679 Phil. 508
VELASCO JR., J.:
1) Partial Summary Judgment[6] dated July 11, 2003, as reiterated in a resolution[7] of December 28, 2004, denying COCOFED's motion for reconsideration, and the May 11, 2007 resolution denying COCOFED's motion to set case for trial and declaring the partial summary judgment final and appealable,[8] all issued in Civil Case No. 0033-A; and
2) Partial Summary Judgment[9] dated May 7, 2004, as also reiterated in a resolution[10] of December 28, 2004, and the May 11, 2007 resolution[11] issued in Civil Case No. 0033-F. The December 28, 2004 resolution denied COCOFED's Class Action Omnibus Motion therein praying to dismiss CC Case No. 0033-F on jurisdictional ground and alternatively, reconsideration and to set case for trial. The May 11, 2007 resolution declared the judgment final and appealable.
It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at a preferential rates; that this policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by the implementation of the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of Coconut Farmers" executed by the [PCA]...; and that the [PCA] is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers....
ARTICLE III
Levies
Section 1. Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy. -- The [PCA] is hereby empowered to impose and collect ... the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy ........
Section 5. Exemption. -- The [CCSF] and the [CIDF] as well as all disbursements as herein authorized, shall not be construed ... as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation of PD 711; ... the intention being that said Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by them in their private capacities: .... (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 2. Organization of the Cooperative Endeavor. - The [UCPB], in its capacity as the investment arm of the coconut farmers thru the [CIIF] ... is hereby directed to invest, on behalf of the coconut farmers, such portion of the CIIF ... in private corporations ... under the following guidelines:
a) The coconut farmers shall own or control at least ... (50%) of the outstanding voting capital stock of the private corporation [acquired] thru the CIIF and/or corporation owned or controlled by the farmers thru the CIIF .... (Words in bracket added.)
1. On the postulate, inter alia, that its coco-farmer members own at least 51% of the outstanding capital stock of UCPB, the CIIF companies, etc., COCOFED et al., on November 29, 1989, filed Class Action Omnibus Motion praying for the lifting of the orders of sequestration referred to above and for a chance to present evidence to prove the coconut farmers' ownership of the UCPB and CIIF shares. The plea to present evidence was denied;
2. Later, the Republic moved for and secured approval of a motion for separate trial which paved the way for the subdivision of the causes of action in CC 0033, each detailing how the assets subject thereof were acquired and the key roles the principal played;
3. Civil Case 0033, pursuant to an order of the Sandiganbayan would be subdivided into eight complaints, docketed as CC 0033-A to CC 0033-H.[38]
Lobregat, Ballares et al., COCOFED, et al., on the strength of their authority to intervene in CC 0033, continued to participate in CC 0033-A where one of the issues raised was the misuse of the names/identities of the over a million coconut farmers;[39]
4. On February 23, 2001, Lobregat, COCOFED, Ballares et al., filed a Class Action Omnibus Motion to enjoin the PCGG from voting the sequestered UCPB shares and the SMC shares registered in the names of the CIIF companies. The Sandiganbayan, by Order of February 28, 2001, granted the motion, sending the Republic to come to this Court on certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 147062-64, to annul said order; and
5. By Decision of December 14, 2001, in G.R. Nos. 147062-64 (Republic v. COCOFED), [40] the Court declared the coco levy funds as prima facie public funds. And purchased as the sequestered UCPB shares were by such funds, beneficial ownership thereon and the corollary voting rights prima facie pertain, according to the Court, to the government.
1) The farmers' UCPB shares were originally registered in the name of PCA for the eventual free distribution thereof to and registration in the individual names of the coconut farmers in accordance with PD 755 and the IRR that PCA shall issue;
2) Pursuant to the stock distribution procedures set out in PCA Administrative Order No. 1, s. of 1975, (PCA AO 1),[44] farmers who had paid to the CIF under RA 6260 and registered their COCOFUND (CIF) receipts with PCA were given their corresponding UCPB stock certificates. As of June 1976, the cut-off date for the extended registration, only 16 million worth of COCOFUND receipts were registered, leaving over 50 million shares undistributed;
3) PCA would later pass Res. 074-78, s. of 1978, to allocate the 50 million undistributed shares to (a) farmers who were already recipients thereof and (b) qualified farmers to be identified by COCOFED after a national census.
4) As of May 1981, some 15.6 million shares were still held by and registered in the name of COCOFED "in behalf of coconut farmers" for distribution immediately after the completion of the national census, to all those determined by the PCA to be bonafide coconut farmers, but who have not received the bank shares;[45] and
5) Prior to June 1986, a large number of coconut farmers opted to sell all/part of their UCPB shares below their par value. This prompted the UCPB Board to authorize the CIIF companies to buy these shares. Some 40.34 million common voting shares of UCPB ended up with these CIIF companies albeit initially registered in the name of UCPB.
- That Section 2 of [PD] 755, Section 5, Article III of P.D. 961 and Section 5, Article III of P.D. No. 1468 are unconstitutional;
- That ... (CIF) payments under ... (R.A.) No. 6260 are not valid and legal bases for ownership claims over UCPB shares; and
- That COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al. have not legally and validly obtained title over the subject UCPB shares.
As culled from the exhaustive discussions and manifestations of the parties in open court of their respective pleadings and evidence on record, the facts which exist without any substantial controversy are set forth hereunder, together with the admissions and/or the extent or scope of the admissions made by the parties relating to the relevant facts:
1. The late President Ferdinand E. Marcos was President ... for two terms . . . and, during the second term, ... declared Martial Law through Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972.
2. On January 17, 1973, [he] issued Proclamation No. 1102 announcing the ratification of the 1973 Constitution.
3. From January 17, 1973 to April 7, 1981, [he] . . .exercised the powers and prerogative of President under the 1935 Constitution and the powers and prerogative of President . . . the 1973 Constitution.
[He] ...promulgated various [P.D.s], among which were P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 276, P.D. No. 414, P.D. No. 755, P.D. No. 961 and P.D. No. 1468.
4. On April 17, 1981, amendments to the 1973 Constitution were effected and, on June 30, 1981, [he], after being elected President, "reassumed the title and exercised the powers of the President until 25 February 1986."
5. Defendants Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. were [PCA] Directors ... during the period 1970 to 1986....
6. Plaintiff admits the existence of the following agreements which are attached as Annexes "A" and "B" to the Opposition dated October 10, 2002 of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. to the above-cited Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:a) "Agreement made and entered into this ______ day of May, 1975 at Makati, Rizal, Philippines, by and between:
PEDRO COJUANGCO, Filipino, x x x, for and in his own behalf and in behalf of certain other stockholders of First United Bank listed in Annex "A" attached hereto (hereinafter collectively called the SELLERS);- and -
EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR., Filipino, x x x, represented in this act by his duly authorized attorney-in-fact, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, for and in his own behalf and in behalf of certain other buyers, (hereinafter collectively called the BUYERS)";WITNESSETH: That
WHEREAS, the SELLERS own of record and beneficially a total of 137,866 shares of stock, with a par value of P100.00 each, of the common stock of the First United Bank (the "Bank"), a commercial banking corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the BUYERS desire to purchase, and the SELLERS are willing to sell, the aforementioned shares of stock totaling 137,866 shares (hereinafter called the "Contract Shares") owned by the SELLERS due to their special relationship to EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR.;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants herein contained, the parties agree as follows:
1. Sale and Purchase of Contract Shares
Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the SELLERS hereby sell, assign, transfer and convey unto the BUYERS, and the BUYERS hereby purchase and acquire, the Contract Shares free and clear of all liens and encumbrances thereon.
2. Contract Price
The purchase price per share of the Contract Shares payable by the BUYERS is P200.00 or an aggregate price of P27,573,200.00 (the "Contract Price").
3. Delivery of, and payment for, stock certificates
Upon the execution of this Agreement, (i) the SELLERS shall deliver to the BUYERS the stock certificates representing the Contract Shares, free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, obligations, liabilities and other burdens in favor of the Bank or third parties, duly endorsed in blank or with stock powers sufficient to transfer the shares to bearer; and (ii) BUYERS shall deliver to the SELLERS P27,511,295.50 representing the Contract Price less the amount of stock transfer taxes payable by the SELLERS, which the BUYERS undertake to remit to the appropriate authorities. (Emphasis added.)
4. Representation and Warranties of Sellers
The SELLERS respectively and independently of each other represent and warrant that:
(a) The SELLERS are the lawful owners of, with good marketable title to, the Contract Shares and that (i) the certificates to be delivered pursuant thereto have been validly issued and are fully paid and no-assessable; (ii) the Contract Shares are free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, obligations, liabilities and other burdens in favor of the Bank or third parties...
This representation shall survive the execution and delivery of this Agreement and the consummation or transfer hereby contemplated.
(b) The execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement by the SELLERS does not conflict with or constitute any breach of any provision in any agreement to which they are a party or by which they may be bound.
(c) They have complied with the condition set forth in Article X of the Amended Articles of Incorporation of the Bank.
5. Representation of BUYERS ....
6. Implementation
The parties hereto hereby agree to execute or cause to be executed such documents and instruments as may be required in order to carry out the intent and purpose of this Agreement.
7. Notices ....
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands at the place and on the date first above written.
PEDRO COJUANGCO EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR. (on his own behalf and in behalf of the other Sellers listed in Annex "A" hereof)(BUYERS) (on his own behalf and in behalf of the other Buyers) (SELLERS) By:EDGARDO J. ANGARA
Attorney-in-Fact... ... ...
b) "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of the Philippines, made and entered into this 25th day of May 1975 at Makati, Rizal, Philippines, by and between:
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., x x x, hereinafter referred to as the SELLER;- and -
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, a public corporation created by Presidential Decree No. 232, as amended, for itself and for the benefit of the coconut farmers of the Philippines, (hereinafter called the BUYER)"WITNESSETH: That
WHEREAS, on May 17, 1975, the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation ("PCPF"), through its Board of Directors, expressed the desire of the coconut farmers to own a commercial bank which will be an effective instrument to solve the perennial credit problems and, for that purpose, passed a resolution requesting the PCA to negotiate with the SELLER for the transfer to the coconut farmers of the SELLER's option to buy the First United Bank (the "Bank") under such terms and conditions as BUYER may deem to be in the best interest of the coconut farmers and instructed Mrs. Maria Clara Lobregat to convey such request to the BUYER;
WHEREAS, the PCPF further instructed Mrs. Maria Clara Lobregat to make representations with the BUYER to utilize its funds to finance the purchase of the Bank;
WHEREAS, the SELLER has the exclusive and personal option to buy 144,400 shares (the "Option Shares") of the Bank, constituting 72.2% of the present outstanding shares of stock of the Bank, at the price of P200.00 per share, which option only the SELLER can validly exercise;
WHEREAS, in response to the representations made by the coconut farmers, the BUYER has requested the SELLER to exercise his personal option for the benefit of the coconut farmers;
WHEREAS, the SELLER is willing to transfer the Option Shares to the BUYER at a price equal to his option price of P200 per share;
WHEREAS, recognizing that ownership by the coconut farmers of a commercial bank is a permanent solution to their perennial credit problems, that it will accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry and that the policy of the state which the BUYER is required to implement is to achieve vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, the request of PCPF that it acquire a commercial bank to be owned by the coconut farmers and, appropriated, for that purpose, the sum of P150 Million to enable the farmers to buy the Bank and capitalize the Bank to such an extension as to be in a position to adopt a credit policy for the coconut farmers at preferential rates;
WHEREAS, x x x the BUYER is willing to subscribe to additional shares ("Subscribed Shares") and place the Bank in a more favorable financial position to extend loans and credit facilities to coconut farmers at preferential rates;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the other terms and conditions hereinafter contained, the parties hereby declare and affirm that their principal contractual intent is (1) to ensure that the coconut farmers own at least 60% of the outstanding capital stock of the Bank; and (2) that the SELLER shall receive compensation for exercising his personal and exclusive option to acquire the Option Shares, for transferring such shares to the coconut farmers at the option price of P200 per share, and for performing the management services required of him hereunder.
1. To ensure that the transfer to the coconut farmers of the Option Shares is effected with the least possible delay and to provide for the faithful performance of the obligations of the parties hereunder, the parties hereby appoint the Philippine National Bank as their escrow agent (the "Escrow Agent").
Upon execution of this Agreement, the BUYER shall deposit with the Escrow Agent such amount as may be necessary to implement the terms of this Agreement....
2. As promptly as practicable after execution of this Agreement, the SELLER shall exercise his option to acquire the Option Share and SELLER shall immediately thereafter deliver and turn over to the Escrow Agent such stock certificates as are herein provided to be received from the existing stockholders of the Bank by virtue of the exercise on the aforementioned option....
3. To ensure the stability of the Bank and continuity of management and credit policies to be adopted for the benefit of the coconut farmers, the parties undertake to cause the stockholders and the Board of Directors of the Bank to authorize and approve a management contract between the Bank and the SELLER under the following terms:(a) The management contract shall be for a period of five (5) years, renewable for another five (5) years by mutual agreement of the SELLER and the Bank;
(b) The SELLER shall be elected President and shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board of Directors. While serving in such capacity, he shall be entitled to such salaries and emoluments as the Board of Directors may determine;
(c) The SELLER shall recruit and develop a professional management team to manage and operate the Bank under the control and supervision of the Board of Directors of the Bank;
(d) The BUYER undertakes to cause three (3) persons designated by the SELLER to be elected to the Board of Directors of the Bank;
(e) The SELLER shall receive no compensation for managing the Bank, other than such salaries or emoluments to which he may be entitled by virtue of the discharge of his function and duties as President, provided ... and
(f) The management contract may be assigned to a management company owned and controlled by the SELLER.
4. As compensation for exercising his personal and exclusive option to acquire the Option Shares and for transferring such shares to the coconut farmers, as well as for performing the management services required of him, SELLER shall receive equity in the Bank amounting, in the aggregate, to 95,304 fully paid shares in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 6 below;
5. In order to comply with the Central Bank program for increased capitalization of banks and to ensure that the Bank will be in a more favorable financial position to attain its objective to extend to the coconut farmers loans and credit facilities, the BUYER undertakes to subscribe to shares with an aggregate par value of P80,864,000 (the "Subscribed Shares"). The obligation of the BUYER with respect to the Subscribed Shares shall be as follows:(a) The BUYER undertakes to subscribe, for the benefit of the coconut farmers, to shares with an aggregate par value of P15,884,000 from the present authorized but unissued shares of the Bank; and
(b) The BUYER undertakes to subscribe, for the benefit of the coconut farmers, to shares with an aggregate par value of P64,980,000 from the increased capital stock of the Bank, which subscriptions shall be deemed made upon the approval by the stockholders of the increase of the authorized capital stock of the Bank from P50 Million to P140 Million.
The parties undertake to declare stock dividends of P8 Million out of the present authorized but unissued capital stock of P30 Million.
6. To carry into effect the agreement of the parties that the SELLER shall receive as his compensation 95,304 shares:(a) ....
(b) With respect to the Subscribed Shares, the BUYER undertakes, in order to prevent the dilution of SELLER's equity position, that it shall cede over to the SELLER 64,980 fully-paid shares out of the Subscribed Shares. Such undertaking shall be complied with in the following manner: ....
7. The parties further undertake that the Board of Directors and management of the Bank shall establish and implement a loan policy for the Bank of making available for loans at preferential rates of interest to the coconut farmers ....
8. The BUYER shall expeditiously distribute from time to time the shares of the Bank, that shall be held by it for the benefit of the coconut farmers of the Philippines under the provisions of this Agreement, to such, coconut farmers holding registered COCOFUND receipts on such equitable basis as may be determine by the BUYER in its sound discretion.
9. ....
10. To ensure that not only existing but future coconut farmers shall be participants in and beneficiaries of the credit policies, and shall be entitled to the benefit of loans and credit facilities to be extended by the Bank to coconut farmers at preferential rates, the shares held by the coconut farmers shall not be entitled to pre-emptive rights with respect to the unissued portion of the authorized capital stock or any increase thereof.
11. After the parties shall have acquired two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding shares of the Bank, the parties shall call a special stockholders' meeting of the Bank:(a) To classify the present authorized capital stock of P50,000,000 divided into 500,000 shares, with a par value of P100.00 per share into: 361,000 Class A shares, with an aggregate par value of P36,100,000 and 139,000 Class B shares, with an aggregate par value of P13,900,000. All of the Option Shares constituting 72.2% of the outstanding shares, shall be classified as Class A shares and the balance of the outstanding shares, constituting 27.8% of the outstanding shares, as Class B shares;
(b) To amend the articles of incorporation of the Bank to effect the following changes:(i) change of corporate name to First United Coconut Bank;
(ii) replace the present provision restricting the transferability of the shares with a limitation on ownership by any individual or entity to not more than 10% of the outstanding shares of the Bank;
(iii) provide that the holders of Class A shares shall not be entitled to pre-emptive rights with respect to the unissued portion of the authorized capital stock or any increase thereof; and
(iv) provide that the holders of Class B shares shall be absolutely entitled to pre-emptive rights, with respect to the unissued portion of Class B shares comprising part of the authorized capital stock or any increase thereof, to subscribe to Class B shares in proportion t the subscriptions of Class A shares, and to pay for their subscriptions to Class B shares within a period of five (5) years from the call of the Board of Directors.(f) To authorize and approve the management contract provided in paragraph 2 above.
(c) To increase the authorized capital stock of the Bank from P50 Million to P140 Million....;
(d) To declare a stock dividend of P8 Million payable to the SELLER, the BUYER and other stockholders of the Bank out of the present authorized but unissued capital stock of P30 Million;
(e) To amend the by-laws of the Bank accordingly; and
The parties agree that they shall vote their shares and take all the necessary corporate action in order to carry into effect the foregoing provisions of this paragraph 11 ....
12. It is the contemplation of the parties that the Bank shall achieve a financial and equity position to be able to lend to the coconut farmers at preferential rates.
In order to achieve such objective, the parties shall cause the Bank to adopt a policy of reinvestment, by way of stock dividends, of such percentage of the profits of the Bank as may be necessary.
13. The parties agree to execute or cause to be executed such documents and instruments as may be required in order to carry out the intent and purpose of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, ...PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
(BUYER)
By:
EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR. MARIA CLARA L. LOBREGAT
(SELLER)... ... ...
7. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the ... (PCA) was the "other buyers" represented by .... Cojuangco, Jr. in the May 1975 Agreement entered into between Pedro Cojuangco (on his own behalf and in behalf of other sellers listed in Annex "A" of the agreement) and ... Cojuangco, Jr. (on his own behalf and in behalf of the other buyers). Defendant Cojuangco insists he was the "only buyer" under the aforesaid Agreement.
8. .....
9. Defendants Lobregat, et al., and COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al. admit that in addition to the 137,866 FUB shares of Pedro Cojuangco, et al. covered by the Agreement, other FUB stockholders sold their shares to PCA such that the total number of FUB shares purchased by PCA ... increased from 137,866 shares to 144,400 shares, the OPTION SHARES referred to in the Agreement of May 25, 1975. Defendant Cojuangco did not make said admission as to the said 6,534 shares in excess of the 137,866 shares covered by the Agreement with Pedro Cojuangco.
10. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the Agreement, described in Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 755 dated July 29, 1975 as the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of Coconut Farmers" executed by the Philippine Coconut Authority" and incorporated in Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 by reference, refers to the "AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A COMMERCIAL BANK FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COCONUT FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES" dated May 25, 1975 between defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and the [PCA] (Annex "B" for defendant Cojuangco's OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [RE: EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.] dated September 18, 2002).
Plaintiff refused to make the same admission.
11. ... the Court takes judicial notice that P.D. No. 755 was published [in] ... volume 71 of the Official Gazette but the text of the agreement ... was not so published with P.D. No. 755.
12. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the PCA used public funds, ... in the total amount of P150 million, to purchase the FUB shares amounting to 72.2% of the authorized capital stock of the FUB, although the PCA was later reimbursed from the coconut levy funds and that the PCA subscription in the increased capitalization of the FUB, which was later renamed the ... (UCPB), came from the said coconut levy funds....
13. Pursuant to the May 25, 1975 Agreement, out of the 72.2% shares of the authorized and the increased capital stock of the FUB (later UCPB), entirely paid for by PCA, 64.98% of the shares were placed in the name of the "PCA for the benefit of the coconut farmers" and 7,22% were given to defendant Cojuangco. The remaining 27.8% shares of stock in the FUB which later became the UCPB were not covered by the two (2) agreements referred to in item no. 6, par. (a) and (b) above.
"There were shares forming part of the aforementioned 64.98% which were later sold or transferred to non-coconut farmers.
14. Under the May 27, 1975 Agreement, defendant Cojuangco's equity in the FUB (now UCPB) was ten percent (10%) of the shares of stock acquired by the PCA for the benefit of the coconut farmers.
15. That the fully paid 95.304 shares of the FUB, later the UCPB, acquired by defendant ... Cojuangco, Jr. pursuant to the May 25, 1975 Agreement were paid for by the PCA in accordance with the terms and conditions provided in the said Agreement.
16. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the affidavits of the coconut farmers (specifically, Exhibit "1-Farmer" to "70-Farmer") uniformly state that:
- they are coconut farmers who sold coconut products;
- in the sale thereof, they received COCOFUND receipts pursuant to R.A. No. 6260;
- they registered the said COCOFUND receipts; and
- by virtue thereof, and under R.A. No. 6260, P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468, they are allegedly entitled to the subject UCPB shares.
but subject to the following qualifications:
- there were other coconut farmers who received UCPB shares although they did not present said COCOFUND receipt because the PCA distributed the unclaimed UCPB shares not only to those who already received their UCPB shares in exchange for their COCOFUND receipts but also to the coconut farmers determined by a national census conducted pursuant to PCA administrative issuances;
- [t]here were other affidavits executed by Lobregat, Eleazar, Ballares and Aldeguer relative to the said distribution of the unclaimed UCPB shares; and
- the coconut farmers claim the UCPB shares by virtue of their compliance not only with the laws mentioned in item (d) above but also with the relevant issuances of the PCA such as, PCA Administrative Order No. 1, dated August 20, 1975 (Exh. "298-Farmer"); PCA Resolution No. 033-78 dated February 16, 1978....
The plaintiff did not make any admission as to the foregoing qualifications.
17. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. claim that the UCPB shares in question have legitimately become the private properties of the 1,405,366 coconut farmers solely on the basis of their having acquired said shares in compliance with R.A. No. 6260, P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 and the administrative issuances of the PCA cited above.
18. .....
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:... ... ...
A. Re: CLASS ACTION MOTION FOR A SEPARATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT dated April 11, 2001 filed by Defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al.
The Class Action Motion for Separate Summary Judgment dated April 11, 2001 filed by defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al., is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
B. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: COCOFED, ET AL. AND BALLARES, ET AL.) dated April 22, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.
- a. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755, taken in relation to Section 2 of the same P.D., is unconstitutional: (i) for having allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined "coconut farmers", which negated or circumvented the national policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755 to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve its vertical integration; and (ii) for having unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA.
b. The implementing regulations issued by PCA, namely, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78 are likewise invalid for their failure to see to it that the distribution of shares serve exclusively or at least primarily or directly the aforementioned public purpose or national policy declared by P.D. No. 755.- Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which mandated that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and/or fiduciary funds nor part of the general funds of the national government and similar provisions of Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 961 and Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 1468 contravene the provisions of the Constitution, particularly, Art. IX (D), Sec. 2; and Article VI, Sec. 29 (3).
- Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. have not legally and validly obtained title of ownership over the subject UCPB shares by virtue of P.D. No. 755, the Agreement dated May 25, 1975 between the PCA and defendant Cojuangco, and PCA implementing rules, namely, Adm. Order No. 1, s. 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78.
- The so-called "Farmers' UCPB shares" covered by 64.98% of the UCPB shares of stock, which formed part of the 72.2% of the shares of stock of the former FUB and now of the UCPB, the entire consideration of which was charged by PCA to the CCSF, are hereby declared conclusively owned by, the Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.
C. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.) dated September 18, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.
- Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 755 did not validate the Agreement between PCA and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 nor did it give the Agreement the binding force of a law because of the non-publication of the said Agreement.
- Regarding the questioned transfer of the shares of stock of FUB (later UCPB) by PCA to defendant Cojuangco or the so-called "Cojuangco UCPB shares" which cost the PCA more than Ten Million Pesos in CCSF in 1975, we declare, that the transfer of the following FUB/UCPB shares to defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. was not supported by valuable consideration, and therefore null and void:
a. The 14,400 shares from the "Option Shares";
b. Additional Bank Shares Subscribed and Paid by PCA, consisting of:
1. Fifteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Four (15,884) shares out of the authorized but unissued shares of the bank, subscribed and paid by PCA;
2. Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty (64,980) shares of the increased capital stock subscribed and paid by PCA; and
3. Stock dividends declared pursuant to paragraph 5 and paragraph 11 (iv) (d) of the Agreement.- The above-mentioned shares of stock of the FUB/UCPB transferred to defendant Cojuangco are hereby declared conclusively owned by the Republic of the Philippines.
- The UCPB shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form part of the 72.2% shares of the FUB/UCPB paid for by the PCA with public funds later charged to the coconut levy funds, particularly the CCSF, belong to the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as their true and beneficial owner.
Let trial of this Civil Case proceed with respect to the issues which have not been disposed of in this Partial Summary Judgment. For this purpose, the plaintiff's Motion Ad Cautelam to Present Additional Evidence dated March 28, 2001 is hereby GRANTED.
1) Declaring Section 5 of Article III of P.D. No. 961 (Coconut Industry Code) and Section 5 of Article III of P.D. No. 1468 (Revised Coconut Industry Code) to be unconstitutional; 2) Declaring that CIF payments under RA No. 6260 are not valid and legal bases for ownership claims over the CIIF companies and, ultimately, the CIIF block of SMC shares; and 3) Ordering the reconveyance of the CIIF companies, the 14 holding companies, and the 27% CIIF block of San Miguel Corporation shares of stocks in favor of the government and declaring the ownership thereof to belong to the government in trust for all the coconut farmers.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hold that:
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants CIIF Companies, 14 Holding Companies and Cocofed et al.) filed by Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, THE CIIF COMPANIES, namely:
- Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills (SOLCOM);
- Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc. (CAGOIL);
- Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc. (ILICOCO);
- San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. (SPMC);
- Granexport Manufacturing Corp. (GRANEX); and
- Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. (LEGOIL),
AS WELL AS THE 14 HOLDING COMPANIES, NAMELY:
- Soriano Shares, Inc.;
- ACS Investors, Inc.;
- Roxas Shares, Inc.;
- Arc Investors, Inc.;
- Toda Holdings, Inc.;
- AP Holdings, Inc.;
- Fernandez Holdings, Inc.;
- SMC Officers Corps, Inc.;
- Te Deum Resources, Inc.;
- Anglo Ventures, Inc.;
- Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.;
- Rock Steel Resources, Inc.;
- Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and
- First Meridian Development, Inc.
AND THE CIIF BLOCK OF SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (SMC) SHARES OF STOCK TOTALLING 33,133,266 SHARES AS OF 1983 ... ARE DECLARED OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN TRUST FOR ALL THE COCONUT FARMERS GOVERNMENT AND ORDERDED RECONVEYED TO THE GOVERNMENT.[58] (Emphasis and capitalization in the original; underscoring added.)
Let the trial of this Civil Case proceed with respect to the issues which have not been disposed of in this Partial Summary Judgment, including the determination of whether the CIIF Block of SMC Shares adjudged to be owned by the Government represents 27% of the issued and outstanding capital stock of SMC according to plaintiff or to 31.3% of said capital stock according to COCOFED, et al and Ballares, et al.
SO ORDERED.
I. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred ... when it refused to acknowledge that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the ill-gotten wealth cases because the respondent Republic failed to prove, and did not even attempt to prove, the jurisdictional fact that the sequestered assets constitute ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and Cojuangco. Being without subject matter jurisdiction over the ill-gotten wealth cases, a defect previously pointed out and repeatedly assailed by COCOFED, et al., the assailed PSJs and the assailed Resolutions are all null and void.A. Insofar as the ill-gotten wealth cases are concerned, the Sandiganbayan's subject matter jurisdiction is limited to the recovery of "ill-gotten wealth" as defined in Eos 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Consistent with that jurisdiction, the subdivided complaints in the ill-gotten wealth cases expressly alleged that the sequestered assets constitutes "ill-gotten wealth" of former President Marcos and Cojuangco, having been filed pursuant to, and in connection with, Eos 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred, if not exceeded its jurisdiction, when it refused to require the respondent Republic to prove the aforesaid jurisdictional fact.
B. .... Having no evidence on record to prove the said jurisdictional fact, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred, if not grossly exceeded its statutory jurisdiction, when it rendered the assailed PSJs instead of dismissing the ill-gotten wealth cases....
C. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.... In any event, in pursuing its intervention in the ill-gotten wealth cases, COCOFED, et al precisely questioned the Sandiganbayan's subject matter jurisdiction, asserted that the jurisdictional fact does not exist, moved to dismiss the ill-gotten wealth cases and even prayed that the writs of sequestration over the sequestered assets be lifted. In concluding that those actions constitute an "invocation" of its jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan clearly acted whimsically, capriciously and in grave abuse of its discretion.
II. Through the assailed PSJs and the assailed Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan declared certain provisions of the coconut levy laws as well as certain administrative issuances of the PCA as unconstitutional. In doing so, the Sandiganbayan erroneously employed, if not grossly abused, its power of judicial review....A. ... the Sandiganbayan gravely erred, if not brazenly exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and abused the judicial powers, when it concluded that the public purpose of certain coconut levy laws was not evident, when it thereupon formulated its own public policies and purposes for the coconut levy laws and at the same time disregarded the national policies specifically prescribed therein.III. In rendering the assailed PSJs and thereafter refusing to proceed to trial on the merits, on the mere say-so of the respondent Republic, the Sandiganbayan committed gross and irreversible error, gravely abused its judicial discretion and flagrantly exceeded its jurisdiction as it effectively sanctioned the taking of COCOFED, et al.'s property by the respondent Republic without due process of law and through retroactive application of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the coconut levy laws, an act that is not only illegal and violative of the settled Operative Fact Doctrine but, more importantly, inequitable to the coconut farmers whose only possible mistake, offense or misfortune was to follow the law.
B. In ruling that "it is not clear or evident how the means employed by the [coconut levy] laws" would "serve the avowed purpose of the law" or "can serve a public purpose", the Sandiganbayan erroneously examined, determined and evaluated the wisdom of such laws, a constitutional power within the exclusive province of the legislative department.
C. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in declaring Section 1 of PD 755, PCA [AO] 1 and PCA Resolution No. 074-78 constitutionally infirm by reason of alleged but unproven and unsubstantiated flaws in their implementation.
D. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in concluding that Section 1 of PD 755 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it authorizes the PCA to promulgate rules and regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB shares to the coconut farmers. Rather, taken in their proper context, Section 1 of PD 755 was complete in itself, [and] prescribed sufficient standards that circumscribed the discretion of the PCA....
More importantly, this Honorable Court has, on three (3) separate occasions, rejected respondent Republic's motion to declare the coconut levy laws unconstitutional. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred, if not acted in excess of its jurisdiction, when it ignored the settled doctrines of law of the case and/or stare decisis and granted respondent Republic's fourth attempt to declare the coconut levy laws unconstitutional, despite fact that such declaration of unconstitutionality was not necessary to resolve the ultimate issue of ownership involved in the ill-gotten wealth cases.A. ....1. In the course of the almost twenty (20) years that the ill-gotten wealth cases were pending, COCOFED, et al. repeatedly asked to be allowed to present evidence to prove that the true, actual and beneficial owners of the sequestered assets are the coconut farmers and not Cojuangco, an alleged "crony" of former President Marcos. The Sandiganbayan grievously erred and clearly abused its judicial discretion when it repeatedly and continuously denied COCOFED, et al. the opportunity to present their evidence to disprove the baseless allegations of the Ill-Gotten Wealth Cases that the sequestered assets constitute ill-gotten wealth of Cojuangco and of former President Marcos, an error that undeniably and illegally deprived COCOFED, et al of their constitutional right to be heard.
2. The Sandiganbayan erroneously concluded that the Assailed PSJs and Assailed Resolutions settled the ultimate issue of ownership of the Sequestered Assets and, more importantly, resolved all factual and legal issues involved in the ill-gotten wealth cases. Rather, as there are triable issues still to be resolved, it was incumbent upon the Sandiganbayan to receive evidence thereon and conduct trial on the merits.
3. Having expressly ordered the parties to proceed to trial and thereafter decreeing that trial is unnecessary as the Assailed PSJs were "final" and "appealable" judgments, the Sandiganbayan acted whimsically, capriciously and contrary to the Rules of Court, treated the parties in the ill-gotten wealth cases unfairly, disobeyed the dictate of this Honorable Court and, worse, violated COCOFED, et al's right to due process and equal protection of the laws.
B. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred if not grossly abused its discretion when it repeatedly disregarded, and outrightly refused to recognize, the operative facts that existed as well as the rights that vested from the time the coconut levy laws were enacted until their declaration of unconstitutionality in the assailed PSJs. As a result, the assailed PSJs constitute a proscribed retroactive application of the declaration of unconstitutionality, a taking of private property, and an impairment of vested rights of ownership, all without due process of law.[64] Otherwise stated, the assailed PSJs and the assailed Resolutions effectively penalized the coconut farmers whose only possible mistake, offense or misfortune was to follow the laws that were then legal, valid and constitutional.
IV. The voluminous records of these ill-gotten wealth cases readily reveal the various dilatory tactics respondent Republic resorted to.... As a result, despite the lapse of almost twenty (20) years of litigation, the respondent Republic has not been required to, and has not even attempted to prove, the bases of its perjurious claim that the sequestered assets constitute ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his crony, Cojuangco. In tolerating respondent Republic's antics for almost twenty (20) years..., the Sandiganbayan so glaringly departed from procedure and thereby flagrantly violated COCOFED, et al.'s right to speedy trial.
I
The Sandiganbayan decided in a manner not in accord with the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence in rendering the questioned PSJ as final and appealable thereafter taking the sequestered assets from their owners or record without presentation of any evidence, thus, the questioned PSJ and the questioned Resolutions are all null and void.A. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction insofar as the ill-gotten wealth cases are concerned, is limited to the recovery of "ill-gotten wealth" as defined in Executive Orders No. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
B. The Sandiganbayan should have decided to dismiss the case or continue to receive evidence instead of ruling against the constitutionality of some coconut levy laws and PCA issuances because it could decide on other grounds available to it.II
The Sandiganbayan gravely erred when it declared PD. 755, Section 1 and 2, Section 5, Article 1 of PD 961, and Section 5 of Art. III of PD 1468 as well as administrative issuances of the PCA as unconstitutional in effect, it abused it power of judicial review....A. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in concluding that the purpose of PD 755 Section 1 and 2, Section 5, Article 1 of PD 961, and Section 5 of Art. III of PD 1468 is not evident. It then proceeded to formulated its own purpose thereby intruding into the wisdom of the legislature in enacting [t]he law.
B. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in declaring Section 1 of PD 755, PCA [AO] No. 1 and PCA Resolution No. 074-78 unconstitutional due to alleged flaws in their implementation.
C. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in concluding that Section 1 of PD No. 755 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it authorizes the PCA to promulgate rules and regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB shares to the coconut farmers. Section 1 of PD 755 was complete in itself, prescribed sufficient standards that circumscribed the discretion of the PCA and merely authorized the PCA to fill matters of detail an execution through promulgated rules and regulations.III
The coconut levy laws, insofar as they allowed the PCA to promulgate rules and regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB to the coconut farmers, do not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power as they were complete in themselves and prescribed sufficient standards that circumscribed the discretion of the PCA.IV
Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the coconut levy laws are unconstitutional, still, the owners thereof cannot be deprived of their property without due process of law considering that they have in good faith acquired vested rights over the sequestered assets.
The determinations made by the PCGG at the time of issuing sequestration ... orders cannot be considered as final determinations; that the properties or entities sequestered or taken-over in fact constitute "ill-gotten wealth" according to [E.O.] No. 1 is a question which can be finally determined only by a court - the Sandiganbayan. The PCGG has the burden of proving before the Sandiganbayan that the assets it has sequestered or business entity it has provisionally taken-over constitutes "ill-gotten wealth" within the meaning of [E.O.] No. 1 and Article No. XVIII (26) of the 1987 Constitution.
16. Basic ... is the doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of an action is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and that the Rules of Court yield to substantive law, in this case, the Judiciary Act and B.P. Blg. 129, both as amended, and of which jurisdiction is only a part. Jurisdiction ... cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties; neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court.... Jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law.... Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal even if such issue was not raised in the lower court....
17. Nevertheless, in some case, the principle of estoppel by laches has been availed ... to bar attacks on jurisdiction....[69]
[J]urisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein-a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the question of jurisdiction could depend almost entirely upon the defendant.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Basic is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the cause or causes of action as alleged in the complaint.
12. Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr served as a public officer during the Marcos administration....
13. Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., taking advantage of his association, influence and connection, acting in unlawful concert with the [Marcoses] and the individual defendants, embarked upon devices, schemes and stratagems, including the use of defendant corporations as fronts, to unjustly enrich themselves as the expense of the Plaintiff and the Filipino people, such as when he -
a) manipulated, beginning the year 1975 with the active collaboration of Defendants ..., Marai Clara Lobregat, Danilo Ursua [etc.], the purchase by the ... (PCA) of 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of the ... (FUB) which was subsequently converted into a universal bank named ... (UCPB) through the use of ... (CCSF) ... in a manner contrary to law and to the specific purposes for which said coconut levy funds were imposed and collected under P.D. 276 and under anomalous and sinister designs and circumstances, to wit:(i) Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. coveted the coconut levy funds as a cheap, lucrative and risk-free source of funds with which to exercise his private option to buy the controlling interest in FUB....
(ii) to legitimize a posteriori his highly anomalous and irregular use and diversion of government funds to advance his own private and commercial interests ... Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. caused the issuance ... of PD 755 (a) declaring that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and fiduciary and trust funds ... conveniently repealing for that purpose a series of previous decrees ... establishing the character of the coconut levy funds as special, fiduciary, trust and governments; (b) confirming the agreement between ...Cojuangco and PCA on the purchase of FUB by incorporating by reference said private commercial agreement in PD 755;
(iii) ....
(iv) To perpetuate his opportunity ... to build his economic empire, ... Cojuangco caused the issuance of an unconstitutional decree (PD 1468) requiring the deposit of all coconut levy funds with UCPB interest free to the prejudice of the government and finally
(v) Having fully established himself as the undisputed "coconut king" with unlimited powers to deal with the coconut levy funds, the stage was now set for Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. to launch his predatory forays into almost all aspects of Philippine activity namely .... oil mills.
(vi) In gross violation of their fiduciary positions and in contravention of the goal to create a bank for coconut farmers of the country, the capital stock of UCPB as of February 25, 1986 was actually held by the defendants, their lawyers, factotum and business associates, thereby finally gaining control of the UCPB by misusing the names and identities of the so-called "more than one million coconut farmers."
(b) created and/or funded with the use of coconut levy funds various corporations, such as ... (COCOFED) ... with the active collaboration and participation of Defendants Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara Lobregat ... most of whom comprised the interlocking officers and directors of said companies; dissipated, misused and/or misappropriated a substantial part of said coco levy funds ... FINALLY GAIN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK BY MISUSING THE NAMES AND/OR IDENTIFIES OF THE SO-CALLLED "MORE THAN ONE MILLION COCONUT FARNMERS;
(c) misappropriated, misused and dissipated P840 million of the ... (CIDF) levy funds deposited with the National Development Corporation (NIDC) as administrator -trustee of said funds and later with UCPB, of which Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. was the Chief Executive Officer....
(d) established and caused to be funded with coconut levy fundfs, with the active collaboration of Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos through the issuance of LOI 926 and of [other] defendants ... the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc., a corporation controlled by Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and bought sixteen (16) certain competing oil mills at exorbitant prices ... then mothballed them....... ... ...
(i) misused coconut levy funds to buy majority of the outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation....... ... ...
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. ... of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds the financial and corporate structures that led to the establishment of UCPB UNICOM [etc.] and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations including the acquisition of [SMC] shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly....... ... ...
16. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and /or in unlawful concert with one another, constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations, brazen abuse of right and power, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws ... to the grave and irreparable damage of the Plaintiff and the Filipino people.CC No. 0033-F
12. Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., served as a public officer during the Marcos administration....
13. Having fully established himself as the undisputed "coconut king" with unlimited powers to deal with the coconut levy funds, the stage was now set for ... Cojuangco, Jr. to launch his predatory forays into almost all aspects of Philippine economic activity namely ... oil mills ....
14. Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., taking undue advantage of his association, influence, and connection, acting in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and the individual defendants, embarked upon devices, schemes and stratagems, including the use of defendant corporations as fronts, to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people....(a) Having control over the coconut levy, Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco invested the funds in diverse activities, such as the various businesses SMC was engaged in....;... ... ...
(c) Later that year [1983], Cojuangco also acquired the Soriano stocks through a series of complicated and secret agreements, a key feature of which was a "voting trust agreement" that stipulated that Andres, Jr. or his heir would proxy over the vote of the shares owned by Soriano and Cojuangco....... ... ...
(g) All together, Cojuangco purchased 33 million shares of the SMC through the ... 14 holding companies... ... ...
3.1. The same fourteen companies were in turn owned by the ... six (6) so-called CIIF Companies....
(h) Defendant Corporations are but "shell" corporations owned by interlocking shareholders who have previously admitted that they are just "nominee stockholders" who do not have any proprietary interest over the shares in their names.... [L]awyers of the Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz (ACCRA) Law offices, the previous counsel who incorporated said corporations, prove that they were merely nominee stockholders thereof.
(l) These companies, which ACCRA Law Offices organized for Defendant Cojuangco to be able to control more than 60% of SMC shares, were funded by institutions which depended upon the coconut levy such as the UCPB, UNICOM, ... (COCOLIFE), among others. Cojuangco and his ACCRA lawyers used the funds from 6 large coconut oil mills and 10 copra trading companies to borrow money from the UCPB and purchase these holding companies and the SMC stocks. Cojuangco used $ 150 million from the coconut levy, broken down as follows:
Amount (in million) Source Purpose $ 22.26 Oil Mills equity in holding Companies $ 65.6 Oil Mills loan to holding Companies $ 61.2 UCPBloan to holding Companies [164]
The entire amount, therefore, came from the coconut levy, some passing through the Unicom Oil mills, others directly from the UCPB.
(m) With his entry into the said Company, it began to get favors from the Marcos government, significantly the lowering of the excise taxes ... on beer, one of the main products of SMC.
15. Defendants ... plotted, devised, schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, [etc.], and more than twenty other coconut levy-funded corporations, including the acquisition of [SMC] shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly....
16. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations, brazen abuse of right and power, unjust enrichment, violation of the constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.[73]
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) ....;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or by the issuance, promulgation and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; and
(6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship or influence for personal gain or benefit.[75] (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot allow her to attack its jurisdiction simply because it rendered a Decision prejudicial to her position. Participation in all stages of a case before a trial court effectively estops a party from challenging its jurisdiction. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. If, by deed or conduct, a party has induced another to act in a particular manner, estoppel effectively bars the former from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to the latter.
It is of course not for this Court to pass upon the factual issues thus raised. That function pertains to the Sandiganbayan in the first instance. For purposes of this proceeding, all that the Court needs to determine is whether or not there is prima facie justification for the sequestration ordered by the PCGG. The Court is satisfied that there is. The cited incidents, given the public character of the coconut levy funds, place petitioners COCOFED and its leaders and officials, at least prima facie, squarely within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as construed and applied in BASECO, to wit:
"1. that ill-gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime;
"a. more particularly, that `(i)ll-gotten wealth was accumulated by ... Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, .... (and) business enterprises and entities (came to be) owned or controlled by them, during ... (the Marcos) administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationships';
"b. otherwise stated, that `there are assets and properties purportedly pertaining to [the Marcoses], their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the Government ...or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust enrichment ....;... ... ...
2. The petitioners' claim that the assets acquired with the coconut levy funds are privately owned by the coconut farmers is founded on certain provisions of law, to wit [Sec. 7, RA 6260 and Sec. 5, Art. III, PD 1468]... (Words in bracket added; italics in the original).
... designated to act for another as his representative in a rather limited sense. It has no connotation, however, other than that of acting for another, in representation of another or as the grantee of another. In its commonly accepted meaning the term connoted the delegation of authority to the nominee in a representative or nominal capacity only, and does not connote the transfer or assignment to the nominee of any property in, or ownership of, the rights of the person nominating him.[84]
Laws must receive a sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they are enacted. They should be so given reasonable and practical construction as will give life to them, if it can be done without doing violence to reason. Conversely, a law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, not so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat or that interpretation as will give the thing efficacy is to be adopted.[85]
SEC. 5. Order of trial.--Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows:(a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of his complaint;
(b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint;... ... ...
(g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision, unless the court directs the parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda or any further pleadings.
If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth. having separate defenses appear by different counsel, the court shall determine the relative order of presentation of their evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.--A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim ... may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
SEC. 2. Summary judgment for defending party.--A party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted ... is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
SEC. 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion.--If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of all persons to a "speedy disposition of their cases." Nevertheless, this right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. Moreover, the determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and cannot be based on a mere mathematical reckoning of time. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. As a guideline, the Court in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan mentioned certain factors that should be considered and balanced, namely: 1) length of delay; 2) reasons for the delay; 3) assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and 4) prejudice caused by the delay.... ... ...
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on the merits... we hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain ... substantial justice in the premises.
In Bernat ..., the Court denied petitioner's claim of denial of his right to a speedy disposition of cases considering that [he] ... chose to remain silent for eight years before complaining of the delay in the disposition of his case. The Court ruled that petitioner failed to seasonably assert his right and he merely sat and waited from the time his case was submitted for resolution. In this case, petitioner similarly failed to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case.... He only invoked his right to a speedy disposition of cases after [his conviction].... Petitioner's silence may be considered as a waiver of his right.
Section 2. Financial Assistance. -- To enable the coconut farmers to comply with their contractual obligations under the aforesaid Agreement, the [PCA] is hereby directed to draw and utilize the collections under the [CCSF] authorized to be levied by [PD] No. 232, as amended, to pay for the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the said agreement and, except for [PCA's] budgetary requirements ..., all collections under the [CCSF] Levy and (50%) of the collections under the [CIDF] shall be deposited, interest free, with the said bank of the coconut farmers and such deposits shall not be withdrawn until the ... the bank has sufficient equity capital ...; and since the operations, and activities of the [PCA] are all in accord with the present social economic plans and programs of the Government, all collections and levies which the [PCA] is authorized to levy and collect such as but not limited to the [CCS Levy] and the [CIDF] ... shall not be considered or construed, under any law or regulation, special and/or fiduciary funds and do not form part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation of [P.D.] No. 711. (Emphasis supplied)
P.D. No. 961
Section 5. Exemptions. The Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund as well as all disbursements of said funds for the benefit of the coconut farmers as herein authorized shall not be construed or interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation of P.D. No. 711; nor as a subsidy, donation, levy, government funded investment, or government share within the contemplation of P.D. 898, the intention being that said Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by them in their own private capacities.[100] (Emphasis Ours)P.D. No. 1468
Section 5. Exemptions. The [CCSF] and the [CIDF] as well as all disbursement as herein authorized, shall not be construed or interpreted, under nay law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation of PD 711; nor as subsidy, donation, levy government funded investment, or government share within the contemplation of PD 898, the intention being that said Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by them in their private capacities....[101] (Emphasis Ours.)
This Court is convinced of the imperative need to pass upon the issues of constitutionality raised by Plaintiff. The issue of constitutionality of the provisions of P.D. No. 755 and the laws related thereto goes to the very core of Plaintiff's causes of action and defenses thereto. It will serve the best interest of justice to define this early the legal framework within which this case shall be heard and tried, taking into account the admission of the parties and the established facts, particularly those relating to the main substance of the defense of Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al., which is anchored on the laws being assailed by Plaintiff on constitutional grounds.... ... ...
The Court is also mindful that lower courts are admonished to observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, but that they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal (Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court).... ... ...
It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. The Honorable Supreme Court ... has clearly stated that the general rule admits of exceptions, thus:... ... ...
`For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later.... It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case ... as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute, the validity of which is attacked.'
In the case now before us, the allegations of the Subdivided Complaint are consistent with those in the subject Motion, and they sufficiently raise the issue of constitutionality of the provisions of laws in question. The Third Amended Complaint (Subdivided) states:
`(ii) to legitimize a posteriori his highly anomalous and irregular use and diversion of government funds to advance his own private and commercial interests, ... Cojuangco, Jr. caused the issuance ... of PD 755 (a) declaring that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and fiduciary and trusts funds and do not form part of the general funds of the National Government, conveniently repealing for that purpose a series of coconut levy funds as special, fiduciary, trust and government funds....... ... ...
`(iv) To perpetuate his opportunity to deal with and make use the coconut levy funds to build his economic empire, Cojuangco, Jr. caused the issuance by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos of an unconstitutional decree (PD 1468) requiring the deposit of all coconut levy funds with UCPB, interest free, to the prejudice of the government.'
The above-quoted allegations in the Third Amended Complaint (Subdivided) already question the "legitimacy" of the exercise by former President Marcos of his legislative authority when he issued P.D. Nos. 755 and 1468. The provision of Sec. 5, Art. III of P.D. 961 is substantially similar to the provisions of the aforesaid two [PDs]. P.D. No. 755 allegedly legitimized the "highly anomalous and irregular use and diversion of government funds to advance his [defendant Cojuangco's] own private and commercial interest." The issuance of the said [PD] which has the force and effect of a law can only be assailed on constitutional grounds. The merits of the grounds adverted to in the allegations of the Third Amended Complaint (Subdivided) can only be resolved by this Court by testing the questioned [PDs], which are considered part of the laws of the land....
As early as June 20, 1989, this Court in its Resolution expressed this Court's understanding of the import of the allegations of the complaint, as follows:"It is likewise alleged in the Complaint that in order to legitimize the diversion of funds, defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos issued the Presidential Decrees referred to by the movants. This is then the core of Plaintiff's complaint: that, insofar as the coconut levy is concerned, these decrees had been enacted as tools for the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth for specific favored individuals.
"Even if Plaintiff may not have said so effectively, the complaint in fact disputes the legitimacy, and, if one pleases, the constitutionality of such enactments....
"The issue is validly raised on the face of the complaint and defendants must respond to it."
Since ... the question of constitutionality ... may be raised even on appeal if the determination of such a question is essential to the decision of the case, we find more reason to resolve this constitutional question at this stage of the proceedings, where the defense is grounded solely on the very laws the constitutionality of which are being questioned and where the evidence of the defendants would seek mainly to prove their faithful and good faith compliance with the said laws and their implementing rules and regulations.[103] (Emphasis added.)
Otherwise stated, the decision of this Honorable Court in the COCOFED Case overruling the strict public fund theory espoused by the Respondent Republic, upholding the propriety of the laws imposing the collections of the different Coconut Levies and expressly allowing COCOFED, et al., to prove that the Sequestered Assets have legitimately become their private properties had become final and immutable.[104]
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, ... so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
.... Indeed, the Solicitor General suggests quite strongly that the laws operating or purporting to convert the coconut levy funds into private funds, are a transgression of the basic limitations for the licit exercise of the state's taxing and police powers, and that certain provisions of said laws are merely clever stratagems to keep away government audit in order to facilitate misappropriation of the funds in question.
The utilization and proper management of the coconut levy funds, [to acquire shares of stocks for coconut farmers and workers] raised as they were by the State's police and taxing power are certainly the concern of the Government.... The coconut levy funds are clearly affected with public interest. Until it is demonstrated satisfactorily that they have legitimately become private funds, they must prima facie be accounted subject to measures prescribed in EO Nos. 1, 2, and 14 to prevent their concealment, dissipation, etc....[108] [Words in bracket added.]
Indeed, coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes, which, in general, are enforced proportional contributions from persons and properties, exacted by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all public needs.We have ruled time and again that taxes are imposed only for a public purpose.[111] "They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons."[112] When a law imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose.[113] In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, the petitioning sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers sought the distribution of the shares of stock of the Republic Planters Bank, alleging that they are the true beneficial owners thereof.[114] In that case, the investment, i.e., the purchase of the said bank, was funded by the deduction of PhP 1.00 per picul from the sugar proceeds of the sugar producers pursuant to P.D. No. 388.[115] In ruling against the petitioners, the Court held that to rule in their favor would contravene the general principle that revenues received from the imposition of taxes or levies "cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons."[116] The Court amply reasoned that the Stabilization Fund must "be utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar industry, and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including foreign market, the industry being of vital importance to the country's economy and to national interest."[117]
Based on its definition, a tax has three elements, namely: a) it is an enforced proportional contribution from persons and properties; b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of its sovereignty; and c) it is levied for the support of the government. The coconut levy funds fall squarely into these elements for the following reasons:
(a) They were generated by virtue of statutory enactments imposed on the coconut farmers requiring the payment of prescribed amounts. Thus, PD No. 276, which created the Coconut Consumer[s] Stabilization Fund (CCSF), mandated the following:"a. A levy, initially, of P15.00 per 100 kilograms of copra resecada or its equivalent in other coconut products, shall be imposed on every first sale, in accordance with the mechanics established under RA 6260, effective at the start of business hours on August 10, 1973.
"The proceeds from the levy shall be deposited with the Philippine National Bank or any other government bank to the account of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, as a separate trust fund which shall not form part of the general fund of the government."
The coco levies were further clarified in amendatory laws, specifically PD No. 961 and PD No. 1468 - in this wise:"The Authority (PCA) is hereby empowered to impose and collect a levy, to be known as the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy, on every one hundred kilos of copra resecada, or its equivalent ... delivered to, and/or purchased by, copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators and other end-users of copra or its equivalent in other coconut products. The levy shall be paid by such copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators and other end-users of copra or its equivalent in other coconut products under such rules and regulations as the Authority may prescribe. Until otherwise prescribed by the Authority, the current levy being collected shall be continued."
Like other tax measures, they were not voluntary payments or donations by the people. They were enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions, as provided under PD No. 276:"3. Any person or firm who violates any provision of this Decree or the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, shall, in addition to penalties already prescribed under existing administrative and special law, pay a fine of not less than P2,500 or more than P10,000, or suffer cancellation of licenses to operate, or both, at the discretion of the Court."
Such penalties were later amended thus: ....
(b) The coconut levies were imposed pursuant to the laws enacted by the proper legislative authorities of the State. Indeed, the CCSF was collected under PD No. 276...."
(c) They were clearly imposed for a public purpose. There is absolutely no question that they were collected to advance the government's avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the coconut industry is one of the great economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading position among the country's export products....
Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also to provide means for the rehabilitation and the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the State....
Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character.... In Cocofed v. PCGG, the Court observed that certain agencies or enterprises "were organized and financed with revenues derived from coconut levies imposed under a succession of law of the late dictatorship ... with deposed Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies as the suspected authors and chief beneficiaries of the resulting coconut industry monopoly." The Court continued: ".... It cannot be denied that the coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national economy. It is, therefore, the State's concern to make it a strong and secure source not only of the livelihood of a significant segment of the population, but also of export earnings the sustained growth of which is one of the imperatives of economic stability.[110] (Emphasis Ours)
The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State ... for a special purpose - that of "financing the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign market." The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them as state funds even though they are held for a special purpose....
That the fees were collected from sugar producers,[etc.], and that the funds were channeled to the purchase of shares of stock in respondent Bank do not convert the funds into a trust fund for their benefit nor make them the beneficial owners of the shares so purchased. It is but rational that the fees be collected from them since it is also they who are benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. ....[121] (Emphasis Ours.)
Finally and tellingly, the very laws governing the coconut levies recognize their public character. Thus, the third Whereas clause of PD No. 276 treats them as special funds for a specific public purpose. Furthermore, PD No. 711 transferred to the general funds of the State all existing special and fiduciary funds including the CCSF. On the other hand, PD No. 1234 specifically declared the CCSF as a special fund for a special purpose, which should be treated as a special account in the National Treasury.[126] (Emphasis Ours.)
Section 1. All income and collections for Special or Fiduciary Funds authorized by law shall be remitted to the Treasury and treated as Special Accounts in the General Fund, including the following:
(a) [PCA] Development Fund, including all income derived therefrom under Sections 13 and 14 of [RA] No. 1145; Coconut Investments Fund under Section 8 of [RA] No. 6260, including earnings, profits, proceeds and interests derived therefrom; Coconut Consumers Stabilization Funds under Section 3-A of PD No. 232, as inserted by Section 3 of P.D. No. 232, as inserted by Section 2 of P.D. No. 583; and all other fees accruing to the [PCA] under the provisions of Section 19 of [RA] No. 1365, in accordance with Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 and all other income accruing to the [PCA] under existing laws.[127] (Emphasis Ours)
The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof should revert back to the general fund. Consequently, their subsequent reclassification as a private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional. |
Section 29(3)....
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. (Emphasis Ours)
Section 2. Financial Assistance. To enable the coconut farmers to comply with their contractual obligations under the aforesaid Agreement, the [PCA] is hereby directed to draw and utilize the collections under the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund [CCSF] authorized to be levied by [P.D.] 232, as amended, to pay for the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the said agreement.... and the Coconut Industry Development Fund as prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 582 shall not be considered or construed, under any law or regulation, special and/or fiduciary funds and do not form part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation of Presidential Decree No. 711. (Emphasis Ours)
WHEREAS, an escalating crisis brought about by an abnormal situation in the world market for fats and oils has resulted in supply and price dislocations in the domestic market for coconut-based goods, and has created hardships for consumers thereof;As couched, P.D. No. 276 created and exacted the CCSF "to advance the government's avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry."[132] Evidently, the CCSF was originally set up as a special fund to support consumer purchases of coconut products. To put it a bit differently, the protection of the entire coconut industry, and even more importantly, for the consuming public provides the rationale for the creation of the coconut levy fund. There can be no quibbling then that the foregoing provisions of P.D. No. 276 intended the fund created and set up therein not especially for the coconut farmers but for the entire coconut industry, albeit the improvement of the industry would doubtless redound to the benefit of the farmers. Upon the foregoing perspective, the following provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 insofar as they declared, as the case may be, that: "[the coconut levy] fund and the disbursements thereof [shall be] authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers and shall be owned by them in their private capacities;"[133] or the coconut levy fund shall not be construed by any law to be a special and/or fiduciary fund, and do not therefore form part of the general fund of the national government later on;[134] or the UCPB shares acquired using the coconut levy fund shall be distributed to the coconut farmers for free,[135] violated the special public purpose for which the CCSF was established.
WHEREAS, the representatives of the coconut industry ... have proposed the implementation of an industry-financed stabilization scheme which will permit socialized pricing of coconut-based commodities;
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to promote the welfare and economic well-being of the consuming public;....
1. In addition to its powers granted under [P.D.] No. 232, the [PCA] is hereby authorized to formulate and immediately implement a stabilization scheme for coconut-based consumer goods, along the following general guidelines:(a) ....The proceeds of the levy shall be deposited with the Philippine National Bank or any other government bank to the account of the CCSF as a separate trust fund....
(b) The Fund shall be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products at prices set by the Price Control Council....:....
It is now settled, in view of the ruling in Republic v. COCOFED, et al., supra, that "Coconut levy funds are raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State;" that "they are levies imposed by the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers" and that "they were clearly imposed for a public purpose." This public purpose is explained in the said case, as follows:.... c) They were clearly imposed for a public purpose. There is absolutely no question that they were colleted to advance the government's avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry....
"Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also to provide means for the rehabilitation and the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the State, as held in Caltex Philippines v. COA and Osmeña v. Orbos.... ... ...
The avowed public purpose for the disbursement of the CCSF is contained in the perambulatory clauses and Section 1 of P.D. No. 755. The imperativeness of enunciating the public purpose of the expenditure of funds raised through taxation is underscored in the case of Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications, et al, supra, which held:"As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a private purpose the principle according to Ruling Case Law, is this:
`It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose ... it is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money.' 25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400)
"The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language:... ... ...
`The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public....' (81 C.J.S. p. 1147)
"Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views.... Besides, reflecting as they do, the established jurisprudence in the United States, after whose constitutional system ours has been patterned, said views and jurisprudence are, likewise, part and parcel of our own constitutional law."
The gift of funds raised by the exercise of the taxing powers of the State which were converted into shares of stock in a private corporation, slated for free distribution to the coconut farmers, can only be accorded constitutional sanction if it will directly serve the public purpose declared by law....[139]
Section 1 of P.D. No. 755, as well as PCA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 (PCA AO 1), and Resolution No. 074-75, are invalid delegations of legislative power. |
The actual distribution of the bank shares was admittedly an enormous operational problem which resulted in the failure of the intended beneficiaries to receive their shares of stocks in the bank, as shown by the rules and regulations, issued by the PCA, without adequate guidelines being provided to it by P.D. No. 755. PCA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 (August 20, 1975), "Rules and Regulations Governing the Distribution of Shares of Stock of the Bank Authorized to be Acquired Pursuant to PCA Board Resolution No. 246-75", quoted hereunder discloses how the undistributed shares of stocks due to anonymous coconut farmers or payors of the coconut levy fees were authorized to be distributed to existing shareholders of the Bank:"Section 9. Fractional and Undistributed Shares - Fractional shares and shares which remain undistributed ... shall be distributed to all the coconut farmers who have qualified and received equity in the Bank and shall be apportioned among them, as far as practicable, in proportion to their equity in relation to the number of undistributed equity and such further rules and regulations as may hereafter be promulgated.'
The foregoing PCA issuance was further amended by Resolution No. 074-78, still citing the same problem of distribution of the bank shares....:... ... ...
Thus, when 51,200,806 shares in the bank remained undistributed, the PCA deemed it proper to give a "bonanza" to coconut farmers who already got their bank shares, by giving them an additional share for each share owned by them and by converting their fractional shares into full shares. The rest of the shares were then transferred to a private organization, the COCOFED, for distribution to those determined to be "bona fide coconut farmers" who had "not received shares of stock of the Bank." ....
The PCA thus assumed, due to lack of adequate guidelines set by P.D. No. 755, that it had complete authority to define who are the coconut farmers and to decide as to who among the coconut farmers shall be given the gift of bank shares; how many shares shall be given to them, and what basis it shall use to determine the amount of shares to be distributed for free to the coconut farmers. In other words, P.D. No. 755 fails the completeness test which renders it constitutionally infirm.
Regarding the second requisite of standard, it is settled that legislative standard need not be expressed....
We observed, however, that the PCA [AO] No. 1, Series of 1975 and PCA Rules and Regulations 074-78, did not take into consideration the accomplishment of the public purpose or the national standard/policy of P.D. No. 755 which is directly to accelerate the development and growth of the coconut industry and as a consequence thereof, to make the coconut farmers "participants in and beneficiaries" of such growth and development. The said PCA issuances did nothing more than provide guidelines as to whom the UCPB shares were to be distributed and how many bank shares shall be allotted to the beneficiaries. There was no mention of how the distributed shares shall be used to achieve exclusively or at least directly or primarily the aim or public purpose enunciated by P.D. No. 755. The numerical or quantitative distribution of shares contemplated by the PCA regulations which is a condition for the validly of said administrative issuances. There was a reversal of priorities. The narrow private interests prevailed over the laudable objectives of the law.... However, under the May 25, 1975 agreement implemented by the PCA issuances, the PCA acquired only 64.98% of the shares of the bank and even the shares covering the said 64.98% were later on transferred to non-coconut farmers."
The distribution for free of the shares of stock of the CIIF Companies is tainted with the above-mentioned constitutional infirmities of the PCA administrative issuances. In view of the foregoing, we cannot consider the provision of P.D. No. 961 and P.D. No. 1468 and the implementing regulations issued by the PCA as valid legal basis to hold that assets acquired with public funds have legitimately become private properties." [140] (Emphasis added.)
It is a fundamental ... that Congress may not delegate its legislative power.... What cannot be delegated is the authority ... to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority....
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.[142] (Emphasis supplied)
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
There were shares forming part of the aforementioned 64.98% which were, after their distribution, for free, to the coconut farmers as required by P.D. No. 755, sold or transferred respectively by individual coconut farmers who were then the registered stockholders of those UCPB shares to non-coconut farmers.[148]
SECTION 9. Fractional and Undistributed Shares - Fractional shares and shares which remain undistributed as a consequence of the failure of the coconut farmers to register their COCOFUND receipts or the destruction of the COCOFUND receipts or the registration of COCOFUND receipts in the name of an unqualified individual, after the final distribution is made on the basis of the consolidated IBM registration Report as of March 31, 1976 shall be distributed to all the coconut farmers who have qualified and received equity in the Bank and shall be appointed among them, as far as practicable, in proportion to their equity in relation to the number of undistributed equity and such further rules and regulations as may hereafter be promulgated.
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468 violate Article IX (D) (2) of the 1987 Constitution. |
Section 5. Exemptions. The Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry Development fund as well as all disbursements of said funds for the benefit of the coconut farmers as herein authorized shall not be construed or interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation of P.D. No. 711; nor as a subsidy, donation, levy, government funded investment, or government share within the contemplation of P.D. 898 the intention being that said Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned in their own private capacity.[151] (Emphasis Ours)
Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;.[152] (Emphasis Ours)
Section 2. The Commission on Audit shall have the following powers and functions:(1) Examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations; keep the general accounts of the government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers pertaining thereto; and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or use of funds and property.[153] (Emphasis Ours)
... ... ...
2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which mandated that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and/or fiduciary funds nor part of the general funds of the national government and similar provisions of Sec. 3, Art. III, P.D. 961 and Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. 1468 contravene the provisions of the Constitution, particularly, Art. IX (D), Sec. 2; and Article VI, Sec. 29 (3). (Emphasis Ours)... ... ...
We observe, however, that the PCA [AO] No. 1, Series of 1975 and PCA Rules and Regulations 074-78, did not take into consideration the accomplishment of the public purpose or the national standard/policy of P.D. No. 755 which is directly to accelerate the development and growth of the coconut industry and as a consequence thereof, to make the coconut farmers "participants in and beneficiaries" of such growth and development....
... [W]hat the petitioner asks is for the Court to delve into the policy behind or wisdom of a statute, ... which, under the doctrine of separation of powers, it cannot do,.... Even with the best of motives, the Court can only interpret and apply the law and cannot, despite doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice have no right to encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has not been shown that they have acted with grave abuse of discretion. And while the judiciary may interpret laws and evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to strike them down if they are proven to be infirm, this solemn power and duty do not include the discretion to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.
Section 1. Declaration of National Policy. -- It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates; that this policy can be ... efficiently realized by the implementation of the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of the Coconut Farmers" executed by the [PCA], the terms of which "Agreement" are hereby incorporated by reference; and that the [PCA] is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations it may promulgate.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, we held:The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.[171]
The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with, thus:As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution." It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (Emphasis supplied.)
The principle was further explicated in the case of Rieta v. People of the Philippines, thus:In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree.... It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects -with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Furthermore, when petitioner filed the instant case against respondents on August 5, 2004, the JVAs were already terminated by virtue of the MOA between the NHA and RBI. The respondents had no reason to think that their agreements were unconstitutional or even questionable, as in fact, the concurrent acts of the executive department lent validity to the implementation of the Project. The SMDRP agreements have produced vested rights in favor of the slum dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed land who were issued titles over said land, and the agencies and investors who made investments in the project or who bought SMPPCs. These properties and rights cannot be disturbed or questioned after the passage of around ten (10) years from the start of the SMDRP implementation. Evidently, the "operative fact" principle has set in. The titles to the lands in the hands of the buyers can no longer be invalidated.[174]
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to accelerate the development of the coconut industry through the provision of adequate medium and long-term financing for capital investment in the industry, by instituting a Coconut Investment fund capitalized and administered by coconut farmers through a Coconut Investment Company.[176]
1. In addition to its powers granted under Presidential Decree No. 232, the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby authorized to formulate and immediately implement a stabilization scheme for coconut-based consumer goods, along the following general guidelines:(a) ....
The proceeds from the levy shall be deposited with the Philippine National Bank or any other government bank to the account of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, as a separate trust fund which shall not form part of the general fund of the government.
(b) The Fund shall be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products at prices set by the Price Control Council, under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Philippine Consumers Stabilization Committee....[177]
It must be remembered that the receipts issued under R.A. No. 6260 were to be registered in exchange for shares of stock in the Coconut Investment Company (CIC), which obviously is a different corporate entity from UCPB. This fact was admitted by petitioners during the April 17, 2001 oral arguments in G.R. Nos. 147062-64.
In fact, while the CIF levy payments claimed to have been paid by petitioners were meant for the CIC, the distribution of UCPB stock certificates to the coconut farmers, if at all, were meant for the payors of the CCSF in proportion to the coconut farmer's CCSF contributions pursuant to PCA Resolution No. 045-75 dated May 21, 1975:RESOLVED, FURTHER, That the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION (P150,000,000.00) PESOS be appropriated and set aside from available funds of the PCA to be utilized in payment for the shares of stock of such existing commercial bank and that the Treasurer be instructed to disburse the said amount accordingly.... ... ...
RESOLVED, FINALLY, That ... be directed to organize a team which shall prepare a list of coconut farmers who have paid the levy and contributed to the [CCSF] and to prepare a stock distribution plan to the end that the aforesaid coconut farmers shall receive certificates of stock of such commercial bank in proportion to their contributions to the Fund.
Unfortunately, the said resolution was never complied with in the distribution of the so-called "farmers" UCPB shares.
The actual distribution of the bank shares was admittedly an enormous operational problem which resulted in the failure of the intended beneficiaries to receive their shares of stocks in the bank, as shown by the rules and regulations, issued by the PCA, without adequate guidelines being provided to it by P.D. No. 755. PCA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 (August 20, 1975), "Rules and Regulations Governing the Distribution of Shares of Stock of the Bank Authorized to be Acquired Pursuant to PCA Board Resolution No. 246-75", quoted hereunder discloses how the undistributed shares of stocks due to anonymous coconut farmers or payors of the coconut levy fees were authorized to be distributed to existing shareholders of the Bank:"Section 9. Fractional and Undistributed Shares - Fractional shares and shares which remain undistributed as a consequence of the failure of the coconut farmers to register their COCOFUND receipts or the destruction of the COCOFUND receipts or the registration of the COCOFUND receipts in the name of an unqualified individual, after the final distribution is made on the basis of the consolidated IBM registration Report as of March 31, 1976 shall be distributed to all the coconut farmers who have qualified and received equity in the Bank and shall be apportioned among them, as far as practicable, in proportion to their equity in relation to the number of undistributed equity and such further rules and regulations as may hereafter be promulgated.'
The foregoing PCA issuance was further amended by Resolution No. 074-78, still citing the same problem of distribution of the bank shares. This latter Resolution is quoted as follows:RESOLUTION NO. 074-78
AMENDMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
NO. 1, SERIES OF 1975, GOVERNING THE
DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES
WHEREAS, pursuant to PCA Board Resolution No. 246-75, the total par value of the shares of stock of the Bank purchased by the PCA for the benefit of the coconut farmers is P85,773,600.00 with a par value of P1.00 per share or equivalent to 85,773.600 shares;
WHEREAS, out of the 85,773,600 shares, a total of 34,572,794 shares have already been distributed in accordance with Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975, to wit:First Distribution - 12,573,059
Second Distribution - 10,841,409
Third Distribution - 11,158,326
34,572,794
"WHEREAS, there is, therefore, a total of 51,200,806 shares still available for distribution among the coconut farmers;
WHEREAS, it was determined by the PCA Board, in consonance with the policy of the state on the integration of the coconut industry, that the Bank shares must be widely distributed as possible among the coconut farmers, for which purpose a national census of coconut farmers was made through the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED);
WHEREAS, to implement such determination of the PCA Board, there is a need to accordingly amend Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the remaining 51,200,806 shares of stock of the Bank authorized to be acquired pursuant to the PCA Board Resolution No. 246-75 dated July 25, 1975 be distributed as follows:(1) All the coconut farmers who have received their shares in the equity of the Bank on the basis of Section 8 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975, shall receive additional share for each share presently owned by them;
(2) Fractional shares shall be completed into full shares, and such full shares shall be distributed among the coconut farmers who qualified for the corresponding fractional shares;
(3) The balance of the shares, after deducting those to be distributed in accordance with (1) and (2) above, shall be transferred to COCOFED for distribution, immediately after completion of the national census of coconut farmers prescribed under Resolution No. 033-78 of the PCA Board, to all those who are determined by the PCA Board to be bona fide coconut farmers and have not received shares of stock of the Bank. The shares shall be equally determined among them on the basis of per capita.
RESOLVED, FURTHER, That the rules and regulations under Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975, which are inconsistent with this Administrative Order be, as they are hereby, repealed and/or amended accordingly."
Thus, when 51,200,806 shares in the bank remained undistributed, the PCA deemed it proper to give a "bonanza" to coconut farmers who already got their bank shares, by giving them an additional share for each share owned by them and by converting their fractional shares into full shares. The rest of the shares were then transferred to a private organization, the COCOFED, for distribution to those determined to be "bona fide coconut farmers" who had "not received shares of stock of the Bank." The distribution to the latter was made on the basis of "per capita", meaning without regard to the COCOFUND receipts. The PCA considered itself free to disregard the said receipts in the distribution of the shares although they were considered by the May 25, 1975 Agreement between the PCA and defendant Cojuangco (par. [8] of said Agreement) and by Sections 1, 3, 4, 6 and 9, PCA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 as the basis for the distribution of shares.
The PCA thus assumed, due to lack of adequate guidelines set by P.D. No. 755, that it had complete authority to define who are the coconut farmers and to decide as to who among the coconut farmers shall be given the gift of bank shares; how many shares shall be given to them, and what basis it shall use to determine the amount of shares to be distributed for free to the coconut farmers. In other words, P.D. No. 755 fails the completeness test which renders it constitutionally infirm.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We rule as follows:
SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S RULING.
A. Re: CLASS ACTION MOTION FOR A SEPARATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT dated April 11, 2001 filed by Defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al.
The Class Action Motion for Separate Summary Judgment dated April 11, 2001 filed by defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al., is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
B. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: COCOFED, ET AL. AND BALLARES, ET AL.) dated April 22, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.
- a. The portion of Section 1 of P.D. No. 755, which reads:
...and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations it may promulgate.
taken in relation to Section 2 of the same P.D., is unconstitutional: (i) for having allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined "coconut farmers", which negated or circumvented the national policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755 to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve its vertical integration; and (ii) for having unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA.
b. The implementing regulations issued by PCA, namely, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78 are likewise invalid for their failure to see to it that the distribution of shares serve exclusively or at least primarily or directly the aforementioned public purpose or national policy declared by P.D. No. 755.- Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which mandated that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and/or fiduciary funds nor part of the general funds of the national government and similar provisions of Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 961 and Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 1468 contravene the provisions of the Constitution, particularly, Art. IX (D), Sec. 2; and Article VI, Sec. 29 (3).
- Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. have not legally and validly obtained title of ownership over the subject UCPB shares by virtue of P.D. No. 755, the Agreement dated May 25, 1975 between the PCA and defendant Cojuangco, and PCA implementing rules, namely, Adm. Order No. 1, s. 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78.
- The so-called "Farmers' UCPB shares" covered by 64.98% of the UCPB shares of stock, which formed part of the 72.2% of the shares of stock of the former FUB and now of the UCPB, the entire consideration of which was charged by PCA to the CCSF, are hereby declared conclusively owned by, the Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.
... ... ...So ordered.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Execution of Partial summary judgment (re: CIIF Block of Smc Shares of Stock) dated August 8, 2005 of the plaintiff is hereby denied for lack of merit. However, this Court orders the severance of this particular claim of Plaintiff. The Partial Summary Judgment dated May 7, 2004 is now considered a separate final and appealable judgment with respect to the said CIIF Block of SMC shares of stock.
The Partial Summary Judgment rendered on May 7, 2004 is modified by deleting the last paragraph of the dispositive portion, which will now read, as follows:Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, we hold that:
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants CIIF Companies, 14 Holding Companies and Cocofed, et al) filed by Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the CIIF Companies, namely:
- Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills (SOLCOM);
- Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc. (CAGOIL);
- Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc. (ILICOCO);
- San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. (SPMC);
- Granexport Manufacturing Corp. (GRANEX); and
- Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. (LEGOIL),
As well as the 14 Holding Companies, namely:
- Soriano Shares, Inc.;
- ACS Investors, Inc.;
- Roxas Shares, Inc.;
- Arc Investors; Inc.;
- Toda Holdings, Inc.;
- AP Holdings, Inc.;
- Fernandez Holdings, Inc.;
- SMC Officers Corps, Inc.;
- Te Deum Resources, Inc.;
- Anglo Ventures, Inc.;
- Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.;
- Rock Steel Resources, Inc.;
- Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and
- First Meridian Development, Inc.
AND THE CIIF BLOCK OF SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (SMC) SHARES OF STOCK TOTALING 33,133,266 SHARES AS OF 1983 TOGETHER WITH ALL DIVIDENDS DECLARED, PAID AND ISSUED THEREON AS WELL AS ANY INCREMENTS THERETO ARISING FROM, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, EXERCISE OF PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARE DECLARED OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO BE USED ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL COCONUT FARMERS AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COCONUT INDUSTRY, AND ORDERED RECONVEYED TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court affirms the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan on June 5, 2007 in civil case no. 0033-A and ON May 11, 2007 in civil case No. 0033-F, that there is no more necessity of further trial with respect to the issue of ownership of (1) the sequestered UCPB shares, (2) the CIIF block of SMC shares, and (3) the CIIF companies. as they have finally been ADJUDICATED in the AFOREMENTIONED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED jULY 11, 2003 AND mAY 7, 2004.