430 Phil. 420
PANGANIBAN, J.:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Wilfredo dela Torre is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as follows:The two Amended Informations for acts of lasciviousness, dated July 1, 1997, were similarly worded as follows:
“1) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2179-I – of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years of prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.“2) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2180-I – of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years of prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.“3) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2181-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.“4) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2182-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.“5) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2183-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.“6) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2184-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.”[4]
“That on or about the 30th day of September, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, actuated by lust and by means of coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness on the person of Mary Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years old, to the damage and prejudice of the said Mary Rose de la Torre.”[5]The other Information[6] charged appellee with the same crime against the same victim on a different date, October 10, 1996.
“That on or about the 18th day of October, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippine[s], and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, with lewd design by means of coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with one Mary Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years old, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.”[7]The three other Amended Informations recited the same allegations on different dates: November 1,[8] November 12[9] and December 23,[10] 1996. When arraigned on August 13, 1997, appellee pleaded[11] not guilty[12] to all six (6) Informations. After trial in due course, the RTC rendered the challenged Decision.
“Appellee Wilfredo dela Torre had a common-law relationship with Melinda dela Torre. The latter gave birth to three children, Mary Rose, Mark Anthony, and Mark Domil. When Mary Rose was about seven (7) years old, her mother left the conjugal abode with Mark Domil, leaving her and sibling Mark Anthony in the care of appellee, who resided with his progeny in a one-room hut in Sitio Pao, Guis-guis, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
“Mary Rose and her brother Mark Anthony studied at the Guinabon Elementary School. She was the brightest in her class, even though because of their poverty, she had to walk from their hut to the school everyday.
“In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, noticed a sudden change in the behavior and performance of Mary Rose, who was twelve-year[s] old at th[at] time. The latter appeared sleepy, hungry and snobbish. She also urinated on her panty. When confronted by Generosa Mayo, the head teacher, Mary Rose admitted to her that she was abused repeatedly by appellee. Mayo informed Elpidia Balindo, the aunt of Mary Rose, about the abuses. They then decided to refer the matter to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), who took Mary Rose under its custody.
“It turned out that on September 30, 1996, Mary Rose was about to sleep when appellee told her, ‘anak puwede ba nating subukan?’ She did not understand what that meant and continued to sleep. Appellee then placed himself on top of Mary Rose. After removing her shorts as well as his shorts, he poked his penis into her organ. He also kissed and embraced Mary Rose, who just wept. The same incident was repeated in the evening of October 10, 1996.
“In the evening of October 18, 1996, appellee was able to insert his penis into the vagina of Mary Rose. After the act, her whole body ached. She started to fear appellee. He also had sexual intercourse with his minor daughter on three more occasions, that is, on November 1 and 12 and December 23, 1996.
“A medical examination conducted by Dr. Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed that her vagina admitted one finger with ease. She was no longer a virgin. Her hymen was broken with healed lacerations at the 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 nine o’clock positions. The girl also suffered from urinary tract infection.”[15] (Citations omitted)
“Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three (3) children with Melinda Torre, namely: Mary Rose, Mark Anthony and Mark Ronnil. Melinda left her family when Mary Rose was about seven (7) years old bringing with her Mark Ronnil. The victim lived with her father and brother Mark Anthony in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
“Felina Sobrevilla, teacher of Mary Rose, noticed sudden changes in her behavior and when confronted, the latter admitted that she was sexually abused by her father. Her head teacher informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the sexual abuses. They referred the case to the DSWD who took her under its custody.
“Mary Rose testified that her father committed sexual abuses on her on the following dates: September 30, 1996, October 10, 1996, October 18, 1996, November 01, 1996, November 12, 1996 and December 23, 1996.
“Appellee, on the other hand denies vehemently the charges being imputed on him by her daughter and said that the only reason he can think of why the daughter filed the charges is because he did not allow her to stay with her teacher, Mrs. Sobrevilla.”[18] (Citations omitted)
Hence, this appeal.[21]
“1. As testified to (supra) there was absence of any actual, physical violence or intimidation in the commission of the acts complained of.x x x x x x x x x “2. The abandonement by Melinda (common-law wife of accused Wilfredo and mother of Mary Rose) when Mary Rose was seven (7) years old leaving behind Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother, Mark Anthony.“3. The extreme poverty on the life of Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony.“4. After the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five (5) years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father.“5. There is reason to deprive Wilfredo of the love of her daughter Mary Rose but there is no reason to deprive Mark Anthony of the love of his father considering that both Mary Rose and Mark Anthony have no one to call as a mother.”[20]
“The Court a quo erred in penalizing appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. No. 7659.”[22]
“This Court has not just once ruled that where the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his conviction, an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should therefore be dismissed.”[26]This doctrine was applied as early as 1904 in Kepner v. United States[27] (hereinafter “Kepner”), as follows:
“The Court of First Instance, having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused, found Kepner not guilty; to try him again upon the merits, even in an appellate court, is to put him a second time in jeopardy for the same offense.”[28]The Kepner doctrine was clarified in a 1987 case.[29] Speaking through Justice Isagani A. Cruz, the Court explained that an “appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy.”[30]
“Whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be.”[37]The only way to nullify an acquittal or to increase the penalty is through a proper petition for certiorari to show grave abuse of discretion. This was explained in People v. CA and Maquiling[38] as follows:
“While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. On the other hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.”[39]WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.