857 Phil. 407; 116 OG No. 42, 6646 (October 19, 2020)
REYES, A., JR., J.:
Wherefore. it is ordered that the Sales Application Nos. and (VI-1) 114 of [Diego] and [Abello heirs], represented by Lolita Abello be, as hereby they are, REJECTED, forfeiting in favor of the Government whatever amount has been paid on account thereof.Consequently, Batayola's heirs[12] and Pacina filed the aforementioned free patent applications, which were both granted by the government. However, in April 1996, the Abello heirs discovered the existence of OCT No. 1208, which was in the custody of their uncle, Valentin Pacina.
The approved plan or Lot 1 Psu-130749 in the name of [Diego] be amended, so as to exclude the area subject of this controversy as shown in the sketch drawn at the back hereof.
If qualified, Messrs. [Batayola] and [Pacina], shall file their respective appropriate public lands application within sixty (60) days from the receipt hereof, otherwise they shall lose their preferential rights thereto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with no award, however, of counterclaims in favor of the defendants.The trial court held that the Abello heirs were estopped from questioning the BL-VII decision since they failed to file an appeal therefrom; and as such, the findings of the BL-VII and the adjudication of rights to the disputed parcel made therein have become final and executory. Furthermore, the Batayola group was shown to be in prior physical possession of the disputed parcel. As a result, the trial court declared OCT No. 1208 void insofar as it covers the disputed parcel, and upheld the validity of OCT No. 0-24953.
SO ORDERED.[14] (Emphases in the original)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AMENDS the dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court in the above-captioned case dated September 3, 2002, by adding as second paragraph thereof the following:From these dispositions, the Abello heirs appealed to the CA. In the assailed Decision[17] dated November 10, 2008, the CA set aside the trial court's Decision dated September 3, 2002 and Order dated March 31, 2003, and decreed the cancellation of the titles issued to Diego and Batayola, insofar as these covered the disputed parcel, viz.:
x x x x
[OCT] No. 1208 in the name of [Diego] is hereby ordered cancelled. However, in lieu thereof, another certificate/s of title be issued in his name to cover the remaining areas after the exclusion from the said title (i.e. OCT No. 1208). the areas owned and occupied by the Heirs of [Batayola] containing an area of Fight Thousand Four Hundred and Ninety-Five (8,495) sq. meters and that occupied and owned by [Pacina] containing an area of Seven Thousand Seven Hundred and Nine and Seventy Five Hundredths (7,709.75) sq. meters.
SO ORDERED.[16]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the impugned Decision of the [RTC] dated September 3, 2002 and the Order of March 31, 2003 is SET ASIDE and a new [one] is hereby entered declaring the Decision or the Office of the Regional Director or the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated March 21, 1974 as NULL and VOID. Consequently, [FP] No. (VII-4)114. [OCT] No. 0-24953 in the name of the Heirs of [Batayola], [FP] No. 335423 and [OCT] No. 1208 in the name of [Diego] are likewise declared NULL and VOID insofar as the land subject or the present controversy with an area or 16.295 square meters is concerned.The CA held that the fundamental issue in the appeal was whether or not the disputed parcel was alienable and disposable land of the public domain: a question it answered in the negative. According to the appellate court, there was no evidence or any positive act or declaration of the government setting aside the disputed parcel as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Furthermore, the disputed parcel is foreshore land, which cannot be disposed of by free patent. In so ruling, the appellate court cited the BL-VII decision, the report[19] of LI del Monte, and his testimony before the trial court. Under Sections 58 to 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,[20] foreshore lands may only be disposed of to private parties by lease, after a declaration by the President that the same are not necessary for public service and are open tn disposition under the Act. As a consequence of this finding, the appellate court cancelled the certificates of title of Batayola and Diego, ratiocinating that:
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.[18] (Emphases in the original)
In fact, the Supreme Court annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in the instant case, being foreshore land should, therefore, be returned to the public domain.[21] (Citation omitted)Both parties filed motions for reconsideration,[22] which the CA denied in the assailed Resolution[23] dated July 5, 2010. Hence, these petitions.
In G.R. No. 193032, the Abello heirs assign the following errors:
- THE CA WITH DUE RESPECT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID INSOFAR AS THE LAND SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY WITH AN AREA OF 16,295 SQ M IS CONCERNED;
- THE CA WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE DECISION OF THE BL-VII DATED MARCH 21, 1974; and
- THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 3, 2002 AND THE ORDER DATED MARCH 31, 2003 OF THE RTC.[24]
These assigned errors boil down to two essential issues: first, the nature and status of the disputed parcel of land; and second, the validity of the titles being claimed by the Abello heirs, the Batayola heirs. and Pacina. Stated differently, did the appellate court commit reversible error in: I) declaring the disputed parcel of land a foreshore area and 2) by virtue of such declaration, nullifying all the parties' titles thereto?
- THE HONORABLE CA GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE AREAS COVERED WITH TORRENS TITLE AS FORESHORE AREAS, AND IN INVALIDATING THE TITLE LONG ISSUED TO THE ABELLO HEIRS; and
- THE HONORABLE CA GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT INVALIDATING THE SUBSEQUENT TITLES ISSUED IN FAVOR OF BATAYOLA GROUP AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE PRIOR TITLE IN FAVOR OF THE ABELLO HEIRS.[25]
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion. the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence in Gabila v. Barriga where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the defendant's title because even if the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.In the case at bar, the Abello heirs alleged ownership of the disputed parcel, arguing that the BL-VII decision was null and void because its subject has since become private land titled in favor of Diego. It is, therefore, clear that the root of the present petition was a complaint for nullity of title to real property, an action which does not require the participation of the Solicitor General.[28] The Abello heirs specifically alleged in their complaint that: they are the owners of the disputed parcel by virtue of OCT No. 1208; the BL-VII decision was void for lack of jurisdiction since the disputed parcel was already private land; and OCT No. 1208 was fraudulently concealed, resulting in the Abello heirs being unable to defend their title to the disputed parcel before the BL-VII They, thus, prayed for the cancellation of Batayola's FP and OCT No. 0-24953 and the nullification of the BL-VII decision which allowed Batayola and Pacina to apply for, and obtain FPs.[29] In their answer with counterclaim, the Batayola group set up their own title to the disputed parcel; and sought the following reliefs: a declaration that the Batayola heirs and Pacina are the true and lawful owners of Lot Nos. 3864 and 3863, respectively; a declaration that OCT No. 0-24953 is valid and indefeasible; and the exclusion from the disputed parcel Diego's FP No. 335423.[30]
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiff's ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant's fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant.[27] (Emphasis and underscoring Ours; citations omitted)
Considering that none of the parties has established a valid acquisition under the provisions of Act No. 1120, as amended. we therefore adopt the recommendation of the CA declaring the Manotok title as null and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as still part of the patrimonial property of the Government.It must be recalled that a reversion suit presupposes State ownership of the property sought to be reverted. The CA, by categorically declaring the disputed parcel as foreshore land and nullifying the certificates of title held by Diego and the Batayola heirs, merely provided the basis by which the Solicitor General can allege State ownership of the disputed parcel for purposes of tiling a reversion suit.
WHEREFORE, the petitions filed by the Manotoks under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. as well as the petition-in-intervention of the Manahans, are DENIED. The petition for reconstitution of title filed by the Barques is likewise DENIED. TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Severino Manotok IV, et al., TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque and Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 issued to Felicitas B. Manahan, are all hereby declared NULL and VOID. The Register of Deeds or Caloocan City and/or Quezon City arc hereby ordered to CANCEL the said titles. The Court hereby DECLARES that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, legally belongs to the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC Of THE PHILIPPINES, without prejudice to the institution of REVERSION proceedings by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.[34] (Emphases, italics and underscoring in the original)
[Atty. Monteclar:] What was the condition of the land before you constructed your house?On cross-examination by counsel for the Abello heirs, Pacina testified on the condition of the land in 1972, when the BL-VII proceedings were conducted, viz.:
[Pacina:] It could be reached and covered by sea water during high tide.
[Atty. Monteclar:] You said that the land would be covered with water during high tide at the time when you first occupied it. Then what did you do about it?
[Pacina:] We covered it with stones, put wall boards on the sides, then placed sand or earth to cover the stones so that the area will be elevated. And then it would not be reached anymore with water during high tide.[44] (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)
[Atty. Montecillo:] Up to now the land can still be reached by water during high tide?Batayola and Pacina's declarations are corroborated not only by their own witnesses, but also by those called by the other parties in the BL-VII proceeding. Marciano Batiancila, who had been living in Sillon before 1944, testified that the houses of Batayola and Pacina were built on suba-suba, or land which is reached by sea water during high tide.[46] He further testified that both Batayola and Pacina filled their home lots with sand, stones, and lumber to prevent erosion.[47] Rosario Batuigas (Batuigas), who worked for Batayola and lived in Sillon from 1944 to 1955, testified that he helped Batayola in filling the area with stones.[48] Batuigas further declared that Pacina and Batayola's houses were constructed on a sandbar, viz.:
[Pacina:] A portion.
[Atty. Montecillo:] The portion which Mr. Batayola is occupying or the portion you are occupying?
[Pacina:] Which one?
[Atty. Montecillo:] You said that a portion of the land could be reached by sea water, during high tide. Which portion could be reached by water during high tide, the one occupied by Mr. Batayola or the one you arc occupying?
[Pacina:] The portion occupied by our "landahaw" both Mr. Batayola and mine.
[Atty. Montecillo:] So is it correct to say that the whole portion on which the landahaw was constructed could be reached by water during high tide?
[Pacina:] Partly.
[Atty. Montecillo:] It could partly be reached by water because the terrain is not level?
[Pacina:] A little bit elevated but the elevation is below the high tide.
[Atty. Montecillo:] So that the area occupied by the landahaw is not level, so much so that a portion could be reached by water during high tide and a portion is far from sea water during high tide, is that correct?
[Pacina:] Yes, Sir. But that part which could not be reached by sea water during high tide was improved by us.
[Atty. Montecillo:] You said that you placed wall boards in order to avoid sand erosion during high tide, am I correct?
[Pacina:] To prevent the sand from being eroded.
[Atty. Montecillo:] Where did you place the wall boards then?
[Pacina:] Facing the sea.
[Atty. Montecillo:] The portion of the land occupied by the landahaw which can still be reached by sea water during high tide was there no wall board constructed on it?
[Pacina:] There are also.[45] (Emphases and underscoring Ours)
[Atty. Monteclar:] Do you also know if Mr. Pacina has a residential house in Sillon, Bantayan, Cebu?The barrio captain of Sillon, Perseverando del a Peña (dela Peña), testified for another claimant of the disputed parcel who intervened in the BL-VII proceedings. He testified that Batayola built a house on the disputed parcel in 1944, while Pacina did so in 1947.[50] On cross-examination, dela Peña testified that the parcel claimed by the intervenor, which corresponds to the disputed parcel, was bounded on the south by a sandbar known as a camino vecinal, viz.:
[Batuigas:] Yes, Sir.
[Atty. Monteclar:] In what particular place in Sillon did Mr. Pacina construct his house?
[Batuigas:] He also constructed his house in the sand bar (pasil) adjacent to the land of Mr. Batayola.
lAtty. Monteclar:] Could you describe to us the condi1tion of the land wherein Mr. Pacina constructed his house?
[Batuigas:] It could also be reached by water.
[Atty. Monteclar:] Then, what did Mr. Pacina do with that land?
[Batuigas:] He also filled it up with stones and sand.
[Atty. Monteclar:] Do you know who were tilling the land occupied by Mr. Pacina with sand and stones?
[Batuigas:] One by the name of Atawo, Mariano, Jose, and I.[49] (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)
[Atty. Monteclar:] When you were requested by your counsel to make a circle in Exhibit "1-Sebelleno" as to the area of the land claimed by Lourdes Sebelleno, you encircled the whole portion Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B". Would you still insist that this is the area owned by Modesto Alolod?Eustaquio Dawa (Dawa), who acted as overseer of the disputed parcel for Diego, testified that Batayola's portion had been filled in naturally and not through human effort.[52] As regards Pacina's parcel, he declared:
[dela Peña:] When I encircled it it is only in accordance with the boundary owners.
[Atty. Monteclar:] You said that the land allegedly owned by Modesto Alolod is bounded on the south by camilo vesenal [sic]. Could you tell us what camilo vesenal [sic] is?
[dela Peña:] What I mean is that in this portion of the south there is a sand bar wherein during fiestas in Sillon horse racing is made.
[Atty. Monteclar:] Could you tell us then what is camilo vesenal [sic]?
[dela Peña:] What I mean by camilo vesenal [sic] is that no plants would grow because it is reached by water during high tide.[51]
[Atty. Montecillo:] According to Mr. Pacina, corroborating the testimony of Mr. Batayola, that they were the ones who filled that up with earth in order that that portion will not be reached by water. What can you say to that?In 1999, or 27 years after the BL-VII proceedings, Dawa's wife, Concepcion, who was also an overseer for the Abello heirs, testified before the trial court on behalf of the Abello heirs, viz.:
[Dawa:] Mr. Pacina has made some stone walls there only to protect his house because it could be reached by water.
[Atty. Montecillo:] Before Mr. Pacina constructed his house was that portion wherein he constructed his house already elevated or there is already land (sic)?
[Dawa:] That is already an elevated portion of the land. It was only the side of the house which he placed stone walls to preserve the walling of his house.
x x x x
[Atty. Monteclar:] You will agree with me that until now the warehouse, fish dryers and residential house of Mr. Pacina arc still existing on the land now in litigation?
[Dawa:] His warehouse is now destroyed. What remains is [sic] only his residential house and fish dryers.
[Atty. Monteclar:] And these warehouses, fish dryers and residential houses of Mr. Batayola and Mr. Pacina are still near the seashore?
[Dawa:] It could be passed by seawater.
[Atty. Monteclar:] Are you sure that this land now occupied by Mr. Manuel Batayola and Mr. Onecefero Pacina could be passed by sea water?
[Dawa:] The sea water will not often pass there.
[Atty. Monteclar:] In a year how often does the sea water passed (sic) the residential houses of Mr. Pacina and Mr. Batayola?
[Dawa:] During high tide the residential houses of Mr. Batayola and Mr. Pacina could be reached by sea water.
[Atty. Monteclar:] And that was precisely the reason why you staled a while ago that Mr. Pacina constructed stone walls to protect his house from sea water?
[Dawa:l Yes. Sir.
x x x x
[Atty. Monteclar:] In the stenographic notes it appears that you testified that the residential house of Mr. Batayola could be reached by sea water during high tide. Would you change your statement?
[Dawa:] Yes, Sir. Because that place of Mr. Batayola is already distant or the place which could be reached by sea water.
[Atty. Monteclar:] How about the fish dryers of Mr. Batayola where arc they located in relation to his residential house?
[Dawa:] At the side of his house.
[Atty. Monteclar:] How far is it from his house?
[Dawa:] About five armslenght [sic] towards the eastern portion.
[Atty. Monteclar:] Could it he reached by sea water?
[Dawa:] That is the portion which is the passage or sea water.
[Atty. Monteclar:] How about the warehouses of Mr. Batayola, where is it situated?
[Dawa:] Behind his house.
[Atty. Monteclar:] How far is it from the fish dryers?
[Dawa:] Six arms lenght [sic].
[Atty. Monteclar:] This warehouse could also be reached by sea water?
[Dawa:] It can not (sic).
[Atty. Monteclar:] You said that Mr. Pacina also constructed fish dryers way back in the year 1952 which until now is still existing. My question is where is it situated in relation to his house?
[Dawa:] In front of his house.
[Atty. Monteclar:] How far is it from the [seashore]?
[Dawa:] Forty arms lenght (sic).
[Atty. Monteclar:] How about his residential house, how far is it from the [seashore]?
[Dawa:] More or less the same.
[Atty. Monteclar:] So these fish dryers of Mr. Pacina could also be reached by sea water?
[Dawa:] That fish dryers is the usual passage of sea water during high tide.
[Atty. Monteclar:] Where is the warehouse of Mr. Pacina situated in relation to his residential house?
[Dawa:] Beside his house.
[Atty. Monteclar:] So this could also be reached by sea water during high tide?
[Dawa:] It can not (sic).
x x x x
[Atty. Buenconsejo:] Yesterday during the direct-examination you stated that the land where the house of Onecefero Pacina was constructed is on a land where it could be reached by water during high tide. I will asked [sic] you whether that reaching of water could be by crossing around the house or going around the house?
[Dawa:] The water will be going around the house.
[Atty. Buenconsejo:] The water that goes around where did it pass?
[Dawa:] There is a passage of water which directly goes to their fish dryers.[53] (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)
[Atty. Quijano:] Now, this land where Batayola and Pacina constructed their house, their warehouse and their fish dried [sic], do you know if during high tide you can be reach (sic) by high waters?Luz Armojalas, whose husband, Carnoto Ungod (Ungod), gathered coconuts and acted as overseer for the Abellos, corroborated Dawa's assertion that Batayola 's claimed portion had been filled in naturally even before 1944.[55] She admitted that Pacina did place stones on his claimed portion but asserted that they were only used to hold flower pots. She also claimed that coconut trees, agonoy, bantigue, and kandangkandang shrubs grew on the disputed parcel.[56]
[Concepcion]: Yes, it can be reach (sic) during high tide.
x x x x
[Atty. Quijano:] How far was this warehouse and fish dried (sic) from the beach?
[Concepcion]: Maybe ten meters.[54]
Article 420. The following things are property of public dominion:The non-registrability of foreshore lands is a well-settled jurisprudential doctrine.[59] In Republic of the Phil. v. CA,[60] it was held that foreshore lands belong to the public domain and cannot be the subject of free patents or Torrens titles, viz.:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character[.] (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)
The application for a free patent was made in 1972. From the undisputed factual findings of the [CA], however, the land has since become foreshore. Accordingly, it can no longer be subject of a free patent under the Public Land Act. x x x.Therefore, to ascertain the validity of the titles held by the parties herein, the Court now determines if the disputed parcel was foreshore land at the time said titles were issued.
x x x x
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in Government vs. Cabangis annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public domain.[61] (Citations omitted)
If qualified, Messrs. Manuel Batayola and Onesefero Pacina, shall file their respective appropriate public lands application within sixty (60) days from the receipt hereof, otherwise they shall lose their preferential rights thereto.[65] (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)Once again, it must be emphasized that the disputed parcel was still foreshore land in 1972, as found by the Del Monte report and the BL-VII decision. The disposition of foreshore lands is governed by Sections 58, 59, and 61 of the Public Land Act, viz.:
These legal provisions mandate that foreshore lands of the public domain must first be opened to disposition or concession by the President; and afterwards may only be disposed of through lease, and not otherwise. The "appropriate public lands application" adverted to in the BL-VII decision, therefore, can only refer to a foreshore lease application. However, both the Batayola heirs and Pacina filed FP applications, in 1983 and 1985, respectively,[66] instead of foreshore lease applications. There is nothing in the record which indicates that the disputed parcel had been released into the public domain and reclassified as agricultural land prior to 1983; or that the Batayola group filed any foreshore lease application. On the other hand, Presidential Proclamation No. 2151,[67] dated December 29, 1981, expressly declared Bantayan a Wilderness Area, with the effect of withdrawing all lands therein "from entry, sale, settlement, exploitation of whatever nature or forms of disposition, subject to existing recognized and valid private rights, if any there be"; and placing said lands under the administration and control of the DENR.[68] This fact is annotated in the 1982 cadastral survey plan of Bantayan, which already reflects the 1972 BL-VII decision separating the disputed parcel from the rest of the land covered by the Abello heirs' OCT No. 1208.[69]TITLE III
Lands for Residential, Commercial or Industrial Purposes and Other Similar Purposes
CHAPTER VIII
Classification and Concession of Public Lands Suitable for Residence, Commerce and Industry
SECTION 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
SECTION 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of nuvigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
SECTION 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act. (Emphases and underlining Ours)