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352 Phil. 608


[ G.R. No. 113931, May 06, 1998 ]




This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 1993 which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 51, denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint, as well as the Resolution[2] dated February 15, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.

The facts are as follows:

Respondent spouses Raul and Elea Claveria, doing business under the name "Agro Brokers," applied for a loan with respondent Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (now SOLIDBANK) in the amount of Two Million Eight Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P2, 875,000.00) to finance the purchase of two (2) maritime barges and one tugboat[3] which would be used in their molasses business. The loan was granted subject to the condition that respondent spouses execute a chattel mortgage over the three (3) vessels to be acquired and that a continuing guarantee be executed by Ayala International Philippines, Inc., now herein petitioner E. Zobel, Inc. in favor of SOLIDBANK. The respondent spouses agreed to the arrangement. Consequently, a chattel mortgage and a Continuing Guaranty[4] were executed.

Respondent spouses defaulted in the payment of the entire obligation upon maturity. Hence, on January 31,1991, SOLIDBANK filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment, against respondents spouses and petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 91-55909 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that its liability as guarantor of the loan was extinguished pursuant to Article 2080 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. It argued that it has lost its right to be subrogated to the first chattel mortgage in view of SOLIDBANK's failure to register the chattel mortgage with the appropriate government agency.

SOLIDBANK opposed the motion contending that Article 2080 is not applicable because petitioner is not a guarantor but a surety.

On February 18, 1993, the trial court issued an Order, portions of which reads:

"After a careful consideration of the matter on hand, the Court finds the ground of the motion to dismiss without merit. The document referred to as 'Continuing Guaranty' dated August 21,1985 (Exh. 7) states as follows:

'For and in consideration of any existing indebtedness to you of Agro Brokers, a single proprietorship owned by Mr. Raul Claveria for the payment of which the undersigned is now obligated to you as surety and in order to induce you, in your discretion, at any other manner, to, or at the request or for the account of the borrower, x x x '

"The provisions of the document are clear, plain and explicit.
"Clearly therefore, defendant E. Zobel, Inc. signed as surety. Even though the title of the document is 'Continuing Guaranty', the Court's interpretation is not limited to the title alone but to the contents and intention of the parties more specifically if the language is clear and positive. The obligation of the defendant Zobel being that of a surety, Art. 2080 New Civil Code will not apply as it is only for those acting as guarantor. In fact, in the letter of January 31, 1986 of the defendants (spouses and Zobel) to the plaintiff it is requesting that the chattel mortgage on the vessels and tugboat be waived and/or rescinded by the bank inasmuch as the said loan is covered by the Continuing Guaranty by Zobel in favor of the plaintiff thus thwarting the claim of the defendant now that the chattel mortgage is an essential condition of the guaranty. In its letter, it said that because of the Continuing Guaranty in favor of the plaintiff the chattel mortgage is rendered unnecessary and redundant.
"With regard to the claim that the failure of the plaintiff to register the chattel mortgage with the proper government agency, i.e. with the Office of the Collector of Customs or with the Register of Deeds makes the obligation a guaranty, the same merits a scant consideration and could not be taken by this Court as the basis of the extinguishment of the obligation of the defendant corporation to the plaintiff as surety. The chattel mortgage is an additional security and should not be considered as payment of the debt in case of failure of payment. The same is true with the failure to register, extinction of the liability would not lie.
"WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and defendant E. Zobel, Inc., is ordered to file its answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Order."[5]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied on April 26,1993.[6]

Thereafter, petitioner questioned said Orders before the respondent Court of Appeals, through a petition for certiorari, alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.

On July 13,1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Judge has not committed any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the herein assailed orders, We hereby DISMISS the petition."

A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied for lack of merit on February 15,1994.

Petitioner now comes to us via this petition arguing that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in its finding: (1) that Article 2080 of the New Civil Code which provides: "The guarantors, even though they be solidary, are released from their obligation whenever by some act of the creditor they cannot be subrogated to the rights, mortgages, and preferences of the latter," is not applicable to petitioner; (2) that petitioner's obligation to respondent SOLIDBANK under the continuing guaranty is that of a surety; and (3) that the failure of respondent SOLIDBANK to register the chattel mortgage did not extinguish petitioner's liability to respondent SOLIDBANK.

We shall first resolve the issue of whether or not petitioner under the "Continuing Guaranty" obligated itself to SOLIDBANK as a guarantor or a surety.

A contract of surety is an accessory promise by which a person binds himself for another already bound, and agrees with the creditor to satisfy the obligation if the debtor does not.[7] A contract of guaranty, on the other hand, is a collateral undertaking to pay the debt of another in case the latter does not pay the debt.[8]

Strictly speaking, guaranty and surety are nearly related, and many of the principles are common to both. However, under our civil law, they may be distinguished thus: A surety is usually bound with his principal by the same instrument, executed at the same time, and on the same consideration. He is an original promissor and debtor from the beginning, and is held, ordinarily, to know every default of his principal. Usually, he will not be discharged, either by the mere indulgence of the creditor to the principal, or by want of notice of the default of the principal, no matter how much he may be injured thereby. On the other hand, the contract of guaranty is the guarantor's own separate undertaking, in which the principal does not join. It is usually entered into before or after that of the principal, and is often supported on a separate consideration from that supporting the contract of the principal. The original contract of his principal is not his contract, and he is not bound to take notice of its non-performance. He is often discharged by the mere indulgence of the creditor to the principal, and is usually not liable unless notified of the default of the principal.[9]

Simply put, a surety is distinguished from a guaranty in that a guarantor is the insurer of the solvency of the debtor and thus binds himself to pay if the principal is unable to pay while a surety is the insurer of the debt, and he obligates himself to pay if the principal does not pay.[10]

Based on the aforementioned definitions, it appears that the contract executed by petitioner in favor of SOLIDBANK, albeit denominated as a "Continuing Guaranty," is a contract of surety. The terms of the contract categorically obligates petitioner as "surety" to induce SOLIDBANK to extend credit to respondent spouses. This can be seen in the following stipulations.

"For and in consideration of any existing indebtedness to you of AGRO BROKERS, a single proprietorship owned by MR. RAUL P. CLAVERIA, of legal age, married and with business address x x x (hereinafter called the Borrower), for the payment of which the undersigned is now obligated to you as surety and in order to induce you, in your discretion, at any time or from time to time hereafter, to make loans or advances or to extend credit in any other manner to, or at the request or for the account of the Borrower, either with or without purchase or discount, or to make any loans or advances evidenced or secured by any notes, bills receivable, drafts, acceptances, checks or other instruments or evidences of indebtedness x x upon which the Borrower is or may become liable as maker, endorser, acceptor, or otherwise, the undersigned agrees to guarantee, and does hereby guarantee, the punctual payment, at maturity or upon demand, to you of any and all such instruments, loans, advances, credits and/or other obligations herein before referred to, and also any and all other indebtedness of every kind which is now or may hereafter become due or owing to you by the Borrower, together with any and all expenses which may be incurred by you in collecting all or any such instruments or other indebtedness or obligations hereinbefore referred to, and or in enforcing any rights hereunder, and also to make or cause any and all such payments to be made strictly in accordance with the terms and provisions of any agreement (g), express or implied, which has (have) been or may hereafter be made or entered into by the Borrower in reference thereto, regardless of any law, regulation or decree, now or hereafter in effect which might in any manner affect any of the terms or provisions of any such agreements(s) or your right with respect thereto as against the Borrower, or cause or permit to be invoked any alteration in the time, amount or manner of payment by the Borrower of any such instruments, obligations or indebtedness; x x x " (Underscoring Ours)

One need not look too deeply at the contract to determine the nature of the undertaking and the intention of the parties. The contract clearly disclose that petitioner assumed liability to SOLIDBANK, as a regular party to the undertaking and obligated itself as an original promissor. It bound itself jointly and severally to the obligation with the respondent spouses. In fact, SOLIDBANK need not resort to all other legal remedies or exhaust respondent spouses' properties before it can hold petitioner liable for the obligation. This can be gleaned from a reading of the stipulations in the contract, to wit:

'x x x If default be made in the payment of any of the instruments, indebtedness or other obligation hereby guaranteed by the undersigned, or if the Borrower, or the undersigned should die, dissolve, fail in business, or become insolvent, x x x , or if any funds or other property of the Borrower, or of the undersigned which may be or come into your possession or control or that of any third party acting in your behalf as aforesaid should be attached of distrained, or should be or become subject to any mandatory order of court or other legal process, then, or any time after the happening of any such event any or all of the instruments of indebtedness or other obligations hereby guaranteed shall, at your option become (for the purpose of this guaranty) due and payable by the undersigned forthwith without demand of notice, and full power and authority are hereby given you, in your discretion, to sell, assign and deliver all or any part of the property upon which you may then have a lien hereunder at any broker's board, or at public or private sale at your option, either for cash or for credit or for future delivery without assumption by you of credit risk, and without either the demand, advertisement or notice of any kind, all of which are hereby expressly waived. At any sale hereunder, you may, at your option, purchase the whole or any part of the property so sold, free from any right of redemption on the part of the undersigned, all such rights being also hereby waived and released. In case of any sale and other disposition of any of the property aforesaid, after deducting all costs and expenses of every kind for care, safekeeping, collection, sale, delivery or otherwise, you may apply the residue of the proceeds of the sale and other disposition thereof, to the payment or reduction, either in whole or in part, of any one or more of the obligations or liabilities hereunder of the undersigned whether or not except for disagreement such liabilities or obligations would then be due, making proper allowance or interest on the obligations and liabilities not otherwise then due, and returning the overplus, if any, to the undersigned; all without prejudice to your rights as against the undersigned with respect to any and all amounts which may be or remain unpaid on any of the obligations or liabilities aforesaid at any time (s)"

xxx                                                   xxx                                          xxx

'Should the Borrower at this or at any future time furnish, or should be heretofore have furnished, another surety or sureties to guarantee the payment of his obligations to you, the undersigned hereby expressly waives all benefits to which the undersigned might be entitled under the provisions of Article 1837 of the Civil Code (beneficio division), the liability of the undersigned under any and all circumstances being joint and several;" (Underscoring Ours)

The use of the term "guarantee" does not ipso facto mean that the contract is one of guaranty. Authorities recognize that the word "guarantee" is frequently employed in business transactions to describe not the security of the debt but an intention to be bound by a primary or independent obligation.[11] As aptly observed by the trial court, the interpretation of a contract is not limited to the title alone but to the contents and intention of the parties.

Having thus established that petitioner is a surety, Article 2080 of the Civil Code, relied upon by petitioner, finds no application to the case at bar. In Bicol Savings and Loan Association vs. Guinhawa,[12] we have ruled that Article 2080 of the New Civil Code does not apply where the liability is as a surety, not as a guarantor.

But even assuming that Article 2080 is applicable, SOLIDBANK's failure to register the chattel mortgage did not release petitioner from the obligation. In the Continuing Guaranty executed in favor of SOLIDBANK, petitioner bound itself to the contract irrespective of the existence of any collateral. It even released SOLIDBANK from any fault or negligence that may impair the contract. The pertinent portions of the contract so provides:

"x x x the undersigned (petitioner) who hereby agrees to be and remain bound upon this guaranty, irrespective of the existence, value or condition of any collateral, and notwithstanding any such change, exchange, settlement, compromise, surrender, release, sale, application, renewal or extension, and notwithstanding also that all obligations of the Borrower to you outstanding and unpaid at any time (s) may exceed the aggregate principal sum herein above prescribed.
'This is a Continuing Guaranty and shall remain in full force and effect until written notice shall have been received by you that it has been revoked by the undersigned, but any such notice shall not be released the undersigned from any liability as to any instruments, loans, advances or other obligations hereby guaranteed, which may be held by you, or in which you may have any interest, at the time of the receipt of such notice. No act or omission of any kind on your part in the premises shall in any event affect or impair this guaranty, nor shall same be affected by any change which may arise by reason of the death of the undersigned, of any partner (s) of the undersigned, or of the Borrower, or of the accession to any such partnership of any one or more new partners."
(Underscoring supplied)

In fine, we find the petition to be without merit as no reversible error was committed by respondent Court of Appeals in rendering the assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.


Regalado, Melo, and Puno, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., no part, having concurred in the decision of the Court of Appeals when he was a member of the Court.

[1] Annex "I," p. 80, Rollo; The decision was penned by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and concurred in by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza and Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo.

[2] Annex "J," p. 91, Ibid.

[3] Annex "A," p. 39, Rollo.

[4] Annex "B," pp. 41-42.

[5] Annex "G," pp. 70-75, Rollo.

[6] Annex “H,” p. 77, Ibid.

[7] Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. I, Eighth Edition, p. 1386; Hope vs. Board, 43 La. Ann. 738, 9 South. 754

[8] Ibid.; Shaw, C. J. Dole vs Young, 24 Pick. (Mass.), 252.

[9] Brandt, Surety and Guaranty; cited in Bouvier's Law Dictionary, supra., p. 1386.

[10] Machetti vs. Hospicio, 43 Phil. 297.

[11] 24 Am. Jur. 876 cited in De Leon, Credit Transactions, 1984 Ed.. p. 187.

[12] 188 SCRA 647.

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