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In its continuing search for “ill-gotten wealth”, herein petitioner Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 22, 1987 a case (Civil Case No. 0009) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Manuel H. Nieto, Jose L. Africa, Roberto S. Benedicto, Potenciano Ilusorio, Juan Ponce Enrile and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. alleging, in substance, that said defendants acted as “dummies” of the late strongman and devised “schemes” and “strategems” to monopolize the telecommunications industry. Annexed to the complaint is a listing of the assets of defendants Nieto and Africa, among which are their shares of stock in private respondent Aerocom Investors and Managers, Inc. (Aerocom).^[1]

Almost a year later, the PCGG sought to sequester Aerocom under a writ of sequestration dated June 15, 1988,^[2] which was served on and received “under protest” by Aerocom’s president on August 3, 1988.^[3]

Seven (7) days after receipt of the sequestration order, Aerocom on August 10, 1988 filed a complaint against the PCGG (docketed as Civil Case No. 0044)^[4] urging the Sandiganbayan to nullify the same on the ground that it was served on Aerocom beyond the eighteen (18)-month period from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution as provided for in Section 26, Article XVIII thereof which reads:

“Sec. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may extend said period.

“A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof.

“The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.”

In its amended answer dated May 19, 1992,^[5] the PCGG specifically alleged that Aerocom has no cause of action against it since the issuance of the writ of sequestration on June 15, 1988 was well-within the 18-month constitutional deadline counted from February 2, 1987, the date when the people, in a plebiscite, overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 Constitution.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 0044, Aerocom filed on July 5, 1995 a Manifestation and Motion^[6] praying that the Sandiganbayan direct the PCGG to release and distribute the dividends pertaining to the shares of Aerocom in all corporations where it owns shares of stock. Commenting thereon,^[7] the PCGG opposed the release of the dividends on the argument that “the fact that plaintiff (Aerocom) is mentioned in Annex “A” of the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 0009 is a clear indication that the shares thereof are likewise sequestered.”

The Sandiganbayan in its Resolution promulgated on January 31, 1996^[8] acted favorably on Aerocom’s Manifestation and Motion and thus ordered the PCGG to release the dividends pertaining to Aerocom except the dividends on the sequestered shares of stock registered in the names of Manuel Nieto and Jose Africa in POTC, ETPI and Aerocom, on the following findings:

“A close scrutiny of Annex `A’ of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0009, entitled `Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., and Roberto S. Benedicto’, does not show, that herein plaintiff Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc., as a corporation, was itself sequestered. What was sequestered are the shares of stock of Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. and Jose L. Africa in Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc.

“Defendant PCGG is under estoppel from denying that it has in fact recognized and confirmed the non-sequestration status of herein plaintiff, as a corporation, by releasing the cash dividends due to the plaintiff from Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC for short) per its Resolutions dated June 29, 1993 and May 6, 1994. The said PCGG Resolution, dated June 29, 1993 (Annex “A”, Manifestation and Motion, p. 330, record) refers to its approval to release the POTC cash dividends declared in 1989 and 1991 pertaining to the shares of herein plaintiff Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc. in Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation. On the other hand, PCGG Resolution No. 94-066 dated May 6, 1994 refers to its approval releasing the POTC cash dividends declared in 1993 and `accruing to the shares of stocks in POTC, registered under the name of Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc., except cash dividends pertaining to the personal shares of Mr. Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. in POTC and likewise his shares of stocks in Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc.’ (Annex `B’, Manifestation and Motion, p. 331, record).

“There is no dispute that herein plaintiff, as a corporation, has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders.”

After a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the Sandiganbayan per Resolution promulgated on May 7, 1996,^[9] the PCGG filed the present petition for certiorari on August 16, 1996 assailing the Sandiganbayan order for the release of the dividends as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In compliance with the Resolution of this Court dated September 2, 1996^[10] which also granted the temporary restraining order prayed for by the PCGG, Aerocom filed its comment on the petition on September 11, 1996^[11] to which, the PCGG on November 21, 1996 filed a reply.^[12]

The petition must fail.

There is merit in the initial point amplified by Aerocom in its comment that the instant certiorari proceedings brought by the PCGG is an improper remedy under the circumstances. From a reading of its January 31, 1996 Resolution granting Aerocom’s Manifestation and Motion, (as heretofore quoted), as well as the May 7, 1996 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan has virtually passed upon the pivotal issue involved in Aerocom’s complaint for the declaration of nullity of the writ of sequestration (Civil Case No. 0044) - i.e., whether or not Aerocom’s sequestration was in order. That court’s finding to the effect that Aerocom was not validly sequestered, clearly, was a final adjudication on the merits which is reviewable by the appellate court only through an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The PCGG should have availed of the remedy of appeal filed within the statutory fifteen (15)-day period and not a petition for certiorari, as the arguments the PCGG propounds in support of its challenge on the Sandiganbayan Resolutions would amount to a digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment.^[13] At this juncture, “[i]t must emphatically be reiterated,” to borrow the words of Mr. Justice Regalado in Purefoods Corp. vs. NLRC,^[14] “since so often is it overlooked, that the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The reason for the rule is simple. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable through the original civil action of certiorari.”

Equally worth recalling is that certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available^[15] but was lost thru the fault or negligence of petitioner,^[16] as in this case.

Even if we disregard such procedural flaw, the substantial contentions of the PCGG fail to invite judgment in its favor.

First. We cannot subscribe to the PCGG’s theory that, as the first paragraph of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution speaks only of “The authority to issue . . .”, then there is faithful compliance with the 18-month constitutional deadline by the mere issuance of the writ of sequestration within that time-frame (June 15, 1988) even if service thereof on Aerocom was effected thereafter (August 3, 1988).

The obvious intendment behind the 18-month period, as well as the six (6)-month time-limit for the filing of the corresponding judicial action, is to ensure the protection of property rights and to serve as a necessary safeguard against an overzealous exercise by the State, acting as “bounty-hunters” so to speak, of its power of sequestration which, as described by Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in her concurring opinion in BASECO v. PCGG,^[17] is an “extra-ordinary, harsh and severe remedy.” For this reason, “(I)t should be confined”, J. Herrera continues, “to its lawful parameters and exercised, with due regard, in the words of its enabling laws, to the requirements of fairness, due process, and Justice.” The probable evil of governmental abuse is best avoided and the dictates of “fairness”, “due process” and “Justice” are truly heeded under an interpretation of Section 26, Article XVIII as requiring both the issuance of the writ and notification to, or more precisely, the acquisition of jurisdiction over the entity/entities to be sequestered via valid service thereof, to be effected within the 18-month period. A writ of sequestration, therefore, runs the risk of being struck down as invalid if and when the twin requirements of issuance and service are not satisfied within the deadline.

Such is the fate of the subject writ of sequestration, unfortunately. Whether the 18-month period expired on July 26, 1988 (as claimed by Aerocom, in line with the computation of time under Article 13 of the Civil Code and the ruling in “National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson,” 29 SCRA 70) or on August 2, 1988 (the PCGG’s position), the fact remains that service of the writ on Aerocom on August 3, 1988 was made beyond these dates. The PCGG’s theory that the mere issuance of the writ within the 18-month deadline will suffice, is just too dangerous to accept. Imagine a scenario where the PCGG may have actually tarried in the issuance of the sequestration order to the prejudice of the would-be sequestered entity, and all that the PCGG has to do to cover its mistake is to conveniently ante-date the writ so as to feign timely compliance. That would, in effect, be allowing the PCGG to employ a subterfuge to validate what may in fact be a purely whimsical, unfounded and an “afterthought” takeover of corporate property. The Constitution does not and can never tolerate such a deceptive maneuver. Service of the writ of sequestration within the 18-month period, then, is an imperative measure to guard against this kind of mischief, for it will certainly give the assurance that the writ was genuinely issued within that constitutional deadline.

Second. The PCGG cannot justify its failure, as found by the Sandiganbayan,^[18] to file the corresponding judicial action against Aerocom within the six (6)-month period as provided for under the same constitutional provision in focus (Section 26, Article XVIII, second paragraph) by the fact that Aerocom was mentioned in the complaint of the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0009 (the Nieto, Africa, et al. case) and in Annex “A” thereof notwithstanding that Aerocom was not impleaded as party-defendant, and on the argument that the filing of Civil Case No. 0009 against the “Nieto, Africa, et al. group” is enough compliance with the “judicial action” requirement. The case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376, January 23, 1995, relied upon by the PCGG, has no rightful application, inasmuch as this Court’s pronouncements therein, in answer to this crucial question:

“DOES INCLUSION IN THE COMPLAINTS FILED BY THE PCGG BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF CORPORATIONS BEING `DUMMIES’ OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE DEFENDANTS NAMED THEREIN AND USED AS INSTRUMENTS FOR ACQUISITION, OR AS BEING DEPOSITARIES OR PRODUCTS, OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH; OR THE ANNEXING TO SAID COMPLAINTS OF A LIST OF SAID FIRMS, BUT WITHOUT ACTUALLY IMPLEADING THEM AS DEFENDANTS, SATISFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A SEIZURE EFFECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1, s. 1986, THE CORRESPONDING `JUDICIAL ACTION OR PROCEEDING’ SHOULD BE FILED WITHIN THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 26, ARTICLE XVIII, OF THE (1987) CONSTITUTION?”,

presuppose a valid and existing sequestration of the unimpleaded corporation/s concerned. Thus -

“1) Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution does not, by its terms or any fair interpretation thereof, require that corporations or business enterprises alleged to be repositories of `ill-gotten wealth,’ as the term is used in said provision, be actually and formally impleaded in the actions for the recovery thereof, in order to maintain in effect existing sequestrations thereof;

“2) complaints for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth which merely identify and/or allege said corporations or enterprises to be the instruments, repositories or the fruits of ill-gotten wealth, without more, come within the meaning of the phrase `corresponding judicial action or proceeding’ contemplated by the constitutional provision referred to; the more so, that normally, said corporations, as distinguished from their stockholders or members, are not generally suable for the latter’s illegal or criminal actuations in the acquisition of the assets invested by them in the former;

“3) even assuming the impleading of said corporations to be necessary and proper so that judgment may comprehensively and effectively be rendered in the actions, amendment of the complaints to implead them as defendants may, under existing rules of procedure, be done at any time during the pendency of the actions thereby initiated, and even during the pendency of an appeal to the Supreme Court - a procedure that, in any case, is not inconsistent with or proscribed by the constitutional time limits to the filing of the corresponding complaints `for’ - i.e., with regard or in relation to, in respect of, or in connection with, or concerning - orders of sequestration, freezing, or provisional takeover.’” xxx xxx xxx (underscoring supplied)

There is no existing sequestration to talk about in this case, as the writ issued against Aerocom, to repeat, is invalid for reasons hereinbefore stated. Ergo, the suit in Civil Case No. 0009 against Mr. Nieto and Mr. Africa as shareholders in Aerocom is not and cannot ipso facto be a suit against the unimpleaded Aerocom itself without violating the fundamental principle that a corporation has a legal personality distinct and separate from its stockholders. Such is the ruling laid down in PCGG v. Interco^[19] reiterated anew in a case of more recent vintage - Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading Corp. and Allied Banking Corp.^[20] where this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco,^[21] hewed to the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro R. Padilla^[22] in the very same Republic v. Sandiganbayan case herein invoked by the PCGG, to wit:

“x x x failure to implead these corporations as defendants and merely annexing a list of such corporations to the complaints is a violation of their right to due process for it would in effect be disregarding their distinct and separate personality without a hearing.

“In cases where stocks of a corporation were allegedly the fruits of ill-gotten wealth, it should be remembered that in most of these cases the stocks involved constitute a substantial if not controlling interest in the corporations. The basic tenets of fair play demand that these corporations be impleaded as defendants since a judgment in favor of the government will undoubtedly substantially and decisively affect the corporations as distinct entities. The judgment could strip them of everything without being previously heard as they are not parties to the action in which the judgment is rendered.

“x x x. Holding that the `corresponding judicial action or proceeding’ contemplated by the Constitution is any action concerning or involving the corporation under sequestration is oversimplifying the solution, the result of which is antagonistic to the principles of justice and fair play.

“x x x the actions contemplated by the Constitution should be those which include the corporation not as a mere annex to the complaint but as defendant. This is the minimum requirement of the due process guarantee. Short of being impleaded, the corporation has no standing in the judicial action. It cannot adequately defend itself. It may not even be heard.

“On the x x x opinion that alternatively the corporations can be impleaded as defendants by amendment of the complaint, Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution would appear to preclude this procedure, for allowing amendment of the complaint to implead theretofore unimpleaded corporations would in effect allow complaints against the corporation to be filed beyond the periods fixed by said Section 26.

xxx xxx xxx

“While government efforts to recover illegally amassed wealth should have support from all its branches, eagerness and zeal should not be allowed to run berserk, overriding in the process the very principles that it is sworn to uphold. In our legal system, the ends do not always justify the means. Wrongs are never corrected by committing other wrongs, and as above-discussed the recovery of ill-gotten wealth does not and should never justify unreasonable intrusions into constitutionally forbidden grounds. x x x.”

The last area of discussion touches on the doctrine of estoppel. Let us rewind the events for a clear understanding of the issue involved.

During the pendency of the Aerocom complaint against the PCGG, the latter approved the release of the cash dividends declared in the years 1989, 1991 and 1993 accruing to the shares of stock of Aerocom in the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Co. (POTC) per PCGG Certification dated June 29, 1993^[23] and Resolution No. 94-066 dated May 6, 1994 which read, respectively:

“OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

“This is to certify that the following is an excerpt of the Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting held on June 18, 1993 at the PCGG Commission Room, 6th Floor, Philcomcen Bldg., Pasig, Metro Manila:

“03 POTC/AEROCOM INVESTORS, INC./MANUEL NIETO, JR.

“After deliberation on the letter-request dated May 30, 1993 of Aerocom Investors, Inc. and Mr. Manuel Nieto, Jr. thru counsel, the Commission has resolved to approve the release of the POTC cash dividends declared in 1989 and 1991.

“The Chairman further instructed Comm. Guiao to pursue the settlement with Mr. Nieto on more favorable terms to the government.

“Done on this 29th day of June, 1993 at Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines.

                      CERTIFIED CORRECT:

                      (SGD.)
                      ELIZABETH J. TRINIDAD
                      Commission Secretary”

___________________            _______________________

“REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

RESOLUTION NO. 94-066

“WHEREAS, the request of Polygon Investors, Inc. and Mr. Jose Africa and Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc. and Mr. Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. was taken up in the Executive Committee Meeting of this Commission held on May 5, 1994;

“WHEREAS, it appears that Mr. Jose Africa and Mr. Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. are both defendants in Civil Case No. 009 before the Sandiganbayan, and representation has been made that Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc. is not sequestered.

“NOW, THEREFORE, RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) hereby interposes no objection to the release of the cash dividends declared in 1993 and accruing to the shares of stock in Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Co. (POTC) registered under the name of Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc., except the cash dividends pertaining to the personal shares of stock of Mr. Manuel Nieto, Jr. in POTC and likewise, his shares of stock in Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc.

“On the other hand, the release of the cash dividends declared in 1993 and previous years which are accruing to the shares of stock in POTC registered in the name of Polygon Investors, Inc. and Mr. Jose Africa is hereby deferred.

“DONE this 6th day of May, 1994 at Pasig, Metro Manila.

(SGD.)
MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO
Chairman

(SGD.)                                (SGD.)

REYNALDO S. GUIAO                      HERMILO R. ROSAL
Commissioner                                Commissioner

(SGD.)                                 (SGD.)

JULIET C. BERTUBEN                      HERMINIO A. MENDOZA
Commissioner                                 Commissioner”

The PCGG issued the aforequoted “Certification” and “Resolution 94-066” apparently on the basis of a “Memorandum”^[24] prepared by Atty. Ismael B. Sanchez, former legal counsel of the PCGG, advising the latter not to interpose any objection to the release of the POTC cash dividends. A portion of the “Memorandum” reads:

“THE ISSUES:

1. Is there legal basis to withhold the release of the POTC cash dividends declared in 1989 and 1991 in favor of Mr. Nieto and Aerocom?


2. Was the sequestration order over Aerocom issued validly?

“As to the first issue.

“As resolved by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of October 2, 1991 and January 25, 1993, the PCGG has no authority to withhold satisfaction and release of dividends to stockholders whose shares in POTC are not and have never been sequestered. Thus, the Sandiganbayan ruled:

`We have gone over the pleadings filed by the parties, and we find that herein petitioners, whose stockholdings in the POTC are not sequestered, have the right to the payment of their respective dividends. Respondent PCGG has no authority to withhold satisfaction and release of the same.’

“There is nothing in the records of the Commission to show that a sequestration order issued against the shares of Mr. Nieto Jr. and Aerocom in POTC. A distinction must be made in the matter of sequestration of the corporation itself and the sequestration of corporate shareholdings in another corporation. (Please see NOTE above regarding sequestration of Aerocom) The sequestration refers to Aerocom as a corporation.

“Being similarly situated as the petitioners in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 118 and considering the relevant facts stated above, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the POTC dividends due Mr. Nieto and Aerocom may be released to them.

“As to the second issue.

“With respect to the writ of sequestration issued on June 15, 1988 against Aerocom and served on August 3, 1988, the following points are to be considered:

“(1) It may be argued that this writ is a `midnight’ sequestration order considering the date of its issuance and the date it was served on Aerocom, that is, four (4) days before the expiration of the authority of PCGG to issue sequestration or freeze order as provided under Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

“(2) The sequestration order in question was issued after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution exactly on June 15, 1988. As such, the sequestration order can only be issued upon showing a prima facie case of ill-gotten wealth. Nothing was mentioned in the writ against Aerocom of any ground or basis for its issuance. It just stated that the company is placed under sequestration.

“(3) Even assuming that it was valid when issued, the sequestration order was never implemented. In fact, in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 044, the PCGG through the Office of the Solicitor General agreed not to implement the sequestration order as earlier discussed.

“(4) PCGG has not filed any action against Aerocom. In the Interco case, the Supreme Court, citing Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution, has ruled and held `the sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.’ Any action or proceeding against Aerocom should have been commenced or filed within six (6) months from June 15, 1988.

“CONCLUSION:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it our considered opinion and recommendation that the Commission interpose no objection to the release of the POTC cash dividends declared in 1989 and 1991 in favor of Mr. Nieto Jr. and Aerocom Investors, Inc.

“Furthermore, appropriate instruction be given to the assigned Asset Monitor in POTC to approve the corresponding checks covering the cash dividends due Mr. Nieto Jr. and Aerocom Investors, Inc.”

(SGD.)          
ISMAEL B. SANCHEZ”

Taking into account these documents, the Sandiganbayan thus found the PCGG to be in estoppel from denying the non-sequestered status of Aerocom and from refusing the release of cash dividends in favor of the latter. The PCGG takes exception to this finding on the claim that the State should not be held vulnerable to estoppel for the acts of past officials.

The PCGG’s contention is not persuasive under the attendant circumstances. While we agree with the statement that the State is immune from estoppel, this concept, as clarified by this Court thru Mr. Justice Melo in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al.^[25] “is understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those which are irregular.”^[26] Here, other than its bare assertion that Atty. Sanchez’s “Opinion” is “illegal and prejudicial”, the PCGG has not presented convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of Atty. Sanchez in rendering his “Opinion” favorable to Aerocom. In fact, no less than PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo and the rest of the Commissioners clearly heeded the recommendation of Atty. Sanchez by affixing their signatures on Resolution No. 94-066 allowing the release of the cash dividends declared in 1993 accruing to Aerocom’s shares of stock in POTC. Elementary notions of consistency and fair play call upon the PCGG to honor the release of the cash dividends presently requested by Aerocom, after a similar commitment has been collectively confirmed by its commissioners in black and white. “A ruling to the contrary”, in the erudite language of Justice Escareal of the Sandiganbayan as adopted in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 226 SCRA 314, “is not only illogical and irrational, but inequitable and pernicious as well, for it may open the door for capricious adventurism on the part of the policy-makers of the land, and disregard for the majesty of the law, which could ultimately bring about the citizenry’s loss of faith and confidence in the sincerity of the government in its dealings with the governed.”

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on January 31, 1996 and May 7, 1996 are AFFIRMED in their entirety.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman.), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., on leave.

---

^[1] Petition, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 4-6.

^[2] Rollo, p. 37, Annex “C”.

^[3] Rollo, p. 38, Annex “D”.

^[4] Rollo, pp. 42-49, Annex “F”.

^[5] Rollo, pp. 54-59, Annex “G”.

^[6] Rollo, pp. 60-63, Annex “H”.

^[7] Rollo, pp. 66-67, Annex “I”.

^[8] Rollo, pp. 22-27, Annex “A”.

^[9] Rollo, pp. 28-36, Annex “B”.

^[10] Rollo, p. 82.

^[11] Rollo, pp. 91-111.

^[12] Rollo, pp. 132-138.

^[13] Valdez, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 85129, Jan. 31, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution, citing Padilla v. Commission on Elections, 137 SCRA 424, Batino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 137 SCRA 698, Francis N. Tolentino, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. Nos. 83071-72, July 28, 1988.

^[14] 171 SCRA 415.

^[15] Del Rosario v. Balagot, 166 SCRA 429.

^[16] Jose v. Zulueta, 2 SCRA 574; Ago v. Buslon, 10 SCRA 202; Florendo v. CFI, 104 Phil. 661; Dela Cruz v. IAC, 134 SCRA 417.

^[17] 150 SCRA 181, May 27, 1987

^[18] Resolution of May 7, 1996 denying the PCGG’s motion for reconsideration, p. 6.

^[19] G.R. No. 92755, July 26, 1991, En Banc Minute Resolution.

^[20] 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996.

^[21] Retired on February 13, 1998.

^[22] Retired on August 24, 1997.

^[23] Rollo, p. 124.

^[24] Rollo, pp. 120-123.

^[25] 226 SCRA 314, September 10, 1993.

^[26] Citing “Sharp International Marketing v. CA,” 201 SCRA 299 and “Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186.