bureaus and offices under the Ministry of Justice, Assistant Fiscals of Manila and Quezon City, Fourth Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of First Class A Provinces/Cities, Third Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of First Class B/C Provinces/Cities Second Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of Second Class Provinces/Cities, First Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of Third/Fourth Class Provinces/Cities, Provincial/City Fiscals of Fifth Class Provinces/Cities P37,344.00
The CLAO Trial Attorneys II, CID Supervising Special Investigator, Legal Officers III in the bureaus and offices under the Ministry of Justice, Research Attorneys II in the Office of the Minister and in the bureaus and offices under the Ministry of Justice, Parole Officers, Assistant Fiscals of First Class A Provinces/Cities, Fourth Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of First Class B/C Provinces/Cities, Third Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of Second Class Provinces/Cities, Second Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of Third/Fourth Class Provinces/Cities, First Assistant Provincial/City Fiscals of Fifth Class Provinces/Cities, Assistant Fiscals of First Class B/C Provinces/Cities, Prosecution Attorneys P32,184.00
The Legal Officers II in the bureaus and offices under the Ministry of Justice, Deeds Registry Inspectors, Research Attorneys I in the Office of the Minister and in the bureaus and offices under the Ministry of Justice, Legal Officers I in the bureaus and offices under the Ministry of Justice, CID Special Investigator, Bureau of Prisons Legal Officer I (New Bilibid Prison and Leyte Regional Prison) P20,580.00
Section 4. Office of the Solicitor General. The salary of legal positions in the Office of the Solicitor General shall be upgraded in a manner similar to that approved for the Ministry of Justice under Sec. 3 hereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
[8] For convenient reference, we reproduce the Whereas Clauses of Executive Order No. 780 here:
WHEREAS, P.D. No. 1726 provides for a new schedule of salaries for lawyers in the Ministry of Justice and its bureau and offices; and
WHEREAS, position in the Office of the Solicitor General did not come under the operation of said Decree; and
WHEREAS, there is a close relationship between the qualification requirements for Fiscals, State Prosecutors, State Counsels in the Ministry of Justice and Solicitors in the Office of the Solicitor General; and
WHEREAS, there is a need to align the salaries of Solicitors and lawyers in the Office of the Solicitor General with lawyers in the Ministry of Justice in the light of new salary rates under P.D. No. 1726;
[9] SEC. 3. Standards. - The Solicitor General shall have cabinet rank and the same qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals; an Assistant Solicitor General, those of an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
The qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, and privileges of Solicitors shall be the same as judges, specified as follows:
Senior State Solicitor - Regional Trial Court Judge State Solicitor II - Metropolitan Trial Court Judge State Solicitor I - Municipal Trial Court in Cities Judge
[10] The relevant provisions of RA 10071 provide:
SECTION 14. Qualifications, Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor General. — The Prosecutor General shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and shall be appointed by the President.
SECTION 15. Ranks of Prosecutors. — The Prosecutors in the National Prosecution Service shall have the following ranks:
(2)
(3)
Regional Prosecutors; and
Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with at least twenty-five (25) prosecutors and City Prosecutors of cities within a metropolitan area established by law.x x x x
SECTION 16. Qualifications, Ranks and Appointments of Prosecutors and Other Prosecution Officers. — Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor V shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor IV shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a Judge of the Regional Trial Court.
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor III shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, privileges, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Prosecutor with the rank of Prosecutor II shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, privileges, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in cities.
Prosecutor with the rank of Prosecutor I shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, privileges, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in municipalities.
x x x x
SECTION 24. Retroactivity. — The benefits mentioned in Sections 14 and 16 hereof shall be granted to all those who retired prior to the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
[11] A.M. No. 11-10-7-SC, February 14, 2012, 665 SCRA 646.
[12] Id. at 651.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I dissent. This Court must vacate its ruling that recognizes justices' and judges' services rendered outside the judiciary in computing longevity pay.
Once again, we are asked to do this on the ground that formerly held executive positions carry the same rank as their counterparts in the judiciary. Former Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad (former Associate Justice Abad) is before this Court requesting that his services in the Office of the Solicitor General from 1975 to 1986 be included in the computation of his longevity pay. He served as this Court's Associate Justice for four (4) years, eight (8) months, and 16 days, which, as the majority points out, "short of the five years required by the law to qualify for longevity pay."[1]
This is not a case of first impression. This Court had previously denied a similar request[2] involving the same factual milieu, albeit reversed on motion for reconsideration. I strongly recommend that we enjoin this baseless practice.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[3] granted monthly longevity pay to members of the judiciary. Initially, the benefit excluded the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court, among others, but was later extended to them through Presidential Decree No. 1927. Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states:
SECTION 42. Longevity Pay. — A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. (Emphasis supplied)
Granted on top of salary, longevity pay is five percent (5%) of the justices' and judges' monthly basic salary "for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary[.]"[4] The salary then "increases by an increment of 5% for every additional cycle of five (5) years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service."[5] It is paid while the official is in service, and becomes part of his or her monthly pension upon retirement or survivorship benefit upon death.[6]
Longevity pay is incurred in favor of a justice or judge during his or her years of actual, active service in the judiciary. Crediting service in the Office of the Solicitor General for longevity pay entails that the government pay the retiree for work that was not rendered in the judiciary. This blatantly contradicts the longevity pay's purpose: to compensate lengthy service "from the lowest to the highest court in the land."[7] As this Court had previously explained:
[T]he payment of longevity pay is premised on a continued, efficient, and meritorious service: (1) in the Judiciary; and (2) of at least five years. Long and continued service in the Judiciary is the basis and reason for the payment of longevity pay; it rewards the loyal and efficient service of the recipient in the Judiciary.[8] (Emphasis supplied)
Fidelity to the letter of the law commands this reading. In no way does this modify the provision or append what was not in it — both of which are undertakings that the Constitution proscribes this Court to do.
Yet, in its Resolution, the majority grants former Associate Justice Abad's request on doubtful grounds.
I
None of the cited laws sanction the practice of crediting service in the executive branch to the length of judiciary service to avail of or increase longevity pay. The laws do not extend the benefit of longevity pay to those of the same rank.
The majority enunciated that "[a]s early as 1916, the Administrative Code of the Philippines provided that the qualifications for appointment to the position of Solicitor General shall be the same as those prescribed for judges of the Courts of First Instance."[9] But having similar qualifications required for two (2) positions is plain, unambiguous, and has nothing to do with our present concern.
Similarly, the majority invoked Presidential Decree No. 1726, which "upgraded the salary of the legal positions in the OSG in a manner similar to that approved for legal positions in the Ministry of Justice[,]"[10] and Executive Order No. 780, series of 1982,[11] which dealt with the salaries of executive officials. These, however, find no application here. It is indefensible to consider that the Office of the Solicitor General or the Ministry of Justice forms part of the judiciary.
The majority enumerated laws that amended the Administrative Code such that they "adjusted upward the judicial rank given to the Solicitor General, First Assistant Solicitor General, and Assistant Solicitors Generals."[12] However, a perusal of the cited laws, Republic Act Nos. 945,[13] 2068,[14] 3465,[15] and 3596,[16] disproves this assertion.
The first two (2) laws provide that the solicitor general shall have the rank of a department undersecretary, and the same qualifications for appointment as a court of first instance judge. The latter two (2) laws uniformly prescribe that the positions of solicitor general, first assistant solicitor general and assistant solicitor general, and solicitor shall be of the same rank and qualifications as those of a Court of Appeals associate justice, court of first instance judge, and provincial fiscals, respectively. I cannot discern in any way how these laws "adjusted upward the judicial rank."
Likewise suspect is the majority's pronouncement that Presidential Decree No. 1347 granted the solicitor general and associate solicitor general "the same rank, prerogatives, and privileges as those of the Presiding Justice"[17] of the Court of Appeals and a court of first instance judge, respectively.
Presidential Decree No. 1347 declared that the solicitor general and assistant solicitors general "shall receive the same monthly allowances" as the Court of Appeals associate justices and courts of first instance judges. To interpret the law such that it granted them "the same rank, prerogatives, and privileges" is to unduly expand its text. In any case, the monthly allowance cannot be construed to include longevity pay, which, again, "is premised on a continued, efficient, and meritorious service: (1) in the Judiciary; and (2) of at least five years."[18] It is not readily granted to all associate justices. It may never be availed by a member of the judiciary who, as in this case, falls short of the required length of service.
As to Republic Act No. 9417, this Court explained in Re: Vicente S.E. Veloso:[19]
RA 9417 passed into law on March 30, 2007. As in the case of RA 9347, this law was passed to address the plight of the members of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) by upgrading their salaries and benefits to improve their efficiency as the Republic's counsel.
. . . .
As in the case of the NLRC, it must again be noted that this enumeration is specific with respect to the benefits granted to members of the OSG: it particularly referred to the benefits to be granted.
Although Section 3 of RA 9417 provides that the Solicitor General shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as the Presiding Justice of the CA (and an Assistant Solicitor General as that of a CA Associate Justice), RA 9417 still allocated express provisions for the other benefits to be enjoyed by the members of the OSG. These provisions are the following:
Section 4- Compensation
Section 5- Benefits and Privileges
Section 6- Seminar and Other Professional Fees
Section 7- Transportation Benefits
Section 8- Other Benefits
Section 10- Grant of Special AllowancesHad Congress really intended to grant the benefit of longevity pay to the members of the OSG, then it should have also included in the list of benefits granted under RA 9417 a provision pertaining to longevity pay. This provision is glaringly missing and thus cannot be included via this Court's decision without running afoul of the rule that prohibits judicial legislation. Nor can this Court recognize the past service rendered by a current judge or justice in the OSG for purposes of longevity pay.
A closer examination of this law shows that what Congress did was to grant benefits that were applicable to the type of service that the OSG provides.
For example, OSG lawyers are entitled to honoraria and allowances from client departments, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government. This benefit is only proper as the main function of the OSG is to act as the counsel of the Government and its officers acting in their official capacity. On the other hand, this benefit is not applicable to members of the Judiciary as they do not act as advocates but rather as impartial judges of the cases before them, for which they are not entitled to honoraria and allowances on a per case basis.
Another indicator that should be considered from the congressional handling of RA 9417 is that Congress did not intend to introduce a strict one-to-one correspondence between the grant of the same salaries and benefits to members of the executive department and of the Judiciary. The congressional approach apparently was for laws granting benefits to be of specific application that pertains to the different departments according to their personnel's needs and activities. No equalization or standardization of benefits was ever intended on a generalized or across-the-board basis.[20] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Simply put, Republic Act No. 9417 did not extend the award of longevity pay to those serving in the Office of the Solicitor General.
In any case, the law was passed on March 30, 2007, long after former Associate Justice Abad had served in the Office of the Solicitor General from 1975 to 1986.[21] In the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in Re: Vicente S.E. Veloso,[22] this Court granted Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan's request to credit her service in the National Labor Relations Commission in computing her longevity pay, as she was still with the Commission upon Republic Act No. 9347's effectivity. In extending her longevity pay, this Court engaged in judicial legislation. Retroactively applying the law to this case now is liberally construing the law further. This should not be countenanced.
II
The majority, citing three (3) cases as examples, spoke of an "enduring practice of including years served outside the Judiciary in positions statutorily given judicial rank in the computation of longevity pay of members of the Bench."[23] These cases deserve scrutiny.
Request of Judge Fernando Santiago for the Inclusion of His Services as Agrarian Counsel in the Computation of His Longevity Pay,[24] for one, was a Minute Resolution that did not cite any law as basis for its approval of Judge Fernando Santiago's request.
Likewise, in a Minute Resolution, this Court in Re: Adjustment of Longevity Pay of Hon. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco[25] approved Justice Emilio Gancayco's request to include his service as chief prosecuting attorney from 1963 to 1972 in computing his longevity pay. It noted that "under Republic Act No. 4140, the Chief State Prosecutor is given the same rank, qualification, and salary" as a court of first instance judge.
In another Minute Resolution in Re: Adjustment of Longevity Pay of former Associate Justice Buenaventura S. dela Fuente,[26] this Court cited the two (2) previous cases in approving Associate Justice Buenaventura dela Fuente's request for re-computation of his longevity pay. It noted that he served as the chief legal counsel of the Department of Justice from 1963 to 1974, which, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 2705 and 4152, had the same rank and salary as "the first and next ranking assistant solicitors general."
Parity in rank, salary, or benefit, or having the same "judicial rank," does not equate to service in the judiciary, which is the one that longevity pay seeks to reward.
Finally, the majority quotes[27] portions of former Chief Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro's ponencia in the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in Re: Vicente S.E. Veloso.[28] I reiterate former Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion's position[29] on these justifications:
Laws subsequent to BP 129 conferred the same salaries and benefits granted to members of the judiciary, and to certain public officials in the executive who had been given ranks equivalent to those granted in the judiciary. The Court clarified in the June 16, 2015 Resolution that these laws do not expand the concept of longevity pay as provided in Section 42 of BP 129, and do not operate to include services in executive positions in determining the grant of longevity pay.
The Court reached this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The Grant of Longevity Pay is only for Judges and Justices for Service in the Judiciary.
The language and terms of Section 42 of BP 129 are very clear and unambiguous. A plain reading of Section 42 shows that it grants longevity pay to a judge or justice (and to none other) who has rendered five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The granted monthly longevity pay is equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay.
Notably, Section 42 of BP 129 on longevity pay is separate from the provision on the salary of members of the judiciary found in Section 41 of BP 129. This separate placement reflects the longevity pay's status as a separate benefit for members of the judiciary who have rendered "continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary;" longevity pay is not part of the salary that judges and justices are granted under Section 41.
In other words, all judges and justices are entitled to the salary prescribed for them under Section 41 of BP 129, but only those who have complied with the requisites of Section 42 are entitled to receive the additional longevity pay benefit.
Thus, when Section 42 of BP 129 required that the total salary of judges and justices receiving longevity pay should not exceed the salary of those next in rank, it simply meant that the addition of longevity pay cannot result in judges and justices of lower rank receiving a bigger total compensation than those with higher rank.
The salary of judges and justices depend on the salary grade (and subsequent step increments) of their positions under the Compensation and Classification System referred to in Section 41 of BP 129. The proviso in Section 42 of the same law operates to limit the amount of longevity pay granted when it disrupts the compensation system referred to in Section 41. It does not integrate longevity pay in the salary due to judges and justices under the compensation system, as not all of them are entitled to receive longevity pay in the first place.
2. Justice Gacutan's Request has no Basis in Law.
The inclusion of past services in another branch of government in the computation of longevity pay in the judiciary has no express basis in law.
. . . .
In Justice Gacutan's case, her services as past National Labor Relations Commission Commissioner (NLRC) places her under the operation of Republic Act No. 9347 (RA No. 9347), which amended Article 216 of the Labor Code to read:
ART. 216. Salaries, benefits and other emoluments. — The Chairman and members of the Commission shall have the same rank, receive an annual salary equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances, retirement and benefits as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, respectively. Labor Arbiters shall have the same rank, receive an annual salary equivalent to and be entitled to the same allowances, retirement and other benefits and privileges as those of the judges of the regional trial courts. In no case, however, shall the provision of this Article result in the diminution of the existing salaries, allowances and benefits of the aforementioned officials.
The "salary" that Article 216 of the Labor Code speaks of pertains to the "compensation and allowances" under Section 41 of BP 129, as found in the salary schedule of the government's Compensation and Position Classification System. Thus, Article 216 provided NLRC commissioners with the same salary received by Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals as prescribed in the salary schedule found in the government's Compensation and Position Classification System.
. . . .
As an additional benefit, NLRC commissioners may be granted the longevity pay that judges and justices receive under Section 42 of BP 129, for the commissioners' meritorious, efficient, and continuous service in the NLRC. But this is for CONGRESS, NOT FOR THIS COURT, to decide upon and grant. The grant to the members of the Executive Department of this kind of benefit is an act that the Constitution exclusively assigns to Congress. This is an authority and prerogative that the Constitution exclusively grants to Congress.
To recapitulate, RA No. 9347 merely used the salary, allowances, and benefits received by CA Justices as a yardstick for the salary, allowances, and benefits to be received by NLRC commissioners. This is what RA No. 9347 meant when it granted NLRC commissioners the same salary, allowances, and benefits as CA Associate Justices.
The grant of an equivalent judicial rank does not (and cannot) make an official in the executive a member of the judiciary; thus, benefits that accrue only to members of the judiciary cannot be granted to executive officials. This is a consequence of the separation of powers principle that underlies the Constitution.
In more concrete terms, incumbent judges and justices who had previous government service outside the judiciary and who had been granted equivalent judicial rank under these previous positions, cannot credit their past non-judicial service as service in the judiciary for purposes of securing benefits applicable only and earned while a member of the judiciary, unless Congress by law says otherwise and only for purposes of entitlement to salaries and benefits.
3. The Grant of Longevity Pay Prayed for is an Act of Judicial Legislation.
The grant of longevity pay for past services in the NLRC, based on the grant of longevity pay to judges and justices of the judiciary, amounts to prohibited judicial legislation.
. . . .
It must be pointed out that the grant of the requested longevity pay can be a blow disastrous to the reputation of the judiciary and to this Court's role as the final authority in interpreting the Constitution, when the public realizes that this Court engaged in judicial legislation, through interpretation, to undeservedly favor its own judges and justices.
4. A Grant would effectively be a Misplaced Exercise of Liberality at the Expense of Public Funds and to the Prejudice of Sectors who are More in Need of these Funds.
. . . .
The Court should not forget that liberality is not a magic wand that can ward off the clear terms and import of express legal provisions; it has a place only when, between two positions that the law can both accommodate, the Court chooses the more expansive or more generous option. It has no place where no choice is available at all because the terms of the law are clear and do not at all leave room for discretion.
In terms of the longevity pay's purpose, liberality has no place where service is not to the judiciary, as the element of loyalty — the virtue that longevity pay rewards — is not at all present.
I cannot overemphasize too that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should not be to the point of engaging in judicial legislation — an act that the Constitution absolutely forbids this Court to do. The Court may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or include, under its terms, situations that were not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. The Court cannot rewrite the law to conform to what it or certain of its Members think should be the law.
Not to be forgotten is the effect of this Court's grant on the use of public funds: funds granted to other than the legitimate beneficiaries are misdirected funds that may be put to better use by those sectors of society who need them more.[30] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
By legal fiction, this Court would have assumed that former Associate Justice Abad served in the judiciary from 1975 to 1986, when he had been employed in the Office of the Solicitor General. Moreover, we would have construed his time there as part of his "continuous service in the judiciary," where he served from 2009 to 2014, much later than his years in the executive positions.
This reading is unconstitutional. While this Court generally adopts a liberal approach in construing retirement laws, we cannot countenance judicial legislation for the self-serving interest of our members.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY former Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad's request that his services in the Office of the Solicitor General be included in the computation of his longevity pay.
[1] Resolution, p. 2.
[2] Re: Vicente S.E. Veloso, 760 Phil. 62, 108 (2015) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[3] The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (1981).
[4] Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981), sec. 42.
[5] Re: Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Adm. Matter No. 15-11-01-SC, March 6, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63859> [Per J. Martires, En Banc].
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Re: Vicente S.E. Veloso, 760 Phil. 62, 108 (2015) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[9] Resolution, p. 5.
[10] Id. at 6.
[11] Id. at 7. The majority stated that the executive order "reinforced the intention to align the salaries of the Solicitors and lawyers in the OSG with the lawyers in the Ministry of Justice (now the Department of Justice) in the light of new salary rates under P.D. 1726."
[12] Id. at 5.
[13] Republic Act No. 945 (1953), sec. 1 partly provides:
SECTION 1. Section one thousand six hundred and fifty-nine of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 1659. Chief Officials of Office of the Solicitor General. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall have one chief to be known as the Solicitor General whose salary shall be twelve thousand per annum and shall have the rank of an Undersecretary of a Department. . . .
. . . .
"The qualifications for appointment to the position of Solicitor General, the First Assistant Solicitor General and the four Assistant Solicitors General shall be the same as those prescribed for Judges of Courts of First Instance and those of Solicitors shall be the same as those prescribed for provincial fiscals."
[14] Republic Act No. 2068 (1958), sec. 1 partly provides:
SECTION 1. Section sixteen hundred fifty-nine of the Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred forty-five, is further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 1659. Chief Officials of Office of the Solicitor General. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall have one chief to be known as the Solicitor General whose salary shall be twelve thousand pesos per annum and shall have the rank of an Undersecretary of a Department. . . .
. . . .
"The qualifications for appointment to the position of Solicitor General, the First Assistant Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General shall be the same as those prescribed for Judges of Courts of First Instance, and those of Solicitors shall be the same as those prescribed for provincial fiscals, except those for Solicitors mentioned in paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section which must be actual practice of law for at least three years or having occupied a position requiring a lawyer's diploma for the same period."
[15] Republic Act No. 3465 (1962), sec. 1 partly provides:
"The rank and qualifications for appointment to the position of Solicitor General shall be the same as an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals; the rank and qualifications for appointment to the position of the First Assistant Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General shall be the same as those prescribed for Judges of Courts of First Instance, and those Solicitors shall be the same as those prescribed for provincial fiscals."
[16] Republic Act No. 3596 (1963), sec. 1 partly provides:
"Sec. 1569. Chief Officials of the Office of the Solicitor General. — The office of the Solicitor General shall have one chief to be known as the Solicitor General whose salary shall be the same as that of a justice of the court of appeals. He shall be assisted by one First Assistant Solicitor General who shall have the same salary as that of a judge of the court of first instance. . . .
. . . .
"The rank and qualifications for appointment to the position of Solicitor General shall be the same as an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals; the rank and qualifications for appointment to the position of the First Assistant Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General shall be the same as those prescribed for Judges of Courts of First Instance, and those of Solicitors shall be the same as those prescribed for provincial fiscals."
[17] Resolution, p. 6.
[18] Re: Vicente S.E. Veloso, 760 Phil. 62, 108 (2015) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[19] 760 Phil. 62 (2015) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[20] Id. at 116-120.
[21] Resolution, p. 1.
[22] 791 Phil. 177 (2016) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[23] Resolution, pp. 9-10.
[24] Adm. Matter No. 85-8-8334-RTC, September 12, 1985 Resolution [En Banc].
[25] July 25, 1991 Resolution [En Banc].
[26] November 19, 1992 Resolution [En Banc].
[27] Resolution, pp. 4-5.
[28] 791 Phil. 177 (2016) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[29] Id. at 203-212.
[30] Id. at 206-212.