562 Phil. 246
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the
reversal of the rulings of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61567
involving the dismissal of the petition for certiorari wherein
petitioners assailed the Decision dated 28 February 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1, Kalibo, Aklan
[1] in Civil Case No. 5626.
We begin with the salient facts.
The case stemmed from a complaint for recovery of possession dated 5
November 1998 filed by private respondent Sullian Sy Naval (Naval)
against petitioners Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (Fil-Estate) and
Fairways and Blue-Waters Resort and Country Club Inc. (Fairways). Naval
alleged that she was the registered owner of a 1,000-square meter
parcel of land located in Barangay Yapak, Malay, Aklan and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22944.
[2]
This lot as admitted by petitioners is situated within the vicinity of
Holes 12 and 13 of the Fairways and Bluewaters Golf and Country Club, a
golf course owned by Fairways and developed by Fil-Estate. According to
the complaint, petitioners took possession of the subject property and
constructed thereon a portion of the golf course without Naval’s
consent. Despite written demands, petitioners refused to vacate the
property. This prompted Naval to file the complaint, seeking the
recovery of possession of the property and rentals for the use thereof,
as well as actual damages plus moral and exemplary damages “of at
least
P500,000.00.”
Petitioners filed an answer
[3]
wherein they alleged that Naval had purchased the subject lot from
Divina Marte Villanueva (Villanueva) with whom they entered into a
joint venture agreement for the development into a golf course of
several parcels of land owned by Villanueva. It later emerged that
Villanueva had previously sold said parcels of land to third persons,
one of whom was Naval. Thus, Villanueva assured petitioners that she
would convince Naval and the other previous buyers to swap the lots
they had bought from her for lots of equal size within a subdivision
that was to be developed adjacent to the golf course. While several
buyers did agree to the swap, Naval held out. The impasse did not
constrain petitioners from developing the golf course and later
commencing its operations. Petitioners did manifest though in their
answer that they “took pains to exclude development work on the said
lot as there is no definitive agreement yet between [the parties]
concerning the same.”
[4]
The answer was filed for petitioners by Atty. Alfredo Lagamon, Jr.,
then employed as an in-house corporate legal counsel for petitioners.
Pre-trial was set for 16 July 1999, with notice thereof received by
Atty. Lagamon, Jr. eight days prior. However, on 12 July 1999, Atty.
Lagamon, Jr. filed a motion for postponement, wherein it was adduced
that he had already tendered his resignation as corporate legal counsel
for petitioners effective 15 July 1999 and thus, the prayer for
postponement of the pre-trial to a later date. Accordingly, pre-trial
was reset to 27 September 1999, with notice thereof served on Atty.
Lagamon, Jr. However, nobody appeared for petitioners on the new
pre-trial date. Hence, the RTC issued an order setting the date for
presentation of Naval’s evidence as plaintiff. At the trial, only Naval
presented evidence on her behalf.
On 28 February 2000, the RTC rendered a decision
[5]
in favor of Naval, ordering petitioners to restore to her possession
the subject property. The trial court cited Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 18
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as bases for allowing Naval to
present evidence
ex parte in
view of petitioners’ non-appearance at the pre-trial. It concluded that
petitioners had indeed illegally occupied the subject property from the
start of the construction of the golf course. Thus, the RTC ordered
petitioners to pay monthly rentals amounting to
P50,000.00 from April 1997 to October 1998, and
P70,000.00,
compounded by a 20% increase per annum thereafter until possession is
restored to Naval. In addition, Naval was awarded the sum of
P261,177.75 as “attorney’s fees and other compensatory damages,”
P3,000,000.00 as moral damages and another
P3,000,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Petitioners apparently received a copy of the decision on 27 April 2000.
[6]
Thirteen days later, on 10 May 2000, they filed before the RTC a motion
for reconsideration, later followed by a supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Both motions were prepared for petitioners by Atty.
Edgar B. Uytiepo. These motions recounted that Atty. Lagamon, Jr., on
whom notice of pre-trial and other succeeding processes were served in
behalf of petitioners, had already resigned effective 15 July 1999.
Thus, the subsequent trial held without their participation violated
their right to due process. The RTC in an order dated 26 July 2000
pointed out, among others, that Atty. Lagamon, Jr. had never formally
withdrawn his appearance and that the service of subsequent orders and
notices at his given address at Renaissance Bldg., Meralco Avenue,
Pasig City, which was the same address as petitioners,’ was sufficient
notice to petitioners.
[7]
Petitioners received a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on 11 August 2000.
[8]
Through Atty. Uytiepo, they filed a notice of appeal on the same day.
However, they did not pay the docket fees contemporaneously with the
filing of the notice. Instead, they obtained the postal money orders
covering the docket fees from the Bacolod City post office only on 25
August 2000, or outside the reglementary period to appeal which,
according to the RTC, expired on 13 August 2000.
[9]
Consequently, in an order dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied the
appeal of the petitioners and directed the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the judgment of the court.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for
certiorari assailing the 13 September 2000 order of the RTC disallowing
the notice of appeal, as well as its earlier decision and order denying
the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, in a decision
[10]
promulgated on 26 March 2004, reiterated the rule that full payment of
docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory and
non-compliance therewith is cause for the dismissal of the appeal.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the decision proved
unsuccessful; hence, the present petition.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in “rigidly and
perfunctorily” sustaining the dismissal of their appeal on account of
their failure to timely pay the requisite docket fees, as they rely
instead on the liberal application of procedural rules in their favor.
They contend that prior to its amendment in 2000, Section 13 of Rule 41
had originally provided only one ground for the dismissal of appeal by
the trial court which is that the appeal was “taken out of time,”
adding that it was only with the adoption of A.M. 00-2-10-SC that the
rule was amended to include the non-payment of docket fees among the
grounds for the dismissal of the appeal. Petitioners admit that the
amendment took effect on 1 May 2000, or around three (3) months before
the subject incidents had transpired, yet they claim that such
amendment was “a very recent or novel development” which their former
lawyer, or even the respondent judge, might not have been aware of at
the time the notice of appeal was filed. They further point out that
the rule respondent judge had cited in dismissing the appeal is Section
4, Rule 41, which required the payment of the full amount of the
appellate court docket fees within the period for taking an appeal.
Said rule, petitioners say, did not grant the trial court authority to
dismiss the appeal on the ground of late payment of the appellate
docket fee.
Petitioners likewise cite arguments concerning the imputed violation of
their right to due process by the RTC when it proceeded to receive
Naval’s evidence
ex parte,
as well as in view of the “excessive” damages awarded in favor of Naval
and the alleged disastrous effects on the golf course should the RTC
decision be finally executed. These arguments though cannot merit the
attention of this Court unless petitioners first overcome the
jurisdictional barrier caused by the non-perfection of their appeal
from the RTC decision. It is a serious complication of petitioners’ own
making which they are unable to untangle.
According to petitioners’ analysis of the Rules, it was only with the
adoption of A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, amending Section 13 of Rule 41
effective 1 May 2000, that it became obligatory on the part of the
trial courts to dismiss appeals on account of the failure to pay the
full docket fees. The argument is self-defeating given the fact that
petitioners’ failure to pay the requisite docket fees on time precisely
occurred after the amendments had taken effect. It has somehow
persuasive effect only to the extent that the requirement might have
been new and hardly intuitive at the time it applied to petitioners in
August of 2000. Yet the argument, if considered, is ultimately
erroneous and baseless. The dismissal of the appeal as the inevitable
aftermath of the late payment of the appellate docket fee has been
mandated since the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
with Section 4 of Rule 41 in connection with the old Section 13, Rule
41 covering the situation.
The old Section 13 provided that “the trial court may,
motu proprio
or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time.”
Petitioners may be correct in stating that under the old rule, there
was only one provided ground for the dismissal of the appeal ─ that it
was “taken out of time.” Yet Section 4 also provides for a rule that
helps delineate how exactly an appeal is timely taken. The rule, which
incidentally was cited as the basis for the RTC’s dismissal of the
notice of appeal, states in full:
Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other fees.
— Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to
the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the
appellate court together with the original record or the record on
appeal.
It bears further notice that had the RTC anyway allowed the notice of
appeal, Section 1(c) of Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules would have authorized
the Court of Appeals to also dismiss the appeal on account of the
non-payment of the docket fees within the period for taking an appeal.
Taking into account all of these provisions, the Court has consistently
upheld the dismissal of an appeal or notice of appeal for failure to
pay the full docket fees within the period for taking the appeal. Time
and again, this Court has consistently held that the payment of docket
fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of
the appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision
sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.
[11]
In
Enriquez v. Enriquez,
[12] we illustrated at length the scope and history of the requirement laid down in Section 4, Rule 41.
Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, payment of appellate court docket fee is not a
prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal. In Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
this Court held that although an appeal fee is required to be paid in
case of an appeal taken from the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional
Trial Court, it is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal
under Sections 20 2 and 23 3 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued
by this Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129). Under these sections, there
are only two requirements for the perfection of an appeal, to wit: (a)
the filing with the trial court of a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of the last day to appeal
by any party.
However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which took
effect on July 1, 1997, now require that appellate docket and other
lawful fees must be paid within the same period for taking an appeal.
This is clear from the opening sentence of Section 4, Rule 41 of the
same Rules that, "(W)ithin the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees."
The use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the
Rule. The term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always
or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally
imperative or mandatory. Petitioners cannot give a different
interpretation to the Rule and insist that payment of docket fee shall
be made only upon their receipt of a notice from the trial court to
pay. For it is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must be interpreted together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. Indeed, petitioners cannot deviate from the Rule.
Also under Rule 41 of the same Rules, an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a case decided by the RTC in the exercise of the latter's original
jurisdiction, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice
of judgment or final order appealed from. Such appeal is made by filing
a notice thereof with the court that rendered the judgment or final
order and by serving a copy of that notice upon the adverse party.
Furthermore, within this same period, appellant shall pay to the clerk
of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the
full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The
payment of docket fee within this period is mandatory for the
perfection of appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able
to act on the subject matter of the action, and the decision sought to
be appealed from becomes final and executory.
Time and again, this Court has
consistently held that payment of docket fee within the prescribed
period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such
payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed
from becomes final and executory. [emphasis supplied][13]
We have upheld the dismissal of such deficient appeals even when the
incidents preceded the amendment of Section 13, Rule 41, as in such
cases as
Lazaro v. Court of Appeals,
[14] Chan v. Court of Appeals,
[15] Oriental Assurance Corp. v. Solidbank,
[16] Manalili v. De Leon,
[17] La Salette College v. Pilotin,
[18] Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company,
[19] Saint Louis University v. Cordero,
[20] M.A. Santander Construction v. Villanueva,
[21] and
Tamayo v. Tamayo.
[22]
Tellingly, in all these cited cases, the dismissal of the appeals or
notices of appeal was undertaken prior to the amendment of Section 13,
Rule 41 in 2000.
That circumstance certainly undercuts petitioners’ claim that it was
only upon the effectivity of that amendment that trial courts were
compelled to dismiss notices of appeal if the full payment of appellate
docket fees was not made within the period to take the appeal. After
all, Section 4 of Rule 41, in conjunction with the old Section 13 of
the same Rule, already authorizes such dismissal. The 2000 amendment,
which added the clause “or for non-payment of the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period,” did not introduce a novel
ground for dismissal, but only made clear what was already a logical
consequence of Section 4, Rule 41.
Notwithstanding the catena of cases we had earlier cited, there are,
admittedly, exceptions to the general rule on the timely payment of
appellate docket fees which are also embodied in jurisprudence. The
petition adverts to two of these cases which were decided under the
ambit of the 1997 Rules,
MCIAA v. Mangubat[23] and
Ayala Land v. Carpo,
[24] and there are indeed others, such as
Yambao v. Court of Appeals,
[25] Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,
[26] Alfonso v. Andres,
[27] and
Villamor v. Court of Appeals.
[28]
Yet a common thread in all of said cases is an exceptionally
meritorious reason why the appellate docket fees in the cases were not
timely paid. In
MCIAA,
Alfonso and
Villamor,
the notices of appeal were filed therein less than a month after the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which had instituted
appellate docket fees in lieu of the old appeal bond. Hence, the
appropriate finding then that “the changes introduced by the 1997 Rules
of Civil procedure were yet novel, and even judges and lawyers needed
time to familiarize themselves with the rules' intricacies.” In
Yambao, the non-payment of the full docket fees was caused by the erroneous assessment thereof by the RTC Clerk of Court, whereas in
Buenaflor, the postal money orders used to pay the docket fees were erroneously addressed to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
In their supplemental reply, petitioners cite the recent decision in
Villena v. Rupisan[29]
where the appellate docket fees were paid six (6) days after the lapse
of the period to appeal. The Court therein did uphold the Court of
Appeals, which had reversed the trial court’s denial of the notice of
appeal. The appellants in
Villena
explained that their failure to timely pay the docket fees was on
account of their avowed poverty, a justification of a somewhat
differing variety from those above-cited. Still,
Villena
cannot apply as precedent in this case, or indeed as a super-precedent
that cleanses any tardiness accompanying the payment of appellate
docket fees. At most, it adds to the exceptions, rather than
establishes a new general rule. It bears notice that in
Villena,
the Court affirmed the exercise of discretion on the part of the Court
of Appeals, which had opted for a liberal application of the Rules,
since such exercise of discretion did not constitute an error of law as
is clear from the ample precedents allowing for such liberal
construction.
In contrast, the option in this case on the part of the Court of
Appeals to apply what is the clear general rule as established in the
Rules did not constitute a reversible error of law that would impel us
to reverse.
Villena
may stand as a more appropriate precedent in cases acknowledging no
reversible error when the appellate court chooses to liberally apply
the rules and allow belatedly perfected appeals; but it does not have
similar influence as indicia of reversible error in cases where the
appellate court opts instead to apply the general rule.
Besides, in
Villena
and the other above-cited cases where the Court upheld the liberal
application of the rules the appellants therein hinged their arguments
on exceptionally meritorious circumstances peculiar to their particular
situations that would convince the Court that they were entitled to a
lax application of the Rules. Petitioners herein did not pursue such
tack. Instead, they have opted to construct the paradigm where prior to
1 May 2000, trial courts had no authority to dismiss notices of appeal
for non-payment of the full appellate docket fees. But then, where is
the subsequent amendment to the rule constituting a revolution in
procedural law that necessarily entails a grace period so that our
magistrates could imbibe this new learning?
If we were to concede the fundamental premise of petitioners, we would
be negating a considerable sum of our jurisprudence that affirmed
dismissals of appeals or notices of appeal for non-payment of the full
appellate docket fees from the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, until the adoption of A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC. We are not
inclined towards that radical direction. As a rule of thumb, arguments
that seek to carve exceptions to precedents generally hold greater sway
than those designed to eradicate said precedents altogether.
Thus, our only point of focus in determining whether there stands an
exceptionally meritorious reason why petitioners’ appeal should be
given due course is the justification offered as to why the appellate
docket fee was posted only on 25 August 2000, several days after the
expiration of the period for undertaking the appeal.
[30] The only reason provided for the delay in the petition is “due to inadvertence [of] Atty. Uytiepo.”
[31]
That is all. To their credit, petitioners do not fashion the argument
that “inadvertence of counsel” is an admissible standard that would
warrant the liberal application of procedural rules concerning
jurisdictional requirements. Yet if we were to grant the petition, it
would set an ignoble precedent wherein the negligence of appellant’s
counsel is sufficient to relax the jurisdictional requirements for the
perfection of an appeal. That reason suffices for us to uphold the
general rule requiring the timely payment of appellate docket fees,
despite the jurisprudential exceptions to such rule. After all,
exceptions were meant to be exceptional.
Since the appeal was not perfected on time in this case thereby
rendering the decision of the RTC final and executory, any
consideration, however due, of the remaining arguments would be an
exercise in futility. We do wish to note in passing a few observations
concerning the merits of the case. The RTC, in denying the motion for
reconsideration, did point out that Atty. Lagamon, Jr. never formally
withdrew his appearance for petitioners and that the judicial notices
and orders issued subsequent to his resignation as in-house counsel,
while addressed to him, were received at the same address maintained by
petitioners. The counter-arguments raised by petitioners to these
points do not sufficiently disquiet the suspicion, as maintained by the
RTC, that petitioners were well aware of the forthcoming pre-trial and
of the subsequent
ex-parte presentation of evidence by Naval.
Finally, the Court is aware of the somewhat farcical nature of the
ensuing result – a 1000-square meter parcel of land surrounded in its
entirety by a golf course, right in the middle of the 12th and 13th
holes. Yet Naval has every right to blame petitioners for her
predicament while petitioners in turn have nobody else to blame but
themselves for the predicament they are entrapped in. Still, this
decision does not deprive the parties of the necessary tools to clear
up the resulting untidiness, and it is hoped that they do take on the
opportunity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio Morales, and
Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Presided by Judge Marietta Homena-Valencia.
[2] See
rollo, p. 99.
[3] Id. at 78-85.
[4] Id. at 84.
[5] Id. at 99-108.
[6] See id. at 17 and 124.
[7] See id. at 121. See also id. at 13.
[8] As indicated in
petitioners’ Notice of Appeal, see id. at 122, and in the RTC Order
dated 13 September 2000 (see id. at 124). In the present petition
however, petitioners allege that they received the order denying the
motion for reconsideration on 9 August 2000. Because these incidents
occurred prior to the promulgation of our ruling in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 141524, 14 September 2005, 469 SCRA 633, 644, petitioners had
two days from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration to file their notice of appeal. By whichever reckoning,
the notice of appeal in this case was filed within the reglementary
period. The same cannot be said of the full payment of the appellate
docket fees.
[9] See id. at 124.
[10] See id. at 60-64.
Decision penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the
Fourth Division, concurred in by Associate Justices G. Jacinto and L.
Bersamin.
[11] See
Manalili v. De Leon, 422 Phil. 214, 220 (2001);
St. Louis University v. Cordero, G.R. No. 144118, 21 July 2004, 434 SCRA 575, 583.
[12] G.R. No. 139303, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 77.
[13] Id. at 83-85. Citations omitted.
[14] 386 Phil. 412, 417 (2000).
[15] 390 Phil. 615, 620 (2000).
[16] 392 Phil. 847, 854-855 (2000).
[17] Supra note 11.
[18] 463 Phil. 785, 791-793 (2003).
[19] G.R. No. 138031, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 439, 446-447.
[20] Supra note 11.
[21] G.R. No. 136477, 10 November 2004, 441 SCRA 525, 529-530.
[22] G.R. No. 148482, 12 August 2005, 466 SCRA 618, 622-623.
[23] 371 Phil. 393, 398 (1999).
[24] 399 Phil. 327, 333-334 (2000).
[25] 399 Phil. 712, 717-718 (2000).
[26] 400 Phil. 395, 401 (2000).
[27] 439 Phil. 298, 305-306 (2002).
[28] G.R. No. 136858, 21 July 2004, 434 SCRA 565, 573-574.
[29] G.R No. 167620, 4 April 2007. See http://elibrary.supremecourt.gov.ph/decisions.php? doctype=Decisions%20/%20Signed%20Resolutions&docid=a45475a11ec72b843d74959b60fd7bd646294581f273d, (last visited, 1 October 2007).
[30] See note 9. It might be observed that had the subject incidents taken place after
Neypes
(see note 8) was promulgated, then we could have recognized that
petitioners had a fresh fifteen-day period upon receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration, or until 26 August 2000, to
have taken an appeal. Under that estimation, the appellate docket fees,
which were posted on 25 August 2000, would have been within the fresh
fifteen-day period to appeal.
Notably, petitioners did not cite
Neypes
or orient any argument rooted in that decision. And indeed, if
petitioners are correct in their present claim that they received the
order denying the motion for reconsideration on 9 August and not 11
August, then
Neypes, if retroactively applied, would still be inapplicable to them. Yet it should be stressed that
Neypes
cannot apply as precedent in this case. For one, the established rule
is that amendments to procedural rules do not bear retroactive effect.
Moreover, even if they do, it would be inappropriate to impose such
effect in cases, such as this, where doing so would impair the rights
of the parties, such as private respondent who has in her favor a final
and executory trial court decision.
[31] Rollo, p. 18.