594 Phil. 515
REYES, R.T., J.:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in part. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 2003 sustaining the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss, as well as its resolution dated December 16, 2003 denying reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for further proceedings to resolve anew with deliberate dispatch the motion to dismiss in accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as elucidated in this Decision.[6] (Emphasis supplied)Meanwhile, respondent was declared in default by the RTC on May 28, 2003 for failure to file his answer. As a result, plaintiffs were allowed to present evidence ex parte.[7]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds for plaintiffs and hereby enters judgment ordering defendant Douglas Lu Ym to account the following real properties owned by the late Cayetano Ludo and held by him in trust and for the benefit of herein plaintiffs, on the following properties, as follows: Tax Declaration No. 01616 under defendant's name covering Lot No. 1 (Exh. "H"); Tax Declaration No. 02207 under defendant's name covering Lot No. 3 (Exh. "I"); Tax Dec. No. 02143 under the name of Lu Ym Annabel (wife of defendant Douglas Lu Ym) (Exh. "J"); Tax Dec. No. 00024 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant's wife) (Exh. "K"); Tax Dec. No. 02827 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant's wife) (Exh. "L"); Tax Dec. No. 02826 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant's wife) (Exh. "M"); Tax Dec. No. 03157 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant's wife) (Exh. "N"); Transfer Certificate of Title No. 102557 under the name of defendant Douglas Lu Ym (Exh. "0-1"); Tax Dec. No. 02143 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant's wife) (Exh. "P"); Tax Dec. No. 0028 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant's wife) (Exh. "S"); Tax Dec. No. 01615 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant's wife) (Exh. "U"); Tax Dec. No. 01617 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant's wife) (Exh. "W"); Tax Dec. No. 02208 under the name of defendant Douglas covering Lot No. 3 (Exh. "Y"); the 1/3 share of the late Cayetano Ludo with the Ludo & Lu Ym Development Corporation, among which are the following: Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 17029 (Exh. "AA"), 17032 (Exh. "BB"), 22325 (Exh. "CC"), 22323 (Exh. "DD"), 44057 (Exh. "EE"), 20514 (Exh. "FF"), 20515 (Exh. "GG"), and 20516 (Exh. "HH"), all registered under the Ludo and Lu Ym Development Corporation of which defendant Douglas is one of the major stockholders as shown in the Certification issued by the Corporate Secretary (Exh. "II") of the said corporation; the proceeds of the sale of the following properties of the late Cayetano Ludo sold by defendant as follows: (a) of the private jet plane amounting to P100 million pesos; shares of stocks with Crown Oil Corporation Communications amounting to P30 million dollars; shares of stocks with Philippine Bank of Communications amounting to P53 million pesos; luxurious cars amounting P50 million pesos; rent of ancestral house (the White House) located at F. Ramos St. beside Robinson's Department Store, Cebu City; and proceeds of the sale of the Ranudo property; and all other properties which defendant held and continue to hold in trust for all the heirs of the late Cayetano Ludo.On April 12, 2005, respondent moved for reconsideration.[11] He contended that the February 23, 2005 ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 161309[12] invalidated or rendered moot the RTC decision.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue is specifically directed to compute and impose the estate taxes due on the above mentioned properties of the late Don Cayetano Ludo.
SO ORDERED.[10] (Emphasis supplied)
The prayer to set aside herein judgment cannot be sustained for lack of legal basis. The record will show that proceedings in this case was conducted regularly:Meanwhile, as there was no restraining order from the Supreme Court, plaintiffs continued to present evidence. Exhibit was formally offered on March 31, 2004 which was admitted in evidence in an Order dated April 30, 2004. Until this Court entered judgment in the main case.
- Per Motion, defendant Douglas was given until June 15, 2002 to submit responsive pleading (May 30, 2002 order) on August 2, 2002, defendant Douglas was given 15 days to file answer to the amended complaint;
- Another extension of 15 days or until November 8, 2002 was given as prayed for (October 28, 2002 order);
- Another extension was requested on November 7, 2002 which was granted in the order dated November 12, 2002;
- Due to the filing of the Petition for Certiorari, this Court on its own, suspended further proceedings for sixty (60) days (November 29, 2002 order);
- On February 7, 2003, plaintiffs prayed that principal defendant be declared in default;
- On February 10, 2003, said defendant was again reminded to submit answer;
- Defendant Douglas was declared in default (May 25, 2003 order);
- Plaintiff Gertrudes Nabua testified on June 27, 2003;
- Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court of Appeals was received on September 4, 2003;
- On August 20, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Certiorari petition and affirmed the two assailed orders (received on September 11, 2003);
- Defendant Douglas appealed the Court of Appeals decision to the Supreme Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari.
In the light also of a recent Supreme Court Circular, wherein defendant in a civil case is directed to observe restraint in filing a Motion to Dismiss and instead allege the grounds thereof as defenses in the answer, this Court was confident that its ruling in the Motion to dismiss which was upheld by the Court of Appeals is in accord with the said rule. It has already reached a point of no return. Had the Honorable Supreme Court dismissed the main case, which is one of the reliefs in a Petition for Certiorari, it would have been different.[14]
Due to the fact that this Court recognizes the right of appeal, it failed to realize that what was the subject of the notice of appeal is the Order of this Court dated May 20, 2005 order denying the Motion for Reconsideration and not the decision rendered on March 16, 2005.
At any rate, transmit the records of this case to the Court of Appeals as directed in the May 26, 2005 Order and leave it to the higher court to determine whether or not the appeal was filed out of time.[18]
In the present case, the assailed acts of respondents do not constitute disobedience to, or defiance of the decision in G.R. No. 161309. The Court never stated therein that the March 16, 2005 decision of respondent Judge, or any judgment on the merits rendered pending decision of the Court, should be set aside. Note that no TRO or injunction was issued to restrain the proceedings below. Unrestrained, the trial, presentation of evidence and rendition of judgment would logically take their course, and respondent Judge could not be faulted for proceeding with the rendition of judgment.
Moreover, the main thrust of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 161309 was to order the trial court to rule on the issues raised by petitioner in the motion to dismiss. This had already been substantially satisfied by the respondent Judge in his March 16, 2005 decision. In holding that the probated will of Cayetano did not, in fact, settle his estate as the same was simulated and intended merely to evade payment of taxes, respondent Judge in effect debunked the claim of valid assignment of rights over the properties in favor of petitioner and the Lu Ym Corporation as well as petitioner's assertion that the probate of Cayetano's will constituted res judicata and a bar to the relitigation of the same properties. So also, the pronouncement of respondent Judge that Gertrudes is the common law wife of Cayetano is recognition of Gertrudes' capacity to sue. In the same vein, the full faith and credence accorded by respondent Judge on the allegations and testimonies of Gertrudes and her witnesses addressed the issue of fraud invoked by petitioner.[22] (Emphasis supplied)
In Apuyan vs. Haldeman, 438 SCRA 402, September 20, 2004, the Court held:Petitioners thus resorted to the present recourse under Rule 45.Petitioners' reference in his notice of appeal to the Order of the Trial Court dated 07 January 1997 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration should also be deemed to refer to the decision of the trial court dated 09 October 1996 which was subject of the Motion for Reconsideration. (pls. see pages 99-103)Note: Plaintiff-Appellees moved to dismiss defendant-appellants Appeal on the ground that what the appellant appealed from was the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision and not the Decision of the RTC. x x x[25]
In this case, petitioner filed his appeal within the reglementary period. However, he did not appeal from the trial court's decision dated October 9, 1996 which disposed the case, but from the trial court's Order dated January 7, 1997, denying his motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court.The 15-day period to file an appeal is reckoned from the date of receipt of the decision, and this period is interrupted by the timely filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.[34] Records of the instant controversy show that respondent received a copy of the March 16, 2005 Decision of the RTC on April 4, 2005. On the eighth day, April 12, 2005, respondent filed his motion for reconsideration. This translates to a balance of seven days from the original 15-day period to appeal the decision. On May 24, 2005, respondent received the Order dated May 20, 2005 denying his motion for reconsideration. On the fifth day, May 25, 2005, respondent filed his notice of appeal.[35] In sum, respondent used up a total of 13 days to file his appeal, well within the 15 days required to do so.
Can we consider said appeal from the Order denying a motion for reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court as an appeal from a final order?
We rule in the affirmative.x x x x
Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court's Order dated January 7, 1997 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision dated October 9, 1996 is not an interlocutory order, but a final order, as the trial court finally resolved therein the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration, which were already passed upon in the trial court's decision.
Petitioner's reference in his notice of appeal to the Order of the trial court dated January 7, 1997 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration should also be deemed to refer to the decision of the trial court dated October 9, 1996, which was the subject of the motion for reconsideration.
In effect, petitioner appealed from the final order of the trial court dated January 7, 1997 and the decision of the trial court dated October 9, 1996, which appeal was filed on time.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
We rule in the negative.When respondent was declared in default, the proper remedy would have been to file a motion to set aside the order of default upon a proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense.[45] This respondent failed to do.x x x x
In the present case, the assailed acts of respondents do not constitute disobedience to, or defiance of the decision in G.R. No. 161309. The Court never stated therein that the March 16, 2005 decision of respondent Judge, or any judgment on the merits rendered pending decision of the Court, should be set aside. Note that no TRO or injunction was issued to restrain the proceedings below. Unrestrained, the trial, presentation of evidence and rendition of judgment would logically take their course, and respondent Judge could not be faulted for proceeding with the rendition of judgment.
Moreover, the main thrust of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 161309 was to order the trial court to rule on the issues raised by petitioner in the motion to dismiss. This had already been substantially satisfied by the respondent Judge in his March 16, 2005 decision. In holding that the probated will of Cayetano did not, in fact, settle his estate as the same was simulated and intended merely to evade payment of taxes, respondent Judge in effect debunked the claim of valid assignment of rights over the properties in favor of petitioner and the Lu Ym Corporation as well as petitioner's assertion that the probate of Cayetano's will constituted res judicata and a bar to the relitigation of the same properties. So also, the pronouncement of respondent Judge that Gertrudes is the common law wife of Cayetano is recognition of Gertrudes' capacity to sue. In the same vein, the full faith and credence accorded by respondent Judge on the allegations and testimonies of Gertrudes and her witnesses addressed the issue of fraud invoked by petitioner.
It is therefore clear that to nullify the March 16, 2005 decision of respondent Judge and to conduct anew the proceedings before the trial court for the sole purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss, would be a waste of time which would further delay the resolution of this case. Furthermore, the assailed March 16, 2005 decision of the trial court is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals. It is therefore before the latter court where the issue of the nullification of the trial court's decision should be addressed.
In sum, we find that respondents did not commit any act amounting to indirect contempt. To reiterate, respondent Judge's March 16, 2005 Decision and May 20, 2005 Order do not constitute defiance of the Court's verdict in G.R. No. 161309. It follows therefore that the pleadings filed by respondent Atty. Mahinay in reliance of the aforesaid decision and order of the trial court are not as well contumacious. Indeed, an act to be considered contemptuous must be clearly contrary or prohibited by the order of the Court. A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.[44]
Section 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.[32] G.R. No. 129980, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 402.No appeal may be taken from:In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65.
(a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (b) An interlocutory order; (c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (e) An order of execution; (f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and (g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.