464 Phil. 988
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
It is under-collateralized;Among the accounts acted upon by the Committee were the loans obtained by Hotel Mirador from the DBP. Petitioner Atty. Orlando Salvador was then the PCGG consultant detailed with the Committee.
Borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials, like presence of marginal notes;
Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies;
Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
Use of corporate layering;
Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought;
Extra-ordinary speed in which the loan release is made.
“Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:The complaint, docketed as OMB-0-96-2539, alleges inter alia:
“x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions;
x x x
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.”
“4. The evidence submitted to us show that:On May 8, 1998, then Ombudsman Desierto issued the assailed Resolution dated April 27, 1998 dismissing petitioner’s complaint on the following grounds: (a) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the loans in question are behest loans considering that Hotel Mirador has sufficient collateral for the loans and that the value of its properties and assets at the time was P92,025,100.00; and (b) the crime has prescribed because the latest transaction complained of occurred on April 22, 1977, thus, beyond the 15-year prescriptive period provided by Section 11 of the same law.
‘a) Hotel Mirador was registered with the SEC on November 5, 1974 with the following incorporators:
Armando V. Lim
Quintin Lee See
Jose O. Cobarrubias
Juan A. Sison
Manuel Q. Salintes
‘b) Hotel Mirador was granted by DBP a loan on March 19, 1975 in the amount of P60 million under B/R 1206 for the following purposes:
Construction of hotel building
Purchase of machinery and equipment
Payment of interim obligation
‘c) The loan was without sufficient collateral and Hotel Mirador itself had no sufficient capital to be entitled to the amount of the loan considering that at the time the P60 million loan was granted the offered existing collateral (land) amounts to P2,025,100.00 and the rest amounting to P73 million represents assets to be acquired out of the loan and its paid-up capital amounted P17 million only as of December 31, 1976.
‘d) Despite the foregoing facts, Hotel Mirador obtained additional loans up to P35 million as shown below without sufficient capital to ensure not only viability of its operations but its ability to repay all its loans.’”
“Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.The above provisions are clear and need no interpretation. In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee vs. Hon. Desierto, we held:[10]
“The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.”
“…it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the “beneficiaries of the loans.’ Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.We reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto,[11] thus:
“The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase ‘if the same not be known’ in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean ‘lack of knowledge’ but that the crime ‘is not reasonably knowable’ is unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law, which is written in a clear and unambiguous language and thus provides no room for interpretation but only application.”
“In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the dated of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992. The complaint was filed with the Office of respondent Ombudsman on September 18, 1996, or four (4) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.
“As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that prescription is interrupted ‘when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.’”
"The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This Court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.”Indeed, we have consistently ruled that unless there are good and compelling reasons, we cannot interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigating and prosecutory powers.[14]