473 Phil. 758
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
That on or about December 12, 1998 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused defrauded Cecilia Maruyama and Conchita Quicho, complainant herein, in the following manner, to wit: said accused received in trust from Cecilia Maruyama the amount of Japanese Yen 1141 (sic) with peso equivalent to P3,839,465.00 under obligation to deliver the money to Conchita Quicho at the NAIA International Airport, Pasay City, immediately upon accused arrival from Japan, but herein accused once in possession of the same, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal benefit the said amount, and despite demands accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants in the aforesaid amount.Appended to the Information was the affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama and the resolution of Investigating Prosecutor Vibandor. On May 19, 2000, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner with a recommended bond of P40,000. On June 15, 2000, the petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, the Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant. The approved personal bail bond of the petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City on June 21, 2000. Upon her request, the petitioner was furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the resolution and the criminal complaint which formed part of the records of the said case. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial court’s permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000.
Contrary to law.[8]
3. It has come to the knowledge of private complainant that there is an impending marriage within the Philippines of either the son or daughter of the above-named accused and that the above-named accused—who has businesses in Japan, and is presently in Japan—will soon exit Japan and enter the Philippines to precisely attend said wedding;The trial court issued an order on the same day, granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the issuance of a hold departure order and ordering the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) to hold and prevent any attempt on the part of the petitioner to depart from the Philippines.[10] For her part, the petitioner filed on July 17, 2000 a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondent’s counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. The petitioner further alleged that the documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor were not enough on which the trial court could base a finding of probable cause for estafa against her. She further averred that conformably to the rulings of this Court in Lim v. Felix[11] and Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[12] it behooved the investigating prosecutor to submit the following to the trial court to enable it to determine the presence or absence of probable cause: (a) copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant; (b) the counter-affidavit of Okabe and those of her witnesses; (c) the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents presented during the said investigation.
4. Given [a] the bail was fixed at merely P40,000.00 and b] the considerable financial capability of the accused, it is a foregone conclusion that the above-named accused will, upon arrest, readily and immediately post bond, and leave for Japan—thereby frustrating and rendering inutile the administration of criminal justice in our country. The speed with which accused Teresita Sheila Tanghal Okabe can post bond and leave for Japan—effectively evading arraignment and plea—thus necessitates the immediate issuance of a Hold Departure Order even before her arrival here in the Philippines;[9]
3. Accused is (sic) widow and the legitimate mother of three (3) children, two (2) of whom are still minors, namely:The private prosecutor opposed the petitioner’s motions during the hearing on July 21, 2000 which was also the date set for her arraignment. The hearing of the motions as well as the arraignment was reset to 2:00 p.m. of July 26, 2000. On the said date, the petitioner filed a manifestation objecting to her arraignment prior to the resolution of her pending motions. She alleged that her arraignment for the crime charged should not be made a condition for the granting of her motion to recall the hold departure order issued against her. The arraignment of the petitioner was again reset to 2:00 p.m. of August 28, 2000, pending the resolution of her two motions. On August 25, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion for the postponement of her arraignment alleging that, in case the trial court ruled adversely thereon, she would refuse to enter a plea and seek relief from the appellate court. The court denied the petitioner’s motions on the following grounds:3.1. Okabe, Jeffrey-18 years old born on 13 August 1981.4. Accused’s only source of income and livelihood is door-to-door delivery from Japan to the Philippines and vice versa which has been taking place for a very long period of time and in the process she has been constantly departing from the Philippines on a weekly basis and arriving in Japan on the same frequency, as evidenced by xerox copies of the pages of her Philippine Passports which are hereto attached as Annexes “A,” “A-1,” “A-2” up to “A-30,” respectively. To deprive her of this only source of her livelihood to which the aforesaid two (2) minor children are deriving their very survival in a foreign land will (sic) tantamount to oppression rather than prosecution and depriving the said minor sons of their right to live even before trial on the merits of this case that will (sic) tantamount to the destruction of the future of these minor children.[13]
3.2. Okabe, Masatoshi-14 years old and born on 16 October 1985, 3rd year High School student at Hoshikuki, Chiba City, Matsugaoka, High School, residing at Chiba City, Chuo-Ku, Yahagi-cho, 205, Telephone No. 043-224-5804.
3.3. Okabe, Tomoki-13 years old and born on 13 March 1986, 2nd year High School student at Hoshikuki, Chiba City, Matsugaoka, High School, residing at Chiba City, Chuo-Ku, Yahagi-cho, 205, Telephone No. 043-224-5804.
3.4. The accused has to attend the Parents Teachers Association (PTA) at the Hoshikuki High School where her two (2) minor sons aforesaid are presently enrolled and studying because Okabe, Masatoshi’s graduation will take place on 26 July 2000.
3.5. The two (2) minor children of the accused absolutely depend their support (basic necessities) for foods, clothings, medicines, rentals, schooling and all other expenses for their survival to their legitimate mother who is the accused herein.
3.6. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will impair the inherent custodial rights of the accused as the legitimate mother over these two (2) minor children which is repugnant to law.
3.7. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will unduly restrict the accused to her custodial rights and visitation over her aforesaid minor children who are permanently living in Japan.
3.8. The issuance of the hold departure order (HDO) will unduly deprived (sic) these minor children to their right to obtain education and survival.
On January 31, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision[19] partially granting the petition in that the assailed order of the trial court denying the petitioner’s motion to lift/recall the hold departure order was set aside. However, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision was denied and her petition for the nullification of the August 25, 2000 Order of the respondent judge was dismissed. The CA ruled that by posting bail and praying for reliefs from the trial court, the petitioner waived her right to assail the respondent judge’s finding of the existence of probable cause. The appellate court cited the ruling of this Court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan.[20] Thus, the appellate court affirmed the assailed order of the RTC, based on the respondent judge’s personal examination of respondent Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the Information approved by the city prosecutor, a finding of probable cause was in order. However, the appellate court allowed the petitioner to travel to Japan under the following conditions:I RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED
WARRANT OF ARREST DESPITE OF (SIC) LACK
OF PROBABLE CAUSEII RESPONDENT COURT HAS VIOLATED THE
RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESSIII RESPONDENT COURT HAS ALREADY PRE-JUDGED
THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FOR ESTAFAIV RESPONDENT COURT HAS EXHIBITED ITS APPARENT
PARTIALITY TOWARDS THE PROSECUTION AND
AGAINST THE PETITIONERV RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIES (SIC) THE MOTION FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF ROBERTS, JR. VI RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIES (SIC)
THE LIFTING/RECALL OF THE HDO AND/OR ALLOWING THE
PETITIONER TO TRAVEL TO JAPAN REGULARLY FOR
HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONVII RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDERS…[18]
(1) That petitioner post a bond double the amount of her alleged monetary liability under the Information filed against her, as recommended by the Office of the Solicitor General;The appellate court did not resolve the issue of whether the trial court had prejudged the case and was partial to the prosecution. The decretal portion of the decision of the CA reads:
(2) That petitioner inform respondent Court of each and all of her travel itinerary prior to leaving the country;
(3) That petitioner make periodic reports with respondent Court;
(4) That petitioner furnish respondent Court with all the addresses of her possible place of residence, both here and in Japan; and
(5) Such other reasonable conditions which respondent Court may deem appropriate under the circumstances.[21]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as the denial of petitioner’s Motion to Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated 14 July, 2000 and/or Allow the accused to Regularly Travel to Japan is concerned. In all other respect, the same is hereby DENIED.On March 6, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for a partial reconsideration of the decision of the CA contending that the appellate court erred in applying the ruling of this court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[23] instead of Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The petitioner posited that the said rule, which took effect on December 1, 2000, before the court rendered its decision, had superseded the ruling of this Court in the Cojuangco case. However, the appellate court held that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure cannot be applied retroactively, because the petitioner had posted bail on June 15, 2000 before the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect.
SO ORDERED.[22]
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents as follows:The petitioner asserts that the CA committed the following reversible errors:(a) GIVING DUE COURSE to the instant petition;
(b) ORDERING the REVERSAL and PARTIALLY SETTING ASIDE of the Decision promulgated on 31 January 2001 (Annex “A” hereof) of the Honorable Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60732 as well as its Resolution promulgated on 27 September 2001 (Annex “B” hereof);
(c) ORDERING the DISMISSAL of Crim. Case No. 00-0749 for lack of probable cause;
(d) DECLARING the entire proceedings in Crim. Case No. 00-0749 as null and void;
(e) ORDERING the private respondents to pay the petitioners the following amount:
(i) at least P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(ii) at least P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(iii) at least P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and for other expenses of litigation.
(f) ORDERING the private respondent to pay the costs of this suit.
(g) Petitioner further prays for such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.[24]
By way of comment, the Office of the Solicitor General refuted the petitioner’s assigned errors, contending as follows:I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT COMPLETELY DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 26, RULE 114 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON 01 DECEMBER 2000 WHICH IS FAVORABLE TO THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED.II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT “WHATEVER INFIRMITY THERE WAS IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST, THE SAME WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE RESPONDENT COURT’S JURISDICTION WHEN SHE POSTED BAIL AND FILED MOTIONS SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF SUCH AS MOTION TO LIFT/RECALL HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER AND TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO TRAVEL REGULARLY TO JAPAN (Last paragraph, Page 9 DECISION dated 31 January 2001).”III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RELIED UPON THE RULING IN THE CASE OF COJUANGCO, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, [300 SCRA 367 (1998)] WHEN IN FACT SAID RULING IS NOW OBSOLETE AND NO LONGER APPLICABLE.IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT COURT COMPLIED WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ON THE ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE, WHEN THE RESPONDENT COURT MERELY RELIED ON [THE] (i) COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF CECILIA MARUYAMA; (ii) RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR; AND (iii) CRIMINAL INFORMATION.V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE PARTIALITY OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN HANDLING THE CASE BELOW WHICH IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.VI
THE FILING OF CRIM. CASE NO. 4297 (MTC, ANGAT, BULACAN) FOR ESTAFA ENTITLED “PEOPLE VS. SHEILA OKABE”; CIVIL CASE NO. 331-M-98 (RTC, MALOLOS, BULACAN) FOR SUM OF MONEY WITH PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT ENTITLED “CONCHITA SANCHEZ-QUICHO VS. SHEILA TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE”; AND CRIM. CASE NO. 00-07-19 (RTC, PASAY CITY, BRANCH 119) ENTITLED “PEOPLE VS. TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE” CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING.[25]
The Court shall resolve the assigned errors simultaneously as they are interrelated.I
The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.II
The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in ruling that the infirmity, if any, in the issuance by the respondent Judge of the warrant of arrest against petitioner was cured when petitioner voluntarily submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction when she posted bail and filed motions seeking for affirmative reliefs from the trial court, such as the motion to lift/recall Hold Departure Order (HDO) and to allow petitioner to travel regularly to Japan.III
The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in applying the ruling in the Cojuangco case.IV
The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in finding that respondent Judge complied with the constitutional requirements on the issuance of a warrant of arrest.V
The Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error when it did not rule on the partiality of the respondent Judge in handling Criminal Case No. 00-0749.VI
The Honorable Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error when it did not rule on petitioner’s claim of forum shopping.[26]
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. – An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon.[32] The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red.[33] The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application.[34] Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity.[35] Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behooved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioner’s petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
… The present defendants were arrested towards the end of January, 1929, on the Island and Province of Marinduque by order of the judge of the Court of First Instance of Lucena, Tayabas, at a time when there were no court sessions being held in Marinduque. In view of these circumstances and the number of the accused, it may properly be held that the furnishing of the bond was prompted by the sheer necessity of not remaining in detention, and in no way implied their waiver of any right, such as the summary examination of the case before their detention. That they had no intention of waiving this right is clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on which they furnished a bond, and the fact that they renewed this petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of their arrest for lack of the summary examination; the first motion being denied by the court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708, page 8), and the second remaining undecided, but with an order to have it presented in Boac, Marinduque.Moreover, the next day, or on June 16, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, received certified true copies of the Information, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the affidavit-complaint of the private complainant, respondent Maruyama, and a certification from the branch clerk of court that only the Information, resolution and affidavit-complaint formed part of the entire records of the case. The next day, June 17, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer the proceedings and her arraignment. All the foregoing are inconsistent with a waiver of her right to assail the validity of her arrest and to question the respondent judge’s determination of the existence of probable cause for her arrest.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right granted to them by section 13, General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 3042.[39]
It must be stressed, however, that in these exceptional cases, the Court took the extraordinary step of annulling findings of probable cause either to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The constitutional duty of this Court in criminal litigations is not only to acquit the innocent after trial but to insulate, from the start, the innocent from unfounded charges. For the Court is aware of the strains of a criminal accusation and the stresses of litigation which should not be suffered by the clearly innocent. The filing of an unfounded criminal information in court exposes the innocent to severe distress especially when the crime is not bailable. Even an acquittal of the innocent will not fully bleach the dark and deep stains left by a baseless accusation for reputation once tarnished remains tarnished for a long length of time. The expense to establish innocence may also be prohibitive and can be more punishing especially to the poor and the powerless. Innocence ought to be enough and the business of this Court is to shield the innocent from senseless suits right from the start.[48]In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the RTC judge may rely on the findings and conclusions in the resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding probable cause for the filing of the Information. After all, as the Court held in Webb v. De Leon,[49] the judge just personally reviews the initial determination of the investigating prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.[50] However, in determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on the said report.[51] The judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.[52] Indeed, in Ho v. People,[53] this Court held that:
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor’s recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.[54]The rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that an Information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence of the resolution:
SEC. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case.If the judge is able to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause on the basis of the records submitted by the investigating prosecutor, there would no longer be a need to order the elevation of the rest of the records of the case. However, if the judge finds the records and/or evidence submitted by the investigating prosecutor to be insufficient, he may order the dismissal of the case, or direct the investigating prosecutor either to submit more evidence or to submit the entire records of the preliminary investigation, to enable him to discharge his duty.[55] The judge may even call the complainant and his witness to themselves answer the court’s probing questions to determine the existence of probable cause.[56] The rulings of this Court in Soliven v. Makasiar[57] and Lim v. Felix[58] are now embodied in Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, with modifications, viz:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.In this case, the investigating prosecutor submitted to the respondent judge only his resolution after his preliminary investigation of the case and the affidavit-complaint of the private complainant, and failed to include the affidavits of the witnesses of the private complainant, and the latter’s reply affidavit, the counter-affidavit of the petitioner, as well as the evidence adduced by the private complainant as required by case law, and now by Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The aforecited affidavits, more specifically the fax message of Lorna Tanghal and the document signed by her covering the amount of US$1,000, are of vital importance, as they would enable the respondent judge to properly determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause.