384 Phil. 635
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"WHEREFORE, the trial court's June 17, 1991 decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof a new one is hereby entered ordering the dismissal of the plaintiffs-appellees['] second amended complaint."Earlier, the trial court had disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:The January 15, 1996 CA Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
1. Declaring free patent Title No. IV-1-010021 issued by the Bureau of Lands as null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos to deliver the property subject of this case to the plaintiff; and
3. Declaring the heirs of Silvino Robles as the absolute owner of the land in controversy."
"There seems to be no dispute that Leon Robles primitively owned the land situated in Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal with an area of 9,985 square meters. He occupied the same openly and adversely. He also declared the same in his name for taxation purposes as early as 1916 covered by Tax Declaration No. 17865 (Exh. "I") and paid the corresponding taxes thereon (Exh. "B"). When Leon Robles died, his son Silvino Robles inherited the land, who took possession of the land, declared it in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon.On the other hand, the Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
"Upon the death of Silvino Robles in 1942, his widow Maria de la Cruz and his children inherited the property. They took adverse possession of said property and paid taxes thereon. The task of cultivat[ing] the land was assigned to plaintiff Lucio Robles who planted trees and other crops. He also built a nipa hut on the land. The plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles.
"In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the name of Silvino Robles was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena (Exh. "19"), father of Andrea Robles who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank, using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the tax declaration was transferred [to] the name of Antipolo Rural Bank (Exh. "17") and later on, was transferred [to] the name of defendant Hilario Robles and his wife (Exh. "16").
"In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cardona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as security. Andrea Robles testified without contradiction that somebody else, not her husband Hilario Robles, signed the loan papers because Hilario Robles was working in Marinduque at that time as a carpenter.
"For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings were had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale in October 1968.
"The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax declaration was transferred in the name of defendant Rural Bank. On September 25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos.
"In September 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the property, but was unsuccessful. On May 10,1988, defendant spouses Santos took possession of the property in question and was able to secure Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their names."[5]
"The instant action for quieting of title concerns the parcel of land bounded and more particularly described as follows:"A parcel of land located at Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. Bounded [i]n the north by the property of Venancio Ablay y Simeon Ablay; [i]n the east by the property of Veronica Tulak y Dionisio Ablay; [i]n the south by the property of Simeon Ablay y Dionisio Ablay; and [i]n the west by the property of Dionisio Ablay y Simeon Ablay, with an area of 9,985 square meters, more or less, assessed in the year 1935 at P60.00 under Tax Declaration No. 23219."As the heirs of Silvino Robles who, likewise inherited the above-described parcel from Leon Robles, the siblings Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio, all surnamed Robles, commenced the instant suit with the filing of their March 14, 1988 complaint against Spouses Virgilio and Ruth Santos, as well as the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. Contending that they had been in possession of the land since 1942, the plaintiff alleged, among other matters, that it was only in September of 1987 that they came to know of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted thereon by the half-brother, Hilario Robles, in favor of defendant Rural Bank; and that they likewise learned upon further inquiry, that the latter had already sold the self-same parcel in favor of the Santos spouses (pp. 1-3, orig. rec.). Twice amended to implead Hilario Robles (pp. 76-80, orig. rec) and, upon subsequent discovery of the issuance of Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in favor of the defendant spouses, the Director of Lands and the District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands as parties-defendants (pp. 117-121, orig. rec). The plaintiffs' complaint sought the following reliefs on the theory that the encumbrance of their half-brother, constituted on the land, as well as all proceedings taken subsequent thereto, were null and void, to wit:"Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (a) a preliminary mandatory injunction be issued forthwith restoring plaintiffs to their possession of said parcel of land; (b) an order be issued annulling said Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in the name of defendants spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth C. Santos, the deed of sale aforementioned and any tax declaration which have been issued in the name of defendants; and (c) ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees."With the termination of the pre-trial stage upon the parties-litigants' agreement (p. 203, orig. rec.) the trial court proceeded to try the case on the merits. It thereafter rendered the challenged June 17, 1991 decision upon the following findings and conclusions:
"Plaintiffs pray for other relief as [may be] just and equitable under the premises." (pp. 120-121, orig. rec.)x x x x x x x x x"The real estate mortgage allegedly executed by Hilario Robles is not valid because his signature in the mortgage deed was forged. This fact, which remains unrebutted, was admitted by Andrea Robles."Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, the Santos spouses and the defendant Rural Bank jointly filed their July 6, 1991 Notice of Appeal (p.260, orig. rec.) x x x."[6]
"Inasmuch as the real estate mortgage executed allegedly by Hilario Robles in favor of the defendant Cardona Rural Bank, Inc. was not valid, it stands to reason that the foreclosure proceedings therein were likewise not valid. Therefore, the defendant bank did not acquire any right arising out of the foreclosure proceedings. Consequently, defendant bank could not have transferred any right to the spouses Santos.
"The fact that the land was covered by a free patent will not help the defendant Santos any.
"There can be no question that the subject [property was held] in the concept of owner by Leon Robles since 1916. Likewise, his successor-in-interest, Silvino Robles, his wife Maria de la Cruz and the plaintiffs occupied the property openly, continuously and exclusively until they were ousted from their possession in 1988 by the spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos.
"Under the circumstances, therefore, and considering that "open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public lands for the period prescribed by law (30 years), creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other action, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. Possession of public land x x x which is [of] the character and duration prescribed by the statute is the equivalent of an express grant from the State, considering the dictum of the statute itself[:]; "The possessor x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x." No proof is admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption[,] and confirmation proceedings would be a little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time. Registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. (Cruz v. IAC, G.R. No. 75042, November 29, 1988) The land in question has become private land.
"Consequently, the issuance of [a] free patent title to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth C. Santos is not valid because at the time the property subject of this case was already private land, the Bureau of Lands having no jurisdiction to dispose of the same." (pp. 257-259, orig. rec.)"
"As correctly urged by the appellants, the plaintiff-appellees no longer had any title to the property at the time of the institution of the instant complaint. (pp. 25-27, rec.) The latter's claim of continuous possession notwithstanding (pp. 3-5, TSN, July 5, 1990; p. 12, TSN, July 12, 1990), the aforesaid loss of title is amply evidenced by the subsequent declaration of the subject realty for taxation purposes not only in the name of Exequiel Ballena (Exhibits "1" and "2", pp. 23-24, orig. rec.) but also in the name of the Rural Bank of Antipolo (Exhibit 17, vol. II, orig. rec.). On the theory that tax declarations can be evincive of the transfer of a parcel of land or a portion thereof (Gacos v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 214), the court a quo clearly erred in simply brushing aside the apparent transfers [which] the land in litigation had undergone. Whether legal or equitable, it cannot, under the circumstances, be gainsaid that the plaintiff-appellees no longer had any title to speak of when Exequiel Ballena executed the November 7, 1966 Deed of Absolute Sale transferring the land in favor of the spouses Hilario and Andrea Robles (Exhibit "3", p. 25, orig. rec.)Contending that such ruling was contrary to law and jurisprudence, Petitioners Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio — all surnamed Robles — filed this Petition for Review.[7]
"Even on the theory that the plaintiffs-appellees and their half-brother, Hilario Robles, are co-owners of the land left behind by their common father, Silvino Robles, such title would still be effectively discounted by what could well serve as the latter's acts of repudiation of the co-ownership, i.e., his possession (p. 22, TSN, November 15, 1990) and declaration thereof for taxation purposes in his own name (Exhibit "4", p. 26, orig. rec.). In view of the plaintiffs-appellees' inaction for more than twenty (20) years from the time the subject realty was transferred in favor of Hilario Robles, the appellants correctly maintain that prescription had already set in. While it may be readily conceded that an action to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptible (Almanza vs. Arguelles, 156 SCRA 718; Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 270; Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 718; Charon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 784; Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441; Burton vs. Gabar, 55 SCRA 4999), it equally bears emphasis that a co-owner or, for that matter, the said co-owner[']s successors-in-interest who occupy the community property other than as co-owner[s] can claim prescription as against the other co-owners (De Guzman vs. Austria, 148 SCRA 75; Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 902; Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). If only in this latter sense, the appellants correctly argue that the plaintiffs-appellees have lost their cause of action by prescription.
"Over and above the foregoing considerations, the court a quo gravely erred in invalidating the real estate mortgage constituted on the land solely on the basis of Andrea Robles' testimony that her husband's signature thereon was forged (p. 257, orig. rec.),xxx xxx xxx
"In according to the foregoing testimony x x x credibility which, while admittedly unrebutted, was altogether uncorroborated, the trial court lost sight of the fact that the assailed deed of real estate mortgage (Exhibit "5", Vol. II, orig. rec.) is a public document, the acknowledgment of which is a prima facie evidence of its due execution (Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 339). As such, it retains the presumption of validity in the absence of a full, clear and convincing evidence to overcome such presumption (Agdeppa vs. Ibe, 220 SCRA 584).
"The foregoing principles take even more greater [sic] when it is, moreover, borne in mind that Hilario Robles made the following admissions in his March 8, 1989 answer, viz:"3. The complaint filed against herein answering defendant has no legal basis considering that as the lawful owner of the subject real property, defendant Hilario Robles has the right to mortgage the said real property and could dispose the same in whatever manner he wishe[s] to do." (p. 96, orig. rec.)"Appropriately underscored by the appellants, the foregoing admission is binding against Hilario [Robles]. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same. They cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through [a] palpable mistake or [unless] no such admission was actually made (Philippine American General Insurance, Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194).
"It does not help the plaintiffs-appellees' cause any that, aside from complying with the requirements for the foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage (Exhibits "6", "7", "8" and "10", Volume II[)], the appellant Rural Bank had not only relented to the mortgagor's request to postpone the (Exhibit "g", Vol. II, orig. rec.) but had likewise granted the latter's request for an extension of the redemption period therefor (Exhibits "11" and "12", pp. 35-36, orig. rec.). Without going into minute detail in discussing the Santos spouses' rights as purchasers for value and in good faith (Exhibit "21", Vol. II, orig. rec.), the mortgagor and the plaintiffs'-appellees cannot now be heard to challenge the validity of the sale of the land after admittedly failing to redeem the same within the extension the appellant Rural Bank granted (pp. 10-11, TSN, November 15, 1990).
"Being dependent on the supposed invalidity of the constitution and foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage, the plaintiffs-appellees' attack upon x x x Free Patent No. IV-I must necessarily fail. The trial court, therefore, misread, and ignored the evidence o[n] record, to come up with erroneous conclusion."
"Respondent Court of Appeals grievously erred in ruling that with the transfers of the tax declaration over the parcel of land in question from Silvino Robles to Exequiel Ballena, then to the Rural Bank of Antipolo, then to Respondent Hilario Robles, then to Respondent Rural Bank of Cardona Inc., and then finally to Respondent Spouses Santos, petitioners, who by themselves and their predecessors in interest have been in open, actual and adverse possession of said parcel of land since 1916 up to their forced removal therefrom in 1988, have lost their title to said property by prescription to their half-brother, Respondent Hilario Robles, and then finally, to Respondent Spouses Santos."[8]For a better understanding of the case, the above issue will be broken down into three points: first, the nature of the remedy of quieting of title; second, the validity of the real estate mortgage; and third, the efficacy of the free patent granted to the Santos spouses.
"Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.Based on the above definition, an action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property.[9] It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.[10] Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.[11]
"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein."
"x x x. Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing even with registered lands, than private individuals, for their business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust money belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against loss by not committing any act of negligence which amounts to lack of good faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of land registration statute, Act 496, extended only to purchasers for value and in good faith, as well as to mortgagees of the same character and description. x x x."[18]Lastly, the Court likewise finds it unusual that, notwithstanding the bank's insistence that it had become the owner of the subject property and had paid the land taxes thereon, the petitioners continued occupying it and harvesting the fruits therefrom.[19]
The preceding claim is an assertion that the subject property is private land. The petitioners do not concede, and the records do not show, that it was ever an alienable land of the public domain. They allege private ownership thereof, as evidenced by their testimonies and the tax declarations issued in the names of their predecessors-in-interest. It must be noted that while their claim was not corroborated by other witnesses, it was not controverted by the other parties, either."xxx xxx xxx
Q By the way, why do you know this parcel of land?
A Because before my father died, he showed me all the documents.
Q Before the death of your father, who was the owner of this parcel of land?
A My father, sir.
Q How did your father acquire this parcel of land?
A My father knew that it [was] by inheritance, sir.
Q From whom?
A From his father, Leon Robles, sir.
Q And do you know also [from] whom Leon Robles acquired this land?
A It was inherited from his father, sir.
Q What is the nature of this parcel of land?
A It's an agricultural land, sir,
Q Now, at the time of the death of your father, this land was planted with what crops?
A Mango trees, santol trees, and I was the one who planted those trees, sir.
Q When did you plant those trees?
A Before the death of my father, sir.
Q Now, after the death of your father, who cultivated this parcel of land?
A I took charge of the land after the death of my father, sir.
Q Up to when?
A Up to the present, sir, after this case was already filed."[20]
"Under the provisions of Act 2874 pursuant to which the title of private respondents' predecessor-in-interest was issued, the President of the Philippines, or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands publicly owned. The purpose of the Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act, Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee title, or of private ownership, constitutes no part of the public domain, and cannot possibly come within the purview of said act 2874, inasmuch as the `subject' of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act and the same is excluded from the provisions of the text thereof.The Santos spouses argue that petitioners do not have the requisite personality to question the free patent granted them, inasmuch as "it is a well-settled rule that actions to nullify free patents should be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General at the behest of the Director of Lands."[25]
"We reiterate that private ownership of land is not affected by the issuance of the free patent over the same land because the Public Land Act applies only to lands of the public domain. Only public land may be disposed of by the Director of Lands. Since as early as 1920, the land in dispute was already under the private ownership of herein petitioners and no longer a part of the lands of the public domain, the same could not have been the subject matter of a free patent. The patentee and his successors-in-interest acquired no right or title to said land. Necessarily, Free Patent No. 23263 issued to Herminigildo Agpoon is null and void and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto cannot become final and indefeasible. Hence we ruled in Director of Lands v. Sicsican, et al. that if at the time the free patents were issued in 1953 the land covered therein were already private property of another and, therefore, not part of the disposable land of the public domain, then applicants patentees acquired no right or title to the land.
"Now, a certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although it is not. As earlier stated, the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Being null and void, the free patent granted and the subsequent titles produce no legal effect whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum.
"A free patent which purports to convey land to which the government did not have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. The Court has previously held that the Land Registration Act and the Cadastral Act do not give anybody who resorts to the provisions thereof a better title than what he really and lawfully has.xxx xxx xxx
"We have, therefore, to arrive at the unavoidable conclusion that the title of herein petitioners over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner which is a total nullity. The long and continued possession of petitioners under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning."
The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the ground that they were derived from a "spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said title. While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will have the same result of reverting the land to the government under the Regalian Doctrine. Gabila v. Barinaga[27] ruled that only the government is entitled to this relief. x x x."Because the cancellation of the free patent as prayed for by the private respondents in Peltan would revert the property in question to the public domain, the ultimate beneficiary would be the government, which can be represented by the solicitor general only. Therefore, the real party-in-interest is the government, not the private respondents.
"It is settled that a Free Patent issued over private land is null and void, and produces no legal effect whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. Moreover, private respondents' claim of open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the 2,250 square meter portion since 1920, and its illegal inclusion in the Free Patent of petitioners and in their original certificate of title, gave private respondents a cause of action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible."In any event, the Office of the Solicitor General was afforded an opportunity to express its position in these proceedings. But it manifested that it would not file a memorandum, because "this case involves purely private interests."[30]
"Q And who planted the trees planted [o]n the land?[14] Art. 493, Civil Code. "Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."
A My children were going to that land and planted trees.
Q And who took care of those trees?
A They and us, sir.
Q When you said they, to whom [we]re you referring?
A Plaintiffs in this case, sir.xxx xxx xxx
Q And you and the plaintiffs participated in the harvest of these plants, is that correct?
A Yes sir, and I was giving them their share.xxx xxx xxx"
"Q By the way, have you visited these properties from the time that your bank acquired the same from the auction sale?[22] Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437,443, January 22, 1980, per De Castro, J.
A I went there after the foreclosure, sir.
Q And after that date, have you ever gone to these properties?
A Yes, sir.
Q When?
A 1987, sir."
"Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or good faith."