549 Phil. 325
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
SEC. 2. No restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the court against any government financial institution in any action taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided in Section 1 hereof, whether such restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction is sought by the borrower(s) or any third party or parties, except after due hearing in which it is established by the borrower and admitted by the government financial institution concerned that twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding arrearages has been paid after the filing of foreclosure proceedings.After hearing on January 5, 2001 the arguments of the parties on petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC, by Order[5] of January 12, 2001, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction, dismissed the main petition for Injunction, and directed herein petitioners to proceed with the public auction:
For resolution by this Court is the "Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Lift Preliminary Injunction."On March 12, 2001, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC Order of January 12, 2001 to the Court of Appeals. In a separate move, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said RTC Order of January 12, 2001, positing as follows:
The said motion was set for hearing on January 5, 2001. Atty. Domingo V. Pascua, counsel for the petitioners, and Attys. Joselito Mendoza and Jose Manuel Calderon, counsels for respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), argued their respective contentions lengthily. In the absence of any clear jurisprudence to show that the provisions of P.D. 385 will not apply in this case, the Court has to agree with the point of respondent DBP that the Court should not have issued the temporary restraining order (TRO) as well as the subsequent preliminary injunction for being violative of the above-quoted law. The contentions of the petitioners, thru counsel, that said provision of law which was issued during the Martial Law years, was supposedly abandoned pursuant to numerous decisions of the Supreme Court, cannot be taken without the citation of the Supreme Court decisions as jurisprudence thereof.
In view of the foregoing, this Court is now constrained to LIFT the preliminary injunction issued against the respondents. With this order, the said respondents can now proceed with the public auction of the foreclosed mortgaged properties subject of the litigation.
The issue that can now be raised is whether the Court should also dismiss this injunction suit filed by petitioners. Obviously, with the lifting of the preliminary injunction, the prayer sought for by the petitioners is rendered moot and academic. For this reason, specifically considering the provisions of P.D. 385, this case may now be ordered dismissed.
It is noteworthy that petitioners made allegations in the body of the petition to the effect that the responsible officials of the respondent DBP acted with negligence, imprudence, haste and incompetence. However, the Court must emphasize that the petition, in its prayer, explicitly asked the Court to enjoin the respondents from proceeding with the auction sale. Nowhere was it prayed that petitioners are asking for damages. The Court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction to try such issue even if there were allegations towards this effect in the body of the petition.
WHEREFORE, the preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby ordered LIFTED, and this case ordered DISMISSED.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The trial court, by Order of February 14, 2001, deferred resolution of respondents' Motion for Reconsideration "for compelling reasons and in the interest of justice," in that:
- PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 385 WAS MISAPPLIED BY THE HONORABLE COURT AND MISREAD BY THE RESPONDENTS.
- THE INJUNCTION SUIT, BEING AN INDEPENDENT SUIT BY ITSELF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED UNTIL TRIAL ON THE MERITS WERE CONDUCTED AND THE PETITIONERS ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE INJUNCTION SUIT.
- THE HONORABLE COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE PETITIONERS' RIGHTS OVER THEIR PROPERTIES HAVE BEEN FLAGRANTLY INVADED BY THE RESPONDENTS AND AS ASSERTED IN THEIR PETITION THEY HAVE VERY SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS TO PROTECT.
- THE ORDER OF THE HONORABLE COURT IF NOT REVERSED SHALL CAUSE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE TO THE PERSONS OF THE PETITIONERS AND IRREPERABLE DAMAGE AND INJURY TO THEIR PROPERTIES.[7] (EMPHASIS AND UNDERSCORING SUPPLIED)
The trial court thus set the case for hearing on February 28, 2001 at 2:00 p.m.x x x x
Legally, the Court finds no reason to grant the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners. The applicable law is very explicit and does not give the court any discretion in the issuance of either an injunction or preliminary injunction for the prevailing situation. Nevertheless, petitioners made allegations, which in effect, is to ask the court to give said party their day in court[.] In fact, petitioners' counsel made assertions alluding misconduct, which according to petitioners' counsel ca[n] be testified to by the petitioners and their witnesses. In the interest of justice the court will, therefore, set this case for the purpose of hearing said testimonies. It must be emphasized that the petitioners and their witnesses will be under oath and should not in the least way commit an offense by giving any false testimony or perjurous statement as this will result in the court imposing sanctions.x x x x[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
When the case was called, Atty. Domingo V. Pascua appeared as counsel for the petitioners.On March 2, 2001, the trial court issued the following order, maintaining its order allowing herein petitioners to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgaged property:
Filed today is a "Motion for Reconsideration" by respondent Development Bank of the Philippines. There is no counsel appearing for said respondent in today's setting.
The Court asked counsel for the petitioners [herein respondents] if he is ready to present his witnesses to substantiate his allegations on the supposed misconduct since the said testimonies will be forwarded by this Court to the City Prosecutor's Office for its evaluation of any possible criminal offense committed. Atty. Pascua manifested that the proceeding to be undertaken by this Court should first be the pre-trial as this is the ordinary course. The Court explained to said counsel that there is no legal basis to grant either the injunction or preliminary injunction and the only reason why the case is being heard today is for the purpose of giving petitioners their day in Court specifically with regards [sic]to their serious allegations. Counsel for the petitioners insisted that they could not present any witness as the Court should first resolve the pending motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the Court, since it had given the petitioners their day in Court yet failed to pursue their alleged claim of misconduct, the motion for reconsideration [of herein respondents] is hereby submitted for resolution.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
This Court had emphasized in the order dated February 14, 2001 that there is no legal basis for this Court to grant the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners. It was further stated in the said order that the applicable law is very explicit and does not give the Court any discretion in the issuance of either an injunction or preliminary injunction considering the factual situation of this case. However, the Court, in the interest of justice, gave petitioners their day in Court to be able to substantiate allegations alluding misconduct. As stated in the order dated February 28, 2001, had counsel for the petitioners opted to present witnesses to substantiate their serious allegations regarding the purported misconduct, the testimony of petitioners/witnesses will be forwarded by this Court to the City Prosecutor's Office for its evaluation of any possible criminal offense committed. It was noted by this Court that in the motion for reconsideration filed by respondents, it was alleged in paragraph 4 thereof that the respondents recognized petitioners' allegations of misconduct and are WILLING, ABLE and READY to defend themselves against those accusations, but they should be brought in the proper forum and in the proper venue. It is further alleged that if petitioners believe in their hearts and have evidence to prove that respondents did them wrong, they should file appropriate cases and PAY CORRESPONDING FILING FEES, unlike in this case where they alleged irregularities in the body of the complaint but did not include them in their prayers, presumably to evade payment of relevant fees imposed by the Rules of Court.On May 9, 2001, the Court of Appeals received the records of the case from the RTC.
The Court agrees with the contention of the respondents but believes that a short delay in the resolution to help the cause of justice is not inappropriate. After all, the dictum should be that the Courts should not be strict in the implementation of the technical rules if this will result in injustice.
At any rate, considering the actuation of the petitioners in the last hearing of February 28, 2001, this Court is now indeed of the sincere belief that petitioners have proven themselves to be undeserving and unworthy of being given the opportunity to be heard. This Court is now even convinced that the petitioners are merely resorting to dilatory tactics to frustrate the lawful claim of respondents.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the "Motion for Reconsideration["] by the petitioners thru counsel is hereby DENIED.
This Court is now reinstating with finality the order dated January 12, 2001 lifting the preliminary injunction and dismissing this case. Furthermore, this Court is allowing the respondents to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties.
Due to the circumstances of the case particularly the pitiful plight of petitioners in questioning the amount of the principal loan and interests, this Court is not inclined to allow the respondents to secure compensation from the bond posted by the petitioners in the amount of P500,000.00. This Court believes that there was no substantial damage capable of pecuniary estimation incurred by respondent Development Bank of the Philippines due to the issuance of the temporary restraining order (TRO).[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The grounds stated by petitioners in their urgent motion are mere conclusions of fact not supported by proof so as to justify the grant by this Court of the injunctive relief prayed for. The trial court gave the petitioners the opportunity to prove their allegations of misconduct on the part of the respondents in the auction sale and set the case for hearing of the petitioners' evidence. (Vide, Order dated February 14, 2001, Record, p. 233). However, during the scheduled hearing, petitioners did not present evidence but instead manifested and moved that there should first be a pre-trial and that their motion for reconsideration of the order lifting the preliminary injunction and dismissing the case should first be resolved (vide, Records, p. 242)The appeal of respondents from the January 12, 2001 Order of the trial court was, by Decision of April 19, 2004,[14] decided by the appellate court in their favor, it holding that "the lack of pre-trial and the premature dismissal of the main case [for injunction] violated [respondents'] right to due process as they were deprived of their day in court to have the case judiciously determined." It thus ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for it "to proceed with the pre-trial and trial on the merits," even citing Section 5 of Rule 39 which reads:
In their motion, the petitioners likewise pray that this Court declare the public auction sale conducted by respondent Sheriff null and void. The order of the trial court dated March 2, 2001, lifting the preliminary injunction and dismissing the herein case for injunction is on appeal with this Court. Appellants-movants have not yet been required to file their brief. Resolving the issue of the validity of the auction sale would be tantamount to deciding the appeal via the instant motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which would be premature and improper.[13] (Underscoring supplied)
SEC. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment. ─ Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances,Hence, petitioners' instant petition for review, they complaining that the Court of Appeals
Early on, petitioners argue that for failure of respondents to remit the 20% deposit required by P.D. No. 385 which, they insist, is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court dutifully complied with the mandate of the said decree by dismissing respondents' action for injunction.[16]I.
. . . DISPOSED OF THE APPEAL OF THE RESPONDENTS AND DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE APPLICABLE LAW (P.D. NO. 385) OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.II.
. . . DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS THE COURT OF APPEALS ORDER FOR THE COURT A QUO TO CONDUCT FURTHER TRIAL TO DETERMINE THE PROPRIETY OF THE ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTION IS ALREADY MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS THE ACTION SOUGHT TO BE ENJOINED (FORECLOSURE) WAS ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that this INJUNCTION SUIT be given due course and a WRIT of PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issue in the interest of the highest level of justice, fair play and equity. Moreover, a WRIT of TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be henceforth and immediately issue not only to avoid and prevent irreperable [sic] damage, injury and harm to petitioner(s) substantial rights and to their properties should the auction sale proceed as scheduled on September 12, 2000 at 10:00 o' clock in the morning at the Justice Hall in San Jose City, but also to avoid this petition moot and academic [sic]. It is prayed also that a PERMANENT INJUNCTION issue at the wisdom of the Honorable Court.[18] (Emphasis in the original and underscoring supplied)The foreclosure sale, which was sought to be restrained, had, however, been conducted on May 30, 2001. And title to the property had already been consolidated in the name of DBP in whose name TCT No. 26107 had been issued.
SEC. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment. ─ Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances,is self-explanatory. If the executed judgment is reversed on appeal, "the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances."