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351 Phil. 421
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 121698, March 26, 1998 ]
MALAYA SHIPPING SERVICES,
INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ROLANDO M. REY, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
This petition
for certiorari seeks to vacate the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) dated April 29, 1995, sustaining the Labor
Arbiter’s finding of illegal dismissal, as well as the resolution dated June
26, 1995, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner
Malaya Shipping Services, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of
repairing containers used for maritime transport and navigation. Respondent Rolando M. Rey, on the other
hand, was employed as welder sometime in June 1983 and assigned at petitioner’s
Container Repair Department (CRD).
The petitioner’s
version follows:
On June 18,
1992, at around 2:00 p.m., respondent, who was supposedly on duty starting at
8:00 a.m., arrived at the company premises apparently under the influence of liquor. The security guard on duty, Bernido A.
Marchan, sensing that respondent was intoxicated, refused the latter entry into
the company premises. Respondent,
however, was persistent and explained that his purpose was merely to procure
his automated teller machine card (ATM) from the Accounting Department.
Witnessing the
incident, CRD Head Mr. Edgardo M. del Rosario approached respondent and advised
him to go home but this appeal was rejected. Uttering expletive remarks, he
insisted vociferously that he be allowed entry to the compound. Hoping to appease him, del Rosario finally
relented and even escorted him to the accounting office.
After obtaining
his ATM card, respondent started to cry for no apparent reason. Upon seeing his predicament, employees tried
to comfort him but this show of concern was, not only rebuffed, but worse, he
hurled invectives at them. When
respondent was led out of the office, he saw a co-worker, Mr. Arturo Ramirez,
standing beside a delivery truck. Without warning he cursed Ramirez, saying “Putang ina mo Turing,
walanghiya ka, pati Ate ko sinisilipan mo,” and chased the latter with manifest
intent to inflict injury upon him. Unable to get hold of Ramirez, he vented his ire on another fellow
employee, Wilfredo Gregorio, who was able to dodge the blow thrown at him. Frustrated, respondent repeatedly kicked a
parked delivery truck until the driver of said truck “got out and took a piece
of wood with which to scare respondent.”[1] When apprised of the incident, two
other co-workers, a certain Jonatas and Matic, tried to pacify the respondent
but again, he screamed profanities, particularly at the former in this wise;
“Putang ina mo matanda ka, sinungaling ka rin.”
Consequently,
petitioner’s Finance and Administrative Manager, Mr. Engracio L. Sagcal, Jr.,
scheduled an investigation on July 13, 1992 for respondent to explain his
behavior and why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him. Directed to attend the inquiry were del
Rosario, Ramirez, Jonatas and Matic.
At the inquiry, respondent
merely proffered self-serving denials. Forthwith, he was suspended for
fifteen (15) days commencing on July 15, 1992. On the ground of serious misconduct, he was terminated from employment
on August 6, 1992.
Respondent, in
his position paper, argues that the cause for his dismissal was unsubstantiated
and that he was denied the statutory rights of notice and hearing.
In the complaint
for illegal dismissal against petitioner, Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes
rendered a decision dated April 15, 1994, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal illegal and ordering respondent to:
1. Pay
complainant separation pay at 1/2 mo. for every year of service and backwages
from the date of the termination to the date of decision;
2. Pay
complainant his 13th month pay and accrued vacation leaves; and
3. Attorney’s
fees of 10% of the total monetary award.
The Research and Information Unit
of this Commission is hereby directed to effect necessary computation which
shall form part of this decision.
SO ORDERED.”[2]
On appeal, this decision was
affirmed by the NLRC with the deletion, however, of the award of attorney’s fees.
There is merit
in the petition.
It must be
underscored that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC
are generally accorded, not only respect but, at times, finality if such are
supported by substantial evidence.[3] The rule will not apply, however,
where the substantiality of the evidence requires a reversal or modification.[4] This is one such case.
Undoubtedly, the
labor arbiter and the NLRC accorded credence to respondent’s rejoinder which
essentially refuted petitioner’s allegation that an investigation of the
incident was conducted, thereby affording the former his right to due
process. They alleged that the
transcript[5] taken during the investigation was
unreliable for several reasons, namely: (1) the transcript did not bear the
signature of the respondent; (2) the specific date on which the same took place
was omitted; and (3) that while the claimed investigation was conducted on July
13, 1992, the affidavits[6] of Marchan, del Rosario and Ramirez
were executed only on November 9, 1992
or four months after the alleged inquiry. These contentions are specious.
In proceedings
before the NLRC, there is nothing in the Labor Code or in its implementing
rules and regulations which require the submission of affidavits in company
investigations for infractions committed by its employees. On the contrary, they are not indispensable
in such inquiries for what usually takes place therein is merely the
confrontation between the witnesses for and against the employee
concerned. The affidavit’s importance
is underscored only upon order by the labor arbiter for the party litigants to
submit their respective position papers. Rule V, Section 3 of the NLRC’s rules
states that in the event of the failure to reach an amicable settlement, the
parties shall submit their position papers accompanied by all supporting
documents, including the affidavits of their respective witnesses.
Likewise, the
fact that the transcript is undated and unsigned by respondent is not a
sufficient ground for rejecting them. In the instant case, the genuineness of the transcript was attested to
by several persons who, as the record shows, had no ulterior motive to falsely
testify against respondent. Thus, in
the absence of convincing proof that the witnesses were impelled by improper
motive to make untruthful statements against respondent, their testimony shall
be worthy of full faith and credit. Besides, there is no provision of law which prescribes that an employee
must affix his signature on the transcript taken during company investigations.
With regard to
the charge of serious misconduct, we find that the same was amply supported by
the evidence on record. The respondent
failed to make a categorical assertion that he did not commit the serious
misconduct on June 18, 1992 or that the accusations against him were
fabricated. It must be noted that the
respondent’s rejoinder, upon which the labor arbiter and the NLRC based their
decision, neither denied the charge of misconduct nor controverted the same.
Respondent merely harped on the alleged infirmities in the procedure for
dismissing employees. The acts of
respondent having been squarely put in issue, he, therefore, had all the
opportunity to deny and disprove the allegations of petitioner. Evidently, he failed in this respect.
It is settled
that in termination cases, the employer must furnish the worker with two (2)
written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (a)
notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which his dismissal is sought, and (b) the subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.[7] Apparently, the first notice
required seem absent from the record. Respondent, however, was accorded the second notice through registered
mail which formally notified him of his termination from employment effective
August 6, 1992. After a careful
deliberation, we conclude that partial compliance with the statutory
requirements respecting the procedure to be observed in terminating employees
will not suffice. While this does not
render the dismissal illegal, it makes the same defective for which “the
employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the requirements of or for
failure to observe due process.”[8] “The twin requirements of notice
and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of
those elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional
guaranty. These requisites cannot be
replaced as they are not mere technicalities, but requirements of due process
to which every employee is entitled to ensure that the employer’s prerogative
to dismiss is not exercised abitrarily.”[9]
This Court has
held in numerous cases[10] that fighting within company
premises is a valid ground for dismissing an employee. In Seahorse Maritime Corporation v. NLRC,[11] it was ruled that serious
misconduct in the form of drunkenness and disorderly and violent behavior,
habitual neglect of duty and insubordination or willful disobedience to the
lawful orders of his superior officer, are just causes for the dismissal of an
employee. Thus, we find that
respondent’s failure to deny culpability is fatal to his cause and that the
same, therefore, “assumes the character of an admission of liability.”[12]
In view of the
prevailing circumstances, we hold that a valid cause exists for respondent’s
dismissal from his employment. The
dismissal, however, of respondent was accomplished in violation of the
“necessary procedural safeguards.” In
the recent case of Better Buildings, Inc. v. NLRC,[13] this Court held that where an
employee’s dismissal is grounded upon a just or valid cause but disregards the
procedural aspect thereof, the dismissed employee shall be entitled to nominal
damages.[14] The award is not for the purpose of
penalizing the petitioner but to vindicate or recognize private respondent’s
right to procedural due process which was violated by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated April 29, 1995 is
hereby SET ASIDE. For the
non-observance of full procedural due process in effecting the dismissal,
petitioner shall PAY to the private respondent the amount of P5,000.00
as nominal damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Rollo,
p. 49.
[2] Rollo,
pp. 135-136.
[3] Trendline
Employees Association - Southern Philippines Federation of Labor v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 112923, May 5, 1997.
[4] Anderson v.
NLRC, 252 SCRA 116 (1996).
[5] Annex E, Rollo,
p. 65.
[6] Annexes
B, C, D, Rollo, pp. 62-65
[7]
Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services (Phil.), Inc. v. NRLC, 264 SCRA 307
(1996).
[8] Sebuguero
v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 532 (1995).
[9] Vinta
Maritime Co., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113911, January 23, 1998.
[10] Flores v.
NLRC, 256 SCRA 735 (1996); Royo v. NLRC, 256 SCRA 639 (1996); E.g., Foodmine, Inc. v. NLRC, 188 SCRA 748
(1990); Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69 (1989); North Camarines
Lumber Co., Inc. v. Barreda, 153 SCRA 244 (1987); Haverton Shipping,
Ltd. v. NLRC, 135 SCRA 685 (1985).
[11] 173 SCRA
390 (1989).
[12] Caliguia
v. NLRC, 264 SCRA 110 (1996).
[13] G.R. No.
109714, December 15, 1997.
[14] ART.
2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated
in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
idemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.