493 Phil. 831
GARCIA, J.:
The material facts may be briefly stated, as follows:On 15 November 1991, petitioner Voyeur Visage Studio, Inc. hired respondent Anna Melissa del Mundo (Melissa, for short) on a 6-month probationary basis. As agreed, Melissa worked as a Production and Planning Coordinator/Receptionist and was assigned at petitioner’s studio located in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
- Decision dated 26 July 2000[1], reversing and setting aside the 21 October 1999 resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and
- Resolution dated 8 September 2000,[2] denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
We regret to inform you that you have not passed the probationary period given to you by the Management. You are hereby terminated from work effective August 30, 1992.The following day, Melissa, through counsel, addressed a letter to petitioner protesting her dismissal, therein alleging that the dismissal was illegal because at the time it was effected, she was then already a regular employee.
You will be given corresponding legal benefits in compliance with the Department of Labor and Administrative requirements.(SGD.)
BING A. CHUA
Personnel Officer
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Voyeur Visage Studio, Inc. to reinstate complainant Anna Melissa del Mundo to her former or equivalent position with full backwages from September 1992 up to June 30, 1996 in the computed amount of P117,480.00 less P3,560.00 corresponding to her salary for the supposed one-month suspension, or P113,920.00. This amount is still subject to further adjustment until the complainant has been reinstated physically or in the payroll.Therefrom, petitioner went on appeal to the NLRC. In its appeal, petitioner reiterated its thesis that at the time of Melissa’s dismissal, she was a probationary employee, claiming that the probation period was earlier extended for another six (6) months and that she was unable to comply with the requirements for regularization because of her inexcusable negligence and inefficiency.
All other issues are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED to the effect that complainant-appellee del Mundo is not entitled to reinstatement to her former or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges nor to payment of full backwages from the date of her dismissal up to the date of her actual reinstatement.Melissa moved for a motion for reconsideration but her motion was denied by the NLRC in its subsequent resolution of 28 December 1999.
As to all other aspects, the Decision is SUSTAINED.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and the writ prayed for GRANTED. The Resolutions dated October 21, 1999 and December 28, 1999 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are both REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated July 8, 1996 of Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.In its Resolution of 8 September 2000,[5] the appellate court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner would want us to declare that the appellate court gravely erred in holding that Melissa is a regular employee.I
xxx IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT ANNA MELISSA DEL MUNDO WAS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE.II
xxx IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S DISMISSAL WAS ILLEGAL FOR LACK OF A VALID AND JUST CAUSE AND NON OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS IN TERMINATING HER SERVICES CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.III
xxx IN ORDERING PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S REINSTATEMENT CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
We DENY.
Only employees who worked for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuos (sic) and merely intermittent is considered regular. (See Petition, p. 13, Rollo, p. 19).We have carefully perused the text of Bernardo and nowhere may be found therein the quoted statement ascribed to this Court. Nor can the import of such a statement be even implied from what we said in the same case.
Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary appointments, ad infinitum. The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined the employees’ fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees. (Emphasis supplied).Being a regular employee, Melissa enjoys the protection of the Labor Code on security of tenure and termination of employment only upon compliance with the legal requisites for a valid dismissal, which requisites embrace both substantive and procedural aspects, as pointed out Colegio de San Juan de Letran-Calamba vs. Villas:[13]
Under the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a valid dismissal from employment: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code (substantive aspect) and (b) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself (procedural aspect),non-compliance with which renders the dismissal illegal and entitles the employee concerned to “reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits, or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement”.[14]
Clearly, [Melissa] was not dismissed for cause. The alleged infractions committed by [Melissa] being relied upon by [petitioner] as grounds for her dismissal, save perhaps for the incomplete delivered items incident which was not even proved to be her fault and which she already paid for, were mere afterthoughts, designed to cover-up what is otherwise an illegal termination.Likewise, there was non-observance by the petitioner of the twin notice requirement under Article 282 of the Labor Code. In the same case of Colegio de San Juan de Letran-Calamba vs. Villas, supra, we added:
During the hearing, [petitioner] presented several memoranda showing that [Melissa] was dismissed for cause: notice informing her of her inexcusable negligence in receiving deliveries without thoroughly checking if they are complete or not. Hence, deductions would be made from her salary; prohibiting her from disbursing money from the petty cash fund; requiring her to give a status report concerning certain contracts she entered into in behalf of [petitioner]; and ordering her to turn-over the contracts in her possession and to properly account for them. To prove that [Melissa] was granted a second probationary period in order to improve her performance and be appointed to a regular status, [petitioner] presented a memorandum informing the former of the same. In rebuttal, [Melissa] asseverated that these memoranda, including the one extending her probationary period were never received by her during the dates mentioned therein as evidenced by the absence of her signature above her name. That the disbursements she made from the petty cash fund were not for her personal use but for the account of the office, duly documented by her, and that such disbursements were authorized by the office accountant.
In refutation, [petitioner] merely alleged that [Melissa] refused to receive the memoranda, thus they were unsigned. We are not convinced. In indeed [petitioner] sent those memoranda, [Melissa] would have received and signed the same. There appears to be no reason why she would refuse to receive the said memoranda, especially the one allegedly extending her probation, for that is clearly favorable to her. Furthermore, as pointed out by [Melissa], the memorandum dated March 16, 1992 informing her that the amount of P250.00 would be deducted from her salary starting March 20, 1992 to compensate for the P6,000.00 lost paper supplies strengthens Our resolve that the alleged just causes were embraced as an afterthought, as exemplified by the said memorandum. A careful perusal of the payroll for the period of March 10-16, 1992 would reveal that [petitioner] started deducting P250.00 from [Melissa’s] weekly salary during the said period, in contrast to the memorandum dated March 16, 1992.
The procedural aspect requires that the employee be given two written notices before she is terminated consisting of a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts/omissions for which the dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.In the present case, there merely was a single notice sent to Melissa - the memorandum dated 11 August 1992 informing her that she was thereby terminated from work effective 30 August 1992. There was no notice apprising her of the particular acts or omissions for which her dismissal was sought.