537 Phil. 48
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Complainants in this case worked in respondents' paper manufacturing business in various capacities as machine operator, bookbinding head and/or helper. They claimed that, for refusal to sign for the ratification of an addendum to an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement which was intended to effect a reduction in their leave benefits of fifteen (15) days for every year of service, they were subjected to acts of harassment such that, on November 11, 1998, when they reported for work, they were not allowed entry by respondent company's security guard and that, they were instead instructed by the company's Personnel Manager, Mr. Jessie Ongsitco, to receive a Memorandum of Transfer which they refused. Complainants alleged that their transfer to a provincial post constituted a case of constructive dismissal.The NLRC then affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and dismissed herein respondents' appeal.
Respondents denied the charge, averring that the transfer had, for its sole consideration, the best interest of the company and that it was an undertaking which was agreed into (sic) by the complainants when they signed their employment contracts with the respondent company.
Respondents further alleged that there was no reason to get back at the complainants on account of their refusal to sign the adverted signature sheet for the ratification of an Addendum to the 1995 CBA, since the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit had already ratified the said addendum; that during their employment, complainants committed several offenses in that, Tungpalan failed to report for work on March 12, 1998 then broke a breaker in August 1998, signed an overtime form but did not render overtime work, and had several unexcused absences; Espiritu was also cited for a number of tardiness and absences; that Regalado was suspended for seven (7) days in November 1997 for absences, issued a memorandum for not wearing the proper uniform and for tardiness likewise; and that Paguirigan in 1998 had ten (10) unexcused absences and was suspended twice on such account.
On January 25, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment, the pertinent portion of which reads, as follows:There is a convincing and cogent evidence to buttress the contention that respondents in giving new provincial assignments to complainants, or otherwise transferred them to other places were nothing more, but to consider the same as an act of management right and prerogative. x x x
It is observed, however, that complainants were given new provincial assignments by the respondents by virtue of the Information Sheets filled up and signed by them as a condition sine qua non for employment, (See Annexes "I", Position Paper of Respondents), where it explicitly spelled out complainants unconditional willingness to be transferred to any branch office of the company within the country. x x x
Suffice it to say, therefore, that respondents in transferring the assignments of complainants from other places or provincial branch offices are indeed justified under our jurisprudence (supra). Along this line, it seems clear enough to discern that complainants were transferred to the branch offices of respondents, without malicious intent, in order to utilize the expertise and talent of these employees. x x x
x x x x x x x x x"
In summation, the Commission finds and so conclude after a careful evaluation of the pleadings, as well as, the evidence adduced by the contending parties that complainants' claim for illegal dismissal, or constructive dismissal will not prosper x x x .
x x x Nevertheless, notwithstanding the aforesaid findings, on considerations of justice and equity, separation pay was awarded in complainants' favor at the rate of one-half month's salary for every year of service.
From the Labor Arbiter's decision, complainants filed an appeal, maintaining that their transfer was effected in bad faith, as gleaned from the chain of events which transpired, from their refusal to sign the signature sheet, to the service of memoranda for their planned transfer, and finally to their being barred from their employer's premises.x x x x x x x x x [2]
The filing of the instant petition is proper in view of the extreme urgency of the issues involved in the case. The petitioners had to dispense with the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration because, firstly, since the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised and passed upon by the court-a-quo, the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this court is no longer a pre-requisite. (Legaspi Oil Co. vs. Geronimo – 76 SCRA 174) Secondly, the rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the circumstances. (Matutina vs. Buslon, et al., 109 Phil 140)The CA gave due course to the petition despite the fact that no motion for reconsideration from the NLRC Decision was filed by herein respondents. The findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were reversed by the CA, holding instead that:
In the present case, time is of the essence in view of the unilateral acts committed by Respondent Company [herein petitioners], which tend to undermine the rights of petitioners thereby depriving them of the rights granted to them by law.[3]
Considering the uncontroverted fact that there was a previous meeting between petitioners [herein respondents] and the representative of the Corporation before the Mediation Board and an agreement dated November 10, 1998 was reached wherein the respondents agreed that that petitioners be allowed to report for work the following day leaving the settlement of the money claims as the lone issue to be resolved; we cannot rationalize as reasonable, more so lawful why the promised reinstatement to the petitioners was not effected but instead, petitioners were stopped at the gate when they reported for work and served the memorandum of their transfer to provincial assignments.The dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated February 4, 2002 reads:
Furthermore, since all the complainants were residents of Metro Manila, their transfer to Iloilo, Bacolod, Davao, Cebu and Cagayan on the same day when the Memorandum of Transfer was served to them is very unreasonable. (p. 51, rollo) Indeed, it is inconsiderate for the Corporation to order its employees who are residents of Metro Manila and have families to be left behind to report to their provincial assignments on the same day they were served the Memorandum of Transfer.
Moreover, petitioners worked in the Corporation as machine operator, bookbinding head and/or helper. It certainly does not need a great stretch of imagination to know that it is difficult for them to relocate to provinces far from Metro Manila on so short a notice.
The aforementioned facts as established from the records render support to the claim of the petitioners that there was bad faith on the part of the Corporation specially when the Memo of Transfer of work assignment came less than a week after petitioners refused to sign the signature sheet of the document for the ratification of the Addendum to the Collective Bargaining Agreement of 1995 between the Corporation and its employees.
Indeed, one of the prerogatives of management, and a very important one at that, is the right to transfer employees in their work station. But, of course, like other prerogatives, the right to transfer or re-assign is subject to limitations arising under the law, contract, or general principles of fair play and justice. (Chu vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 232 SCRA 764)
Jurisprudence proscribes transfers or reassignments of employees when such acts are unreasonable and cause inconvenience or prejudice to them. (Chu vs. National Labor Relations Commission, supra.)
Given the foregoing facts, we conclude that the Memo of Transfer served on the petitioners was effected with mala fides. [4]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 25, 2000 of the Labor Arbiter, and the Resolution dated May 29, 2001 of the Public Respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private Respondent STAR PAPERS CORPORATION is found to have constructively dismissed petitioners and is hereby ordered to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service; and in accordance with Republic Act 6715, petitioners are entitled to their full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of the finality of this decision.Herein petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision but per Resolution dated June 11, 2002, the same was denied.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.[5]
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;In Romy's Freight Service v. Castro,[9] the Court ruled that since the issue in the petition for certiorari filed with the appellate court was the very same one that was presented and resolved by the NLRC, and also because the employer-employee relationship is imbued with public interest, the appellate court acted properly in taking cognizance of the case even if no motion for reconsideration had been filed by private respondents with the NLRC.
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.[8]