411 Phil. 25
VITUG, J.:
On 01 March 1989, the PCA, through its then Acting Board Chairman, Apolonio B. Bautista, filed an administrative complaint, docketed Special PCA Administrative Case No. 01-89, against herein petitioner Leandro P. Garcia for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with his grant of export quota for "fresh young coconuts" or "buko."
"After a cursory perusal of the records on hand and the testimonies of all aforenamed witnesses, this Board finds: "1. A prima facie case against respondent Garcia with respect to the first issue. Complainant Pua presented the original copy of the certification dated July 24, 1987 in favor of Westmont, the genuineness and due execution of which respondent does not dispute as in fact said document is being adopted as part of his defense. Photocopy of the same is hereto attached and made a part hereof as Annex `A'. Director Joaquin Roces likewise presented to the Committee a photocopy of another certification also dated July 24, 1987 in favor of Westmont which, as testified to under oath, he secured from the Board of Foreign Trade. Director Roces further testified that he actually saw the original of this latter document at the Board of Foreign Trade in Taiwan on 21 February 1989 - the day he had this photocopied; that this was the very document his Office authenticated on 17 August 1987; that he is certain that what he saw was the original copy of the authenticated certificate taking into account the signature of respondent Garcia (of which he is familiar) affixed therein in blue ink, the seal on the left bottom portion, the heading of PCA with the distinct color of yellow. Photocopy of the document is hereto attached as part hereof and marked as Annex `B'. "2. A prima facie case against respondent Garcia as regards the second issue in view of the categorical testimony of Mr. Jesus Cabalza that he (Cabalza) and Director Rodriguez met only on July 27, 1987 or thereafter - thereby negating the claim of respondent Garcia that it was Director Rodriguez who designated I.Q. as importer on suggestion of Mr. Cabalza when the two allegedly met in his (Garcia) office on 24 July 1987 - the day the certification in favor of Westmont was first issued. "x x x x x x x x x "In view of the foregoing, this Committee recommends: "1. That formal charges be filed against Administrator Leandro Garcia for dishonesty, falsification of official document, grave misconduct and violation of RA 3019, Sec. 3e, f and j. "2. That respondent Garcia be placed under preventive suspension upon the filing of the formal charge until such time that the case shall have been terminated and a decision on the case has become final and executory."[3]
"RESOLVED, that consistent with the pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 807, the recommendation of the Board Investigation Committee that the period of delay in the disposition of the case resulting from the petitions/requests for extension of time, postponement/cancellation of the scheduled hearings and related requests filed by the counsel of respondent Administrator Leandro P. Garcia, shall not be counted in computing the period of preventive suspension, be and is hereby approved;
"RESOLVED FURTHER, that Administrator Leandro P. Garcia who is under preventive suspension, shall be advised that his re-assumption of office as Administrator of PCA shall require prior notice of reinstatement as may be issued by the Governing Board."[4]
(a) Public respondent Josefel P. Grajeda and his committee from proceeding with the hearing of the administrative charges against him;
(b) The Board and all persons acting in its behalf from implementing its Resolution No. 046-89; and
(c) The Board and persons acting in its behalf to defer its action/decision on the charges against petitioner pending hearing on the merits of his petition.
"The decisive question therefore is whether the postponements sought by petitioner before the PCA Board is devoid of merit and merely intended to delay the proceedings before that body. This question hinges around the provisions of PD No. 807, Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42, which states that:
"x x x x x x x x x
"The ultimate justice springs from the heart and mind of a judge. It is he who determines from conflicting evidence what are the facts of a case; what and how the laws are to be interpreted and applied. Thus, it can not be lightly brushed aside that when a party raises the question of impartiality of a judge, as in this case the investigating committee headed by respondent Josefel P. Grajeda, that it only unduly and unnecessarily delays a case.
"Moreover, for the petitioner to continue being suspended after the reglementary 90-day suspension would tantamount to already penalizing him even when the charges against him are yet being heard. The constitutional mandate and statutory juris tantum is that a person is presumed innocent until his guilt is proved."[5]
"After an exhaustive discussion on petitioner's prayer for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Court, in respect to the Investigating Committee of the PCA, will not grant the same but rather evidence of petitioner will be received on whether a temporary restraining order shall issue.
"By agreement, the reception of such evidence on the incident is scheduled on July 20, 1989, at 8:30 A.M. Parties are notified of this order in open Court."[6]
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and the assailed Orders of June 29, 1989 and September 25, 1989 granting the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondent Garcia are hereby SET ASIDE."[7]
"1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT RTC JUDGE PEDRO SANTIAGO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY HIS ISSUANCE OF THE QUESTIONED ORDERS;"2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENT PCA'S VIOLATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS;"3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING RESPONDENT PCA'S PATENT ILLEGAL ACTS AS EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES."[8]
"The records show that on July 26, 1989, the court issued a temporary restraining order restraining Grajeda and his committee from further conducting an investigation of the petitioner. The temporary restraining order was good for 20 days. On August 21, 1989, respondent Grajeda and his committee finalized their resolution in Special Case No. 01-89, finding petitioner guilty of the charges filed against him; the committee's recommendation was approved by the Board on August 25, 1989. The petitioner sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondents from implementing the said Board Resolution, which was granted by the court in its order dated September 11, 1989, which also set for September 19, 1989, the reception of respondents' evidence or explanation why a preliminary injunction should not issue. The court directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in its order dated September 25, 1989, wherein respondent judge stated:"`The question before this Court is whether due process was violated by respondents in the course of arriving at their resolution. The power of the Court on this question is explicit in Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution that, `Judicial power includes whether or not these has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.'
`The factual synopsis of the incidents are: On July 26, 1989 the Court issued a TRO, `restraining the respondent Josefel P. Grajeda and his Investigating Committee from further conducting an investigation of herein petitioner within 20 days from receipt hereof'. Respondents received this Order on July 25, 1989. The evidence of the respondents was scheduled for reception on August 3, 1989.
`On August 3, 1989, respondents manifested that their evidence are documentary and they were given until August 7, 1989 to submit the same and petitioner was given until August 11, 1989 to submit his comment as the 20-day TRO would expire on September 18, 1989. Respondents submitted their documentary exhibits on August 8, 1989 and mailed the same to petitioner. What with the mail service, petitioner received respondents' evidence only on August 21, 1989. There was no more time for the petitioner to comment; there was also no more time for the Court to resolve and worse, the TRO already expired on September 18, 1989.
`It was within these interregnum periods when the above incident was pending before this Court that respondent Grajeda and his Investigating Committee issued on August 21, 1989 their resolution finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, etc. and imposing a penalty of Forced Resignation and the respondent PCA Board approved said resolution on August 25, 1989. This is now the subject of petitioner's supplemental Petition.
`There is much to be asked on the question of due process of law on the proceedings in the investigation conducted by respondent. WAS THE PETITIONER ACCORDED HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS WITNESSES; WAS HE ABLE TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE?
`These were not answered by the respondent. Instead, they claim that their resolution has already been implemented. The resolution seemed to be hurriedly arrived at. It was done at a time when the case was still before the Court. Respondents' claim that their resolution was already implemented cannot defeat the paramount constitutional mandate that due process should be accorded the petitioner.'
"We agree with the Solicitor-General that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction on September 25, 1989 despite the fact that the temporary restraining order dated July 26, 1989 bearing on the same subject matter had long become functus oficio.
"The temporary restraining order issued on July 26, 1989, which enjoined the petitioners from proceeding with the administrative case involving private respondent, had a limited life of twenty days (Section 5, BP Blg. 224) and automatically expired on August 15, 1989, not September 18, 1989, as found by the respondent judge. When the Grajeda committee submitted their Resolution to the Board on August 21, 1989, and the Board approved the same in its Resolution No. 0070-89, dated August 25, 1989, there was no longer any legal restraint from proceeding with the investigation. Accordingly, the allegation of [respondent] Garcia that the investigating Committee committed grave abuse of discretion in finalizing and submitting its resolution to the PCA Board while the court's resolution on the prayer for preliminary injunction against the said Committee was pending is without merit. To say that the Committee and the Board cannot act despite the lapse of the restraining order and before the preliminary injunction is heard and granted, is to extend the life of the temporary restraining order beyond its statutory life.
"The respondent court admits that the merits of the questioned Resolutions of August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989 are not in issue, as `the question is within the ambit of respondents' authority and if petitioner is not in accord therewith, his proper recourse is an appeal before the Civil Service'."[10]
"When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government, but nevertheless, a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect: convenience of the party litigants and respect for a coequal office in the government. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the) courts."[12]
"Exhibits `9' and `10' in particular will show that the committee reluctantly granted Garcia's requests for postponement in view of his `right to due process and in the interest of substantial justice'. There is no question that petitioner was accorded the right to confront his witnesses; and that he was able to present his defense. Respondent Garcia actually filed his answer but he refused to attend the scheduled hearings on the case despite due notice when the Grajeda Committee refused his request for the creation of a new committee that would hear his case. As enunciated in Tajonera vs. Lamaroza (110 SCRA 438), what due process abhors is the absolute lack of an opportunity to be heard, a vice We cannot impute to the proceedings before the Committee. Respondent was given full opportunity to be heard on his defense, and his failure to appear before the committee was due to his own desistance."[14]
"SEC. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. - (a) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the head of department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other persons.
"(b) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath, together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case."
"x x x. There is no question that the petitioner Committee and PCA Board acted in the exercise of their jurisdiction in conducting the administrative investigation of private respondent Garcia. Under Civil Service Law and Rules exclusive original jurisdiction is lodged in the administrative agency, and appeal is available to the Commission on Civil Service. The rule is that where a law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated (Pascual vs. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 and several other cases). While there are recognized exceptions to this rule (Cortes, Philippine Administrative Law, pp. 394-395), We find none of the reasons for excepting this case from the rule."[15]
"x x x. The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein, see those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the Civil Service Commission."[17]
"SEC. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided."