623 Phil. 453
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant:
Ordering defendant to reconvey to plaintiff the seventy-eight (78) lots released and excluded from the foreclosure sale including the additional exclusion from the public sale, namely:a. Lot Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 13, Block I (Old Plan).
b. Lot Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, Block II (Old Plan).
c. Lot Nos. 3, 10, 12 and 13, Block I (New Plan), Block III (Old Plan).
d. Lot Nos. 7, 14 and 20, Block III (New Plan), Block V (Old Plan).
e. Lot Nos. 13 and 20, Block IV (New Plan), Block VI (Old Plan).
f. Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10, Block V (New Plan), Block VII (Old Plan).
g. Lot Nos. 1, 5, 8, 15, 26 and 27, Block VI (New Plan), Block VIII (Old Plan).
h. Lot Nos. 7 and 12, Block VII (New Plan), Block II (Old Plan).
i. Lot Nos. 1, 4 and 6, Block VIII (New Plan), Block X (Old Plan).
j. Lot 5, Block X (New Plan), Block XII (Old Plan).
k. Lot 6, Block XI (New Plan), Block XII (Old Plan).
l. Lots 2, 5, 12 and 15, Block I.
m. Lots 6, 9 and 11, Block II.
n. Lots 1, 5, 6, 7, 16 and 23, Block 3.
o. Lot 6, Block 4.
p. Lots 5, 12, 13 and 24, Block 5.
q. Lots 10 and 16, Block 6.
r. Lots 6 and 15, Block 7.
s. Lots 13, 24, 28 and 29, Block 8.
t. Lots 1, 11, 17 and 22, Block 9.
u. Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Block 10.
v. Lots 1, 2, 3 and 5 (New), Block 11.
2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, if the [78] excluded lots could not be reconveyed [,] the fair market value of each of said lots.
3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City ... to cancel the land titles covering the excluded lots in the name of defendant or any of its successors-in-interest including all derivative titles therefrom and to issue new land titles in plaintiff's name.
4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasig City... to cancel the Notices of Lis Pendens inscribed in TCT No. PT-80342 under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554; x x x TCT No. PT-81812 under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554; and TCT No. PT-84913 under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554.
5. Costs of suit.
Counterclaims filed by defendant, intervenors Urbano and intervenors Gonzales are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
"x x x [The] Court considers the amount of P35,000.00 per square meter, of all the reconveyed 78 lots, representing the current fair market value which value is well within the range [P10,000.00 - P45,000.00 per square meter] established and found by the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and has been considered binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court per its Decision dated October 28, 2003 which has become final and executory on February 24, 2004."[9]
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution or Order for Cancellation of Lis Pendens and the Motion to cancel Notice of Lis Pendens, with their merits, are both GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
"Between whatever right or obligation the banks may have to retain the deposits and let another party withdraw it and the right of the depositor GSIS, who acts in behalf of millions of beneficiaries who will suffer the moment the financial condition of GSIS is compromised, this Court finds the choice commonsensical.
"Considering that the rights of the GSIS over its own funds has been firmly established plus the unimaginable scenario of chaos the country might face the moment the public has learned that the funds of the only Government Agency tasked to provide social security protection of the government workers is in jeopardy is almost certain this Court deems it best to issue a status quo order.
WHEREFORE, respondent PNB and DBP are restrained from honoring the garnishing of the GSIS funds x x x (faded text in rollo).
On May 31, 2004, RTC Pasay City Branch 115 issued an Order[17] in Civil Case No. 04-0316 CFM that provides:
"In compliance with the Ex-parte Request for Clarification of Order dated 26 May 2004, directing the parties to preserve the status quo and in ... light of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court of Appeals dated May 27, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP. 84079 case entitled "Government Service Insurance System vs. Hon. Celso Laviña, et al.", restraining the garnishment of the subject deposits, clarification is hereby made that the status quo contemplated in the Order refers to the condition of the parties prior to the service of the Notice of Garnishment on the respondent banks by the Sheriff of the RTC-71 of Pasig City and that the said status quo Order was never intended to prevent petitioner GSIS from withdrawing the funds and monies deposited in the respondent banks.
SO ORDERED."[18]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The orders dated April 27, 2004 and May 13, 2004 and writ of execution dated April 28, 2004, all issued by the regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 71) in Civil Case No. 59439 entitled "Eduardo M. Santiago, etc., vs. Government Service Insurance System", are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in (i) that said orders and writ shall be for the satisfaction of the decision dated December 17, 1997 rendered in said case to the extent of the sum of P399,828,000.99; and (ii) that said court is directed to immediately conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the fair market value of the subject lots as of April 29, 2004 and, upon such determination, issue an order of execution and the corresponding writ for the unsatisfied portion of the decision, if any.
The motion for reconsideration of our resolution dated July 27, 2004 and motion to allow immediate partial execution filed by respondent Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago are PARTIALLY GRANTED in that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is PARTIALLY LIFTED, such that execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 59439 for the amount of P399,828,000.00 may immediately proceed while the writ of preliminary injunction against the execution of the rest of the judgment award is made PERMANENT subject to the disposition in the preceding paragraph.
For lack of merit, the motion to cite GSIS and others for direct contempt is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[19]
"It is rather obvious that petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration pending with the CA and its present Petition, while ostensibly directed at different orders of the RTC, are actually aimed at only one objective: to thwart implementation of the modified April 28, 2004 Writ of Execution. Such simultaneous recourse to two remedies at different fora for a single objective is plain forum shopping. Forum shopping exists not only when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another, but also where the elements of litis pendentia are present, i.e., regardless of which party will prevail, the result of one action will be determinative of that of the other action. Specifically, if we give due course to the present Petition, our proceedings would have to take precedence over the resolution by the CA of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Our decision would also bind the CA On the issue of the April 28, 2004 Writ of Execution. There is also the possibility that if the CA Proceeds to resolve petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, its resolution will preempt our action on the present Petition. Either way, one court will be pitted against the other in an appalling scheme petitioner should not get away with.
Having declared the present Petition improper for forum shopping, petitioner's request that it be treated as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is not feasible.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.[30]
- In ordering the respondent trial court to proceed with the second option of requiring the petitioner GSIS to pay private respondent for the value of the lots initially pegged at P12,000.00 without affording petitioner GSIS the opportunity to show compliance with the first option of reconveyance of the lots;
- In ignoring the exemption from execution of the funds and assets of petitioner GSIS under Section 39 of Section 1 of the GSIS Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8291); and
- In holding that petitioner GSIS is barred by estoppel from invoking the prior sale, reconveyance and segregation of lots and double enumeration of two lots, because these allegedly delve into the correctness of respondent trial court's decision.[34]
I. Whether it is grave abuse of discretion or gross reversible error for the respondent trial court to ignore or modify the judgment of the Supreme Court.
- Whether there has been actual or constructive compliance with the judgment directing the reconveyance of the 78 lots which are the subject matter of this case.
- Whether in the absence of denial by the private respondent of the fact of reconveyance to the buyers of private respondent's assignor of the lots in question, petitioner GSIS should be deemed to have satisfied the decision under the first option of reconveyance. Otherwise, there would be unjust enrichment and double indemnification.
- Whether the respondent trial court acted with obvious partiality toward the private respondent.
II. Whether it is tenable that when a literal and blind execution of a judgment shall result in grievous error and injustice, the judgment should be executed in a faithful manner that harmonizes with truth and equity. If necessary to avoid distortions, falsehood, and marked injustice, whether the Supreme Court may even reverse and set aside its earlier judgment.
- Whether a party litigant is necessarily bound by the mistakes or grave negligence of its former counsel and officials or employees.
III. Whether the respondent trial court committed reversible error when it ruled on the issue of prescription
IV. Whether it is state policy that GSIS funds are exempt from garnishment. Whether just claims of litigants should be decided in a way that does not conflict with such public policy.[36]
Rubia distinguishes between GSIS funds to pay for benefits and funds intended for investments. There is no such distinction. All funds including those invested and the income derived from them are funds used to pay benefits. GSIS never views its income from investments as "profits". All income goes to benefit payments, if not current, then for the future when the billions now paid annually will multiply several times because most of the 1,200,000 current members and the employees succeeding them will have retired.
The amount involved in Rubia is relatively nominal. But when unlawful or unjustified claims like the Billion Peso garnishment in this case comes up, the true meaning and correct interpretation of the GSIS Charter become imperative.x x x
GSIS respectfully submits that the trust funds under its stewardship have the same public character as funds of regular departments, bureaus, and offices of the Government. GSIS is not in business, in the commercial meaning of the word. GSIS tries to make its trust fund earn in order to meet the heavy demands and requirements of the future. In the same way as funds needed to construct school buildings or to buy tanks, helicopters, and other defense equipment may not be garnished to pay debts of the Department of Education and Culture or the Department of National Defense, so should funds intended for pensions of public servants, their death compensation or disability benefits be freed from the perils of execution and garnishment. Or defraudation as in this case.x x x
The law provides for the exemption of GSIS funds from court processes, execution, garnishment, and other levies. It does not follow that parties with legitimate grievances cannot have any means of redress. The law provides for the handling of claims against regular departments, bureaus, and offices. The exemption of GSIS from court processes means that the same procedure for regular government offices should apply to it. Having removed regular procedures like attachment and garnishment, the law provides the mode of redress against exempt agencies and institutions for persons filing cases against GSIS.x x x
Clearly, the forcible execution of the final judgment in this Santiago case will no doubt violate Section 39 of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8291 and the State policy relative to the preservation and maintenance of the actuarial solvency of the funds of petitioner GSIS.[44]
44. The issues tackled here can be divided into four (4) groups. The First Group, those which have been already laid to rest by the finality of judgment of the RTC, 1st CA Decision and the 1st SC Decision but which petitioner GSIS is reviving in the current incidents of these proceedings. The Second Group consist of those raised in the Petition in GR No. 175393 (2nd SC Case). The Third Group are those raised in Petition in GR No. 177731 (3rd SC Case). The Fourth Group comprises the issue of "Reconveyance" and related matters.
45. The issues are therefore the following:
45. A. FIRST GROUP OF ISSUES
I. Whether or not there is forum shopping and therefore the petitions should already be dismissed;
II. Whether or not, the subject case having become final and executory, the instant two petitions should be dismissed;
III. Whether or not Prescription or Laches has set in;
IV. Whether or not petitioner GSIS funds or properties are exempt from execution;
Violation of other Rules
45. B. SECOND GROUP OF ISSUES (Raised in G.R. No. 175393, 2nd SC Case)
V. Whether or not the RTC Order dated 12 September 2006 sought to be reconsidered was, in fact, prematurely issued;
VI. Whether or not respondent RTC deviated from the final and executory judgment when it effectively ruled that the judgment against the petitioner GSIS should be satisfied through the alternative and secondary mode (i.e., payment of the fair market value of the 78 lots, computed at P12,000.00 per square meter) without according the petitioner GSIS the primary mode of satisfying the same judgment (i.e., reconveyance of the said lots);
VII. Whether or not in the absence of denial by the private respondent's lawyers, with the actual reconveyance to the latter of some 59 out of 78 lots in question, the petitioner GSIS should be deemed to have satisfied the judgment to the extent of the same approximately fifty nine (59) lots; otherwise, there would be a clear case of unjust enrichment and double indeminification;
VIII. Whether or not [the] Honorable Presiding Judge of the respondent RTC acted with obvious partiality toward respondent; and
IX. This Honorable Court, in G.R. No. 140393, entitled "Dela Merced vs. GSIS, et al" having also decreed the reconveyance of the lots to Dela Merced, which include at least one (1) of the subject 78 lots, the physical impossibility of the petitioner GSIS reconveying a singular lot to two different parties has to be clarified;
45. C. THIRD GROUP OF ISSUES (raised in G.R. No. 177731, 3rd SC Case). [Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed the following manifest reversible errors:]
X. [In] ordering respondent trial court to proceed with the second option of requiring the petitioner GSIS to pay the private [respondent] for the value of the lots initially pegged at P12,000.00 without affording petitioner GSIS the opportunity to show compliance with the first option of reconveyance of the lots;
XI. [In] ignoring the exemption from execution of the funds and assets of petitioner GSIS under Section 39 and Section 1 of the GSIS Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8291); and
XII. In holding that petitioner GSIS is barred by estoppel from invoking the prior sale reconveyance and segregation of lots and double enumeration of two lots, because these allegedly delve into the correctness of respondent trial court's decision.
45. D. FOURTH GROUP OF ISSUES ("Reconveyance" and related issues)
XIII. GR No. 177731 (3rd SC Case) is not a petition for review - it is actually a camouflaged petition for re-opening of the case.
XIV. "Reconveyance" was introduced progressively in a creeping manner - from none or nothing to a bare allegation and now to a complete "defense". Hence, it should be dismissed for being unreliable.
XV. "Reconveyance" is no longer just a matter of defeating the execution. GR No. 177731 as made, is a matter of defense to be introduced in the RTC.
XVI. GSIS is not even consistent of how many lots have been "reconveyed".
XVII. "Reconveyance" has not been proved as fact, as petitioner GSIS would want to impress.
XVIII. The Honorable Court should not refer the case back to the RCT for the "... conduct of a hearing to determine the actual number of lots which have already been transferred or reconveyed".[46]
Neither is defendant-appellee guilty of laches. We agree with the ruling of the lower court that plaintiff and her predecessors cannot be held guilty of laches. There is no evidence that they actually slept on their rights. Lawful owners have a right to demand the return of property at anytime as long as possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated (Quevada vs. Glorioso, 294 SCRA 608). Besides, the essential elements of laches are not present in this case, especially a delay in asserting plaintiff's right.
a. Dismissing the instant petitions for violation of the rule against forum shopping and/or for lack of merit;
b. In GR No. 175393, declaring the assailed RTC Order dated 12 September 2006 and the assailed RTC Order dated 20 November 2006 valid in so far as the same refer to the execution or garnishment of funds up to the extent of P399,828,000 (but the allocation of said amount to the plaintiff and the attorneys claiming attorney's fees or the entitlement of all or any of the latter to attorney's fees is left to the lower court/s to determine);
c. Ordering the RTC to immediately implement and enforce the order or writ of execution and/or notice of garnishment; and
d. Ordering the RTC to conduct proceedings to determine the market value of the subject 78 lots and thereafter execute or cause the execution of the remaining unsatisfied portion of the decision.[58]
It is settled that when a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.
The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void. None of these has been shown to be present to justify the "modification" of the judgment. Parenthetically, the modification was made not by the same court (CFI of Pasig) that rendered the judgment.
xxx Public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final at some definite date. The Court frowns upon frivolous appeals and any dilatory maneuver calculated to defeat or frustrate the ends of justice and fair play (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals) [60] .
xxx Once a decision is final and executory, it can no longer be attacked by any party or be modified directly or indirectly, even by the Court (Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Court of Appeals) [61] .
xxx To once again re-open that issue through a different avenue would defeat the existence of our courts as final arbiters of legal controversies. Having attained finality, the decision is beyond review or modification even by this Court (Toledo-Banaga v. Court of Appeals) [62].
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by setting justiciable controversies with finality (Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo)[63].
The petition and pending incidents hinge on the principal issue of whether the exemption from execution and garnishment of the funds and properties of GSIS under Sec. 39 of Rep. Act No. 8291 may be invoked to quash the writ of execution issued pursuant to the final and executory judgment against it. We rule in the negative.
In Rubia vs. GSIS (432 SCRA 529), the Supreme Court ruled that the exemption from execution enjoyed by GSIS under Sec. 39 of Rep. Act No. 8291 is not absolute. The Rubia case stemmed from an action for specific performance and damages filed by Marino E. Rubia (or "Rubia") seeking refund of his overpayment on his housing loan with GSIS. The RTC of Laguna (San Pedro, Branch 93) ruled in favor of Rubia. The decision having become final and, upon Rubia's motion, the RTC issued a writ of execution, on the strength of which the sheriff served a notice of garnishment against the account of GSIS with LBP. GSIS filed a motion to quash the writ of execution but it was denied. Thus, GSIS' funds with LBP, to the extent of the amount of the judgment award in favor of Rubia, were garnished and turned over to him in satisfaction of the writ of execution. On the matter of GSIS' exemption from execution, the Supreme Court ratiocinated, thus:In so far as Section 39 of the GSIS charter exempts the GSIS from execution, suffice it to say that such exemption is not absolute and does not encompass all the GSIS funds. By way of illustration and as may be gleaned from the Implementing Rules and Regulation of the GSIS Act of 1997, one exemption refers to social security benefits and other benefits of GSIS members under Republic Act No. 8291 in connection with financial obligations of the members to other parties. The pertinent GSIS Rule provides:
Rule XV. Funds of the GSIS
Section 15.7 Exemption of Benefits of Members from Tax, Attachment, Execution, Levy or other Legal Processes. -- The social security benefits and other benefits of GSIS members under R.A. 8291 shall be exempt from tax, attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies in connection with all financial obligations of the member, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties or incurred in connection with his position or work, as well as COA disallowances. Monetary liability in favor of the GSIS, however, may be deducted from the benefits of the member. x x x
The processual exemption of the GSIS funds and properties under Section 39 of the GSIS Charter, in our view, should be read consistently with its avowed principal purpose: to maintain actuarial solvency of the GSIS in the protection of assets which are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of its members. Clearly, the exemption should be limited to the purposes and objects covered. Any interpretation that would give it an expansive construction to exempt all GSIS assets from legal processes absolutely would be unwarranted.
Furthermore, the declared policy of the State in Section 39 of the GSIS Charter granting GSIS an exemption from tax, lien, attachment, levy, execution, and other legal processes should be read together with the grant of power to the GSIS to invest its "excess funds" under Section 36 of the same Act. Under Section 36, the GSIS is granted the ancillary power to invest in business and other ventures for the benefit of the employees, by using its excess funds for investment purposes. In the exercise of such function and power, the GSIS is allowed to assume a character similar to a private corporation. Thus, it may sue and be sued, as also, explicitly granted by its charter. Needless to say, where proper, under Section 36, the GSIS may be held liable for the contracts it has entered into in the course of its business investments. For GSIS cannot claim a special immunity from liability in regard to its business ventures under said Section. Nor can it deny contracting parties, in our view, the right of redress and the enforcement of a claim, particularly as it arises from a purely contractual relationship, of a private character between an individual and the GSIS.
In the instant case, the final and executory judgment arose from loans extended by GSIS to private respondent's predecessors-in-interest in the course of its business and secured by a mortgage. As in Rubia, GSIS' relationship with private respondent's predecessors-in-interest is purely private and contractual in nature. As such, GSIS cannot claim immunity from the enforcement of the final and executory judgment against it.[64]
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the trial court and the CA. The petitioner is not an ordinary mortgagee. It is a government financial institution and, like banks, is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered lands.[65]
x x x [There] is no need for respondent judge to first issue a writ of execution for the reconveyance of the subject lots. Such recourse would merely be an exercise in futility because as shown in the Sheriff's Partial Report dated May 3, 2004 x x x, reconveyance was not possible as of April 29, 2004 since the subject lots were no longer registered in the name of GSIS. To quote said partial report:"That considering the seventy eight (78) excluded lots were already sold by the GSIS to third party buyers as stated and attested by Mr. Manuel Ibabao, GSIS Acquired Asset Officer IV, in his submission and presentation of List of Lots Excluded from Foreclosure to the Honorable Court and was marked as Exhibit 3, dated October 11, 1996, reconveyance of GSIS of said lots to the plaintiff is no longer possible; as verified and confirmed by the undersigned during his levy on said lots on April 29, 2004 together with Sheriff Marcial Estrellado, subject excluded lots are not only titled to individual buyers in good faith but they have also constructed their houses and buildings there and having [resided] therein for so many years with some other lots being sold and resold to other new buyers; for purposes of attaching/levying subject excluded lots now would be impossible and ineffective because the owners are in actual possession of their lots they being buyers in good faith with corresponding possession of titles to it. Reconveyance of the seventy eight (78) excluded lots mentioned in paragraph 1 (a to v) of the Decision dated December 17, 1997 is very impossible so that on paragraph 2, garnishment is resorted to."
Nevertheless, We find merit in GSIS' claim that the valuation of the subject lots at P35,000.00 per square meter has no factual and legal basis. While said valuation falls within the P10,000.00 to P45,000.00 range as the estimated market value of said properties per testimony of Eduardo M. Santiago, as alluded to by the RTC, it did not "set out in its decision the facts which had been proved and its conclusions culled therefrom" (People vs. Lizada, 396 SCRA 62). Indeed, "(t)rial courts should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out with its decretal conclusion" (People vs. Lizada, supra).
Besides, the fair market value of the subject lots cannot be a mere ballpark figure. There should be some factual and legal basis for arriving at a reasonable valuation of the lots. Admittedly, the price range mentioned in the final and executory judgment against GSIS is too wide and encompassing that further analysis is necessary to establish with more exactitude the fair market value of the subject lots.
GSIS asserts that respondent sheriff committed grave abuse of discretion in serving the writ of execution prior to its receipt of an official copy of the order of execution, thereby depriving it of an opportunity to contest said order. Contrary to its claim, GSIS was given the opportunity to question the order of execution as, in fact, it filed an opposition and supplemental opposition to private respondent's motion for execution in the court below. Even supposing that GSIS was denied the opportunity to move for reconsideration of the order of execution, this was subsequently cured when it filed the motion to quash where it raised its objections to the issuance of the order and writ of execution.x x x
Since GSIS did not deny the facts stated in the sheriff's partial report, We accord the same full faith and credit in keeping with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
GSIS further contends that instead of immediately serving the notices of garnishment on its banks, respondent sheriff should have effected the reconveyance of the subject lots to private respondent. As earlier discussed, respondent sheriff already made a determination in his partial report dated May 3, 2004 that reconveyance of the subject properties was no longer possible. Hence, he properly acted in proceeding to enforce the payment of the fair market value of the subject lots.x x x
Based on GSIS' own appraisal of lands in San Antonio Vilalge as of December 18, 2003, the reasonable value of the subject lots ranged from P12,000.00 to P15,000.00 per square meter depending on the street where a particular lot is located (Annex "R", petition). Since GSIS itself has admitted that the reasonable value of the subject lost, which have an aggregate area of 33,319 square meters, was at least P12,000.00 per square meter or a total value of P399,828,000.00, partial execution may now proceed on the basis of said valuation. Any difference between the P12,000.00 per square meter valuation and the fair market value of the subject lots as of April 29, 2004, as may be finally determined by the court a quo, can be recovered later. It is the fair market value of the subject lots as of April 29, 2004 which must be reckoned for purposes of enforcing the judgment in question because it was on that date that it was ascertained that reconveyance of those lots was no longer possible.
This is as it should be in order to afford private respondent partial satisfaction of the judgment which she and her predecessors-in-interest have long sought. As found in said judgment, private respondent and her privies have been deprived of ownership and enjoyment of the subject lots since November 1975. To add insult to injury, it took them almost fourteen years to obtain a final and executory judgment against GSIS.
On the other hand, the quantity (78 lots) and area (33,319 square meters) of the lots adjudged to be reconveyed cannot be reduced. It is settled that final and executory judgment is immutable and cannot be altered except for correction of clerical errors or making of nunc pro tunc entries (Mayon Estate Corporation vs. Altrua, 440 SCRA 377).
Indeed, if we are to keep and sustain the people's faith in the judicial system, We must ensure that those who have won their cases on the merits will obtain the relief they patiently sought. Otherwise, our courts might as well be decision mills churning out judgments which are nothing more than Pyrrhic victories for the prevailing parties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The orders dated April 27, 2004 and May 13, 2004 and writ of execution dated April 28, 2004, all issued by the regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 71) in Civil Case No. 59439 entitled "Eduardo M. Santiago, etc., vs. Government Service Insurance System", are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in (i) that said orders and writ shall be for the satisfaction of the decision dated December 17, 1997 rendered in said case to the extent of the sum of P399,828,000.99; and (ii) that said court is directed to immediately conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining the fair market value of the subject lots as of April 29, 2004 and, upon such determination, issue an order of execution and the corresponding writ for the unsatisfied portion of the decision, if any.
The motion for reconsideration of our resolution dated July 27, 2004 and motion to allow immediate partial execution filed by respondent Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago are PARTIALLY GRANTED in that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is PARTIALLY LIFTED, such that execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 59439 for the amount of P399,828,000.00 may immediately proceed while the writ of preliminary injunction against the execution of the rest of the judgment award is made PERMANENT subject to the disposition in the preceding paragraph.
For lack of merit, the motion to cite GSIS and others for direct contempt is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[66]
The asserted sale, reconveyance and segregation of lots, as well as the alleged double-enumeration of two lots (Lot 7, Block 2 and Lot 7, Block 3, with areas 396 and 389 square meters, respectively) delve into the correctness of the trial court's decision. However, an issue not timely presented in the proceedings before the lower court is barred by the principle of estoppel (Springsun Management Systems Corporation vs. Camerino, 449 SCRA 65).
It is too late for petitioner to seek modification of the trial court's decision which has already become final and executory. All that is needed to be done is to carry out the terms and conditions of said decision. This is consistent with the doctrine of finality of judgments (Clavano, Inc. vs. Housing and Land Use Regulatory board, 378 SCRA 172).
Consequently, no new and cogent reason as presented in the motion for reconsideration which would warrant reconsideration of Our decision.
On the other hand, Sec. 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an attorney shall have a lien "upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, x x x. As the judgment involved in this case was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 71), it is in that court where the asserted charging lien should be recorded.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration and notice of charging lien and motion for recording of charging lien are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice. To reverse the CA Decision denying petitioner's petition for relief from judgment would put a premium on the negligence of petitioner's former counsel and encourage endless litigation. If the negligence of counsel is generally admitted as a justification for opening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as a new counsel can be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. We, therefore, write finis to this litigation. [70]