544 Phil. 565
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
x x x [O]n October 9, 1985, private respondent Bernardo de Vera, bought a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1685 from petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB for brevity) and the former signed a “Contract of Sale with Option to Resell” prepared by the latter.On April 20, 2001, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
Shortly after the sale, petitioner PNB placed in possession respondent de Vera who started to introduce improvements thereon such as the construction of roads and putting up of concrete fence. However, respondent de Vera was evicted by respondents Consolacion Chan, Elizabeth Capulla and Caroline Reyes.
Thus, an action for quieting of title and damages was filed by plaintiffs-respondents Chan, et al. against Bernardo de Vera and his spouse, the latter filed a third-party complaint against third-party defendant (now petitioner) PNB. Both the de Veras and PNB did not contest plaintiffs-respondents’ claim of possession and ownership over the questioned property, thus, the respondent judge gave his “imprimatur to plaintiffs’ claim of the rights of possession, under claim of ownership over the disputed parcel of land described” in the complaint. After trial on the merits, respondent Judge rendered his decision, the decretal portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment:Petitioner PNB filed a Motion for New Trial and Reconsideration x x x.
a) Declaring the plaintiffs [Chan, et al.] to be lawful possessors and owners over the litigated lot described in their Complaint in the above-entitled case.
b) Ordering the third party defendant (PNB) to pay the value of the lot sold to the third party plaintiffs (DE VERAS) under the Contract of Sale With Option to Resell dated October 9, 1985 (Exh. “1”) in the amount of P1,000.00 per square meter for the entire 33,873 square meters plus the sum of P20,000.00 spent for documentation or registration of the contract of sale, with legal interest thereon at the rate of 12% per month from the date of this judgment until full payment thereof to the DE VERAS.
c) Condemning the third party defendant (PNB) to pay the third party plaintiffs (DE VERAS) the sum of P200,000.00 (sic) representing the value of the labor and construction materials and improvements the latter introduced in the disputed lot from October 10, 1985 up to October 27, 1985.
d) Ordering the third party defendant (PNB) to pay the third party plaintiffs (DE VERAS) the amount of P50,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to the sum of P10,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses and, to pay the costs of this suit.
e) Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims which the parties may have against each in this case for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
x x x x
[The RTC] rendered the assailed Order of February 18, 1999, the pertinent portions of which are hereunder reproduced, as follows:Viewed from all the foregoing, the Court finds merit in the plaintiffs’ motion for execution embodied in their opposition and, the third-party plaintiffs De Vera’s Motion for Execution, meritorious, it appearing that the third-party defendant PNB’s Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, is pro forma, and, as such, it did not suspend the running of the period of appeal, it having expired, or no appeal having been perfected by PNB within the reglementary period, this Court finds no alternative but to comply with its ministerial duty to issue the corresponding Writ of Execution for the enforcement of its decision of August 20, 1998.Thus, the instant petition [under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court] with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction was filed [with the CA].
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the third-party defendant PNB’s Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration dated December 2, 1998, as pro forma and, as such, did not toll the running of the period of appeal, the same is hereby DENIED; consequently, the Decision of this Court dated August 20, 1998, is now final and executory.
Let the corresponding Writ of Execution for the enforcement and satisfaction of the said decision of August 20, 1998 be issued.
Be it noted also herein the Notice of Attorney’s Lien filed by Atty. Benigno Puno, counsel for the third-party plaintiff, Bernardo de Vera, which contains his conformity thereto.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner PNB raised the following ground in support of its petition:RESPONDENT COURT COMMITED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR AUTHORITY, AMOUNTING TO WANT OF JURISDICTION, IN DECLARING ITS DECISION OF AUGUST 20, 1998 AS HAVING BEEN BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY NOTWITHSTANDING PETITIONER’S TIMELY FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND RECONSIDERATION IS PRO FORMA, THEREBY DEPRIVING PETITIONER OF ITS VALUABLE RIGHT TO APPEAL.On March 23, 1999, [the CA] issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the writ of execution, and thereafter a writ of preliminary injunction was issued on May 18, 1999. The Resolutions of [the CA] dated March 23 and May 18, 1999 were the subjects of a petition for certiorari/mandamus before the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. 138681, which was dismissed in the Supreme Court’s Resolution of November 15, 1999.[3]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for having failed to show that grave abuse of discretion and/or lack of jurisdiction had been committed by the respondent court, and the assailed Order of February 18, 1999 is AFFIRMED.In affirming the RTC Order, the CA held that petitioner’s Motion for New Trial and Reconsideration (Motion) is pro forma, and, consequently, the said Motion did not toll the running of the period for appeal and the decision thus attained finality; that the documents proffered by the petitioner in the said Motion, allegedly newly discovered evidence, are the same as those marked and presented by the petitioner in its Pre-Trial Brief dated July 1, 1994; and that the Motion failed to comply with Section 5 of Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that the notice of hearing be directed to the parties concerned.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:I.
The Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has sanctioned such departure by the Trial Court when it affirmed the trial court’s award of excessive and unfounded damages of P33.8 Million against the Petitioner by way of summary judgment.II.
The Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has sanctioned such departure by the Trial Court when it affirmed the lower court’s denial of the notice of appeal of petitioner while granting the belated withdrawal of appeal by respondents in support of the latter’s motion for execution.III.
The Court of Appeals in affirming the trial court’s decision has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with the laws of the New Civil Code on Sales and Warranty against Eviction.[5]
The petition has merit.I.
Whether or not the Decision of the Trial Court has attained finalityII.
Whether or not the respondents de Veras are entitled to the payment of P33,873,000.00.III.
The provisions of the Contract of Sale with Option to Resell is the law between the parties and should thus
be respected.[6]
x x x The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy. But, as we have held in another case:The averments found in the Motion for Reconsideration of herein petitioner point out specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment of the RTC which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, and, moreover, the motion states additional specific reasons for those grounds.Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence; and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial.Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof. The 16-page motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was pro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere “rehash” of his earlier pleadings or did not raise “new matters.” Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.[8] (Emphasis supplied)
and in Marina Properties Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[9] thus:
Under our rules of procedure, a party adversely affected by a decision of a trial court may move for reconsideration thereof on the following grounds: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision; or (c) the decision is contrary to law. A motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to appeal, unless the motion is pro forma. This is now expressly set forth in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
A motion for reconsideration based on the foregoing grounds is deemed pro forma if the same does not specify the findings or conclusions in the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions. It is settled that although a motion for reconsideration may merely reiterate issues already passed upon by the court, that by itself does not make it pro forma and is immaterial because what is essential is compliance with the requisites of the Rules. xxx.
x x x x
Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the pleader to merely delay the proceedings, and his motion reveals a bona fide effort to present additional matters or to reiterate his arguments in a different light, the courts should be slow to declare the same outright as pro forma. The doctrine relating to pro forma motions has a direct bearing upon the movant’s valuable right to appeal. It would be in the interest of justice to accord the appellate court the opportunity to review the decision of the trial court on the merits than to abort the appeal by declaring the motion pro forma, such that the period to appeal was not interrupted and had consequently lapsed. [10] (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.The RTC held that petitioner’s Motion which was filed on December 3, 1998, and was set for hearing on December 21, 1998, eight days beyond the reglementary period prescribed under Section 5, Rule 15, and that the Motion set the hearing on a Monday and not on a Friday. The CA held that the notice of hearing of said Motion was not addressed to the parties concerned.
Section 7. Motion day. – Except for motions requiring immediate action, all motions shall be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoon, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon the next working day.
As enjoined by the Rules of Court and the controlling jurisprudence, a liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.Thus, even if the Motion may be defective for failure to address the notice of hearing of said motion to the parties concerned, the defect was cured by the court’s taking cognizance thereof and the fact that the adverse party was otherwise notified of the existence of said pleading.[14] There is substantial compliance with the foregoing rules if a copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of herein private respondents. [15]
The rule requiring notice to herein private respondents as defendant and intervenors in the lower court with respect to the hearing of the motion filed by herein petitioner for the reconsideration of the decision of respondent Judge, has been substantially complied with. While the notice was addressed only to the clerk of court, a copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished counsel of herein private respondents, which fact is not denied by private respondent. As a matter of fact, private respondents filed their opposition to the said motion for reconsideration dated January 14, 1981 after the hearing of the said motion was deferred and re-set twice from December 8, 1980, which was the first date set for its hearing as specified in the notice. Hence, private respondents were not denied their day in court with respect to the said motion for reconsideration. The fact that the respondent Judge issued his order on January 15, 1981 denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit as it merely repeated the same grounds raised in the memorandum of herein petitioner as plaintiff in the court below, one day after the opposition to the motion for reconsideration was filed on January 14, 1981 by herein private respondents, demonstrates that the said opposition of herein respondents was considered by the respondent Judge.
x x x x
The motion for reconsideration of herein petitioner, while substantially based on the same grounds he invoked in his memorandum after the case was submitted for decision, is not pro forma as it points out specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment which he claims are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law (City of Cebu v. Mendoza, L-26321, Feb. 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 440, 446), aside from stating additional specific reasons for the said grounds.[13] (Emphasis supplied)