ADVISORY: |
The Supreme Court E-Library will undergo a system
maintenance on March 28-31, 2024 and will be inaccessible during this period. Thank you for your understanding! |
CONTACT: |
Supreme Court of the Philippines Library Services, Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, Philippines 1000 |
(632) 8524-2706 |
libraryservices.sc@judiciary.gov.ph |
352 Phil. 336
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 112972, April 24, 1998 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMEO
SAMBULAN, LUCAS SAMBULAN AND ALFREDO SAMBULAN, ACCUSED.
ROMEO SAMBULAN AND
LUCAS SAMBULAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellants Romeo and Lucas Sambulan, together with their brother Alberto Sambulan, were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Tangub City, in an information alleging -
That on or about the 28th day of August, 1998, at 6:00 o’clock in the evening, in Barangay Manga, Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating (with) one another and armed with bolos, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, strike and stab one Antonio Roda, hitting and inflicting multiple wounds on the different parts of his body, resulting in his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.[1]
Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty to the
charges filed against them.[2] At the trial and after the prosecution had
rested its case, the lower court, upon motion of the defense, ordered the
dismissal of the case against Alberto Sambulan for lack of evidence.[3] The trial then proceeded with regard to
accused Romeo and Lucas Sambulan.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, Antonia Roda,
Saturnino* Mabalod,
Felix Ano-os, Dr. Sinforiana del Castillo and Delfin Lumingkit. Their version of the incident, culled from
their testimonies in the trial court, constitute the bases for the findings of
facts narrated hereunder.
On August 28, 1992 at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon,
according to Saturnino Mabalod, appellants’ father, Pedro Sambulan, and the victim, Antonio Roda, were
at the store of Lourdes Gulahab situated at Barangay Manga, Tangub
City. Shortly thereafter, Pedro
Sambulan approached the victim and told him that he is a crocodile (“buaya”). Offended, the victim replied, “Do not say
that word, Nong, because that will cause me shame.” As a result, the two engaged in a fistfight, whereupon Saturnino
intervened and pacified them. He then
brought Pedro Sambulan home. Nobody was
present at the Sambulan household when they arrived.[4]
At about 6:00 o’clock in the evening of the same day, Felix
Ano-os saw appellants Romeo and Lucas Sambulan at the cornfield of Esteban
Gulahab hacking Antonio Roda with a bolo. This cornfield is situated at Barangay Manga, and witness Ano-os
was then more or less 10 meters away from the crime scene. He later overheard Lucas Sambulan say, “We have already taken you, Ling,” referring
to the victim. From the cornfield,
Felix Ano-os immediately went home and recounted what he saw to Delfin Lumingkit,
the victim’s brother-in-law who was his neighbor. The latter went to the house of his sister, Antonia Roda, and
informed her about the incident.[5]
Thereafter, Delfin accompanied his sister to the locus
criminis. There, Antonia Roda could
hardly recognize her husband as his corpse lay on the cornfield covered with
blood and bearing multiple wounds on the face and neck. She reported the incident to the police and
then fetched Dr. Sinforiana del Castillo, City Health Officer of Tangub City,
to examine the body of her husband.[6]
Dr. Del Castillo testified in court that the multiple mortal wounds on the face and neck of the victim were the immediate cause of his death. According to her findings, the victim sustained 13 wounds described in the necropsy report as follows:
1. Open incised wound at the base of the anterior neck above Angle of Louis, deep 7 centimeters long across the neck. Extremity of wound at the right is round and at the left is sharp.
2. Immediately above is another open gaping incised wound, deep, 9.3 centimeters long across the neck. Trachea, esophagus and blood vessels completely cut. Both extremities of the wound sharp.
3. Open gaping incised wound across submandibular region 15 centimeters long from right face towards the left side of the neck.
4. Open wound cutting bones from left eye towards the right posterior portion of the neck obliquely 30 centimeters long.
5. Open gaping incised wound at the left face 7.5 centimeters long longitudinally. Both extremities of the wound is sharp.
6. Open wound 10.5 centimeters long from left to right cheek across the bridge of the nose.
7. Open wound across frontal region cutting bones 16 centimeters long from left ear to right eyebrow.
8. Stab wound located at left chest anterior, mid-clavicular line at the level of the nipple obliquely 3.2 centimeters, both extremities of wound sharp.
9. Open incised wound, deep, bones exposed at the right elbow lateral aspect 5 centimeters long, lower extremity of the wound is sharp, upper extremity round with continuity 10 centimeters linear superficial wound upward to the right arm lateral aspect.
10. Open gaping wound at left shoulder 13 centimeters towards upper 3rd of arm. Both extremities sharp.
11. Incised wound 3 centimeters across left forearm posterior deep.
12. Superficial wound of skin only 5 centimeters across left forearm.
13. Open wound right arm lateral aspect 4 centimeters long. Both extremities sharp.[7]
When asked on cross-examination if it could be possible that all
the injuries found on the body of the victim may have been caused by one and
the same kind of instrument, she answered in the negative because of the nature
and shape of the wound found on his chest.[8]
Testifying in his defense, appellant Romeo Sambulan[9] admitted having killed the victim but
invoked self-defense. He testified that
on August 28, 1992, when he arrived home from Cagayan de Oro City after
attending the fiesta, he found his father with hematoma on his face. When he inquired about the cause of the
injuries, his father told him that he was boxed by Antonio Roda. Later, after taking a short rest, appellant
went to the street crossing to buy cigarettes. On his way to the store, he met the victim by chance and he asked the
latter why he boxed appellant’s father. The victim got mad and said: “Are you going to defend him?” As the victim pulled out his long bolo,
appellant kicked him in the groin. As
soon as the victim fell, appellant grabbed the bolo and stabbed him, then
hacked him several times, and ran away.
He immediately went to the house of his brother, Lucas, to ask the latter to accompany him to see their brother-in-law who was a councilman, so that appellant could surrender to the police. He thereafter did so and he also yielded to the police a bolo and its scabbard, claiming that it was the bolo he had wrested from the victim and the scabbard which he had removed from the latter’s waist. He belied the claim of the prosecution that his brother, Lucas, took part in the killing of Antonio Roda. He insisted that it was he alone who committed the killing.
The foregoing testimony of appellant was corroborated by defense
witness Rosalinda Undag Malig-on, an itinerant vendor of “amahong”
shells, who allegedly happened to pass by the scene of the crime at the time of
the killing. She claimed that she was
then on her way home from Bongabong and passed by Barangay Manga at
around 6:00 P.M. of that fatal day. She
further confirmed that only appellant Romeo Sambulan and the victim were
present at the time and place of the incident.[10]
The other appellant, Lucas Sambulan, denied participation in the
killing of the victim. He declared that
he was in his house at the time of the commission of the crime when his
brother, Romeo, arrived. The latter asked for help because of his fight with
the victim whose bolo he was bringing with him.[11] His testimony was echoed by Godofredo Dayo,
who testified that on the day of the incident, he was in the house of Lucas
watching television. He stated that at
about 6:00 P.M., appellant Romeo Sambulan arrived and asked his brother, Lucas,
to accompany him to the city in order to turn himself in to the authorities
because he had wounded Antonio Roda.[12]
On September 10, 1993, the trial court, presided over by
Executive Judge Dominador B. Borje, rendered the questioned decision finding
both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing them to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.[13] Not satisfied, both accused interposed the
present appeal.
On July 15, 1995, this Court received a letter from the Assistant
Director of the Bureau of Corrections informing it that on May 23, 1994,
appellant Lucas Sambulan died at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in
Zamboanga City.[14] Thereafter, appellant Romeo Sambulan
manifested through his then counsel that he was no longer interested in
pursuing his appeal.[15] On the basis thereof, the Court issued a
resolution on November 13, 1995 dismissing the appeal and declaring this case
closed and terminated.[16]
On January 12, 1995, however, the Court received a letter from
appellant Romeo Sambulan, dated December 18, 1995, moving for the
reconsideration of the said dismissal and requesting for the appointment of a
new counsel to represent him.[17] In a resolution dated July 8, 1996, his
appeal was reinstated and the Public Attorney’s Office was appointed as his
counsel de oficio.[18]
On September 27, 1996, the new counsel filed appellant’s brief with the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in disregarding the theory of the accused Romeo Sambulan that he acted in self-defense.
2. The trial court erred in finding that the killing is qualified by evident premeditation and treachery and failed to appreciate in favor of the accused the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and vindication of a grave offense.
3. The trial court erred in finding accused-appellants Romeo and Lucas Sambulan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.[19]
There is obviously no need to discuss the merits of the appeal of
appellant Lucas Sambulan. His criminal
liability, as well as the civil liability based solely thereon, have been
extinguished by his death. Upon the
death of an accused pending appeal from his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished, and the civil aspect instituted therewith for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it
is on the criminal action alone.[20]
As to the other appellant, Romeo Sambulan, we agree that his plea
of self-defense was correctly rejected by the trial court. Long embedded in our jurisprudence is the
decisional rule that where an accused admits having killed the victim but
invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden of
proof to establish his plea of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing
evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed
the victim.[21] Further, the accused must this time rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution. For, even if the
prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself
had admitted the killing.[22]
On this score, for self-defense to prosper, it must be positively
shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the
life of the accused in danger and forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds
upon his assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to resist said attack.[23]
In the instant case, the defense failed to establish the primary
element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Even granting arguendo the truth of
the version purveyed by appellant, the mere drawing by the victim of a bolo
does not justify the acts of appellant of forthwith stabbing and repeatedly
hacking the victim who was already lying immobilized on the ground after being
kicked in the groin. From that moment,
the supposed aggression had already ceased and the continuation of the
offensive stance of the accused puts him in the place of the aggressor.[24] When an unlawful agression which has begun
no longer exists, the one making a defense has no right to kill or even to
wound the former aggressor. [25]
Additionally, the nature, number and severity of the wounds
sustained by the victim negate appellant’s claim of self-defense. The necropsy report shows that the victim
sustained 13 wounds, the majority of which were grave and inflicted on his neck
and face, whereas appellant Romeo Sambulan suffered no bodily harm or injury
whatsoever. The gruesome wounds
sustained by the victim logically indicate that the assault was no longer an
act of self-defense but a determined murderous aggression. Such wounds belie the exculpatory pretension
of appellant and confirm the theory of the prosecution that appellant purposely
and vigorously attacked the deceased in order to kill the latter. [26]
It is both a statutory and doctrinal axiom that for the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence of unlawful aggression is
a condition sine qua non. There
can be no self-defense to speak of, whether complete or incomplete, unless the
victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending
himself.[27]
Another consideration that undermines the claim of self-defense
is the fact that there is physical evidence which casts serious doubt on the
story given by appellant Romeo Sambulan to the trial court. From the testimony of the doctor based on
her necropsy report, the wounds of the victim must have been inflicted by at
least two kinds of instruments.[28] This contradicts herein appellant’s version
of the incident that he used only the bolo of the victim in attacking him and that
he alone killed the latter.
Ironically, the very submission of appellant that the bolo he
used in hacking the victim belonged to the latter was rendered gravely doubtful
by his own act of surrendering the bolo together with its scabbard to the
police. His allegation that he removed
the scabbard from the waist of the victim, so that he could also surrender it
with the bolo[29]
is incredible. It is not in accord with human behavior and
the natural course of things that despite the frenzied attack launched by
appellant against the victim which virtually mutilated the latter in the
process, as well as the extremely agitated emotional and psychological state of
mind of appellant at that time, he could still have the meticulosity to think
of the niceties of surrendering the death weapon without overlooking its
scabbard.
Appellant also faults the trial court for holding that the killing was qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, hence constitutive of murder. We agree with appellant on these points.
It was error for the lower court to appreciate treachery as a
qualifying circumstance for the simple and apparent reason that it was not so
alleged in the information. Nor can it
be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance, there being no showing that
appellant employed means, methods or forms calculated to insure the execution
of the killing without risk to himself arising from the defense the victim
might have made.[30] This is a fundamental requirement which is
mandated right in the codal provision therefor of our penal law.
More specifically, for treachery to be appreciated, there must be
proof that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself and that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack which he employed to ensure the
accomplishment of his purpose with impunity.[31]
In the case at bar, the record is bereft of evidence showing the methods or the means employed by appellant in order to ensure his safety from any retaliation that could be put up by the victim.[32] The witness for the prosecution only saw the actual hacking of the victim and not the preceding events that led to it. Treachery cannot be considered where the lone witness did not see the commencement of the assault. The importance of such testimony cannot be overemphasized considering that treachery cannot be presumed nor established from mere suppositions.[33]
The trial court also erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. To acknowledge the presence of this circumstance, it is necessary to establish (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) the act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to harken to its warnings.[34]
None of the abovestated elements has been established by the
prosecution, although it was at least able to prove that there was a previous
altercation between the victim and the father of appellant. This alone, of course, could not prove
evident premeditation on the part of herein appellant. The mere existence of ill-feelings or
grudges between the parties is not sufficient to sustain a conclusion of
premeditated killing.[35]
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal
act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to
carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a
calm judgment.[36] Where there is no showing as to how and when
the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried
out, evident premeditation cannot be considered to exist.[37] To show premeditation (premeditación
conocida), it is required that the criminal intent must be evident, not
merely suspected or thought of or contemplated mentally without an externalized
act.[38]
The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be
proved in an evident and incontestable manner. They must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense
itself.[39] They must be established by clear and
positive evidence, mere presumptions and inferences being insufficient no
matter how logical and probable they may be, and they cannot be drawn from mere
conclusions for they must be evident and not merely suspected. And, whenever, their existence have not been
established beyond doubt, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt.[40]
In view of the absence of any qualifying circumstance, therefore,
the crime committed by appellant Romeo Sambulan is homicide and not murder.[41]
Appellant also claims the benefit of two mitigating circumstances, namely, voluntary surrender and vindication of a grave offense. From the evidence on record, his submission on the first circumstance may be favorably considered, but not that with respect to the second.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have
been appreciated by the court below in the determination of the penalty. Appellant Romeo Sambulan did unconditionally
surrender himself to the authorities immediately after the killing.[42] This was not disputed by the
prosecution. In fact, the records show
that herein appellant has been detained, upon a volitional arrangement, at the
Tangub City Jail since August 28, 1992.[43] For the circumstance of voluntary surrender,
it is sufficient that it be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating
the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and
expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him.[44]
However, appellant’s claim for extenuation due to his having
allegedly acted in vindication of a grave offense cannot be granted. The evidence for the defense shows that from
the time appellant learned about the alleged fight between his father and the
victim up to the time he met the victim by chance on his way to the store, a
sufficient interval of time had elapsed for appellant to attain a cool
composure. In fact, he testified that
after his conversation with his father he even rested before going to the store
and he only went out to buy cigarettes.[45] There can be no immediate[46] vindication of a grave offense when the
accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity.[47]
Moreover, the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense was negated by appellant himself. In substantiating his plea of self-defense, appellant claimed that it was the victim who initiated the fight with him and was, therefore, the unlawful aggressor. He insisted that it was not the fact that the victim had boxed his father which impelled him to kill the victim, to wit:
Q In other words when your father reported to you that he was boxed in the face by Antonio Roda you became very mad?
A I was not mad at that time.
Q Why do you say that you hacked Antonio Roda many times because he boxed your father?
A Because he attacked me first.
Q After thrusting you(r) bolo for the first time to the body of Antonio Roda he fell down, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And after that you still inflicted 12 other injuries by hacking?
A Yes.
Q That is because he boxed your father?
A That is not the very cause and because he attacked me first I forgot my senses.
Q Now, when your father reported to you that he was boxed in the face by Antonio Roda you (were) still of sound senses, you did not still forget things?
A Not yet.[48]
Immediate vindication of a grave offense, like any other,
modifying circumstance, should be affirmatively proven,[49] and this burden appellant failed to
discharge. In fact, it is problematical
if he was actually redressing a grave offense committed against his father, it
appearing that the latter provoked the fight with the victim and they were
mutual aggressors. Furthermore, in
appellant’s own fight with the victim wherein he claims self-defense which
presupposes a defensive stance, it is inapposite to likewise claim that he
fought the victim to vindicate a wrong committed against his father, a posture
founded this time upon an offensive assault initiated by him.
All told, the criminal liability of appellant is for simple homicide, with a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and without any aggravating circumstance. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum imposable penalty would be within the minimum period of reclusion temporal, and the minimum penalty would be within any of the three periods of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Romeo Sambulan is declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED, with costs against said accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.Melo, Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, 1.
[2] Original Record, 21.
[3] Ibid., 47.
* Erroneously referred to in some parts of the record as "Santiago."
[4] TSN, April 16, 1993,
8-9.
[5] Ibid, April
17, 1993, 11-14.
[6] Ibid., April
16, 1993, 5-6.
[7] Ibid., June
16, 1993, 5-9; Exhibits A and B; Folder of Exhibits, 1 and 2.
[8] Ibid., June
16, 1993, 12.
[9] Ibid., July
30, 1993, 4-5.
[10] TSN, July 30, 1993,
4-5.
[11] Ibid., id.,
36-38.
[12] Ibid., July
29, 1993, 5-6.
[13] Original Record,
67-72.
[14] Rollo, 79.
[15] Ibid., 99.
[16] Ibid., 104.
[17] Ibid.,
106-107.
[18] Ibid., 113.
[19] Brief for
Appellants, 1; Rollo, 126.
[20] People vs. Sumaya,
G.R. Nos. 93281-84, November 17, 1994, 238 SCRA 201; People vs. Bayotas,
G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 239.
[21] People vs.
Morato, et al., G.R. Nos. 95358-59, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 361; People vs.
Mercado, G.R. No. L-33492, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 453.
[22] People vs.
Tidong, G.R. No. 101583, August 13, 1993, 225 SCRA 324; People vs.
Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, September 18, 1990, 189 SCRA 700; People vs. Rey,
G.R. No. 80089, April 13, 1989, 172 SCRA 149.
[23] People vs.
Sarense, et al., G.R. No. 97433, October 20, 1992, 214 SCRA 780; People vs.
Madali, et al., G.R. Nos. 67803-04, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 69.
[24] See People vs.
Ganzagan, Jr., G.R. No. 113793, August 11, 1995, 247 SCRA 220; People vs.
Binondo, G.R. No. 97227, October 20, 1992, 214 SCRA 764.
[25] Cf. People vs.
Alconga, et al., 78 Phil. 366 (1947).
[26] People vs. Macagaling, G.R. Nos. 109131-33, October 3, 1994, 237 SCRA 299; People vs.
Marciales, et al., G.R. No. 61961. October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 436.
[27] People vs.
Sazon, supra, fn. 21; People vs. Batas, et al., G.R. Nos.
84277-78, August 2, 1989, 176 SCRA 46; People vs. Bayocot, G.R. No.
55285, June 28, 1989, 174 SCRA 285.
[28] TSN, June 16, 1993,
11-13.
[29] Ibid., June
30, 1993, 33.
[30] People vs.
Salveron, G.R. No. 102079, November 22,
1993, 228 SCRA 92; People vs. Lubreo, et al., G.R. No. 74146,
August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA 11; People vs. Villapando, G.R. No. 73656,
October 5, 1989, 178 SCRA 34.
[31] People vs. Villapando, G.R. No. 73656, October 5, 1989, 178 SCRA 341; People vs. Espera, et
al., G.R. No. 67173, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA 728.
[32] People vs.
Buela, et al., G.R. No. 92536, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 534; People vs.
Bustos, G.R. No. 35475, March 16, 1989, 171 SCRA 243.
[33] People vs.
Salvador, et al., G.R. No. 101215, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 819; People vs.
Tiozon, G.R. No. 89823, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 368.
[34] People vs.
Layno, et al., G.R. No. 110833, November 21, 1996, 264 SCRA 558; People vs.
Liwag, et al., G.R. No. 89112, August 3, 1993, 225 SCRA 46; People vs.
Talla, et al., G.R. No. L-44414, January 18, 1990, 181 SCRA 133.
[35] See People vs. Lacao, et al., G.R. No. L-32078, September 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 89.
[36] See People vs.
Durante, 53 Phil. 363 (1929).
[37] People vs.
Narit, G.R. No. 77087, May 23, 1991, 197 SCRA 334.
[38] People vs.
Buela, et al., supra, fn. 31; People vs. Lagarto, G.R. No.
65833, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 611.
[39] People vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 68481, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 147; People vs. Tiongson, G.R.
Nos. L-35123-24, July 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 614.
[40] People vs. Pastoral, G.R. No. 51686, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 219; U.S. vs. Alvarez, 3
Phil. 24 (1903).
[41] People vs.
Adriano, G.R. No. 104578, September 6, 1993, 226 SCRA 131.
[42] See People vs.
Morato, et al., G.R. Nos. 95358-59, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 361; People vs.
Curaraton, G.R. No. 96765, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 372.
[43] Original Record, 9
and 11.
[44] People vs. Bautista, G.R.
No. 109800, March 12, 1996, 254 SCRA 621; People vs. Lagrana,
et al., G.R. No. 68790, January 23, 1987, 147 SCRA 281; People vs. Gervacio, et al., G.R. No. L-21965, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 960.
[45] TSN, July 30, 1992,
16.
[46] It may be noted that
the English text providing for the immediate vindication of a grave
offense is not an exact translation of the Spanish text which is controlling
and states “La de haber ejecutado el hecho en vindicacion proxima de una
ofensa grave.” However, in the
factual context of this case, such divergence would be insignificant since proximate
also means “that immediately preceding or following (as in a chain of events,
causes or effects)” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1993).
[47] People vs. Santos, G.R. Nos. 99259-60, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 309; People vs. Pajares, G.R. No.
96444, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA 237; People vs. Benito, G.R. No. L-32042,
December 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 271.
[48] TSN, July 30, 1993,
19.
[49] See People vs.
Alconga, et al., supra, fn. 24.