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350 Phil. 412
SECOND DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 2040, March 04, 1998 ]
IMELDA A. NAKPIL, COMPLAINANT,
VS. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
The friendship
of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the ‘50s during
their schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness
extended to their families and respondent became the business consultant,
lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose
Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street,
Baguio City.[1] For lack of funds, he requested
respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent
would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it
back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a
bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used
to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondent’s
name.
It was the
Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July 8,
1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow,
complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondent’s law firm, Carlos J.
Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Jose’s
estate. Complainant was appointed as administratix of the estate.
The ownership of
the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It appears
that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s
estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran
property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29,
1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with
damages against respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed
absolute ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over
it.
During the
pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative
case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated
professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the ‘inventory of real estate properties’ he prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to the said property to his family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its counsel and auditor.[2]
On the first
charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondent’s offer to serve as
lawyer and auditor to settle her husband’s estate. Respondent’s law firm then filed a petition for settlement of the
estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in the estate’s
inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his corporation,
Caval Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused
respondent of maliciously appropriating the property in trust knowing that it
did not belong to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly acknowledged
that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his correspondences[3] with the Baguio City Treasurer and
the complainant.
On the second
charge, complainant alleged that respondent’s auditing firm (C. J. Valdes and
Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husband’s
estate, yet included in the claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00
and P75,000.00, which respondent represented as her husband’s loans
applied “probably for the purchase of a house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio
City.”
As to the third
charge, complainant alleged that respondent’s law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and
Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husband’s estate in
court, while respondent’s auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as
accountant of both the estate and two of its creditors. She claimed that
respondent represented conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared
the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her husband’s
estate which was represented by respondent’s law firm. Complainant averred that
there is no distinction between respondent’s law and auditing firms as
respondent is the senior and controlling partner of both firms which are housed
in the same building.
We required
respondent to answer the charges against him. In hisANSWER,[4] respondent initially asserted that
the resolution of the first and second charges against him depended on the
result of the pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the
issue of ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of
the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case
that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its
absolute owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought back the
Moran property from him, hence, the property remained to be his and was rightly
excluded from the inventory of Nakpil’s estate.
As to the second
charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate which
included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase
and renovation of the Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate,
he stressed that the list drawn up by his accounting firm merely stated that
the loans in respondent’s name were applied “probably for the purchase of the
house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.” Respondent insisted that this was
not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase “probably
for the purchase” did not imply a consummated transaction but a projected
acquisition.
Respondent also
disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit “H”) of
his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate
taxes for the Moran property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the
letter could be a mere error or oversight.
Respondent
averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the
Moran property for: (1) complainant’s February 1979 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities did not include the said property, and; (2) complainant, as
administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property
was not mentioned.
Respondent
admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms
in the settlement of her husband’s estate.[5] However, he pointed out that he has
resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it
was Atty. Percival Cendaña (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates)
who filed the inestate proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third
charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm
represented the estate in the inestate proceedings while his accounting firm
(C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared
the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He
proffered the following reasons for his
thesis: First, the two claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil.
Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation of the Nakpils of which the late
Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil
who, upon the latter’s death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two
claimants had been clients of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime
of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests was
with the knowledge and consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there
was no conflict of interests between the estate and the claimants for they had
forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied
only after full payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as
administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc.
Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc.
after satisfying the banks’ claims. Complainant did not assert that their
claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J. Valdes and
Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm
prepared a true and accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned
from his law and accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974.[6] He rejoined his accounting firm
several years later. He submitted as proof the SEC’s certification of the
filing of his accounting firm of an Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it
was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaña, from the firm Carlos J. Valdes and
Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand,
the claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan.
Sixth, respondent alleged that in the remote possibility that he committed a
breach of professional ethics, he committed such “misconduct” not as a lawyer
but as an accountant who acted as common auditor of the estate and its
creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another forum.
On November 12,
1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.[7] She maintained that the pendency of
the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment
complaint against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership
of the Moran property but the ethics and morality of respondent’s conduct as a
CPA-lawyer.
Complainant
alleged that respondent’s Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of Assets
& Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which
showed that complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran property were all
prepared by C. J. Valdes and Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and
filed with the intestate court by C. J. Valdes and Associates as counsel for
the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that respondent
owned the Moran property but were part of respondent’s scheme to remove the
property from the estate and transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant
alleged that she signed the documents because of the professional counsel of
respondent and his firm that her signature thereon was required. Complainant
charged respondent with greed for coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects
in the documents he himself prepared.
Complainant
urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of claims
against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpil’s payments of realty tax on
the Moran property) which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and
invoke other documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him.
She averred that respondent must accept responsibility not just for some, but
for all the representations and communications of his firms.
Complainant
refuted respondent’s claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976
to “several years later.” She alleged that none of the documents submitted as
evidence referred to his resignation from his law firm. The documents merely
substantiated his resignation from his accounting firm.
In his
REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that
complainant cannot hold him liable for representing the interests of both the
estate and the claimants without showing that his action prejudiced the estate.
He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondent’s accounting
firm to act as accountant for the
estate and its creditors. He reiterated that he is not subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for
both the estate and its claimants.
He alleged that
his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel
Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law
firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose
these claims as they were legitimate and not because they were prepared by his
accounting firm. He emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims
were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of respondent’s law firm to
object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January
21, 1980 Resolution,[9] we deferred further action on the
disbarment case until after resolution of the action for reconveyance between
the parties involving the issue of ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant
moved for reconsideration on the ground that the issue of ownership pending
with the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which involved an entirely
different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We
granted her motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation.[10]
In 1983, the CFI
of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that
respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that
complainant waived her right over it.
On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that
respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was
elevated to this Court.
On February 18,
1986, during the pendency of complainant’s appeal to this Court, the OSG
submitted its Report[11] on the disbarment complaint. The
OSG relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals then pending review
by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not put on notice of
complainant’s claim over the property. It opined that there was no trust
agreement created over the property and that respondent was the absolute owner
thereof. Thus, it upheld respondent’s right to transfer title to his family
corporation. It also found no conflict of interests as the claimants were
related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case.
Prefatorily, we
note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the
disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and
law practice in connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a
lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith.[12] The measure of good faith which an
attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much
higher standard than is required in business dealings where the parties trade
at “arms length.”[13] Business transactions between an
attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the
law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no
advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public
policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take
advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of
innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s favor. [14]
In the case at
bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These
findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
action for reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993.[15]
As to the first
two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the
aforementioned reconveyance case.[16] It is well-established that
respondent offered to the complainant the services of his law and accounting
firms by reason of their close relationship dating as far back as the ‘50s. She
reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the lawyer, accountant and
business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed
that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the
latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute
ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to complainant
after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of
complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his
corporation.
Contrary to the
findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the trust
nature of the Moran property. Respondent’s bad faith in transferring the
property to his family corporation is well discussed in this Court’s Decision,[17] thus:
“x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. x x x (H)e repudiated the trust when (he) excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
“The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can be bolstered by Exh. “I-2,” an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit “I-2,” which is a list of the application of the proceeds of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, x x x contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name of respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was already transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been included in the list.
“Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement outlined in Exh. “J” was that respondent Valdes would x x x ‘take over the total loan ofP140,000.00 and pay all of the interests due on the notes’ while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to live in the disputed property for five (5) years without remuneration save for regular maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes could already automatically assume ownership of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J. Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or the property itself.” (emphasis supplied)
In the said
reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainant’s documentary evidence
(Exhibits “H”, “J” and “L”), which she also adduced in this administrative
case, should estop respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran property
for himself, and not merely in trust for Jose Nakpil.[18]
It ought to
follow that respondent’s act of excluding Moran property from the estate which
his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his
client. If respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he
should have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could
not agree on its ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim
in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the property to his own
corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate
proceedings. Respondent’s misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client
of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
To make matters
worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00
and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were
obtained by respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he
claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by
disclaiming knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the estate’s
liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans must have been a mere
error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the information as
to how these two loans should be treated could have only come from respondent
himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in charging
respondent’s loans against the estate could not have been committed without
respondent’s participation. Respondent wanted to “have his cake and eat it too”
and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain.
Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and enjoins him to
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the
third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an
attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent
both sides of an issue.[19] The proscription against
representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter[20] and is applicable however slight
such adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney’s intentions and
motives were honest and he acted in good faith.[21] However, representation of
conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the
representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough
for the clients must give their informed consent to such representation. The
lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of conflict and the
possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients.[22]
In the case at
bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of it
creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the
list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed
the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between
the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two
claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance,
respondent’s law firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against
the estate.
To exculpate
himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate
proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaña, from his law
firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court.
However, the fact that he did not personally file the case and appear in court
is beside the point. As established in the records of this case and in the
reconveyance case, [23] respondent acted as counsel and
accountant of complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondent’s defense
that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974 (or two
years before the filing of the intestate case) is unworthy of merit.
Respondent’s claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by any
documentary proof. The documents on record [24] only show respondent’s resignation
from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent returned to his accounting
firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the
settlement of Jose’s estate had not yet been terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent
transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February 13, 1978, the
intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent could not
have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent
claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes &
Associates was the legal counsel of the estate[25] and his accounting firm, C.J.
Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the auditor of both the estate and the two
claimants against it.[26] The fact, however, that
complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be taken
against her as there is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his
law firm explained the legal situation and its consequences to complainant.
Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does not amount to an acquiescence
based on an informed consent.
We also hold
that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the
conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his
interest is per se adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by
complainant, if she had a claim against her husband’s estate, her claim is
still adverse and must be filed in the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from
these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where
his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty
of respondent’s law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but
which claims were prepared by respondent’s accounting firm. Even if the claims
were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable.
The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondent’s
duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the
probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent
advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not
be charged before this Court as his alleged “misconduct” pertains to his
accounting practice.
We do not agree.
Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is
the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the
case at bar, complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for
being the common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged
for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and,
at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the
proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of
professional ethics and undesirable as it placed respondent’s and his law
firm’s loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondent’s
misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court
from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer
may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor. [27] Possession of good moral character
is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.
Public
confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by
acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the
standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the
relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature
and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [28] In the case at bar, respondent exhibited
less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
his dealings and transactions with his clients. [29]
IN VIEW
WHEREOF, the Court
finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from receipt of
this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with
more severely in the future.
Let copies of
this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., no part. Previous associate with respondent.
[1] The Moran
property consists of a four-bedroom bungalow on a 2,490 square meter lot.
[2]
Letter-complaint, dated June 16, 1979; Rollo, pp. 1-9.
[3] Exhibits
“H”, “J” and “L”; adduced also in the reconveyance case.
[4] Rollo,
pp. 44-63.
[5] Attached
to his Answer is the relationship agreement, dated February 20, 1976, between
complainant and his firms; Rollo, pp. 73-75.
[6] He
attached to his Answer his letter of resignation addressed to the managing
partner of his accounting firm (Rollo, at P. 76) and the SEC certification that the letter of resignation
was duly presented to said body (Rollo, at p. 77).
[7] Rollo,
pp. 137-155.
[8] Rollo,
pp. 182-197.
[9] Ibid.,
p. 200.
[10] See
Resolution, dated July 18, 1984; Rollo, at p. 305.
[11] Rollo,
pp. 306-342.
[12] 7 C. J.
S. 966.
[13] Gould v.
State, 69 ALR 709.
[14] 5 Am.
Jur. 338.
[15] Nakpil v.
IAC, 225 SCRA 456.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Nakpil v.
IAC, supra.
[18] Ibid.,
at p. 465.
[19] 7A C. J.
S. 206-209, citing U.S. – Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation vs.
Daniel Intern Corporation, C.A. Ga., 563.
[20] Md. –
Rippon vs. Mercantile Safe Deposit & T. Co. of Baltimore, 131 A. 2d
695, 699, 213 Md. 215.
[21] U.S. –
Cinema 5 Ltd. vs. Cinerama, Inc., C.A.N.Y., 528 F. 2d 1384.
[22] 7A C. J.
S. 215-216; Pa. – Jedwabny vs. Philadelphia Transport Co., 135 A. 2d
252, 390 Pa. 231; 78 S. Ct. 557, 355 U.S. 966, 2 L. Ed. 2d 541.
[23] Nakpil vs.
IAC, supra, at p. 458.
[24] Amendment
to Amended Articles of Partnership of respondent’s accounting firm which
contains the following information: (a) on July 17, 1973, a week after Jose
Nakpil died, the SEC approved the recall of respondent’s withdrawal from
his accounting firm in 1972; see Rollo, at pp. 80 - 81; (b) on August
31, 1974, respondent resigned again from his accounting firm; see Respondent's
letter of resignation from his accounting firm, dated August 15, 1974; Rollo, at p. 76; (c) on July 1,
1976, barely three months after the filing of intestate case in court,
respondent rejoined his accounting firm; Rollo, at p. 89. All the
foregoing documents refer to respondent’s resignation from his accounting firm. Moreover, it appears from the records
that as of 1978, the intestate case was still pending in court.
[25] Rollo,
at p. 60.
[26] Ibid.,
at p. 59.
[27] Nadayag vs.
Grageda, 237 SCRA 202 [1994].
[28] Igual vs.
Javier, 254 SCRA 416 [1996].
[29] Canon 15,
Code of Professional Responsibility.