512 Phil. 65
CORONA, J.:
1) | making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value; | |
2) | knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and | |
3) | subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[9] |
However, in the light of the factual milieu in the present recourse, (we) find and so declare that the Court a quo did not commit any reversible error in admitting in evidence the photostatic copies of the subject checks in lieu of the originals thereof in the possession of the [Petitioner]. It bears stressing that the raison d'etre of the proscription against the admission of secondary evidence in lieu or in substitution of the original thereof is to prevent the commission of fraud on the part of the offeror who is in possession of the best evidence but, in lieu thereof, adduced secondary evidence:We agree with the Court of Appeals. By admitting that the originals were in his possession and even producing them in open court, petitioner cured whatever flaw might have existed in the prosecution's evidence. The fact that these originals were all stamped "account closed" merely confirmed the allegations of the respondent that the checks were dishonored by reason of the account being closed. Because they were entirely consistent with its main theory, the prosecution correctly adopted these originals as its own evidence. In addition, by petitioner's own admission, five of the original checks were lost, thus rendering the photocopies thereof admissible as exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule.[14]xxx xxx xxx
When he testified in the Court a quo, the [Petitioner] brought out the originals of the checks and even marked the same in evidence as Exhibits "1" to "21", except five (5) of the subject checks, which he claimed as missing and the Prosecution even adopted the original checks as its evidence:xxx xxx xxx
The [Petitioner] admitted, before the Court a quo, that the originals of the subject checks were in his possession. The [Petitioner] never alleged that the photostatic copies of the checks marked and offered in evidence by the Prosecution were not faithful copies of the originals of the checks. In point of fact, when he testified in the Court a quo, he was shown, by his counsel, the photostatic copies of the subject checks... and admitted that the originals of said checks were in his possession on his claim that he had paid the Private Complainant the amount of P600,000.00 in cash and the balance in the form of checks which he drew and issued to the Private Complainant by way of replacement of the aforesaid other checks:xxx xxx xxx
By his testimony, the [Petitioner] thereby admitted that the photostatic copies of the checks marked and offered in evidence by the Prosecution were the faithful reproductions of the originals of the checks in his possession. Hence, the Prosecution may mark and offer in evidence the photostatic copies of the checks.xxx xxx xxx
Having admitted, albeit impliedly, that the photostatic copies of the checks admitted in evidence by the Court a quo were the faithful reproduction of the original copies in his possession, the Petitioner was thus estopped from invoking Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence.
In its decision in Eduardo Vaca, v. Court of Appeals the Supreme Court (Second Division) per Mr. Justice V. Mendoza, modified the sentence imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only the penalty of fine in an amount double the amount of the check. In justification thereof, the Court said:Considerable confusion arose as a result of this circular. Like Justice Villarama, many came to believe that the policy enunciated in this circular was to altogether remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violation of BP 22. The circular created so much confusion, in fact, that less than three months later, we had to issue yet another circular, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001,[17] for the specific purpose of clarifying exactly what the implications of A.C. No. 12-2000 were. In order to put all doubts to rest, the second circular provides:Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In this case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.In the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines, the Supreme Court en banc, applying Vaca also deleted the penalty of imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum of the fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., P200,000, and concluded that "such would best serve the ends of criminal justice."
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Order No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.Clearly, the imposition of either a fine or imprisonment remains entirely within the sound discretion of the judge trying the case, based on his assessment of the offender and the facts. Justice Villarama premised his dissent on the absence of a distinction in A.C. No. 12-2000 between which offenders deserve the relatively lenient penalty of a fine and which deserve imprisonment. As A.C. No. 13-2001 states, the application of the circular is selective and it is entirely up to the trial court judge to make that distinction, given the circumstances obtaining. This brings us to the factual issue of petitioner's worthiness of the lighter penalty. On this, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not to be deemed a hindrance (emphasis ours).