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Enriquito Unarce appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region stationed in Puerto Princesa (Branch 47), which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim Gaspar Narrazid in the amount of P150,000.00 as actual, corrective, and moral damages, and to pay the costs.

The Information filed against accused-appellant with the lower court charged:

That on or about the 16th day of November, 1992, at Barangay Bonobono, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with evident premeditation and treachery, while armed with a bladed weapon and with intent to kill did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with his bladed weapon, to wit: a bolo known also as "Badong", one GASPAR NARRAZID, hitting him in the various vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries:

1.  Incised wound on the left side of his face cutting off the blood vessels and the sigomatic bone and tongue;

2.  Incised wound on the right arm cutting the blood vessels, ligaments and fracturing the humerous;

3.       Incised wound on the left knee cutting the ligaments, muscles and blood vessels and fracturing the patilla or knee cap, left side; and

4.  Incised wound on the right side of the iliac cutting the muscle and the blood vessel.

all of which cause massive hemorrhage which were the direct and immediate cause of the death of said Gaspar Narrazid.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 5-6, Rollo.)

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits accordingly thereafter proceeded.

The evidence for the prosecution tends to show the following:

Accused-appellant Enriquito Unarce is the son-in-law of the victim Gaspar Narrazid. On November 16, 1992, at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Gaspar Narrazid was in Bonobono, Bataraza, some 2 meters away from his house, drying his palay. As he stooped or bent down to dry the palay, accused-appellant suddenly approached from behind and without any warning hacked Gaspar with a bolo, hitting him on the left side of his face. Accused-appellant hacked Gaspar for the second time. Although already wounded, Gaspar managed to parry the blow with his right arm, and in so doing, he was hit on his upper right arm, causing him to fall on the ground, face up. As Gaspar lay mortally wounded and defenseless on the ground and to finish him off, accused-appellant continued hacking and stabbing him several times more in different parts of his body, hitting both his right and left knees.

Roy Odin saw all of this gory attack from a distance of only 3 meters while he was weighing palay. Seeing Gaspar prostrate on the ground and still being hacked by accused-appellant repeatedly and mercilessly, Odin rushed to Gaspar's succor, but accused-appellant blocked Odin and tried to hack him too. Showing no fear, Odin picked up a stone and hurled it at accused-appellant, hitting the latter on the left side of the jaw. Accused-appellant then ran away, leaving behind Gaspar lying prostrate on the ground. Odin also ran away and reported the incident to the police authorities of the Municipality of Bonobono, Bataraza. Gaspar was brought by the police to the Brooke's Point District Hospital for treatment, but he expired six hours later.

Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia, Municipal Health Officer of Bataraza, Palawan, conducted the autopsy. He found the victim to have sustained the following:

1.  Wound, incised, (L) face, extending from the lateral border of the (L) orbital bone, cutting the skin, muscles, blood vessels, and fracturing, directed downward, medially, cutting zygomatic bone, maxillary bone, cutting the tongue, upper and lower lip, approximately 6 inches length.

2.  Wound, incised, (R) arm, proximal 3rd, post, aspect, transverse, cutting skin, muscles, blood vessels, ligaments and fracture, the head of the humerous, approximate 4 inches length.

3.  Wound, incised, (L) knee, transverse, cutting the skin, muscles, ligaments, blood vessels, fracture patella (L), approximate 4-1/2 inches length.

4.  Wound, incised, 1/2 inch above the (R) A.S., iliac, spine, transverse, cutting the skin, muscles, blood vessels, approximate 2 inches length (Exhibit "A-3").

(pp. 28-29, Rollo.)

Of these wounds, Dr. Divinagracia considered the first as the most fatal. He opined that all the wounds inflicted on the victim were caused by a sharp instrument and that the victim could have fallen down.

The victim's family incurred the amount of P50,000.00 for medicine, funeral, and burial expenses. The victim's sister, Rocaya Narrazid Bona, paid for all these expenses.

On the other hand, accused-appellant invoked self-defense to exculpate himself from criminal liability. His version is to the effect that at about 3:30 o'clock on the afternoon of November 16, 1992, he was riding on his bicycle heading for the seashore to repair his banca. Upon reaching the crossing on Bonobono, Bataraza, the victim suddenly appeared, followed by his 2 nephews, Roy Odin and Mundin Hampson. Gaspar stopped accused-appellant and asked him where he was going. Suddenly Odin stoned him, hitting his mouth, breaking his teeth and causing him to fall from his bicycle to the ground. As he lay on the ground, Mundin stoned him, hitting him on the chest. As Odin and Mundin continued stoning him, Gaspar approached and kicked him on the right side of his body and his stomach. Then, Gaspar drew his bolo from his waist and attempted to kick him again. At this point, accused-appellant drew his bolo and parried the kick of Gaspar. In so doing, accused-appellant hit the knee of Gaspar. Again Gaspar tried to hack accused-appellant but he was able to fend it off, hitting Gaspar on his right side of the hip. A third attempt by Gaspar to hack accused-appellant was parried by accused-appellant, hitting the former on the right arm. As Gaspar moved forward, he blocked Gaspar's advance with his bolo, this time hitting Gaspar on the face. Gaspar stumbled to the ground. At this point, accused-appellant hailed a passing tricycle and proceeded to the Municipal Building of Bonobono to report the incident and to surrender to the police. (Exh. 2, 2-A)

On February 24, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, based on the evidence presented, the Court hereby finds the accused ENRIQUITO UNARCE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Murder" charged in the above-captioned case and as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the victim actual, corrective and moral damages in the amount of P150,000.00 and to pay the costs.

The herein convicted prisoner is hereby ordered immediately shipped to the national penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila to serve his sentence there and not in any of the penal colonies in Puerto Princesa City, to prevent reprisal or retaliation as the Court was confidentially informed that if the accused has a chance to be free, or to be near those who testified against him or those who have something to do with his prosecution and conviction, he would kill all of them.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

(pp. 42-43, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant is now before this Court imputing to the trial court four reversible errors, which may be substantially reduced as follows:

1.  For disregarding accused-appellant's evidence of self-defense;

2.  For not considering and giving credence to his testimony and that of his witnesses;

3.  For finding that treachery, attended the commission of the crime;

4.  For not finding that the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to sustain conviction for murder.

(p. 57, Rollo.)

The basic issue is whether or not the trial court erred in rejecting accused-appellant's claim of self-defense and in convicting him of the crime of murder.

After a meticulous review of the record, we can not help concluding that accused-appellant failed to establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. In interposing self-defense, an accused admits authorship of the killing and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that the killing was justified (People vs. Macagaling, 237 SCRA 299 [1994]; People vs. Alapide, 236 SCRA 555 [1994]; People vs. Ocana, 229 SCRA 341 [1994]; Bitalac vs. CA, 241 SCRA 351 [1995]), and to prove the elements of that claim, otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is inescapable. Concomitantly, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence (People vs. Gregorio, 255 SCRA 380 [1996]; People vs. Aliviado, 247 SCRA 302 [1995]; People vs. Decena, 235 SCRA 67 [1994]; People vs. Salazar, 221 SCRA 170 [1993]).

It is basic that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (People vs. Gregorio, supra, People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]; People vs. Flores, 237 SCRA 653 [1994]; People vs. Gutual, 254 SCRA 37 [1996]; People vs. Bernal, 254 SCRA 659 [1996]).

In the case at bar, accused-appellant's claim of self-defense fails to meet the above requisites. All we have to go by is accused-appellant's uncorroborative and unconvincing testimony on this point. Accused-appellant's story would draw the picture of the victim attempting to slash at accused-appellant but suffering in the process — initially — a hit at the left knee and the right side of the hip. Verily, even if only the first wound were considered, this would have been enough to practically immobilize Gaspar, for the wound cut muscles and ligaments fractured the knee, resulting in the termination of any aggression on his part. There would have been no need to hack at him repeatedly. We thus discard the allegation of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Prosecution witness Odin was firm in his declaration that accused-appellant started the aggression. Indeed, as shown by the evidence, the victim was not armed. He had no bolo or weapon. He was doing nothing hostile than drying his palay. He was not threatening to attack nor in any manner did he manifest any aggressive act which may have imperiled accused-appellant's well-being. If accused-appellant himself suffered injuries, fracture and hematoma on the jaw (Exh. 1, 1-A), these were not inflicted by the victim but were caused by the stone Odin hurled at him, indicating that the victim could not have been armed with a bolo during the incident, and that there was no aggression on his part.

In the final analysis, it is settled doctrine that with respect to the issue of credibility of witnesses, we have always accorded the highest degree of respect to the findings of the trial court, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless the court has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered might affect the result of the case (People vs. Jones, 137 SCRA 166 [1985]; People vs. Alapide, supra). The trial court, in the instant case, can not be faulted for any such misapprehension of factual findings in the case at bar.

Absent the essential element of unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased, any consideration or claim of self-defense, complete or incomplete, is of course entirely out of the question (People vs. Ramirez, 203 SCRA 25 [1991]; People vs. Alapide, supra). If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel and the second and third requisites of self-defense would have no basis (People vs. Alapide, supra, People vs. Morato, 224 SCRA 361 [1993]).

The futility of invoking self-defense is likewise revealed in the autopsy report of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. The results of the post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia on the victim showed that the latter sustained incised wounds: (a) on the left side of the face, so deep it fractured the zygomatic bone (cheekbone) and the auxillary bone or upper jaw or palate, cutting in the process, the tongue; (b) on the right arm, about 4 inches long; (c) on the left knee, about 4-½ inches long; (d) and on the right side, iliac, spinal about 2 inches -- any one of which would have immobilized the victim, but with the first wound certainly fatal. The nature, location, and number of the wounds inflicted on the victim thus belie and negate the claim of self-defense (People vs. Morin, supra, People vs. Camahalan, 241 SCRA 558 [1995]; People vs. Tanduyan, 236 SCRA 433 [1994]; People vs. Amaro, 235 SCRA 8 [1994]; People vs. Gregorio, 255 SCRA 380 [1996]; People vs. Layam, 234 SCRA 424 [1994]). If accused-appellant hacked the victim merely to defend himself, it certainly defies reason why he had to inflict several wounds in different parts of the body of the victim. On the contrary, the multiple and serious injuries that the victim sustained would show a determined effort on the part of accused-appellant to kill the victim.

The court a quo properly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of treachery against accused-appellant which qualified the crime to murder. It was clearly established that accused-appellant attacked the victim suddenly, without warning and from behind while he was stooping down, drying palay, and repeatedly hacked him after he had fallen defenseless on the ground, thus giving the victim no time to flee or to prepare for his defense or enable him to offer the least resistance to the sudden assault. Treachery exists when the means, method or manner of attack employed by the accused offered no risk to himself from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might have taken (Rosales vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 123 [1996]; People vs. Bello, 237 SCRA 347 [1994]; People vs. Muyano, 235 SCRA 184 [1994]; Art. 14, Revised Penal Code).

As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same can not be considered in favor of accused-appellant to lighten his liability, considering that the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua which is an indivisible penalty without any minimum, medium, or maximum periods. As such, it should be imposed in the case at bar in its entire duration in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code regardless of the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime (People vs. Saliling, 249 SCRA 185 [1995]; People vs. Villanueva, 246 SCRA 769 [1995]; People vs. Baculi, 246 SCRA 756 [1995]).

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.