591 Phil. 216
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Art. 286 (Grave Coercion)On 18 October 1999, petitioners filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit.[2] Thereafter, or on 21 December 1999, petitioner Tabujara filed a Supplemental Counter-Affidavit.[3]
That on the 14th day of September 1999 at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning more or less, in Brgy. Iba, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without authority of law, by conspiring, confederating and mutually helping to (sic) one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forced to go with them one DAISY DADIVAS-AFABLE and against the latter's will.
Art. 280, par. 2 (Trespass to Dwelling)
That on the 14th day of September 1999 at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning more or less, in Brgy. Iba, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then a (sic) private persons, by conspiring, confederating and mutually helping to (sic) one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house owned by one DAISY DADIVAS-AFABLE by opened the gate and against the latter's will.[1]
After a careful perusal of the allegation setforth in the complaint-affidavit, taking into consideration the allegation likewise setforth in the counter-affidavit submitted by the respondents and that of their witnesses, the Court finds no probable cause to proceed with trial on the merits of the above-entitled cases.Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that when she filed the complaints for grave coercion and trespass to dwelling on 17 September 1999 against petitioners, no information for estafa has yet been filed against her. In fact, the information was filed on 5 October 1999.
The Court believes and so holds that the instant complaints are merely leverage to the estafa[4] case already filed against private complainant herein Daisy Afable by the Miladay Jewels Inc. wherein respondent Atty. Tabujara III is its legal counsel; while respondent Dayrit appears to be one of the officers of the said company.
As could be gleaned from the record, private complainant herein Daisy Afable is being charged with the aforestated estafa case for having allegedly embezzled several pieces of jewelry from the Miladay Jewels Inc., worth P2,177,156.00.
WHEREFORE, let these cases be dismissed for lack of probable cause.[5]
Acting on the "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the private complainant herein on January 17, 2000, with "Opposition..." filed by the accused on January 27, 2000, taking into consideration the "Manifestation/Brief Memorandum" filed by the said private complainant on March 4, 2000, the Court found cogent reason to reconsider its order dated January 7, 2000.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that the alleged affidavit of Mauro V. de Lara on which the court a quo based its findings of probable cause was hearsay because it was not sworn before Judge Adriatico; that De Lara did not personally appear before the investigating judge during preliminary investigation. However, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in the Order dated 14 July 2000, thus:
The sworn allegation/statement of witness Mauro V. de Lara, which was inadvertently overlooked by the undersigned, and which states, among other things, that said witness saw the private complainant herein being forcibly taken by three persons, referring very apparently to the accused herein, from her residence is already sufficient to establish a prima facie evidence or probable cause against the herein accused for the crimes being imputed against them. It is likewise probable that accused herein could have committed the crime charged in view of their belief that the private complainant herein had something to do with the alleged loss or embezzlement of jewelries of the Miladay Jewels.
WHEREFORE, in order to ferret out the truth/veracity of the complainant's allegation and in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, let the above-entitled cases now be set for trial.
Let therefore warrant of arrest be issued against all the accused in Criminal Case No. 99-29038 (Grave Coercions), fixing their bail for their provisional liberty in the amount of P12,000.00 for each of them.
As regard Criminal Case No. 99-29037 (Trespass to Dwelling) the same shall be governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.[6]
Acting on the "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the accused, thru counsel. With comment from the counsel of the private complainant, the Court resolves to deny the same there being no cogent reason to reconsider the Court order dated May 2, 2000.Petitioners moved for clarificatory hearings which were conducted on 23 August 2000 and 31 August 2000. However, before the court a quo could render a resolution based on said clarificatory hearings, petitioners filed on 15 September 2000 a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.[8] Petitioners sought to annul the 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 Orders of the court a quo for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners argued that the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in issuing said Orders finding probable cause and ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest based solely on the unsworn statement of Mauro V. de Lara who never appeared during preliminary investigation and who was not personally examined by the investigating judge.
The Court has resolved to try the above-entitled cases on the merits so as to ferret out the truth of the private complainant's allegations and there being probable cause to warrant criminal prosecution of the same.
The accused's contention that the statement of witness Mauro de Lara is bereft of credibility and that the complaints at bar were initiated merely for harassment purposes could be ventilated well in a full blown trial.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reason, let the trial of these cases proceed as already scheduled.[7]
While it is true that respondent Judge Hon. Calixto O. Adriatico dismisses both criminal cases last January 7, 2000 finding no probable cause and later on reverse himself by issuing the question Order dated May 2, 2000 alleging among others that said Judge inadvertently overlooked the statement of witness Mauro V. De Lara, the stubborn facts remain that whatever defects, or shortcomings on the parts of the respondent Judge was cured when he conducted clarificatory examination on the dates earlier mentioned in this Order.[11]The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, reads:
RESPONSIVE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition for the Annulment of the Orders of the respondent Judge dated May 2, 2000 and July 14, 2000 in criminal cases nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038 (MTC-Meycauayan, Branch 2) should be as it is hereby denied for lack of merit.Petitioners filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals asserting that the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion in basing its findings of probable cause and ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest solely on the unsworn statement of Mauro De Lara who never appeared during preliminary investigation and who was not personally examined by the investigating judge. Moreover, they argued that the 18 September 2000 Order was void because it was issued by the Municipal Trial Court while the temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court enjoining the court a quo to proceed further with the criminal complaints was in force.
ACCORDINGLY, the Presiding Judge of branch II, the Hon. Calixto O. Adriatico may now proceed to hear and decide crim. Cases nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038 pending before that Court.[12]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch II is directed to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case Nos. 99-29037 and 99-29038 and to dispose of them with deliberate dispatch.[14]Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.[15] Hence, the instant petition raising the following assignment of errors:
Petitioners insist that the Orders of the court a quo dated 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 should be annulled for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion because the finding of probable cause was based solely on the unsworn statement of Mauro De Lara who never appeared during the preliminary examination. Petitioners also allege that since De Lara never appeared before the investigating judge, his statement was hearsay and cannot be used as basis for finding probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest or to hold petitioners liable for trial. Granting that the statement of De Lara was subscribed before "Judge Paguio," the same cannot be used as basis because the law requires that the statement be sworn to before the investigating judge and no other.I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN BASING ITS FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD PETITIONERS FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS AND ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST THEM, UPON AN UNSWORN STATEMENT OF A WITNESS WHO NEVER APPEARED BEFORE, NOR WAS PERSONALLY EXAMINED BY, THE TRIAL COURT.A. THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES THAT NO WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AND AFTER PERSONALLY EXAMINING UNDER OATH THE COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES.II.
PETITIONERS ASSERT THEIR RIGHT GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION WHICH TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER RULES OF PROCEDURE OR TECHNICALITIES.A. IT IS WELL-SETTLED THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT IS BOUND BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE PETITION AND NOT BY ITS CAPTION.[16]
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. -It is only when the decision of the RTC was rendered in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction would a petition for review under Rule 42 be proper[18]
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon finding of probable cause personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he/she may produce, and particularly describing the person to be seized.
SEC. 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. -Corollarily, Section 6 of the same Rule provides:
x x x x
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. - If the complaint or information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may, however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - x x xClearly, Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion in issuing the assailed 2 May 2000 and 14 July 2000 Orders finding probable cause to hold petitioners liable for trial and to issue warrants of arrest because it was based solely on the statement of witness Mauro De Lara whom Judge Adriatico did not personally examine in writing and under oath; neither did he propound searching questions. He merely stated in the assailed 2 May 2000 Order that he overlooked the said statement of De Lara; nevertheless, without conducting a personal examination on said witness or propounding searching questions, Judge Adriatico still found De Lara's allegations sufficient to establish probable cause. Plainly, this falls short of the requirements imposed by no less than the Constitution.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. - x x x [T]he judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Failure to comply with such procedure will make him administratively liable. In the case at bar, respondent judge issued several warrants of arrest without examining the complainant and his witnesses in writing and under oath, in violation of Section 6 of Rule 112 which provides:When the investigating judge relied solely on the affidavit of witness De Lara which was not sworn to before him and whom he failed to examine in the form of searching questions and answers, he deprived petitioners of the opportunity to test the veracity of the allegations contained therein. Worse, petitioners' arguments that De Lara's affidavit was hearsay was disregarded by the investigating judge despite the fact that the allegations therein were completely rebutted by petitioners' and their witnesses' affidavits, all of whom appeared before and were personally examined by the investigating judge. It was thus incorrect for the court a quo to rule thus:Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - x x xThe records show that respondent judge has violated the rules on preliminary investigation and issuance of a warrant of arrest since the start of his term as municipal judge in Batac, Ilocos Norte in September 1991. The gross ignorance of respondent judge has immensely prejudiced the administration of justice. Parties adversely affected by his rulings dismissing their complaints after preliminary investigation have been denied their statutory right of review that should have been conducted by the provincial prosecutor. His practice of issuing warrants of arrest without examining the complainants and their witnesses is improvident and could have necessarily deprived the accused of their liberty however momentary it may be. Our Constitution requires that all members of the judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. Respondent judge's stubborn adherence to improper procedures and his constant violation of the constitutional provision requiring him to personally examine the complainant and the witness in writing and under oath before issuing a warrant of arrest makes him unfit to discharge the functions of a judge.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. - If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.
The accused's contention that the statement of witness Mauro de Lara is bereft of credibility and that the complaints at bar were initiated merely for harassment purposes could be ventilated well in a full blown trial.[27]In sum, De Lara's affidavit cannot be relied upon by the court a quo for its finding of probable cause.