563 Phil. 1038
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that pending the hearing of the case, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment be issued against the properties of the defendants to secure the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered therein.WSR likewise sought to collect on unpaid purchases of bananas by KLT amounting to P90,830.00.
It is further prayed that after due hearing on the principal cause of action, judgment be rendered ordering all the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:Plaintiff further prays for such relief deemed just and equitable under the premises.[9]
- FOR THE REDISCOUNTING TRANSACTION:
The amount of THREE MILLION NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS AND SEVENTY CENTAVOS (P3,914,934.70), Philippine Currency, representing the total obligation due and owing with interest, thereon at 5% per month from the date of filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is fully paid and satisfied;- FOR THE PURCHASES:
The amount of NINETY-FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS AND SIX CENTAVOS (P95,400.06), Philippine Currency, representing the total obligation due and owing with interest, thereon at 18% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is fully paid and satisfied;- The sum representing twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount involved as attorney’s fees plus P3,500 per court appearance; and
- Cost of suit.
Premised on the foregoing consideration, the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby renders its judgment ordering defendants KLT Corporation, Michael Lao Tian Ben and Leopoldo Gonzales jointly and severallyOn 23 July 2003, KLT filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted RTC Decision but the same was denied for lack of merit on 25 September 2003. KLT received a copy of the Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration on 13 October 2003.For insufficient evidence, the case against defendants Arlene Lao, Joseph Lao Tiak Ben, Roger Buan and Leida Gonzales is ordered dismissed.
- To pay P3,685,766 to the plaintiff WSR Fruits, Inc. with legal interest;
- To pay plaintiff WSR Fruits, Inc. the amount of P90,830 for the bananas delivered on October 20 & 21, 1998 with legal interest;
- To pay a sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and payable as attorney’s fees;
- To pay costs.
Defendants[´] counter-claim is dismissed.[11]
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules mandates that within the period to appeal, the appellant shall pay to the Clerk of the Court that rendered the judgment x x x the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.KLT subsequently paid the docket fees only on 17 November 2003.
Section 13 of the same Rule provides that the trial court may motu propio dismiss the appeal for non-payment of the docket fees and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
The record of the case shows that defendants have not paid the docket fees and other lawful fees, to date.
This resolves the defendant’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.From the RTC, KLT filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.[21] The Court of Appeals denied the Petition in its Decision dated 28 April 2006.[22]
The record of the case show (sic) that on November 17, 2003 defendants through counsel filed the necessary docket fees with receipt numbers 18832287, 18827082 and 0101710 to the Office of the Clerk of Court Regional Trial Court, Manila.
It is the rule and the jurisprudence that within the period of appeal, the appellant shall pay the amount of the court docket and other fees.
The right to appeal is a procedural remedy of statutory origin and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. (Oro vs. Diaz, 361 SCRA 108)
The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. (Manalili vs. de Leon, 370 SCRA 625)
WHEREFORE, defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for being unmeritorious.[20]
Rule 41. Appeal from the Regional Trial Court:The failure of the appellant to pay the docket fees is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal under Rule 50, Section 1(c) of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which explicitly states that:
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x x
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
Rule 50. Dismissal of Appeal.From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. This is so because a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court.
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
x x x x
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41.
In the case of Gegare v. Court of Appeals [358 Phil. 228 (1998)], this Court upheld the appellate court’s dismissal of an appeal for failure of petitioner to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period despite a notice from the Court of Appeals informing him that such fees had to be paid within 15 days from receipt of such notice. Denying petitioner’s plea for judicial leniency, we held that –It bears stressing that while we have laid down the rule on the discretionary interpretation of the rules on the perfection of an appeal or the payment of docket fees, we have also in some cases refused to give due course to an appeal for failure to pay docket fees. Thus, in Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr.,[27] petitioners therein failed to pay the docket fees on the ground that they were not advised by the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to when to pay the same. In affirming the dismissal of therein petitioners’ appeal, this Court reiterated the rule that anyone seeking exemption from the application of the mandatory nature of the payment of docket fees has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant a departure from the requirement of the law. Of the same tenor is our ruling in Enriquez v. Enriquez,[28] in which we repeated that concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[29]
“Also without merit, in our view, is petitioner’s plea for a liberal treatment by the said court, rather than a strict adherence to the technical rules, in order to promote substantial justice. For it has consistently held that payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. As this Court has firmly declared in Rodillas v. Commission on Elections [245 SCRA 702 (1995)], such payment is an essential requirement before the court could acquire jurisdiction over a case:The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal (Dorego v. Perez, 22 SCRA 8 [1968]; Bello v. Fernandez, 4 SCRA 135 [1962]). In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees as held in Acda v. Minister of Labor, 119 SCRA 306 (1982). The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law.”In Lazaro v. Court of Appeals [386 Phil. 412 (2000)], decided 6 April 2000, the private respondents therein failed to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period. They paid the fees only after the Court of Appeals had dismissed the appeal, that is, six months after the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals reinstated the appeal “in the interest of substantial justice” without other justification. This Court, through then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, though not persuaded, recognized that there are exceptions to the stringent requirements of the law on payment of the docket fees, thus:
We must stress that the bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. “Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of this thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.”
Sure enough, the foregoing jurisprudence truly blazed the trails for a liberal application of the strict interpretation of the law.
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, [371 Phil. 393 (1999)], the payment of the docket fees was delayed by six days, but the late payment was accepted because the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying those fees. The Court also took note of the importance of the issues in this case involving as it does the entitlement or not of the respondents to properties involved.
Of similar import is the ruling of the court in the case of Ginete v. Court of Appeals [357 Phil. 36 (1998)], where we held that aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (2) the merits of the case; (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Yambao v. Court of Appeals [399 Phil. 712 (2000)], saw us again relaxing the Rules when we declared therein that “the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the appellant.
In Go v. Tong [G.R. No. 151942, 27 November 2003, 416 SCRA 557, 567], reiterated in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor [G.R. No. 140954, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 475], it was held that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation [G.R. No. 156278, 29 March 2004, 426 SCRA 414, 420], the Court stated that failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of an appeal, dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. And in determining whether or not to dismiss an appeal on such ground, courts have always been guided by the peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case.
In Camposagrado v. Camposagrado [G.R. No. 143195, 13 September 2005, 469 SCRA 602, 608], the case involved a deficiency in the payment of docket fees in the amount of Five Pesos (P5.00). This Court called for the liberal interpretation of the rules and gave due course to the appeal. In brief, the Court said that the failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal, dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. A party’s failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the reglementary period confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal. Such discretionary power should be used in the exercise of the court’s sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play with great deal of circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances and must be exercised wisely and ever prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice.
In the subsequent case of Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo [G.R. No. 148739, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 218], this Court, while reiterating that the payment of docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, in the same vein, recognized that the existence of persuasive and weighty reasons call for a relaxation of the rules.
In La Salette College v. Pilotin [463 Phil. 785 (2003)], notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognized that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.
In all, what emerges from all of the above is that the rules of procedure in the matter of paying the docket fees must be followed. However, there are exceptions to the stringent requirement as to call for a relaxation of the application of the rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure.
From the foregoing, we are tasked to determine whether the above justification constitutes adequate excuse to call for a relaxation of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the mandatory payment of docket fees. We answer this in the negative. In exceptional circumstances, we allowed a liberal application of the rule.[31] However, in those exceptional circumstances, the payments of the required docket fees were delayed for only a few days,[32] so much unlike this case in which the delay was for more than thirty days; and, at worse, counsel had several opportunities to rectify said faux pas, yet failed to do so. We are, thus, reminded of Guevarra v. Court of Appeals,[33] in which the payment of docket fees was made 41 days after notice of the questioned Decision; and the excuse of “inadvertence, oversight, and pressure of work was disregarded as too flimsy, an old hat, a hackneyed pretext. Such has never been given the badge of excusability by the Court.
- Undersigned counsel admits the hones, innocent oversight or omission he had committed when he was unable to cause the payment of the appeal docket fees with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, when he caused the filing of the notice of appeal. The principal reason for the oversight was that said counsel was already getting frequently sick and staying at home in the month of October and in fact had to visit his physician in the Medical City Medical Center in Mandaluyong City, Dra. Ma. Theresa Chua-Agcaoili, as he had not been feeling well since September due to upper respiratory problems with beginning pneumonia and had been strongly advised to go on leave from active daily law practice for 21 to 30 days. Encloses herein is said physician’s duly notarized Medical Certificate marked as Annex “1.”
- The abovementioned facts and circumstances clearly show that the required appeal docket fee was inadvertently not paid by reason of the recent chronic illness plaguing undersigned counsel who is the only full-time lawyer in his and his brother’s law firm. The Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal glossed over the said requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 41 of the Rules as undersigned counsel was already sick and resting at home and said pleading was rushed by an outside junior lawyer who occasionally assisted undersigned counsel in times of illness or indisposition. After being informed by phone of the Honorable Court’s Order of November 7, 2003, undersigned counsel immediately instructed that appeal docket fee be paid to RTC of Manila Clerk of Court. Attached herewith as Annex “2” is the original copy of the receipt.”[30]
a) Joseph Lao Tiak Ben | - President | |
b) Michael Lao Tian Ben | - Executive Vice-President | |
c) Roger Buan | - Vice-President | |
d) Arlene Lao | - Assistant Vice-President | |
e) Leopoldo J. Gonzales | - Purchasing Manager | |
f) Leida A. Gonzales | - Cash Manager (CA rollo, p. 20) |
PCIB Check No. | Amount | Date | For payment to | |
(Name of Supplier) | ||||
Annex A | 0000263661 | P186,220.00 | 17 Nov 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex B | 0000263649 | P235,720.00 | 20 Nov 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex C | 0000263659 | P322,990.00 | 25 Nov 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex D | 0000263673 | P238,290.00 | 27 Nov 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex E | 0000263682 | P108,220.00 | 29 Nov 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex F | 0000263677 | P148,119.00 | 06 Dec 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex G | 0000263681 | P211,970.00 | 09 Dec 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex H | 0000263687 | P 89,140.00 | 09 Dec 1998 | Norma Atlas |
Annex I | 0000263685 | P 66,440.00 | 10 Dec 1998 | Norma Atlas |
Annex J | 0000263678 | P106,213.00 | 10 Dec 1998 | Nando Cosico |
Annex K | 0000263684 | P174,190.00 | 11 Dec 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex L | 0000263674 | P197,216.00 | 11 Dec 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex M | 0000263693 | P198,220.00 | 11 Dec 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex N | 0000263696 | P198,386.00 | 14 Dec 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex O | 0000263688 | P 67,931.00 | 16 Dec 1998 | Norma Atlas |
Annex P | 0000263676 | P146,390.00 | 16 Dec 1998 | Nardo Cosico |
Annex Q | 0000263675 | P98,472.00 | 16 Dec 1998 | Norma Atlas |
UCPB CHECKS NUMBERS | ||||
Annex R | 00005439824 | P44,910.00 | 17 Dec 1998 | Norma Atlas |
Annex S | 00005439832 | P188,995.00 | 18 Dec 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex T | 00005439823 | P 86,330.00 | 21 Dec 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex U | 00005439822 | P172,390.00 | 22 Dec 1998 | Moreno de Villa |
Annex V | 00005439885 | P113,631.00 | 29 Dec 1998 | |
Annex W | 00005439893 | P156,265.00 | 06 Jan 1999 | |
Annex X | 00005439886 | P129,118.00 | 16 Jan 1999 | |
TOTAL P3,685,766.00 (Rollo, p. 52) |