582 Phil. 339
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Through the testimony of Luzviminda Moral (Luzviminda), the widow of Gaudioso Moral, Jr. (the victim), the prosecution established the following:[2]x x x x
That on or about the 12th day of June 1998 in Quezon City[,] Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of one GAUDIOSO MORAL JR. by then and there stabbing him on the left portion of his body thereby causing upon him [a] serious and grave wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of GAUDIOSO MORAL JR.[1]x x x x
x x x In this case, the victim was drinking with his buddies, unarmed, and in no position to defend himself when the accused suddenly appeared and stabbed him. Although, as testified to by the victim's wife, the accused had warned the group "Walang kikilos!" x x x which should have alerted the victim or put him on guard, the suddenness [of] his attack against Gaudioso Moral, who was unarmed, demonstrated that the accused deliberately employed a method of attack which ensured the execution of his felonious design without risk to himself arising from any defense which his victim might make.[6] (Underscoring supplied)The trial court thus convicted appellant of Murder, by Decision of June 17, 1999, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Cerilo Tambis y Ollana guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of [r]eclusion [p]erpetua; to pay the heirs of Gaudioso Moral the amount of P26,034.93 as actual damages; the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages; the amount of P1,640,034.50 as compensatory damages for the loss of the victim's earning capacity, and P75,000.00 as indemnity for his death, and to pay the costs.Appellant lodged before this Court an appeal which it forwarded to the Court of Appeals following People v. Mateo[8] which directs the intermediate review of decisions imposing the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.[9]
SO ORDERED.[7]
[T]here is no discernible relation between appellant's utterance ("walang kikilos") and his supposed lack of a conscious design to adopt a treacherous mode of attack that would negate treachery.By Decision of July 27, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed[14] the trial court's decision. Appellant thereupon brought the case to this Court.[15]
For alevosia to be considered as a qualifying circumstance, two conditions need to be satisfied: (a) the employment of means, manner or method of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the means, method, or manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. . . . The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. . . . Such treacherous manner is patent in appellant's chosen mode of attack on the victim.
That appellant consciously adopted his treacherous mode of attack is indicated by the fact that he proceeded to the place where the victim was drinking carrying a knife. There is no showing that appellant went to the said place or was carrying the knife for some other purpose. Neither is their any showing that he merely chanced upon the victim who was caught off-guard nor there was provocation on the part of the victim.
x x x x
Appellant's utterance prior to the attack cannot be considered a warning that would negate treachery. For a warning to negate treachery, such must give the intended victim the opportunity to defend himself. Since appellant's utterance [was] made immediately prior to the attack, such cannot constitute adequate warning that would have given the victim the chance to escape or parry the blow. Effectively, the utterance was inconsequential to the progress of the attack for even with such utterance, the victim still was not able to defend himself.[13] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied (citations omitted))
x x x Treachery may still be appreciated even though the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person. In other words, even when the victim is warned of the danger, if the execution of the attack made it impossible for him to defend himself or to retaliate, alevosia can still be appreciated. (Underscoring supplied)[17]Appellant's sudden attack deprived the victim of an opportunity to defend himself. His utterance - "walang kikilos" - cannot be construed as warning to the victim to defend himself. It indicates a caveat to restrain anyone from coming to the victim's defense.
x x x The [amount] was computed taking into account the following: a) his age at the time of his demise - 41 years old; b) his life expectancy - 65 years; c) his monthly salary of P7,624.70 [as driver of Egon Trade, Inc.][21] plus 13th month pay of P6,214.70; and d) his gross earnings for 24 years - P2,342,906.4.Jurisprudence, however, has established the following formula for computing compensation for loss of earning capacity:
Deducting thirty percent 30% therefrom as his living expenses (702,817.92), the actual damages to be paid by the accused should, therefore, be P1,640,034.50. In considering the thirty percent rate, the Court took into account the fact that he was the sole bread winner of the family and he had three minor children.[22]
net earning capacity = [2/3 x (80-age at time of death) x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary living expenses],[23]and pegged reasonable and necessary reasonable expenses at 50% of earnings in the absence of contrary evidence.[24] Applying this formula, this Court arrives at P1,269,047.30 as compensatory damages.