351 Phil. 1089
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The constitutional
proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of Appeals order
requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to
imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard
only to the payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the same
criminal act. Otherwise stated, the
promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for
civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent promulgation of the other part,
the imposition of the criminal accountability.
The Case
This is the gist
of this Court’s resolution of the petition for review on certiorari , assailing the November 5, 1996 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR SP No. 41096. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision, which set aside the April 12, 1996 Resolution[3] of the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39,[4] reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated April 12, 1996 of the respondent Judge is hereby SET ASIDE and he is ordered to set anew the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction and sentencing the accused to serve imprisonment for the duration stated in the decision of the said respondent Court dated February 7, 1989. The order for the payment of the civil liabilities has been promulgated earlier.
SO ORDERED.”[5]
The RTC
Resolution, set aside by the Court of Appeals, disposed:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the “Urgent Motion to Set Aside Promulgation” filed by the accused thru counsel, is meritorious and accordingly, the same is hereby granted.”
The Facts
The undisputed
facts of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are reproduced below:
“On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:
‘WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered finding accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double
homicide, beyond reasonable doubt and therefore sentences him to suffer
imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of [p]rision [m]ayor as [m]inimum to
12 years and 1 day of [r]eclusion [t]emporal as [m]aximum, for each
offense, with the accessories provided by law and to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo
Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.’
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity was increased toP50,000.00. The dispositive portion of said Decision of this Court dated July 30, 1991 reads:
‘PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
joint decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by ordering accused Eduardo
Cuison to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P50,000.00
and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P50,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.’
The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-86 but the Supreme Court denied the said petition on December 1, 1993.
The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4, 1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.
Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor General and requested that a motion for clarification be filed with this Court to clarify the decision dated July 30, 1991. On July 7, 1995, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. On August 17, 1995, [the Court of Appeals] rendered a Resolution which states in pertinent portions thereof:
‘In the dispositive portion
of this Court’s decision, We simply modified the appealed decision of the court
a quo in one respect only - the increase of the indemnity to be
paid by the appellant to the heirs of the victims from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00
as ruled in various cases including that cited in Our decision, People vs.
Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646.
In view of the foregoing,
it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the lower court was not touched
on at all by this Court especially in the light of [o]ur [o]bservation in the
said decision, as follows:
‘After a careful review of the
evidence on records, this Court entertains no doubt as to the participation of
the accused-appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The court a quo has expressed the
following findings in its decision, to which findings this Court accords the
great weight and respect such findings of the trial court are entitled to:
Conspiracy . . . was proven by the
following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
The following circumstances showing
the sequence of events, the mode or manner in which the offenses were perpetrated
taken together indicated that the assailants cooperated and helped each other
in the attainment of the same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21) (CA Decision, pp. 14-16; Rollo, pp.
127-129)”
Acting on the afore-cited motion to
clarify decision, this Court hereby declares that this Court had affirmed
the decision of the court a quo with regard to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed in the said trial court’s decision.’
Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the following grounds:
“1. That the judgment in said case was already promulgated
on 4 April 1995 and therefore there is nothing to promulgate anymore.
2. To pursue with [sic] the scheduled promulgation will violate
the accused’s constitutional right against jeopardy.”
In a Resolution dated April 12, 1996, the respondent Judge granted the aforestated motion holding:
“Now, the question is: May
the resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals promulgated on 17 August 1995
which ‘clarified’ the dispositive portion of its original decision, be
considered as an amendment, alteration or modification of the decision? Here, we must not forget the basic rule that
in the execution of the judgment, it is the dispositive portion of the
decision which controls. We cannot also
forget that, as already mentioned above, we have already promulgated the said
decision by reading to the accused the dispositive portion, and that to the
best of our knowledge, he had already complied therewith by paying the damages
which were awarded. It may be relevant
at this point in time, to cite the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in
the case of Heirs of George Bofill vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 393
that
“Had the Court of Appeals
been more accurate and precise in quoting data from the records, it would have
arrived at the right conclusion”
The Honorable Court of
Appeals cited the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of
Partola-Jo vs. CA, 216 SCRA 692, that:
“Where there is an
ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of the
decision, the Supreme Court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even
after the judgment has become final. (emphasis supplied)’
The above decision is in
consonance with the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Buan
vs. Court of Appeal, et al., 235 SCRA 424 wherein the Supreme Court
said:
‘x x x Thus the respondent
Court stated, ‘it is undisputed that the Decision of the Court of Appeals x x x
had become final and executory.’ Taken
in this light the respondent court apparently did not err in leaving the
issue unresolved, a final decision being unreviewable and conclusive.
But judging from the facts
presented by this case, it is beyond doubt that serious injustice will be
committed if strict adherence to procedural rules were to be followed. It should be remembered that rules of
procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice,
such that when rigid application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend its
operation. (emphasis supplied)’
It would seem from the
above pronouncements of the Honorable Supreme Court therefore, that it may
suspend the operation of the rules of procedure by virtue of its rule-making
power. Certainly if the Honorable
Supreme Court has the power to promulgate the Rules of Court, then it has the
power to suspend its operation in order to promote substantial
justice. Unquestionably, however, the
Honorable Court of Appeals does not have that rule[-] making
authority. Therefore it may not suspend
the operation of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the above
discussion refers to civil cases. Will
the same doctrines apply to criminal cases as in the cases before us? The accused thru his counsels raised the
issues of the effect of a promulgation already once made arguing in the process
that another promulgation can no longer be legally feasible if the constitutional
right of the accused against double jeopardy will not be violated.
We are not unmindful of the
injunction upon lower courts, which the Honorable Supreme Court has imposed,
i.e., to accept with modesty the orders and decisions of the appellate
courts. However, we feel that we must equate
this with another injunction, that trial judges must keep abreast with the
jurisprudence or run the risk of being found to be grossly ignorant of the
law. In short, this Court finds itself
in the horns of a dilemma. Since the
very jurisprudential authority relied upon by the Honorable [Court] of Appeals
refers to the power of the Supreme Court to clarify an ambiguity, may
not this Court therefore conclude that the Honorable Court of Appeals does not
have the power to clarify the dispositive portion of the decision which has not
only become final, but has already been previously promulgated?
Finally, it appears to this
Court that there is validity to the observation made by counsel for the accused
in paragraph 4 of their motion which we quote:
‘4. It appears, therefore, that there is nothing to promulgate as the
same had already been promulgated on April 4, 1995. Besides, there is, likewise, nothing to promulgate in the Court
of Appeals Resolution dated February 2, 1996 and much less in the alluded August
17, 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.’
Indeed, the said Resolution
did not authorize nor did it direct this Court to re-promulgate the Decision.
On June 28, 1996, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, filed [before the Court of Appeals a] petition for certiorari and mandamus contending that the respondent Judge seriously erred and gravely abused his discretion in refusing to execute the penalty of imprisonment in spite [the Court of Appeals’] Decision of July 30, 1991 and Resolution of August 17, 1995. He prays that the Order dated April 12, 1996 of respondent Judge be nullified and the penalty of imprisonment rendered against the accused be enforced.”[6]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
In ruling for
the People, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this way:
“Obviously, respondent Judge was of the belief that the penalty of imprisonment was not affirmed by [the Court of Appeals] although it increased the civil liability fromP30,000.00 toP50,000.00. He failed to recognize the fact that the only modification made by [the Court of Appeals] on the decision [was] to increase the civil liability, which would not have been imposed if the accused was not found guilty of the charge. Had he looked carefully into the text of the decision he would have found that [the Court of Appeals] affirmed the decision of conviction, as borne out by the following portions of said decision:
‘After a careful review of
the evidence on record, this Court entertains no doubt as to the participation of
the accused-appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The Court a quo has expressed the
following findings in its decision, to which findings this Court accords the
great weight and respect such findings of the trial court are entitled to:
Conspiracy
... was proven by the following circumstances:
1. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen together occupying the same table
with Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro drinking beer at the terrace upon the
arrival of Leo Petete and his companions;
2. They left the terrace of the Tropical Hut about 10 to 15 minutes
after the arrival of Rulo Castro, Rafael Sapigao, Leo Petete and Agardo Reyes
and boarded the same yellow car owned and driven by accused Eduardo Cuison.
3. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen by Ronald Ligayo, a resident of
Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan, a disinterested witness in the evening of May
27, 1986 infront (sic) of the house of said accused Eduardo Cuison in
Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Accused Eduardo Cuison alighted from his car, proceeded to his house and
after coming out of his house was seen holding a 45 (sic) caliber and a carbine
pistol. Eduardo Cuison called for his
brother Warling to whom he handed the carbine pistol and received by the latter.
Eduardo Cuison sent Domy
Cuison to call for Bot Cuison. When Bot
Cuison arrived, he, Warling, Domy, Eduardo Cuison and two others inside the car
proceeded towards the north. Obviously,
these two were Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde.
4. Upon arrival of accused Eduardo Cuison, Bot Cuison, Warling Cuison,
Domy Cuison, Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro at the driveway of the Tropical Hut
on board the car of accused Eduardo Cuison, each of them with the use of their
respective firearms simultaneously fired several shots in the air;
5. Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde pulled and poked their guns to [sic]
Sapigao. Then Sgt. Castro fired the
fatal shot to [sic] Sapigao;
6. After Sapigao fell down, Sgt. Castro, Warling Cuison, Eduardo
Cuison, Bot and Domy Cuison turned at [sic] Sapigao obviously to see to it and
make sure Sapigao was already dead;
7. After ascertaining that Sapigao was shot dead, accused Eduardo
Cuison called for Rulo Castro to come outside the restaurant and when Rulo
Castro emerged at the door, accused Eduardo Cuison, Warling Cuison, Bot Cuison,
Domy Cuison and Sgt. Bustarde simultaneously pointed their guns and shot at
Rulo Castro hitting the latter;
8. Accused Eduardo Cuison and Warling Cuison are brothers and uncles of
Bot and Domy Cuison. Eduardo Cuison
being a kagawad enjoyed moral influence upon his brother Warling and his two
nephews Bot and Domy;
9. Sgts. Bustarde and Castro and Kagawad Cuison knew each other before
the incident;
10.After shooting the
victims to death, the accused Cuisons went away from the scene of the crime on
board the same car.
The following circumstances
showing the sequence of events, the mode o[r] manner in which the offenses were
perpetrated taken together indicated that the assailants cooperated and helped
each other in the attainment of the same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21)
As held by the Supreme
Court in the case of People vs. Colman, et al. 55 O.G. 2392 (cited in
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, ‘88 ed., Vol. 2, p. 560),
Conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must
be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which
vary according to the purpose to be accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so
that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them
for concerted means is proved (People vs. Colman, et. al., 55 O.G.
2393).
In the appealed decision,
the trial court had ordered the accused-appellant ‘to indemnify the heirs of
Rafael Sapigao [in] the amount of P30,000.00 and to [sic] the heirs of
Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00’ (Decision, p. 24). In accordance with the new policy of the
Supreme Court on this matter, the above-specified amount of P30,000.00
should be increased to P50,000.00 (People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643,
646).’
It is absurd to conclude that [the Court of Appeals] increased the civil liability in accordance with new rulings of the Supreme Court without finding that the accused [was] guilty of the offense of homicide. Thus, the promulgation of the civil liability only and omission of the criminal liability is an error.
Furthermore, [the Court of Appeals] has clarified the ambiguity in the dispositive portion through its Resolution dated August 17, 1995 which categorically stated that the court affirmed the decision of the respondent court with respect to the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon the accused.
This clarification is not an amendment, modification, correction or alteration to an already final decision. It is conceded that such cannot be done anymore. The Court of Appeals simply stated in categorical terms what it obviously meant in its decision - - that the conviction of the accused is affirmed with the modification that the civil liability is increased. The dispositive portion of the decision may not have used the exact words but a reading of the decision can lead to no other conclusion.
It certainly would be ridiculous to allow the accused to go scot-free after paying the heirs the civil indemnity imposed by the Court for his participation in the act of killing the two (2) victims in these cases, because of a wrong interpretation of a decision.”[7]'
Hence, this
appeal.[8]
The Issues
In this appeal,
Petitioner Eduardo Cuison raises the following “assignment of errors”:
“I. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari .
II. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed to show the existence of the elements for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus.
III. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the promulgation of April 4, 1995 cannot be modified, over objection of the accused.
IV. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the filing of the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus dated June 28, 1995 by the Solicitor General violates the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy.
V. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in deciding as it did and in denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.”[9]
Simply put,
petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the writs of certiorari and mandamus were properly issued by
the Court of Appeals, and (2) whether petitioner’s right against double
jeopardy was violated.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is
utterly unmeritorious.
First Issue: Certiorari
and Mandamus Justified
A petition for certiorari
is allowed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provided the following
requisites are present: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[10] Grave abuse of discretion “ x x x
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.”[11]
Petitioner points
out that the solicitor general’s petition for certiorari and mandamus
before the Court of Appeals failed to show grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution of the trial court. In the said Resolution, the trial court
declined to order the incarceration of petitioner and, thus, effectively
refused to promulgate the August 17, 1995 CA Decision which, in turn, clarified
that the CA’s earlier Decision dated July 30, 1991 merely increased the amount
of indemnity but did not delete the penalty of imprisonment. In justifying its said Order, the trial
court insisted that it had already promulgated the July 30, 1991 CA Decision
when it ordered petitioner to pay the increased amount of indemnity. Petitioner argues that the trial court’s
Order, “far from being whimsical, capricious or malevolent, [was] valid and
substantial, to say the least, and the impugned [R]esolution was issued after a
careful deliberation and weighing of the facts, issues and points of applicable
law.”[12]
We disagree. While its language may have been a little
faulty, it is still quite obvious that the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s Decision convicting Petitioner Eduardo Cuison of double homicide. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision,
therefore, cannot be construed to mean that the appellate court merely imposed
an indemnity and deleted the penalty of imprisonment. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in no
way communicated that the appealed Decision of the trial court was modified
only in regard to the amount of indemnity. Nowhere could it be gleaned that the penalty of imprisonment was
deleted. In fact, the CA Decision and
the entire records of this case contain no legal or factual basis for
acquitting petitioner or dismissing the criminal cases against him.
In granting
petitioner’s motion, the trial court judge capriciously and arbitrarily decided
not to promulgate the Court of Appeals’ July 30, 1991 Decision.[13] He had no discretion to refuse; his
refusal was thus a glaring transgression of his jurisdiction.
We must also
emphasize that we dismissed the petition questioning the Court of Appeal’s July
30, 1991 Decision, thereby affirming the conviction of petitioner. The trial court’s assailed April 12, 1996
Resolution was therefore “tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of
the highest Court of the land affirming the judgment of conviction of
respondent Court” and “unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.”[14]
Manifestly
erroneous then is the trial judge’s justification that he has previously
promulgated the Court of Appeals’ Decision on April 4, 1995. As already stated, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was imprisonment plus
a higher amount of civil indemnity. In
ordering only the payment of the indemnity, the trial court failed to execute
the CA Decision in its entirety. Notwithstanding the subsequent CA Decision clarifying -- and this
Court’s dismissal of the petition questioning -- the said earlier CA Decision,
the trial court still adamantly refused to do so. The persistent refusal of the trial court is a clear display of
grave abuse of discretion.
We find
misleading the claim of petitioner that the Court of Appeals itself
acknowledged that the latter’s July 30, 1991 Decision was “ambiguous and obscure.”[15] Such claim is bereft of factual
basis. Nowhere in its Resolution[16] did the CA so describe its previous
Decision. It merely restated the import
of its July 30, 1991 Decision. Evidently, this was either misunderstood or distorted by the trial court,
which stated that “it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the lower
court was not touched on at all by [the Court of Appeals] x x x.”[17]
Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for issuing a writ of mandamus, in
view of the trial court’s refusal to perform its ministerial duty of
promulgating the appellate court’s Decision in its entirety. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, a petition for mandamus is warranted “[w]hen any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x.” [18] Obedience to a superior court’s
order is a ministerial duty of lower courts.
Lastly,
petitioner contends that the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals was
improper, because the People had not filed a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed trial court Order.[19] This contention is bereft of
merit. A motion for reconsideration
need not precede a petition for certiorari where the questioned
resolution was a patent nullity, as in this case.[20]
Second
Issue: Promulgation of Conviction
Not Barred by Double Jeopardy
Petitioner
submits that the trial court’s promulgation of the CA Decision on April 4, 1995
“cannot be set aside and a second promulgation be ordered”[21] because to do so would contravene
the prohibition against double jeopardy.[22] He contends that the judgment as
promulgated on April 4, 1995 has become final[23] and that courts have thus lost
jurisdiction over the case.[24]
To substantiate
a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:
“ x x x (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (citations omitted).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (citation omitted).”[25]
Petitioner
contends that “the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 of the
Respondent Court’s decision of June 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive portion
has effectively terminated the criminal cases against the petitioner x x
x.”[26] In other words, petitioner claims
that the first jeopardy attached at that point.
The Court is not
persuaded. As a rule, a criminal
prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity.[27] Hence, a decision in such case
disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an
accused. Here, trial court promulgated
only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
As earlier
observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation was
not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially
incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his
April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that
grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court
void.[28] Since the criminal cases have not
yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a
defense.[29]
We must stress
that Respondent Court’s questioned Decision did not modify or amend its July
30, 1991 Decision. It merely ordered
the promulgation of the judgment of conviction and the full execution of the
penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.
Cases Cited Not Applicable
People vs.
Hernando, Ramos
vs. Hodges and Republic vs. Court of Appeals, cited by petitioner,
are not applicable because they refer
either to the lower court’s proceeding that is not void or to errors of
judgment, not to lack or excess or abuse of jurisdiction. Thus, in People vs. Hernando,[30] the Court ruled that the questioned
proceedings of the court a quo “were not an absolute nullity as to
render the judgment of acquittal null and void,” considering that the
prosecution was not denied due process. In Ramos vs. Hodges[31] the Court found that the trial judge’s erroneous
conclusion merely constituted “errors of fact or of law,” and not of
jurisdiction. Lastly, in Republic
vs. Court of Appeals[32] the Court held that the lower court
committed merely “an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as
there was no clear showing [that it] exercised its power in [an] arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that its act was
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.”
Epilogue
This Court takes
this occasion to remind members of the bench to be precise in their ponencias,
most especially in the dispositions thereof. Accuracy and clarity in substance and in language are revered objectives
in decision-making.
Having said
that, we also lament the trial court’s convoluted attempt at sophistry, which
obviously enabled the petitioner to delay the service of his imprisonment and to
unnecessarily clog the dockets of this Court and of the Court of Appeals. His Honor’s expressed desire “to accept with
modesty the orders and decisions of the appellate court” was, in truth and in
fact, merely a sarcastic prelude to his veiled rejection of the superior
court’s order modifying his earlier decision. His sophomoric justification of his refusal to obey for fear of “being
found to be grossly ignorant of the law” does not deserve one whit of sympathy
from this Court. Lady Justice may be
blindfolded but she is neither blind nor naive. She can distinguish chicanery from wisdom, fallacious argument
from common sense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED
and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 36-45,
[2]
Fifteenth Division,
composed of J. Salome A. Montoya, chairman and ponente, and JJ.
Godardo A. Jacinto and Maximiano C. Asuncion, concurring.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 83-88.
[4]
Penned by Judge Eugenio
G. Ramos.
[5]
Decision, pp. 10-11; Rollo,
pp. 44-45.
[6]
Ibid., pp. 1-6; Rollo, pp. 36-41.
[7]
Ibid., pp. 7-10; Rollo, pp. 42-44.
[8]
The case was deemed submitted
for resolution on January 22, 1998 upon receipt by this Court of Public
Respondent’s Memorandum. Petitioner’s
Supplemental Memorandum is not a required pleading.
[9]
Petition pp. 6-7; Rollo,
pp. 14-15.
[10]
§1, Rule 65, Rules of
Court. See Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, p. 20, GR No. 108947,
September 29, 1997.
[11]
See Esguerra vs. Court
of Appeals, pp. 20-21, GR No. 119310, February 3, 1997, per Panganiban, J., quoting Alafriz vs. Nable,
72 Phil. 278, p.280 (1941); citing Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182 (1918), Salvador
Campos y Cia vs. Del Rosario, 41 Phil. 45 (1920), Abad Santos vs. Province
of Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz. 830, and Tavera-Luna, Inc. vs. Nable, 38 Off.
Gaz. 62. See also San Sebastian College
vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 444, 458, March 20, 1991; Sinon vs. Civil
Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410, November 5, 1992; Bustamante vs. Commission
on Audit, 216 SCRA 134, 136, November 27, 1992; Zarate vs. Olegario, GR
No. 90655, October 7, 1996.
[12]
Ibid., p. 6; Rollo, p. 142.
[13]
See record, pp. 53-69.
[14]
People vs. Court
of Appeals, 101 SCRA 450, 465, November 28, 1990, per Melencio-Herrera, J.
[15]
Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 8; Rollo, p. 144.
[16]
Record, pp. 71-73.
[17]
Ibid., p. 72.
[18]
See also Go vs. Court
of Appeals, 252 SCRA 564, 567, January 29, 1996 and Tangonan vs. Paño,
137 SCRA 245, 254-255, June 27, 1985.
[19]
Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 9; Rollo, p. 145.
[20]
National
Electrification Administration vs. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA 394, 400,
December 29, 1983.
[21]
Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 14; Rollo, p. 170.
[22]
Ibid., pp. 12-14; Rollo, pp.
168-170.
[23]
Ibid., p. 14; Rollo, p. 170.
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Guerrero vs.
Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 703, 712, June 28, 1996, per Panganiban, J., citing People vs. Puno, 208
SCRA 550, 557, May 8, 1992; People vs. Asuncion, 208 SCRA 231, 239,
April 22, 1992; Gorion vs. Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Br. 17, 213
SCRA 138, 148, August 31, 1992; and Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 237
SCRA 575, 581, October 13, 1994. See
also People vs. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202, 208, May 22, 1995.
[26]
Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 15; Rollo, p. 171. Underscoring found in the original.
[27]
§ 1, Rule 111, Rules of
Court.
[28]
People vs. Montesa,
supra , p. 653; People vs. Court of Appeals, supra , p.
467; and People vs. Pablo, 98
SCRA 289, 301, June 25, 1980, citing People vs. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121;
People vs. Surtida, 43 SCRA 29; and People vs. Navarro, 63 SCRA
264.
[29]
Ibid.
[30]
Supra , p. 131.
[31]
Supra , p. 219.
[32]
Supra , pp. 537-536.