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350 Phil. 683
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 118649, March 09, 1998 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. JAIME REYES Y AROGANSIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant
Jaime Reyes y Arogansia seeks the reversal of the decision[1] of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial
Court in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, dated October 5, 1994, declaring him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as then punished under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659.
By way of
backdrop, appellant was arrested by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation in Parañaque pursuant to a warrant of arrest[2] issued by the Municipal Trial Court
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and was turned over to the custody of the Philippine
National Police of said province. On May 2, 1990, appellant was admitted to
bail. The criminal complaint was later amended to change his middle name stated
therein from “Bautista” to “Arogansia.”[3]
Appellant failed
to submit his counter-affidavit as ordered by the municipal trial court, hence
he was deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. The
records of the case were then forwarded to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Laguna which filed an information on July 2, 1990 charging herein
appellant with murder and alleging –
“That on or about February 15, 1990, in the municipality of Santa Cruz, province of Laguna, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused while conveniently armed with a handgun and motivated by hate and revenge with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot at MEYNARDO ALTOBAR y MENGUITO with the said weapon, thereby the latter suffered gunshot wound which directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
That in the commission of the crime the qualifying circumstances were present: (1) evident premeditation & treachery.”[4]
During his
arraignment with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, appellant
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[5] The pre-trial conference was
terminated on November 28, 1990 and, thereafter, trial proceeded. In the course
of the proceedings, the bail of appellant was cancelled and he was ordered
arrested by virtue of a bench warrant for failure to appear on a scheduled
hearing.
Prosecution
witness Iluminado Broas testified that on or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening
of February 15, 1990, he and the victim, Meynardo "Jun Boy" Altobar,
Jr., together with another prosecution witness, Joel Apundar, were seated in
front of the sari-sari store of Edwin Laborde at M.H. del Pilar Street, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna. They were talking with each other when suddenly a "bemoustached"
man approached them and asked Altobar, Jr., "Ikaw ba si Jun Boy?"
When the latter replied by nodding his head, the man, who was later identified
as herein appellant, immediately pulled out a gun from something which looked
like a book tightly held under his left armpit and shot the victim, hitting him
in the neck.
Broas was able
to push the wounded victim aside before the assailant pulled the trigger for a
second shot. Thereafter, appellant pointed the gun at the group and pulled the
trigger , but the gun jammed and did not fire. Appellant thereupon ran towards
the opposite direction, obviously to avoid being caught or identified by them.[6] The group
rushed to the aid of the victim who sat slouched on the pavement, bathed in his
own blood, about a meter away from where they were seated. They hailed a
tricycle and brought the victim to the hospital where he expired.[7]
Prosecution
witness Joel Apundar corroborated the testimony of Broas in its material
points. He testified further that when appellant escaped by running towards the
direction of the P. Guevarra Memorial High School, he shouted, "Habulin
ninyo iyan, habulin ninyo!" which was heard by several persons within the
vicinity.[8] Broas and
Apundar both testified that the man was wearing a piece of lady's stocking as a mask, RayBan type sunglasses,
a"sure-fit" cap,[9] black
pants and a white t-shirt.[10]
Another
prosecution witness, Johnny Abao, testified that at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening of February 15, 1990, he was in the company of Felix Herbosa and Jun
Laborte at Del Pilat Street in the same town. They heard two gunshots and
somebody shouted, "Habulin ninyo." Then he saw a man running away
from the direction where the gunshots and shout emanated and going towards
them. Their group was about 30 meters away from the Laborte store. The man ran
along Del Pilar Street, turned right to Kamatoy Street, and then right to P.
Guevarra Street. As he ran after the man, he picked up something for his
defense. He only gave up the chase when he saw that the man had boarded a slow
moving tricycle waiting along P. Guevarra Street. He later helped witnesses
Apundar and Broas in bringing the victim to the hospital on board a tricycle
driven by Martin Buena.[11]
Dr. Guia G.
Abad, a medico-legal officer, conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim.
Her findings were set forth in a Medico Necropsy Report, marked as Exhibit
"G" by the prosecution, as follows:
"1. One circular wound measuring 2 mm x 2 mm penetrating located 2 cm above the medial insertion of the left clavicle directed rightwards to a wound with irregular edges measuring 1 cm x 1 cm located 12 cm from midspinal on right upper back at a level 4 cm below the lower border of nape, just above the upper edge of right scapular bond.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Shock due to
hemorrhage due to penetrating wound."[12]
Another
prosecution witness Manolito A. Manuel testified that, while riding on his
racer-type bicycle passing along P. Guevarra Street on his way home to Barangay
Sto. Angel Sur in the same town, he heard two gunshots which he ignored. Upon
reaching the corner of P. Guevarra and Kamatoy Streets, he fell from his
bicycle because he was nearly sideswiped by a passenger jeep. While sprawled on
the street with his bicycle, he saw a man running towards a slow-moving
tricycle and who then boarded the same. Inside the tricycle, the man removed
his mask and put a gun on the passenger seat.[13] When Manuel stood up and
rode his bicycle again, he noticed that the man was staring at him. He was more
or less five meters away from the said tricycle and the place was illuminated
by the lamppost.
Just as he
reached the big bridge, he noticed that the said tricycle, with the same driver
and passenger, was moving behind him. Upon reaching a street corner, he made a
full stop and again noticed the driver and the passenger of the said tricycle
giving him an intimidating look. He thereafter proceeded towards his home and
he tricycle went in the direction of Patimbao.[14] He later
identified the passenger as appellant,[15] and the
driver as Ernan Reyes, a son of Ely Reyes who is a cousin of appellant.[16]
Appellant, as
expected, denied having killed Altobar, Jr. He testified that on the date and
time in question, he was at the Parañaque Cockpit owned by Rolly Ligon,
together with Obet Legasto and Raul Reyes, on a painting job. The said cockpit
is reportedly 85 to 90 kilometers away from Sta. Cruz, Laguna and it would take
more than two hours to travel from one place to the other.[17]
Appellant's alibi was corroborated by his relative, Raul Reyes, who testified
that he and appellant were together the whole night of February 15, 1990 and
they never left the cockpit compound.[18]
However, the
prosecution presented two rebuttal witnesses, Serafin Nepomuceno and Eleodoro
Anibersaryo to refute this alibi of appellant. Witness Nepomuceno testified
that at around 5:30 in the afternoon of February 15, 1990, he was at the house
of witness Anibersaryo at Green Village Subdivision, also in Sta. Cruz. They
were having a celebration when appellant arrived together with Felix Mercado,
Anibersaryo's half brother. Appellant left after drinking a bottle of beer. The
celebration did not last long because the group had to attend to important
matters in the public market. On their way thereto aboard an owner-type jeep,
they saw appellant walking along Taleon Street[19] which was a few blocks away from the scene of the
crime.
The other
rebuttal witness, Eleodoro Anibersaryo, corroborated the testimony of
Nepomuceno. He testified that they saw appellant on February 15, 1991 at around
5:30 in the afternoon, first, when appellant arrived in Anibersaryo's house
and, second, when appellant was walking along Taleon Street.[20] In fact,
their group greeted appellant but could not accommodate him in their jeep which
was already full.[21]
Based on the
evidence introduced by the prosecution vis a vis what was adduced by the
defense, which will hereafter be discussed, the trial court concluded that it
was appellant Jaime Reyes who shot and killed victim Meynardo Altobar, Jr.
Thus,on October 5, 1994, the court below rendered the following judgment:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused JAIME REYES y AROGANSIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by evident premeditation defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the attendant generic circumstance of nocturnity and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Meynardo Altobar y Menguito the amount ofP90,000.00 for and as actual and compensatory damages inclusive of expenses incident to the burial,P100,000.00 for and as moral damages,P50,000.00 for and as exemplary damages and the further sum ofP20,000.00 for expenses of litigation inclusive of attorney's fee, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment."[22]
Hence, this
appeal wherein appellant imputes four supposed errors to the trial court,
namely, (1) in finding that treachery attended the killing of the victim
Meynardo Altobar, Jr.; (2) in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation to qualify the crime to murder; (3) in appreciating
nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime; and
(4) in convicting him of the crime charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[23]
Appellants
faults the trial court for holding that the killing of victim Altobar, Jr. was
attended by treachery. He contends that when he openly approached the victim
and asked him, "Ikaw ba si Jun Boy?" the latter must already been
alerted and forewarned of an impending attack. Moreover, the attack was frontal
as shown by the fact that the victim was hit near the neck[24] above the left clavicle. The Court
disagrees.
The prosecution
evidence meets the requisites for appreciating alevosia in the commission of the
crime, viz.: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods or forms of the attack employed by him. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving the letter of any real chance to defend himself
and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself.[25]
As argued by the
prosecution, the fact that appellant approached the victim and asked him if he
was "Jun Boy" could not have served as a warning to the victim of an
impending harm. It could not have taken appellant more than three seconds to
ask the question and immediately after getting a positive response, he fired at
the victim.[26] This is sustained by
reliable witness accounts.
Prosecution
witness Iluminado Broas lucidly explained:
"Q: Do you recall of (sic) any unusual incident which happened on that particular occasion while in the process of telling stories among yourselves?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you tell the Court what happened?
A: While we were telling stories at that time, a certain man came and then asked who this Jun Boy is.
Q: Will you tell the Court if you recall the exact words of this man, what was (sic) the exact words?
A: The exact words by the man was (sic) "ikaw ba si Jun Boy?" and then he pulled out a gun from something like a book pressed between his left armpit and then he fired a shot at Jun Boy.
Q: Was Jun Boy hit by that first shot?
A: He was hit, sir.
Q: Did you notice on what part of his body as Jun Boy hit?
A: Jun Boy was hit near the neck.
Q: Before he was shot by this man, was Jun Boy able to answer or utter any remarks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was his answer?
A: He just nodded his head.
Q: After Jun Boy nodded if as you mentioned that he was the Jun Boy being sought by this man, this man suddenly pulled out a gun from what appeared to be a book pressed between his left armpit, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir."[27]
This was
corroborated by witness Joel Apundar:
"Q: While you were there at that time in the store of this Laborde, do you recall of (sic) any unusual incident that happened?
A: There was.
Q: What happened?
A: We were sitting on a wooden bench and while we were sitting on a wooden bench, somebody approached us and asked who among us is Jun Boy and after knowing who was Jun Boy, he immediately fired a gun at us."[28]
We can infer
from the foregoing testimonies of these prosecution witnesses that the
suddenness and mode of the attack adopted by appellant placed the victim in a
situation where it would be impossible for him to foresee any impending harm
and to resist the attack or defend himself. It has repeatedly been held that
even if the attack on the victim was immediately preceded by a cry or signal
from the accused, such attack is no less treacherous[29] since the immediacy of the assault
prevents the victim from evading the same or defending himself therefrom. Even
a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the
victim was unarmed,[30] as what
happened in the case at bar.
Apropos to the
foregoing, the rule is that the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity is
ordinarily deemed absorbed in treachery[31] because it forms part of the
treacherous means and manner specifically employed by the accused to insure the
execution of his criminal act. Nocturnity is appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance only when it is purposely sought by or affords some degree of impunity
to the offender, which does not appear to be so in this case. The prosecution
witnesses testified that although the crime was committed at around 7:00
o'clock in the evening, the locus criminis was well lighted[32] and the
face of appellant could easily be seen through his transparent mask.[33] The
circumstances of treachery and nocturnity may well be regarded then as
complementing each other, with the latter absorbed by treachery thus creating a
single circumstance qualifying the killing as murder.
It is also worth
mentioning that while appellant reportedly had a sort of a mask and was using
sunglasses, these clumsy accouterments could not constitute the aggravating
circumstance of disguise. Legally, disfraz contemplates a superficial but
somewhat effective dissembling to avoid identification. Here, even if it is
true that he assumed that masquerade, appellant was readily recognizable
because his face could easily be seen together with the identifying feature of
his mustache. Thus, there was no mention of his having used a disguise, whether
in the information or by the trial court, the prosecution or the Solicitor
General. Why appellant resorted to that juvenile gaucherie is an example of the
delusive quirks of the criminal mind which defy rational explanation.
What is instead
in issue is the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Appellant
claims that the trial court erred in appreciating this as another qualifying
circumstance, on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove all the
requisites thereof.[34] Appellant
is correct. The prosecution failed to prove (a) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and execution of the crime to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.[35] These
elements of evident premeditation must be established with equal certainty and
clarity as the criminal act itself before it can be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance.
The testimony of
prosecution witness Jonas Soriano that on February 7, 1990 Mercy Reyes,
daughter of appellant, told him to inform the victim to be careful because
appellant had a gun and was looking for him;[36] and the
testimony of Perla Ramos that on February 8, 1990, appellant went to her house
looking for his daughter[37]and,
before leaving, he stated, "Huwag lang mayroong mangyayari sa anak ko wala
kayong narinig, wala kayong nakita,"[38] cannot be
taken against appellant as evidence of his intent or plan to kill the victim.
Mere
presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable they might be,
would not be enough to sustain a finding of this qualifying circumstance.[39] For that
matter, absent the elements thereof as earlier noted, neither can it be
considered as an aggavating circumstance. Nonetheless, appellant is still
liable for the crime of murder as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
present and proven by the prosecution.
Appellant faults
the lower court in convicting him of the crime charged despite the failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[40] This
submission is not only too generalized an averment but is likewise devoid of
merit. Although the prosecution's eyewitnesses, Broas and Apundar, initially
failed to reveal or disclose the name of appellant in their preliminary
affidavits, the physical description and identification of the gunman as
narrated by them matches the identity of herein appellant.
Moreover, during
the trial, appellant was positively identified by Broas and Apundar as the man
who shot Altobar, Jr. Broas explained that the day in his disclosure of the
name or identity of appellant was because he was afraid to mention the name of
the person who shot the victim and he was so afraid because he definitely knew
the assailant.[41] Apundar,
in turn, confessed that the delay in his revelation of the identity of appellant was because he was
"afraid that Jaime might
return" to him.[42]
The failure of
the prosecution witnesses to immediately name or identify herein appellant as
the culprit is understandable. It is common for witnesses to delay or vacillate
in disclosing the identity of the offender after the startling occurrence for
fear of reprisal, more so since they were townmates and one of them is related
to appellant. Incidentally, prosecution witness Manuel, on his part, positively
identified appellant as the man who ran towards a slow-moving tricycle, boarded
the same, placed his gun on the passenger seat, removed his mask., and gave him
an intimidating look.[43]
It is a
jurisprudential doctrine of long standing that, aside from its intrinsic
weakness, the defense of alibi and denial invoked by herein appellant cannot
prevail over the positive identification by these prosecution witnesses who had
no improper motive whatsoever to falsely testify against him.[44] This decisional rule
applies squarely to demolish appellant's pretensions.
As to the trial
court's award of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of deceased Meynardo
Altobar, Jr., the Court finds the same to be excessive with respect to moral
damages and unwarranted with regard to exemplary damages. Consistent with our
jurisprudence, the award of moral damages in the present case has necessarily
to be limited by the Court to the maximum amount of P50,000.00.[45]
Exemplary
damages may be awarded in criminal cases where the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances.[46] In the
instant case, no aggravating circumstance is present to warrant the award of
exemplary damages since treachery has been used to qualify the killing to
murder, nocturnity has been absorbed by treachery, and evident premeditation
has not been proved.
WHEREFORE, the
appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, but with MODIFICATION of the civil
liability of accused-appellant Jaime Reyes. Conformably with the foregoing
discussion, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Meynardo Altobar, Jr. the
sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P90,000.00 as compensatory damages for
funeral expenses, P50,000.00 by way of moral damages, and P20,000.00 as actual
damages for litigation expenses inclusive of attorney's fees, all without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and with costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Penned by
Judge Luis R. Tongco.
[2] Original
Record, 35.
[3]
Ibid., 44.
[4] Rollo, 16.
[5] Original
Record, 78.
[6]
TSN, March 20, 1991, 6-10.
[7]
Ibid., id., 13-15.
[8]
Ibid., April 16, 1991, pp. 27-31.
[9]
Sometimes called a "short pit" cap; used by Japanese soldiers during
the last war.
[10]
TSN, March 20, 1991, 19-21; April 16, 1991, 33.
[11]
Ibid., August 8, 1991, 22-30.
[12]
Ibid., May 8, 1991, 2-8; Original Record, 252.
[13]
TSN, August 12, 1991, 4-6.
[14]
Ibid., id., 7-9.
[15]
Ibid., August 18, 1992, 4-5.
[16]
Ibid., August 12, 1991, 8-9.
[17]
Ibid., September 30, 1993, 3-5.
[18]
Ibid., November 18, 1993, 8-10
[19]
Ibid., id., 19-25.
[20]
Ibid., id., 41-43.
[21]
Ibid., id., 51.
[22]
Rollo, 59-60.
[23]
Ibid., 104; Brief for the Accused-Appellant, 1.
[24]
Ibid., 118.
[25]
People vs. Tampon, G.R. No. 105583, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 115.
[26]
Rollo, 174; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, 12.
[27]
TSN, March 20, 1991, 6-7.
[28]
Ibid., April 16, 1991, 25.
[29]
People vs. Tatlonghari, et. al., L-22094, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 726; People
vs. de Manuel, G.R. No. 117950, October 9, 1996, 263 SCRA 49.
[30]
People vs. Tampon, supra, fn. 25.
[31]
People vs. Ronquillo, et. al., G.R. No. 96125, August 31, 1995, 247 SCRA 793.
[32]
TSN, April 16, 1991, 40.
[33]
Ibid., March 20, 1991, 23-24.
[34]
Rollo, 119; Brief for the Accused-Appellant, 16.
[35]
People vs. Pandiano, et al., G.R. No. 90893, May 30, 1994, 232 SCRA 619; People
vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 116610, December 2, 1996, 265 SCRA 216.
[36]
TSN, October 6, 1992, 11-12.
[37]
Ibid., August 8, 1991, 16-17.
[38]
Ibid., id., 18-19.
[39]
People vs. Buka, et al., G.R. Nos. 68311-13, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 567;
People vs. Pastoral, G.R. No. 51686, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 219; People
vs. Villanueva, supra, fn. 35.
[40]
Rollo, 123; Brief for the Accused-Appellant, 123-124.
[41]
TSN, April 16, 1991, 19-20.
[42]
Ibid., id., 35.
[43]
Ibid., August 18, 1992, 4-5.
[44]
People vs. Sotes, et al., G.R. No. 101337, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 353.
[45]
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 113578, July 14,
1995, 246 SCRA 376; People vs. Trilles, et al., G.R. No. 114388, March 12,
1996, 254 SCRA 633.
[46]
People vs. Maguikay, G.R. Nos. 103226-28, October 14, 1994, 237 SCRA 587.