457 Phil. 868
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering respondent to:The private respondent's motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, the private respondent filed a petition for certiorari[3] assailing the above-quoted decision with the Supreme Court which rendered judgment on September 9, 1996,[4] the decretal portion of which reads:
- Immediately reinstate complainants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges; and
- Pay them full backwages from the time they were dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated.[2]
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one rendered holding that petitioner has failed to discharge its burden of proof in the instant case and therefore ORDERING the reinstatement of private respondents as regular employees of petitioner, without loss of seniority rights and privileges and with payment of backwages from the day they were dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated. No costs.The judgment of the court became final and executory on November 18, 1996.[5] The private respondent filed a motion for clarification claiming that it had offered reinstatement to the petitioners on July 13, 1992 but that the latter spurned its offer. The Court denied the said motion. The case was remanded to the NLRC for implementation. In due course, the Research and Information Unit of the NLRC computed the benefits due the petitioners and submitted an updated computation on April 15, 1997, viz:
SO ORDERED.
The Labor Arbiter approved the computation in an Order dated August 15, 1997.[7]
RE: UPDATED COMPUTATION OF AWARD
AS PER NLRC DECISION DATED NOV. 29, 1993[6] Name Backwages
(as of 4/30/96) Additional
Backwages
TOTAL1. Rolando Laya, Sr. P179,674.60 P54,232.10 P233,906.70 2. Romulo Magpili 180,637.60 54,232.10 234,869.16 3. Wilfredo Brun 179,474.62 54,232.10 233,706.72 4. Ramil Hernandez 179,474.62 54,232.10 233,706.72 5. Eduardo Reyes 179,474.62 54,232.10 233,706.72 6. Crisostomo Dorompili 179,474.62 54,232.10 233,706.72 7. Herman Delima 174,489.12 54,232.10 228,721.22 8. Angelito Realizo 191,672.48 54,232.10 245,904.58 9. Roberto Fulgencio 191,672.48 54,232.10 245,904.58 10. Susano Atienza 191,672.48 54,232.10 245,904.58 11. Jorge Cipriano 191,672.48 54,232.10 245,904.58 12. Gerardo de Guzman 191,672.48 54,232.10 245,904.58 13. Jaime Calipayan 191,672.48 54,232.10 245,904.58 13. Jaime Calipayan 191,672.48 54,232.10 245,904.58 15. Florencio Espina 191,761.77 54,232.10 245,993.87 TOTAL AWARD (as of 4/15/97)3,600,607.69
Computation of Additional Backwages
5/1/96 - 2/5/97 = 9.16 mos. P165 x 26 days x 9.16 mos. = P39,296.40 2/6/97 - 4/15/97 = 2.30 mos. P180 x 26 days x 2.30 mos. = 10,764.00 P50,060.40 13th Mo. Pay (1/12 of P50,060.40) 4,171.70 Total P54,232.10 =========
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to accompany complainants Rolando Laya Sr., Romulo Magpili, Wilfredo Brun, Ramil Hernandez, Eduardo Reyes, Crisostomo Dorompili, Hernan Delima, Angelito Ralizo, Roberto Fulgencio, Susano Atienza, Jorge Cipriano, Gerardo de Guzman, Jaime Calipay, Carlito de Guzman and Florencio Espino to the premises of respondent located at Room 306, 20th Century Building, Mandaluyong City, for the purpose of reinstating them to their former position and collect from said respondent the amount of P3,960,668.45 corresponding to complainants' backwages and attorney's lien. If you fail to collect sufficient amount in cash, you are further commanded to satisfy the award from the movable and immovable properties of respondent not exempt from execution and deposit the amount you have with the Cashier of this Office. You may also collect your execution fees in the amount of P4,450.60 pursuant to Section 5, Rule IX of the Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs and likewise to turnover the same to the Cashier or authorized Disbursing Officer of this Office. You shall return this writ within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof with the proceedings endorsed thereon.[9]Pursuant to the above writ, the sheriff on February 10, 1998 garnished the funds of the private respondent amounting to P3,960,668.45 which was in the possession of Intel Technology Philippines, Inc.[10] The same amount was subsequently remitted by Intel to the Cashier of the NLRC on March 19, 1998.[11]
We therefore sum up our ruling as follows:The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the above-quoted decision, contending that by computing the backwages of the petitioners up to July 13, 1992 only, the NLRC modified the already final and executory decision of the Supreme Court. The NLRC issued an Order dated May 11, 1999 denying the said motion.[13] On August 31, 1999, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction[14] with the CA which outrightly dismissed the petition in a Resolution dated September 10, 1999,[15] which reads:
a) The backwages of the complainant will not be reduced by their salaries obtained elsewhere during the period of their dismissal until the offer of reinstatement was made.
b) The computation of backwages stopped on July 13, 1992, when the return-to-work [order] was made by the respondent but was refused by the complainants.
c) The backwages should be based on the complainants' wage rate in 1992.
d) The complainants are awarded 13th Month Pay....
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED but the petition for preliminary injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic. The Cashier is hereby ordered to release the amount of TWO HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND THIRTY PESOS AND TWENTY-NINE CENTAVOS (P202,030.29) for distribution to the individual complainants in accordance with the above computation and to remit the balance of the garnished and deposited amount to the respondent.[12]
Section 3, Rule 46 as amended by the Supreme Court in Bar Matter No. 803 which took effect on September 1, 1998 provides that "In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received." The petition has no such statement of material dates, violating the aforecited rule and is a sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.The petitioners instituted the present recourse, assigning to the CA the following errors:
Also, We note that the petitioners have failed to include in their petition the required explanation on why personal service upon the respondents was not resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Strict compliance with this rule is mandated. (Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Helen Bautista-Ricafort, et al., G.R. No. 132007, August 5, 1998).
Petition is hereby DISMISSED outright.[16]
We find the petition meritorious.I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE SAID "PETITION HAS NO SUCH STATEMENT OF MATERIAL DATES," IN VIOLATION OF RULE 65.II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN STRICTLY ADHERING TO TECHNICALITIES, RATHER THAN IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE, IN THE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT.[17]
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.Nonetheless, we resolve to give due course to the petition to avert a miscarriage of justice. For judicial cases do not come and go through the portals of a court of law by the mere mandate of technicalities. Where a rigid application of the rules will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be disregarded in order to resolve the case.[21] In Aguam v. CA,[22] we ruled that:
... The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.[23]The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.[24]
It is a settled general principle that a writ of execution must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. Execution not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity. It must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.We note that in its Decision dated June 16, 1998, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's dismissal of the case and directed the payment of backwages, to be reckoned from the time of the petitioners' dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement.[28] If the private respondent believed the aforesaid computation to be erroneous in the light of the factual circumstances obtaining between the parties, it should have assigned the same as an error when it filed its petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 114290 assailing the said NLRC judgment. The private respondent did not do so. Although the private respondent filed a motion for clarification of the decision of this Court in the said case, the said motion was, however, denied by this Court in its Resolution dated October 15, 1997[29] considering that entry of judgment had already been made.
Corollary thereto, it must be stressed that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and hence may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes — all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest. This is meant to preserve the stability of decisions rendered by the courts, and to dissuade parties from trifling with court processes. One who has submitted his case to a regular court necessarily commits himself to abide by whatever decision the court may render. Any error in the decision which has not been considered in a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal cannot be impugned when such error becomes apparent only during execution. ...
It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be relitigated anew since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest in that aforementioned case (Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 306 [1986]), if not by the principle of res judicata, but at least by conclusiveness of judgment (Vda. de Sta. Romana v. PCIB 118 SCRA 335 [1982]).IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the NLRC dated June 16, 1998 is SET ASIDE. The Order of the Labor Arbiter dated August 15, 1997 is AFFIRMED.