Supreme Court E-Library
Information At Your Fingertips

  View printer friendly version

388 Phil. 1039


[ G.R. No. 131127, June 08, 2000 ]




This is a petition for review to set aside the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated October 9, 1996[1] dismissing petitioner's Amended-complaint-in-intervention and the subsequent Resolution dated October 6, 1997[2] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The issue in this petition is whether or not, under the undisputed circumstances at bar, the Sandiganbayan may dismiss the complaint-in-intervention for alleged failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees on time.

On July 16, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter, the Republic) filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for Rescission, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos and Prime Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter, PHI), docketed as Civil Case No. 0002. Alleging ownership of the properties of the Marcoses sought to be forfeited by the Republic, petitioner Yuchengco filed a motion for intervention and complaint-in-intervention on August 11, 1988, impleading the Republic, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos and PHI as defendants-in-intervention.[3] Petitioner paid a docket fee of P400.00.

On February 17, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motion for intervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention.[4] The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration on March 14, 1989, which petitioner opposed.

On February 9, 1990, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion for reconsideration.[5] Hence, the Republic and the PCGG, on behalf of PHI, filed an answer to the complaint-in-intervention dated June 19, 1990 and November 2, 1990, respectively.

Meanwhile, PHI filed a Manifestation and Motion, stating that Imelda Cojuangco and the Estate of Ramon U. Cojuangco claim ownership of PHI. Thus, on May 31, 1993, petitioner moved for leave to admit amended complaint-in-intervention to implead the said claimants.[6]

On June 11, 1993, the Sandiganbayan, in open court, admitted the amended complaint-in-intervention.[7] Consequently, amended answers-in-intervention were filed by the Republic and the PHI on July 2, 1993.

On the other hand, the Estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Imelda O. Cojuangco (hereinafter, the Cojuangcos) filed a motion to dismiss[8] the amended complaint-in-intervention, dated August 25, 1993, on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the case, inasmuch as petitioner did not pay the correct docket fees. They argued that the amended-complaint-in-intervention failed to state the amount of the claim or the value of the property subject of the complaint, in violation of the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals.[9]

On September 6, 1993, petitioner filed a second amended complaint-in-intervention with motion for leave. Later, on September 28, 1993, he also opposed the motion to dismiss filed by PHI and the Cojuangcos on September 28, 1993.[10]

PHI and the Cojuangcos filed a reply[11] alleging that since the amended complaint-in-intervention is substantially an action for the recovery of ownership and possession of shareholdings in the Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC), Section 7 (a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court applies, to wit:
Sec. 7..... Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. ---

(a)....For filing an action or a permissive counter-claim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention xxx if xxx the stated value of the property in litigation is:
1.Not more than P20,000.00P120.00
2.More than P20,000.00 but less than P40,000.00150.00
3.P40,000.00 or more but less than P60,000.00200.00
4.P60,000.00 or more but less than P80,000.00250.00
5.P80,000.00 or more but less than P100,000.00400.00
6.P100,000.00 or more but less than P150,000.00600.00
7.For each P1,000.00 in excess of P150,000.005.00

Further, respondents PHI and the Cojuangcos contend that as the action seeks to litigate the ownership and disposition of properties consisting of subject shares, the amount of docket fees must be based on the total value of the same.

Petitioner filed a rejoinder[12] dated November 29, 1993, maintaining that no docket fees are payable to the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, which provides:
Proceedings free of charge. --- All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan shall be conducted at no cost to the complainant and/or his witnesses.
In their sur-rejoinder filed on January 28, 1994,[13] respondents PHI and the Cojuangcos countered that the reason for the above-quoted Section 11 of P.D. 1606 is that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan at the time of its enactment was limited to criminal actions. With the expansion of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to include civil cases, the payment of docket fees has become a jurisdictional requirement.

On February 8, 1994[14], petitioner replied that the Sandiganbayan has no power or discretion to ignore or amend the provision in Section 11 of P.D. 1606 simply on the basis of public policy. Petitioner points out that Executive Order No. 14 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino did not amend the said provision, hence, payment of docket fees in the Sandiganbayan is legally without basis.

On September 21, 1994, petitioner re-filed his second amended complaint-in-intervention[15] with motion to admit, wherein he sought to include Y Realty Corporation as co-plaintiff-in-intervention and to join Imelda R. Marcos as the representative of the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos.

On October 11, 1994, PHI and the Cojuangcos opposed the motion to admit second amended complaint-in-intervention,[16] contending that jurisdictional issues should first be resolved before the most recent motion is considered.

A motion for early resolution[17] was filed by petitioner on October 27, 1994. He averred that since the main issues in the motion to dismiss filed by PHI and the Cojuangcos dwell on payment of docket fees and the amount thereof, which may possibly involve the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and it is unclear whether the filing of the complaint-in-intervention tolled the running of the 10-year prescriptive period, there is a need for the Sandiganbayan to resolve the motion to dismiss as soon as possible.

On March 31, 1995, petitioner moved that he be allowed to post a bond,[18] to answer for whatever docket fees he may be held to pay, with the prayer that the running of the prescriptive period be deemed tolled pending the resolution by the Sandiganbayan of the motion to dismiss.

In a Resolution dated April 17, 1995,[19] the Sandiganbayan deferred the resolution of the motion to dismiss until trial, as the grounds raised therein do not appear to be indubitable.

Meanwhile, PHI and the Cojuangcos opposed petitioner's motion to post bond on the ground that the same should not be construed as a substitute for the actual payment of the proper docket fees, because payment of docket fees should not be subject to any contingency.[20]

On the other hand, petitioner moved for the partial reconsideration of the Resolution dated April 17, 1995 insofar as the deferment of the issue on payment of docket fees and the amount thereof. In the alternative, petitioner prayed that his motion to post bond be granted.[21] PHI and the Cojuangcos also moved for the reconsideration of the April 17, 1995 Resolution.[22]

Meanwhile, petitioner prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss in view of the passage of Republic Act No. 7975[23] which, like Executive Order 14, did not amend Section 11 of P.D. 1606.[24]

In the meantime, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 123264,[25] assailing public respondent's decision to defer adjudication on the issues raised in PHI's and the Cojuangcos' motion to dismiss. The petition for certiorari was dismissed by this Court for being premature.[26]

On March 29, 1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion to post bond and ordering petitioner (plaintiff-in-intervention therein) to pay the balance of the docket fee in the amount of P14,425.00.[27] Petitioner paid with reservation.[28]

PHI and the Cojuangcos filed a motion for reconsideration,[29] arguing that the Sandiganbayan erred in the computation of the docket fees and in allowing petitioner to pay additional docket fees beyond the prescriptive period. They again invoked Rule 141, Section 7 (a) of the Rules of Court and averred that the PTIC, registered in the name of PHI, has a stated value of P1.6 billion. Accordingly, as petitioner claims to own 31% of PTIC, which has a more recent value of P1,078,260,896.56, he should be made to pay at least the sum of P5,391,154.35.

On May 7, 1996,[30] the Sandiganbayan denied PHI's and the Cojuancos' motion for reconsideration of its April 17, 1995 Resolution.

Thereafter, respondents PHI and the Cojuangcos filed their answer to the amended complaint-in-intervention.[31]

On June 11, 1996, petitioner moved that the amount of P14,425.00 be refunded to him,[32] insisting that proceedings in the Sandiganbayan should be free of charge.

The Sandiganbayan, on October 9, 1996, issued the assailed resolution granting the motion to dismiss and denying petitioner's motion to admit second amended complaint-in-intervention.[33]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[34] dated October 30, 1996, and PHI and the Cojuangcos filed their opposition.[35] The Republic filed a manifestation[36] dated December 24, 1996 adopting the arguments raised by PHI and the Cojuangcos.

On October 6, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.[37] Hence this petition.

As earlier stated, the main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not petitioner is barred from asserting his alleged causes of action against respondents by reason of non-payment of the proper docket fees.

The Sandiganbayan cited several cases spanning from 1932 to 1987 to the effect that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests the trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.[38]

The ruling that the timely filing of correct docket fees is jurisdictional is all too familiar. It should be noted, however, that the pronouncements of this Court on the matter have always been influenced by the peculiar legal and equitable circumstances surrounding each case. For instance, the Lazaro v. Eudencia[39] ruling was in accordance with the then applicable law, i.e., Section 76 of Act No. 190 as amended by Act No. 3615. In Malimit v. Degamo[40], this Court ruled that the date of payment of docket fees and not the date of mailing is considered the date of filing of a petition for quo warranto. In Garcia v. Vasquez[41], this Court initially stated that a docket fee must be paid for a second will executed by the same decedent. Subsequently, on a motion for reconsideration, this Court reversed itself and held that the initial payment for the first will presented for probate was sufficient compliance. This Court was even more liberal in Magaspi v. Ramolete,[42] where the docket fee was paid upon the filing of the complaint. It turned out later, after the complaint was amended, that the payment was insufficient. This Court ruled that under the circumstances, the case was docketed upon the first payment and the trial court already acquired jurisdiction. However, the correct fee based on the amended complaint was required to be paid.

In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan adhered strictly to the rule enunciated in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[43] to wit:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. Any amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case, insofar as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
In Manchester, this Court stated that the allegation in the body of the complaint of damages suffered in the amount of P78,000,000.00, and the omission of a specific prayer for that amount, was intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the correct fee. The ruling was intended to put a stop to such an irregularity. In the case at bar, however, we note that there is no such irregularity or attempt to mislead in the instant petition before us.

We also note that the Manchester ruling did not become the final statement on the matter. In Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Asuncion,[44] the Court ruled:
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
In the said case, the payment of the correct fee within "a reasonable time" but in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period was allowed. In another case[45] decided after Manchester, this Court made some more distinctions:
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action.

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in in the meantime. But where x x x the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof. What should be done is imply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Court did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaint so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period.
The rule is not as simple and uncomplicated as Manchester makes it appear. There are other determining circumstances, equally important. The timely filing of correct docket fees is jurisdictional, but as shown by our decisions, considerations of law and equity come into the picture. This situation likewise obtains in the case at bar.

The Sandiganbayan Law itself, Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides:
Sec. 11. Proceedings free of charge. - All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan shall be conducted at no cost to the complainant and/or his witnesses.
Petitioner points out that when former President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 14 in 1986 which expanded the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to include civil cases, she did not repeal or amend Section 11 of P.D. 1606 on filing fees.

Similarly, when Congress in 1994 enacted Republic Act No. 7975 further strengthening the functional and structural organization of the Sandiganbayan, it did not amend the provision on non-payment of fees even as it amended or repealed several sections of the original law. When Congress in 1997 passed Republic Act No. 8429 further amending P.D. 1606, it did not touch the section on non-payment of court fees. If Congress in repealing various parts of P.D. 1606 did not touch Section 11, what is the basis of the Sandiganbayan's ruling on repeal or amendment?

In the resolution submitted to us for review, the Sandiganbayan emphasized that when P.D. No. 1606 was issued, the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court was limited to criminal actions. The Sandiganbayan now tries civil cases. While we are inclined to sustain the ruling that correct filing fees in civil cases must be paid in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan, this does not preclude a ruling that, in this case, the petitioner acted in justifiable good faith. There was ample reason for uncertainty and doubt on the intervenor's part not merely as to the correctness of the amount to be paid but whether or not docket fees should be paid at all.

Equitable considerations are equally significant. Unlike the basis of the Manchester ruling, there is no evidence in the present case that the petitioner tried to evade the payment of correct fees or in any way tried to mislead that court and its employees. On the contrary, petitioner paid dues and asked the Sandiganbayan what are the correct docket fees, if the dues paid are not accurate. When Sandiganbayan came out with its own computation, petitioner paid the corrected amount.

Correctly, petitioner asserted that the Sandiganbayan's resolution, assuming it was correct, was not something that could have been reasonably anticipated by the ordinary litigant.

Indeed, the actions of the Sandiganbayan clearly call for the application of equitable considerations. On February 17, 1989, it admitted the complaint-in-intervention. Answers thereto were filed by PHI and the Cojuangcos. On June 11, 1993, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended complaint-in-intervention. More important, the lower court denied the motions to dismiss filed by respondents questioning the incorrect payment of docket fees in its resolutions dated April 17, 1995, March 29, 1996 and May 7, 1996. Petitioner was thus led into believing, long before the ten year prescriptive period expired, that its complaint-in-intervention would stay admitted.

However, the Sandiganbayan on October 9, 1996 and October 6, 1997 issued the Resolutions now before us in this petition for review. Petitioner's complaint was dismissed for non-payment of the prescribed docket fees, without obvious regard to the implications of the reversal of its earlier rulings.

Moreover, on October 27, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the resolution of the issue on correct docket fees. When no decision was forthcoming, petitioner on March 31, 1995 filed a motion to post bond to answer for whatever additional fees that may be assessed later. On April 17, 1995, the Sandiganbayan decided to defer the resolution of respondents' motions to dismiss until trial. Petitioner even elevated the inaction of the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari but this was dismissed for being premature. It can thus be seen that, far from committing the irregularity illustrated in Manchester, petitioner did the opposite in this case.

More specifically, petitioner's alleged causes of action before the Sandiganbayan constitute the following:   
1.Claims on the 6% stockholdings in PTIC which he alleged to have bought from Gregorio Romulo and Leonides Virata but were purportedly transferred to the Ramon U. Cojuangco group by coercion, duress and force majeure (Martial Law);
2.Claims on the 25% shares of General Telephone & Electronics Corporation (GTE) in Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) which petitioner was prevented from acquiring by virtue of a "put and call" agreement with GTE;
3.(Alternative Third Cause of Action) Claims on the 4.6% shares in PTIC.

Considering that petitioner seeks to recover properties, the ownership and possession of which he was allegedly deprived through fraud, duress and/or coercion, we hold that, assuming hypothetically these averments to be true, the legal relationship of constructive trust was present among the parties concerned in the said transactions. Constructive trust is that created by reason of equity to answer the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. It arises against one, who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold.[46]

Correspondingly, actions thereon prescribe after ten (10) years as provided by Article 1144 of the Civil Code:
The following actions must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues:
1.Upon a written contract;
2.Upon an obligation created by law;
3.Upon a judgment.

(Emphasis provided).
Under normal circumstances, petitioner's cause of action should have prescribed on February 26, 1996, a month before petitioner was ordered by the Sandiganbayan to pay docket fees or two months before the docket fees were actually paid in the corrected amount of P14,825.00. However, we hold that said payment could not be construed as belatedly made such as to foreclose the prosecution of his claims.

It should be noted that when the issue on docket fees was raised, petitioner submitted the determination of the same to the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan. As earlier stated, he sought for the immediate resolution of this issue as early as October 27, 1994. In the alternative, petitioner proposed to post a bond to answer for the docket fees, if such are payable. He even filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 123264, to seek an early resolution of this issue.

Clearly, petitioner did not sleep on his rights, and prescription has not set in to bar his right to seek judicial relief. The essence of the statute of limitations is to prevent fraudulent claims arising from unwarranted length of time and not to defeat actions asserted on the honest belief that they were sufficiently submitted for judicial determination.

To punish petitioner for public respondent's failure to timely decide an issue pivotal to the success of his case would be setting a bad precedent. It would give trial courts unbridled power and an unfair weapon to frustrate the filing of actions. We hold that public respondent's belated action after prolonged inaction on the issue of petitioner's payment of docket fees is a supervening event beyond the independent will and control of petitioner that tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Article 1154 of the Civil Code is applicable by parallelism, to wit:

The period during which the obligee was prevented by fortuitous event from enforcing his right is not reckoned against him.

As earlier stated, equity and the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the present case necessitate this ruling. For among the parties in the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan is the most equipped to afford petitioner the opportunity to present his claims. Not only that, but going back to the pronouncements of this Court in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[47] where we recognized that the sufficiency of the docket fees is a matter for the determination of the clerk of court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge, the Sandiganbayan could have immediately drawn petitioner's attention if its clerk of court found difficulty in determining the amount of chargeable docket fees from a reading of the complaint. Even in the celebrated case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[48] the trial court directed the plaintiff therein to rectify the flaws in its amended complaint. That way, not only could the Sandiganbayan have seasonably resolved the issues on docket fees but it could very well have timely settled petitioner's dilemma on what to do and what was required to preserve his rights.

Courts are mandated to promptly administer justice. Having the inherent power to amend and control the processes and orders, to make them conformable to law and justice[49] we have the avowed duty to uphold the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases and avert the precipitate loss of rights.

While it may be argued that petitioner could have very well amended his complaint and alleged the monetary values of the properties he seeks to recover to comply with Rule 141, Section 7(a) of the Rules of Court, we find, pro hac vice, that petitioner acted in good faith when he contended that proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are free of charge. The present rule must, however, be stressed: parties filing civil actions before the Sandiganbayan are liable to pay the required docket fees. The situation only differs in the case at bar because of petitioner's honest conviction manifested in his filing of a reservation for the payments he made, after having been ordered by the Sandiganbayan on March 29, 1996 to pay the balance of P14,425.00 and after the court denied his motion to post bond pending final resolution of the motion to dismiss.

Be that as it may, petitioner's position that subsequent amendments[50] to PD 1606 did not expressly repeal Section 11 thereof is untenable. Petitioner failed to appreciate that the expansion of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to include civil cases impliedly amended the same and Section 1, Rule IV, Part I of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the Supreme Court enjoys exclusive power to promulgate the rules on pleading, practice, and procedure.

In addition, Republic Act No. 7975[51] amended Section 9 of P.D. 1606 to read as follows:
Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. x x x
Hence, Rule 141 Section 7(a) of the Rules of Court applies to petitioner's complaint and/or amended complaints-in-intervention.

Petitioner argues that R.A. 7975, having been promulgated on March 30, 1995 should not be retroactively applied. This is not so, as statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, thus, retrospective in such sense and to that extent.[52]

As a final note, petitioner's manifestation that he is withdrawing some of the causes of action alleged in his complaints-in-intervention and the subsequent amendments thereto should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan for proper determination and action. This should be taken into consideration by the Sandiganbayan in determining anew the docket fees payable by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partially GRANTED. The questioned Resolutions are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered to submit to public respondent Sandiganbayan the value of the properties he seeks to recover and to pay the proper docket fees therefor within thirty (30) days upon determination thereof either by the Sandiganbayan or its clerk of court, which in turn is directed to act with dispatch on the matter.


Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave abroad.

[1] Annex "A", Rollo, p. 157; penned by Justice Sabino R. de Leon, concurred in by Justices Cipriano A. del Rosario and Leonardo I. Cruz.

[2] Annex "B", Rollo, p. 178; penned by Justice Sabino R. de Leon, concurred in by Justices Narciso S. Nario and Teresita L. de Castro.

[3] Annex "C", Rollo, p. 195.

[4] Annex "D", Rollo, p. 211.

[5] Annex "E", Rollo, p. 216.

[6] Annex "F", Rollo, p. 219.

[7] Annex "G", Rollo, p. 238.

[8] Annex "H", Rollo, p. 239.

[9] 149 SCRA 562 (1987)

[10] Annex "I", Rollo, p. 264.

[11] Annex "J", Rollo, p. 291.

[12] Annex "K", Rollo, p. 310.

[13] Annex "L", Rollo, p. 324.

[14] Annex "M", Rollo, p. 328.

[15] Annexes "N" and "N-1", Rollo, pp. 338, 341.

[16] Annex "O", Rollo, p. 355.

[17] Annex "P", Rollo, p. 360.

[18] Annex "Q", Rollo, p. 367.

[19] Annex "R", Rollo, p. 371.

[20] Annex "S", Rollo, p. 379.

[21] Annex "T", Rollo, p. 386.

[22] Annex "U", Rollo, p. 391.

[23] An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan.

[24] Annex "W", Rollo, p. 401.

[25] Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 109.

[26] Id., p. 15; Rollo, p. 110.

[27] Annex "X", Rollo, p. 406.

[28] Annex "Y", Rollo, p. 414.

[29] Annex "Z", Rollo, p. 416.

[30] Annex "AA", Rollo, p. 427.

[31] Annex "BB", Rollo, p. 433.

[32] Annex "DD", Rollo, p. 452.

[33] Annex "A", op. cit., note 1.

[34] Annex "GG", Rollo, p. 476.

[35] Annex "HH", Rollo, p. 512.

[36] Annex "II", Rollo, p. 526.

[37] Annex "B", op. cit., note 2.

[38] Lazaro v. Eudencia et. al., 57 Phil. 552 (1932); Lee v. Republic, 10 SCRA 65 (1964); Malimit v. Degamo, 12 SCRA 450 (1964); Garcia v. Vasquez, 28 SCRA 330 (1969); Magaspi v. Ramolete, 115 SCRA 193 (1982); Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987)

[39] Supra.

[40] Supra.

[41] Supra.

[42] Supra.

[43] Supra., at p. 569.

[44] 170 SCRA 274 (1989)

[45] Tacay v. Regional Trial Court, 180 SCRA 433 (1989)

[46] Vda. de Esconde v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 66 (1996); citing O'laco v. Co Cho Chit, 220 SCRA 656, 663 (1993)

[47] Id.

[48] Supra.

[49] RULES OF COURT, Rule 135, Section (c)

[50] E.O. 14, R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249.

[51] An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended.

[52] Sun Life Insurance, supra., citing People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946); Alday v. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521 (1983) and Palomo Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 168 (1984)

© Supreme Court E-Library 2019
This website was designed and developed, and is maintained, by the E-Library Technical Staff in collaboration with the Management Information Systems Office.