543 Phil. 546
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
WHEREFORE, consistent with the foregoing tenor, judgment is hereby entered dismissing the charges of illegal dismissal for lack of merit. Complainant is, however, ordered to report to his new assignment at respondent PAL's Domestic Cargo and for respondent PAL to accept him back to work under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the dispute as soon as it resumes operations or, for respondent PAL to pay him his appropriate separation pay in the event it finally closed shop.In dismissing the complaint, the labor arbiter considered respondent Zamora's transfer as an exercise of petitioner PAL's management prerogative.
The rest of the claims is (sic) likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
x x x What appears to be simply an order of transfer is actually an attempt to strifle (sic) complainant's (respondent Zamora) efforts to avert illegal activities at his original work assignment. For why would the individual respondents pick on complainant only after he wrote to the company President, unless there is a veiled attempt to weaken his chance to have a full investigation conducted on an anomaly immediately after he had started to spill out the beans, so to speak.The decretal part of the subject decision provides:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 28, 1998 is hereby ordered SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered declaring complainant's transfer at the Domestic Cargo Operations on November 13, 1996 illegal.Respondent Zamora filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[13] of the abovequoted decision in so far as it denied his claim for damages and attorney's fees.
Moreover, respondents are hereby ordered to immediately reinstate complainant Bernardin J. Zamora to his former position as Cargo Representative at the Import Operations Division of respondent PAL without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay him back salaries and backwages beginning December 15, 1995 until his actual reinstatement, inclusive of allowances and other benefits and increases thereto.
All other reliefs herein sought and prayed for are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.[12]
WHEREFORE, finding the motion to be well taken and in order, the same is granted and respondents are hereby cited for indirect contempt for their failure to comply with the order of the Hon. Commission. They are directed anew to reinstate complainant immediately to his former position as Cargo Representative, physically or in the payroll, and fined an amount of P100.00 per day from 16 August 1999 until compliance.Undaunted, petitioners PAL, et al. appealed the abovementioned 8 January 2001 Order of the labor arbiter before the NLRC. In their appeal,[32] they prayed for the reversal of said Order as well as for the suspension of the proceedings in the subject case considering that petitioner PAL, was, at that time, undergoing rehabilitation per 16 August 1999 Order[33] of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) appointing a permanent rehabilitation receiver for petitioner PAL in SEC Case No. 06-98-6004 entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for the Approval of Rehabilitation Plan and for Appointment of a Rehabilitation Receiver."
Further, let a writ of execution be issued.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE.In setting aside the challenged Order of the labor arbiter, the NLRC gave premium to the copy[36] of the structural organization of petitioner PAL's Cargo Services Sub-Department showing that as of 30 June 2000, the Import Operations Division, to which respondent Zamora's previous position actually belonged, had already been abolished. It opined that:
The Labor Arbiter is hereby advised to forthwith issue a Writ of Execution which, due to a supervening event, the abolition of PAL's Import Operations Division - must vary the terms of the final judgment to the extent that: (1) the complainant must be awarded, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service from February 9, 1981 to June 30, 2000; and (2) the award of backwages must be computed from December 15, 1995 to June 30, 2000.
x x x As it is common knowledge that respondent PAL implemented a massive retrenchment program in 1998-1999, and since it is only the complainant who stands to lose if the instant case were to be allowed to drag any longer, this Commission finds that the technical rules of evidence applicable in the ordinary courts of law must be set aside, and the respondent's contention that the complainant's former position no longer exists may be considered to be meritorious.[37]The commission then proceeded to award respondent Zamora, in lieu of reinstatement to the latter's former position, separation pay equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, that is, from 9 February 1981 to 30 June 2000.[38] Its award was based on:
Section 4 (d), Rule VI of the Implementing rules of the Labor Code provides that 'where (the employee's) former position no longer exists at the time of reinstatement for reasons not attributable to the fault of the employer, the employee shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary or to one month salary for every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year. x x x.[39]The NLRC concluded that the award to respondent Zamora of backwages must likewise be computed from 15 December 1995 until 20 June 2000.
WHEREFORE, complainant's Motion for Partial Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. Respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The instant case is hereby referred to the permanent rehabilitation receiver and the proceedings hereon are deemed SUSPENDED while respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. is under rehabilitation receivership.[40]The NLRC then ordered the suspension of the instant proceedings in light of the 7 June 1999 SEC Order reiterating and confirming its earlier approval of the Amended and Restated Rehabilitation Plan of petitioner PAL and, therein appointing a permanent rehabilitation receiver.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The NLRC resolution dated April 27, 2001 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Bernardin Zamora is hereby REINSTATED to his former position without loss of seniority rights as decreed in the NLRC decision dated July 26, 1999 which has already become final and executory.[41]In said Decision, the Court of Appeals found the NLRC to have gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter, instead of enforcing its 26 July 1999 Decision by ordering respondent Zamora's reinstatement, varied the terms of said decision by suspending the proceedings and referring the case to petitioner PAL's rehabilitation receiver. The appellate court ratiocinated that:
Zamora stands to lose his hard-earned victory if the instant case is allowed to drag any longer simply because of the expediency of a rehabilitation proceeding. The facts are clear that PAL illegally terminated Zamora and that there exists a final and executory order for his reinstatement. PAL's rehabilitation plan was submitted in 1999 and it has been almost five years since then. Disallowing the enforcement to the claim that it would unnecessarily add to the burden of management, does not justify the aggravation caused in the delay in execution of the judgment in favor of Zamora. x x x.[42]The Court of Appeals also rejected the documents proffered by petitioner PAL which supposedly evidenced the abolition of the former position of respondent Zamora, that of a Cargo Representative at the Import Operations Division. On the contrary, the Court of Appeals argued that a table appearing in the proffered documents, entitled Table of Organization of the Cargo Department, clearly showed that the position of Cargo Representative, although at the International Cargo Services Division and not at the Import Organizations Division, still existed - a total of 86 Cargo Representative positions in fact.
WHEREFORE, this Court's August 13, 2004 decision is hereby AMENDED, the dispositive portion to read as follows:The Court of Appeals took into account respondent Zamora's incarceration when it recalled its order of reinstatement. Anent its earlier pronouncement against the suspension of the proceedings of the case owing to the present rehabilitation of petitioner PAL, the appellate court only had this to say:'WHEREDORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The NLRC resolution dated April 27, 2001 is MODIFIED. Considering that petitioner is a detention prisoner making reinstatement impossible, PAL is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Zamora his separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, to be computed at one month salary for every year of service from February 9, 1981 and backwages to be computed from December 19, 1995, both up to October 1, 2000, the date of his incarceration.Considering that PAL is still under receivership, the monetary claims of petitioner Zamora must be presented to the PAL Rehabilitation Receiver, subject to the rules on preference of credits.[44]
SO ORDERED.'
However, since PAL is still under receivership, the provisions of PD 902-A, should apply. The enforcement of the monetary claims of petitioner should be brought before the PAL Rehabilitation Receiver for proper disposition.[45]In spite of such modification, petitioner PAL found fault with the decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, predicated on the following issues:[46]
At this point, notwithstanding the fact that the present petition alleges three issues, the resolution of the third one relating to the propriety of the execution of the NLRC's order of reinstatement[47] despite the verity of the 17 May 1999 SEC Order approving the Amended and Restated Rehabilitation Plan of petitioner PAL and appointing a "permanent rehabilitation receiver for the latter,"[48] is of paramount importance. The overriding legal significance to the instant case of the SEC mandated rehabilitation of petitioner PAL will affect the progress, development or advancement of the present petition.I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING ILLEGAL THE DISMISSAL OF RESPONDENT ZAMORA AND THE DECISION OF THE NLRC DATED JULY 26, 1999 FINAL AND EXECUTORY. IN SO DOING, THE COURT OF APPEALS PREMATURELY RULED ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE;II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A PALPABLE ERROR IN ORDERING PAL TO PAY RESPONDENT ZAMORA HIS 'SEPARATION PAY, IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT, TO BE COMPUTED AT ONE MONTH SALARY FOR EVERY YEAR OF SERVICE FROM FEBRUARY 9, 1981AND BACKWAGES TO BE COMPUTED FROM DECEMBER 15, 1995, BOTH UP TO OCTOBER 12 (sic), 2000, THE DATE OF HIS INCARCERATION; andIII.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR IN ORDERING THAT RESPONDENT ZAMORA'S MONETARY CLAIM BE PRESENTED TO THE PAL REHABILITATION RECEIVER, SUBJECT TO THE RULES ON PREFERENCE OF CREDITS.
SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:and Section 6(c), to wit:
x x x x
d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases where the corporation, partnership or association possesses property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership or association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the [management of a rehabilitation receiver or] management committee created pursuant to this Decree.
SECTION 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following:The term "claim," as contemplated in Sec. 6 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, refers "to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. It means 'the assertion of a right to have money paid.'"[54]
x x x x
c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real or personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the Commission in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and /or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors: x x x Provided, finally, That upon appointment of a management committee, the rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
In light of these powers, the reason for suspending actions for claims against the corporation should not be difficult to discover. It is not really to enable the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to substitute the defendant in any pending action against it before any court, tribunal, board or body. Obviously, the real justification is to enable the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the "rescue" of the debtor company. To allow such other action to continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.[56] (Emphasis supplied.)In the case of Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC,[57] the preceding principle was applied to a case involving claims of employees. After placing Rubberworld (Phils.) under a management committee by the SEC, the former's alleged employees filed before the labor arbiter complaints for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, damages and payment of other benefits. Rubberworld (Phils.) moved to suspend the proceedings of the labor cases predicated on the strength of the SEC order placing it under a management committee. The labor arbiter denied the motion holding that the injunction contained in the SEC order applied only to the enforcement of established rights and did not include suspension of proceedings involving claims against Rubberworld (Phils.) which have yet to be ascertained. The labor arbiter further held that the order of the SEC suspending all actions for claims against Rubberworld (Phils.) did not cover the claims of employees in the labor cases because said claims, and the concomitant liability of Rubberworld (Phils.), are still to be determined, thus carrying no dissipation of the assets of the latter. In rejecting the postulations of the labor arbiter, we held that the actions of the workers before the labor arbiter are among the actions that are suspended upon the placing of the employer-corporation under management committee. In unambiguous terms, this Court articulated that:
It is plain from the foregoing provisions of law that "upon the appointment [by the SEC] of a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver," all actions for claims against the corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board shall ipso jure be suspended. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)Similar to the instant petition is this Court's Resolution in the case of Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC.[59] Therein, PAL questioned, albeit via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, before us, the decision of the NLRC awarding separation pay to Quijano, an employee of PAL. During the pendency of the petition, however, PAL moved for the suspension of proceedings of the case by virtue of the SEC order which appointed an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver for PAL. Before acting on said motion, we required the parties to submit memoranda and to address the issue of whether or not this Court should render judgment during the state of suspension of claims. PAL argued therein that the continuance of actions for claims during receivership would add to the burden of the rehabilitation receiver; that if such claim was granted, the employee, as a money judgment creditor, would be in a position to assert a preference over other creditors. The employee, however, contended that the claim for separation pay may be awarded despite PAL being under a state of receivership since said claim was secured by the supersedeas bond posted by the employer. The employee maintained that the suspension of proceedings provided in Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A refers to actions or suits for claims against corporations placed under receivership and not to petitions for certiorari initiated by the corporation under receivership. In a Resolution dated 4 September 2000, this Court granted PAL's motion elucidating that:
x x x x
x x x The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions "shall be suspended accordingly." No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. Since the law makes no distinction or exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. x x x.[58]
In Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, we held that worker's claims before the NLRC and labor arbiters are included among the actions suspended upon the placing under receivership of the employer-corporations. Although strictly speaking, the ruling in Rubberworld dealt with actions for claims pending before the NLRC and labor arbiters, we find that the rationale for the automatic suspension therein set out would apply to the instant case where the employee's claim was elevated on certiorari before this Court, x x x.And quite recently, in another PAL case, specifically, Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[60] we resolved to grant PAL's Motion for Suspension of Proceedings before us by reason of the SEC Orders dated 23 June 1998 and 1 July 1998, appointing an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver and enjoining the suspension of all claims for payment against PAL, respectively. Therein we declared that this Court is "not prepared to depart from the well-established doctrines" essentially maintaining that all actions for claims against a corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board shall ipso jure be suspended in whatever stage such actions may be found upon the appointment by the SEC of a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver.
x x x x
The Court holds that rendition of judgment while petitioner is under a state of receivership could render violence to the rationale for suspension of payments in Section 6 (c) of P.D. 902-A, if the judgment would result in the granting of private respondent's claim to separation pay, thus defeating the basic purpose behind Section 6 (c) of P.D. 902-A which is to prevent dissipation of the distressed company's resources. (Emphasis supplied.)