557 Phil. 181
CARPIO, J.:
WHEREAS, plaintiff Ceniza C. Glor, in the above-entitled case, having filed an application with this Court praying for the seizure and delivery to Ceniza C. Glor of the property, more particularly described hereafter, and having filed the affidavit required by the Rules of Court and executed to the defendant a bond in the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P800,000.00).Respondent enforced the writ on 17 May 2004.[5] On 20 May 2004, spouses Normandy R. Bautista and Ruth B. Bautista (complainants) filed with the trial court an urgent motion[6] for the return of the vehicle and submission of counter-bond. On 21 May 2004, complainants filed a motion[7] to withdraw the urgent motion, attaching thereto an omnibus motion[8] for entry of appearance, urgent setting of hearing, and redelivery of the vehicle to them. Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 60, complainants required the return of the vehicle to them by filing a counter-bond and serving Glor a copy of the counter-bond.[9]
You are hereby ordered to take immediate possession of the following property which is now detained by the defendant, to wit:
MAKE & TYPE : Honda CRV (Station Wagon)
MOTOR NO. : PEWD7P100308
CHASSIS NO. : PADRD1830WV000347
PLATE NO. : HRS-555
FILE NO. : 1320-00000161749
and to keep the said property in your possession for five (5) days. At the expiration of the said period, you shall deliver, subject to the provisions of Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, to the plaintiff the said property, provided that your legal fees and all the necessary expenses are fully paid.
At 4:50 P.M. he came to us at the designated place and while we were reading his Sheriff's Manifestation, he said he had not eaten lunch yet because in his words "dahil sa paggawa ko ng Manifestation at sama ng loob dahil ako ang naipit dito sa kaso nyo, si judge kasi ang bagal mag-release ng order. Kakasuhan na ko sa Ombudsman ng plaintiff." Trying to clarify what he meant about this, we ask [sic] him what we on our part need [sic] to do so that the property will be ensured that its [sic] under the custody of the court or "custodia legis" until such time that the Honorable Court could resolve our motion. However we were totally surprised when he said that "Nasa sa inyo yan pero yun kasing kabila talagang desidido na makuha ang property, kung makapagbigay kayo ng kahit Twenty (20) Thousand sa akin magagawan natin yan ng paraan na di makuha ng plaintiff, yun ay kung gusto nyo lang, kasi pag napunta yan sa kanila baka di nyo na makita yan".On 27 May 2004, respondent filed a sheriff's manifestation asking the trial court's guidance on whether he should deliver the vehicle to Glor or keep it in custodia legis:
[With] those words from Sheriff IV Ernesto L. Sula it became clear to us that he was asking money to favor us in the disposition of the property, I replied that the only cash we have [sic] at the time was only Three (3) Thousand Pesos and ask [sic] him if he could accept it for the meantime and that we will come up with the balance on the following morning. He said "Cge pero siguraduhin nyo lang maibigay nyo ang balanse bukas ng maaga kasi meron din akong bibigyan para safe din ako. Ganito kasi dito kailangan may nakakaalam na mas mataas para may proteksiyon tayo." At this point I asked my wife, Ruth B. Bautista what she thought about it and she said its [sic] up to me and thereafter I gestured to give him the Three (3) Thousand Pesos which he said "Isimple mo lang ang abot para walang makapansin" and I simply slipped the money in his hand and after he received the money put his hand immediately in his pocket. x x x
[O]n the following day 27th May 2004 at 8:10 A.M. We met him at the benches at the back of the 3rd floor of the Justice Hall Bldg. We immediately apologized and told him that we failed to borrow money for the balance of our agreement and ask [sic] if he could wait until at [sic] Friday 29th May 2004 to come up with the balance of our agreement because it might take some time before we can raise it. x x x He answered that "Medyo mahirap pala kayong kausap" and left us.[13]
[T]his Manifestation is respectfully filed before the Honorable Court, in order that he maybe [sic] guided on whether he should release the vehicle as demanded by plaintiff or hold its release until such time that the Motions and Counter[-]bond filed by defendants is [sic] resolved as requested by the defendant.[14]Without waiting for the trial court's instructions regarding the vehicle, respondent filed his sheriff's return on 28 May 2004 stating that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor:
[O]n May 27, 2004, after the expiration of the five (5) days [sic] period and in the absence of any Court Order/s, undersigned turned-over the possession of the motor vehicle to the Plaintiff as per Court/Sheriff's Receipt hereto attached.[15]On 31 May 2004, complainants alleged that they went to the trial court to check on the vehicle and to look for respondent. There, respondent admitted to them that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor -- he acted on his own discretion. Complainants asked respondent how much he received from Glor and why he did not give them a chance to fulfill their agreement. He just said "pasensiyahan na lang tayo."[16]
In his comment[19] dated 4 August 2004, respondent prayed that the instant case be dismissed because:In their comment[20] to respondent's comment dated 4 August 2004, complainants prayed that respondent be preventively suspended pending the investigation of the case. They alleged that they had a witness who was willing to testify on the circumstances surrounding respondent's demand and receipt of the money from them. However, the witness did not want to testify unless respondent was placed under preventive suspension because she was afraid that her testimony would endanger her means of livelihood inside the Hall of Justice building.
- Complainants' accusations against him were malicious and unfounded. They filed the instant case against him because they "amassed so much anxiety and wrath against respondent to the point of even telling telltales." They felt aggrieved because of the vehicle's delivery to Glor and its subsequent foreclosure.
- He was only guided by the orders of the court and, in their absence, by the Rules of Court particularly Rule 60. Under Section 6 of the said Rule, the vehicle's delivery to Glor followed as a matter of course because she posted a bond which was approved by the court. On the other hand, up to the time of the delivery, complainants' counter-bond had not been approved by the court.
- Complainants' accusation that he asked for P20,000 was incredulous and a total lie. He never dealt clandestinely with complainants, much less demanded money from them. He did not personally know Glor, nor was he acquainted with complainants.
- Complainants had no evidence to support their accusation. If it were true that he asked and received money from them, it would have been easy for them to entrap him, yet, they did not do so.
- He enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties.
From the very words of the respondent Sheriff himself (page 5 of his Reply), he admitted to have [sic] APPROACHED US when he furnished us a copy of his Manifestation x x x. Why then did the respondent Sheriff approached [sic] us when his Manifestation is addressed and concerns only the Court? To put to rest that this is just a bare allegation, a third person is willing to present herself to the investigation of this Honorable Office to testify to the truth of the circumstances of the said incident which she personally witnessed but which [sic] we could not reveal her identity at the moment upon her own request because the said person makes her living in the hallway of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City.[35]Complainants, however, never appeared in any of the investigations, nor presented their witness. The fact that respondent approached complainants in the Hall of Justice building is not enough basis for this Court to conclude that respondent demanded and received money from them. On complainants' witness, the OCA found that "[t]he alleged fear from harassment of the complainants' unnamed witness [precluding her] to testify against the respondent unless the latter is suspended from office is purely speculative."[36] Complainants failed to present the quantum of evidence required to hold respondent liable.
In this case, plaintiff/applicant had posted a replevin bond duly approved by the court. Nevertheless, one of the elements upon which the property subject of replevin may be delivered to the plaintiff/applicant is lacking. There appears to be no court order issued yet for the release of the aforementioned property to the plaintiff/applicant. The order dated 12 May 2004 issued by the court only directed respondent to take into his custody the subject motor vehicle. Further, respondent filed a manifestation seeking guidance from the court on the disposal of the seized property. Hence, respondent's justification that the release of the seized property to the plaintiff/applicant follows as a matter of course because the applicant/plaintiff had already filed a replevin bond to answer for any damage that may be suffered by complainants may not be given weight.Indeed, respondent went beyond the call of his duties when he delivered the vehicle to Glor. The writ of replevin issued by the trial court specifically stated that the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor subject to the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. Yet, respondent opted to ignore these provisions.
It must be stressed that the prerogatives of Sheriffs do not give them any discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of the subject property. The appropriate course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the instructions of the court as to whom he will release the property since he had already asked for its guidance through his Manifestation which was submitted to the court virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004. Yet the following morning, he suddenly decided to release the car to the plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter. Such apparent haste raised questions on his actions and leaves doubts as to his intent or interest in the case.
Moreover, under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. This is because a possessor has every right to be respected in its possession and may not be deprived of it without due process.
The purpose of the five (5) day period in Section 6, Rule 60 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return of the property by filing a counter[-]bond. Considering that there was no court order to release the property to the applicant/plaintiff and the complainants were able to require the return of the property and file their counter[-]bond within the five (5) day period required by the Rules, respondent should have been more circumspect in releasing the property to the plaintiff/applicant. By hastily deciding to release the seized property to the plaintiff/applicant without waiting for the court's order, respondent patently abused his authority. (Emphasis ours)
SEC. 5. Return of property. - If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicant's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot immediately require the return of the property, but if he does not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant, require the return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant, in double the value of the property as stated in the applicant's affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the adverse party, and by serving a copy of such bond on the applicant.Under Section 5, complainants may require the return of the vehicle by (1) posting a counter-bond in double the value of the vehicle and (2) serving Glor with a copy of the counter-bond. Both requirements must be complied with before the vehicle is delivered to Glor. Put differently:
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff. - If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicant's bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party. (Emphasis ours)
If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should within five days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof, both requirements - as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned - being mandatory. x x x
Conformably, a defendant in a replevin suit may demand the return of possession of the property replevined by filing a redelivery bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff's affidavit within the period specified in Sections 5 and 6.[42]
Under Section 6, the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor only under the following instances:In the instant case, complainants duly complied with all of the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 for the return of the vehicle. Respondent took possession of the vehicle on 17 May 2004. On 20 May 2004, complainants filed their urgent motion for the return of the vehicle and submission of counter-bond and, on 21 May 2004, they filed a motion to withdraw the urgent motion and change the same with an omnibus motion. Both the urgent motion and the omnibus motion were filed before the delivery of the vehicle to Glor and before the expiration of the five-day period. Later, the trial court approved complainants' counter-bond. Thus, respondent committed an irregularity when he hastily delivered the vehicle to Glor.
- If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants do not object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon;
- If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants object to the sufficiency of the bond and the trial court affirms its approval of Glor's bond or approves a new bond; or
- If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants require the return of the vehicle and their bond is objected to and found insufficient and they do not forthwith file an approved bond.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and he shall return it to the defendant, if the latter, as in the instant case, requires its return and files a counter[-]bond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court). (Emphasis ours)The prerogatives of sheriffs do not include the discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to the possession of the property. Even when placed in a difficult situation, they are not called to exercise their own discretion. In Cruz v. Villar,[46] the Court agreed with the OCA's observations:
The nature of their functions is essentially ministerial. Their prerogatives do not give them any discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of the subject properties. The appropriate course of action should have been for respondents to inform their judge of the situation by way of a partial Sheriff's Return and wait for instructions on the proper procedure to be observed. These respondents failed to do.Respondent's act of filing the manifestation seeking the trial court's guidance virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004 then delivering the vehicle to Glor in the morning of 27 May 2004 is highly questionable. As the OCA held:
Similarly, in Mamanteo v. Magumun,[47] this Court held that:
[T]he novelty of his predicament did not call for him to use his discretion x x x without waiting for instructions from his judge. A sheriff's prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine who among the parties is entitled to the possession of the attached property.
[R]espondent filed a Manifestation seeking guidance from the court on the disposal of the seized property. Hence, respondent's justification that the release of the seized property to plaintiff/applicant follows as a matter of course because the applicant/plaintiff had already filed a replevin bond to answer for any damage that may be suffered by complainants may not be given weight.Since respondent had filed a manifestation seeking the trial court's guidance, the most appropriate course of action should have been for him to wait for the trial court's instructions on what he should do with the vehicle. Assuming that the issue may have been too technical for respondent to decide on the spot, it would have been prudent for him to let the trial court decide on the matter. However, he was overzealous and delivered the vehicle to Glor without even giving the trial court a chance to act on his manifestation. His unusual zeal and precipitate decision to give possession of the vehicle to Glor effectively destroyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties.[48] "While the expeditious and efficient execution of court orders and writs is commendable, it should not, under any circumstances, be done by departing from the Rules governing the same."[49]
The appropriate course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the instructions of the court as to whom he will release the property since he had already asked for its guidance through his Manifestation which was submitted to the court virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004. Yet the following morning, he suddenly decided to release the car to the plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter. Such apparent haste raised questions on his action and leaves doubts as to his intent or interest in the case.
When, as in this case, the law is clear, respondent owes it to himself and to the public he serves to adhere to its dictates. The failure to do so exposes the wrongdoer to administrative sanctions. When the inefficiency of an officer of the court springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, he is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith or with grave abuse of authority.[51]Section 52(B)(2)[52] of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service[53] classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Having been in the service for more than 26 years,[54] respondent cannot wrongly interpret basic rules without appearing grossly incompetent or having acted in bad faith.
B. The following are less grave offenses with the corresponding penalties:[53] Promulgated by the Civil Service Commission through Resolution No. 99-1936 dated 31 August 1999 and implemented by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999.
x x x x
2. Simple Misconduct
1st offense - Suspension (1 mo. 1 day to 6 mos.)
2nd offense - Dismissal