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493 Phil. 945
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 159411, March 18, 2005 ]
TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND JACINTO S. TRILLANA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the Decision dated April 2, 2003[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59023[2] which modified the Decision dated December 15, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, in Civil Case No. 5139-V-97, as well as its Resolution dated August 8, 2003[3] which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In October 1994, petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered into a contract of lease[4] whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond at Sitio Pariahan, Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, for a term of six (6) years commencing from October 23, 1994 to October 23, 2000. The rental for the whole term was two million two hundred forty thousand (P2,240,000.00) pesos, of which one million (P1,000,000.00) pesos was to be paid upon signing of the contract. The balance was payable as follows:
In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Respondent did not immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later, respondent was informed by a barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond with the use of a crane. Respondent found out that the repairs were at the instance of petitioner who had grown impatient with his delay in commencing the work.
In September 1996, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. He complained about the unauthorized repairs undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his personnel from the leased premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and subsisting lease contract. After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached, viz.:
Petitioner filed his answer but failed to submit the required pretrial brief and to attend the pretrial conference. On October 21, 1997, respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte before the Acting Branch Clerk of Court.[5] On the basis thereof, a decision was rendered on December 15, 1997[6] in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC of Valenzuela City had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease contract with respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. Petitioner argued that respondent should have followed the procedure for enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided for in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Assuming arguendo that the RTC had jurisdiction, it cannot award more than the amount stipulated in the “Kasunduan” which is P150,000.00. In any event, no factual or legal basis existed for the reimbursement of alleged advance rentals for the unexpired portion of the lease contract as well as for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law[8] provides that an amicable settlement reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date.[9] It further provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.[10] This special provision follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos,[14] we clarified that the broad precept enunciated in Art. 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which provides:
Thus, in Morales v. National Labor Relations Commission[17] we upheld the National Labor Relations Commission when it heeded the original demand of four (4) workers for reinstatement upon their employer’s failure to comply with its obligation to pay their monetary benefits within the period prescribed under the amicable settlement. We reiterated the rule that the aggrieved party may either (1) enforce the compromise by a writ of execution, or (2) regard it as rescinded and so insist upon his original demand upon the other party’s failure or refusal to abide by the compromise. We also recognized the options in Mabale v. Apalisok,[18] Canonizado v. Benitez,[19] and Ramnani v. Court of Appeals,[20] to name a few cases.
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.[21] However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417[22] itself which provides that the amicable settlement “may” be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word “may” clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory[23] or merely optional in nature.Thus, although the “Kasunduan” executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner’s non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. Respondent was not limited to claiming P150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in the “Kasunduan,” it is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation[24] which the parties hope to prevent by making reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing.[25] Under the “Kasunduan,” respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder.[26] It is undisputed that herein petitioner did not.
Having affirmed the RTC’s jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent, we now resolve petitioner’s remaining contention. Petitioner contends that no factual or legal basis exists for the reimbursement of alleged advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees awarded by the court a quo and the Court of Appeals.
The rule is that actual damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.[27] In the case at bar, we agree with petitioner that no competent proof was presented to prove that respondent had paid P300,000.00 as advance rentals for the unexpired period of the lease contract. On the contrary, the lease contract itself provided that the remaining rentals of P448,000.00 shall be paid “on April 23, 1997 and/or, on or before October 23, 1997, and on April 23, 1998 and/or, on or before October 23, 1998 the amount P448,000.00.” Respondent filed his complaint on February 7, 1997. No receipt or other competent proof, aside from respondent’s self-serving assertion, was presented to prove that respondent paid the rentals which were not yet due. No proof was even presented by respondent to show that he had already paid P1,000,000.00 upon signing of the lease contract, as stipulated therein. Petitioner, in paragraphs 2 and 7 of his answer,[28] specifically denied that respondent did so. Courts must base actual damages suffered upon competent proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof.[29]
As to moral damages, Art. 2220 of the Civil Code provides that same may be awarded in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In the case at bar, respondent alleged that petitioner made unauthorized repairs in the leased premises and ousted his personnel therefrom despite their valid and subsisting lease agreement. Petitioner alleged, by way of defense, that he undertook the repairs because respondent abandoned the leased premises and left it in a state of disrepair. However, petitioner presented no evidence to prove his allegation, as he did not attend the pretrial conference and was consequently declared in default. What remains undisputed therefore is that petitioner had a valid and subsisting lease contract with respondent which he refused to honor by giving back possession of the leased premises to respondent. We therefore sustain the conclusion of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that an award of moral damages is justified under the circumstances. We likewise sustain the award for exemplary damages considering petitioner’s propensity not to honor his contractual obligations, first under the lease contract and second, under the amicable settlement executed before the Office of the Barangay Captain. Since respondent was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect his interest on account of petitioner’s refusal to comply with his contractual obligations,[30] the award of attorney’s fees has to be sustained.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated April 2, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59023 is modified by deleting the award of P300,000.00 as reimbursement of advance rentals. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1]Rollo, pp. 28-35.
[2]Entitled “Jacinto S. Trillana, plaintiff-appellee v. Teodoro Chavez, defendant-appellant.”
[3] Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[4] Entitled “Contract of Lease of Fishpond,” Id., pp. 46-50; Original Records, pp. 8-12.
[5] Order dated October 21, 1997 issued by Judge Floro P. Alejo, RTC of Valenzuela City, Branch 172; Original Records, p. 46.
[6] Rollo, pp. 58-59; Original Records, pp. 50-51.
[7] Supra at Note 1.
[8] Codified in Sections 399-422, Chapter VII, Title One, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title One, Book IV of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
[9] Section 416, Chapter VII, Title One, Book III of R.A. No. 7160.
[10] Section 417, Chapter VII, Title One, Book III of R.A. No. 7160. See Vidal v. Escueta, 417 SCRA 617 (2003).
[11] Pasay City Government v. CFI of Manila, Br. X, 132 SCRA 156 (1984), citing Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City v. Samahang Magsasaka, Inc., 62 SCRA 435 (1975).
[12] Vda. de Guilas v. David, 23 SCRA 762 (1968).
[13] Binamira v. Ogan-Occena, 148 SCRA 677 (1987).
[14] 137 Phil. 79 (1969).
[15] Leonor v. Sycip, 1 SCRA 1215 (1961). See also Iloilo Traders Finance, Inc. v. Heirs of Oscar Soriano, Jr., 404 SCRA 67 (2003), citing Diongzon v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 477 (1999).
[16] Leonor v. Sycip, supra.
[17] 241 SCRA 103 (1995).
[18] 88 SCRA 234 (1979).
[19] 127 SCRA 610 (1984).
[20] 360 SCRA 645 (2001).
[21] See Vidal v. Escueta, supra.
[22] The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.
[23] Maceda, Jr. v. Moreman Builders Co., Inc., 203 SCRA 293 (1991).
[24] Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 643 (1996).
[25] Genova v. De Castro, 407 SCRA 165 (2003).
[26] The last paragraph of the “Kasunduan” specifically reads: “Kung magkakaroon ng sapat at total na kabayaran si G. Chavez kay G. Trillana ang huli ay lalagda sa kasulatan bilang waiver o walang anumang paghahabol sa nabanggit na buwisan.”
[27] Chan v. Maceda, Jr., 402 SCRA 352 (2003).
[28] Original Records, pp. 22-23.
[29] Id.
[30] See Tugade, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 407 SCRA 497 (2003).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In October 1994, petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered into a contract of lease[4] whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond at Sitio Pariahan, Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, for a term of six (6) years commencing from October 23, 1994 to October 23, 2000. The rental for the whole term was two million two hundred forty thousand (P2,240,000.00) pesos, of which one million (P1,000,000.00) pesos was to be paid upon signing of the contract. The balance was payable as follows:
b. That, after six (6) months and/or, on or before one (1) year from the date of signing this contract, the amount of THREE HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND (P344,000.00) pesos shall be paid on April 23, 1995 and/or, on or before October 23, 1995 shall be paid by the LESSEE to the LESSOR.Paragraph 5 of the contract further provided that respondent shall undertake all construction and preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed during the period of the lease, at his expense, without reimbursement from petitioner.
c. That, the LESSEE, shall pay the amount of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND (P448,000.00) pesos x x x to the LESSOR on April 23, 1997 and/or, on or before October 23, 1997, and on April 23, 1998 and/or, on or before October 23, 1998 the amount of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND (P448,000.00) pesos x x x.
In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Respondent did not immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later, respondent was informed by a barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond with the use of a crane. Respondent found out that the repairs were at the instance of petitioner who had grown impatient with his delay in commencing the work.
In September 1996, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. He complained about the unauthorized repairs undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his personnel from the leased premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and subsisting lease contract. After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached, viz.:
Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the foregoing “Kasunduan,” respondent filed a complaint on February 7, 1997 against petitioner before the RTC of Valenzuela City, docketed as Civil Case No. 5139-V-97. Respondent prayed that the following amounts be awarded him, viz.: (a) P300,000.00 as reimbursement for rentals of the leased premises corresponding to the unexpired portion of the lease contract; (b) P500,000.00 as unrealized profits; (c) P200,000.00 as moral damages; (d) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, (e) P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P1,000.00 for each court appearance of respondent’s counsel.K A S U N D U A N
Napagkasunduan ngayong araw na ‘to ika-17 ng Setyembre ng nagpabuwis – Teodoro Chavez at bumubuwis na si G. Jay Trillana na ibabalik ni G. Chavez ang halagang P150,000.00 kay G. Trillana bilang sukli sa natitirang panahon ng buwisan.
Ngunit kung maibibigay ni G. Chavez ang halagang P100,000.00 bago sumapit o pagsapit ng ika-23 ng Setyembre, taong kasalukuyan, ‘to ay nangangahulugan ng buong kabayaran at hindi P150,000.00.
Kung sakali at hindi maibigay ang P100,000.00 ang magiging kabayaran ay mananatiling P150,000.00 na may paraan ng pagbabayad ng sumusunod:
Ang P50,000.00 ay ibibigay bago sumapit o pagsapit ng ika-31 ng Oktubre 1996 at ang balanseng P100,000.00 ay ibibigay sa loob ng isang taon subalit magbibigay ng promissory note si G. Chavez at kung mabubuwisang ang kanyang palaisdaan ay ibibigay lahat ni G. Chavez ang buong P150,000.00 sa lalong madaling panahon.
Kung magkakaroon ng sapat at total na kabayaran si G. Chavez kay G. Trillana ang huli ay lalagda sa kasulatan bilang waiver o walang anumang paghahabol sa nabanggit na buwisan.
Petitioner filed his answer but failed to submit the required pretrial brief and to attend the pretrial conference. On October 21, 1997, respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte before the Acting Branch Clerk of Court.[5] On the basis thereof, a decision was rendered on December 15, 1997[6] in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial court by deleting the award of P500,000.00 for unrealized profits for lack of basis, and by reducing the award for attorney’s fees to P50,000.00.[7] Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
(1) Ordering the defendant to reimburse to the plaintiff the sum of P300,000.00 representing rental payment of the leased premises for the unused period of lease;
(2) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P500,000.00 representing unrealized profit as a result of the unlawful deprivation by the defendant of the possession of the subject premises;
(3) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages;
(4) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC of Valenzuela City had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease contract with respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. Petitioner argued that respondent should have followed the procedure for enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided for in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Assuming arguendo that the RTC had jurisdiction, it cannot award more than the amount stipulated in the “Kasunduan” which is P150,000.00. In any event, no factual or legal basis existed for the reimbursement of alleged advance rentals for the unexpired portion of the lease contract as well as for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law[8] provides that an amicable settlement reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date.[9] It further provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.[10] This special provision follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties themselves.[11] It has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved,[12] and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.[13]
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos,[14] we clarified that the broad precept enunciated in Art. 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.We explained, viz:
[B]efore the onset of the new Civil Code, there was no right to rescind compromise agreements. Where a party violated the terms of a compromise agreement, the only recourse open to the other party was to enforce the terms thereof.In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission.[15] This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded[16] by the breach thereof of the other party.
When the new Civil Code came into being, its Article 2041 x x x created for the first time the right of rescission. That provision gives to the aggrieved party the right to “either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.” Article 2041 should obviously be deemed to qualify the broad precept enunciated in Article 2037 that “[a] compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata. (underscoring ours)
Thus, in Morales v. National Labor Relations Commission[17] we upheld the National Labor Relations Commission when it heeded the original demand of four (4) workers for reinstatement upon their employer’s failure to comply with its obligation to pay their monetary benefits within the period prescribed under the amicable settlement. We reiterated the rule that the aggrieved party may either (1) enforce the compromise by a writ of execution, or (2) regard it as rescinded and so insist upon his original demand upon the other party’s failure or refusal to abide by the compromise. We also recognized the options in Mabale v. Apalisok,[18] Canonizado v. Benitez,[19] and Ramnani v. Court of Appeals,[20] to name a few cases.
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.[21] However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417[22] itself which provides that the amicable settlement “may” be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word “may” clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory[23] or merely optional in nature.Thus, although the “Kasunduan” executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner’s non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. Respondent was not limited to claiming P150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in the “Kasunduan,” it is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation[24] which the parties hope to prevent by making reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing.[25] Under the “Kasunduan,” respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder.[26] It is undisputed that herein petitioner did not.
Having affirmed the RTC’s jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent, we now resolve petitioner’s remaining contention. Petitioner contends that no factual or legal basis exists for the reimbursement of alleged advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees awarded by the court a quo and the Court of Appeals.
The rule is that actual damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.[27] In the case at bar, we agree with petitioner that no competent proof was presented to prove that respondent had paid P300,000.00 as advance rentals for the unexpired period of the lease contract. On the contrary, the lease contract itself provided that the remaining rentals of P448,000.00 shall be paid “on April 23, 1997 and/or, on or before October 23, 1997, and on April 23, 1998 and/or, on or before October 23, 1998 the amount P448,000.00.” Respondent filed his complaint on February 7, 1997. No receipt or other competent proof, aside from respondent’s self-serving assertion, was presented to prove that respondent paid the rentals which were not yet due. No proof was even presented by respondent to show that he had already paid P1,000,000.00 upon signing of the lease contract, as stipulated therein. Petitioner, in paragraphs 2 and 7 of his answer,[28] specifically denied that respondent did so. Courts must base actual damages suffered upon competent proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof.[29]
As to moral damages, Art. 2220 of the Civil Code provides that same may be awarded in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In the case at bar, respondent alleged that petitioner made unauthorized repairs in the leased premises and ousted his personnel therefrom despite their valid and subsisting lease agreement. Petitioner alleged, by way of defense, that he undertook the repairs because respondent abandoned the leased premises and left it in a state of disrepair. However, petitioner presented no evidence to prove his allegation, as he did not attend the pretrial conference and was consequently declared in default. What remains undisputed therefore is that petitioner had a valid and subsisting lease contract with respondent which he refused to honor by giving back possession of the leased premises to respondent. We therefore sustain the conclusion of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that an award of moral damages is justified under the circumstances. We likewise sustain the award for exemplary damages considering petitioner’s propensity not to honor his contractual obligations, first under the lease contract and second, under the amicable settlement executed before the Office of the Barangay Captain. Since respondent was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect his interest on account of petitioner’s refusal to comply with his contractual obligations,[30] the award of attorney’s fees has to be sustained.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated April 2, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59023 is modified by deleting the award of P300,000.00 as reimbursement of advance rentals. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1]Rollo, pp. 28-35.
[2]Entitled “Jacinto S. Trillana, plaintiff-appellee v. Teodoro Chavez, defendant-appellant.”
[3] Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[4] Entitled “Contract of Lease of Fishpond,” Id., pp. 46-50; Original Records, pp. 8-12.
[5] Order dated October 21, 1997 issued by Judge Floro P. Alejo, RTC of Valenzuela City, Branch 172; Original Records, p. 46.
[6] Rollo, pp. 58-59; Original Records, pp. 50-51.
[7] Supra at Note 1.
[8] Codified in Sections 399-422, Chapter VII, Title One, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title One, Book IV of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
[9] Section 416, Chapter VII, Title One, Book III of R.A. No. 7160.
[10] Section 417, Chapter VII, Title One, Book III of R.A. No. 7160. See Vidal v. Escueta, 417 SCRA 617 (2003).
[11] Pasay City Government v. CFI of Manila, Br. X, 132 SCRA 156 (1984), citing Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City v. Samahang Magsasaka, Inc., 62 SCRA 435 (1975).
[12] Vda. de Guilas v. David, 23 SCRA 762 (1968).
[13] Binamira v. Ogan-Occena, 148 SCRA 677 (1987).
[14] 137 Phil. 79 (1969).
[15] Leonor v. Sycip, 1 SCRA 1215 (1961). See also Iloilo Traders Finance, Inc. v. Heirs of Oscar Soriano, Jr., 404 SCRA 67 (2003), citing Diongzon v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 477 (1999).
[16] Leonor v. Sycip, supra.
[17] 241 SCRA 103 (1995).
[18] 88 SCRA 234 (1979).
[19] 127 SCRA 610 (1984).
[20] 360 SCRA 645 (2001).
[21] See Vidal v. Escueta, supra.
[22] The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.
[23] Maceda, Jr. v. Moreman Builders Co., Inc., 203 SCRA 293 (1991).
[24] Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 643 (1996).
[25] Genova v. De Castro, 407 SCRA 165 (2003).
[26] The last paragraph of the “Kasunduan” specifically reads: “Kung magkakaroon ng sapat at total na kabayaran si G. Chavez kay G. Trillana ang huli ay lalagda sa kasulatan bilang waiver o walang anumang paghahabol sa nabanggit na buwisan.”
[27] Chan v. Maceda, Jr., 402 SCRA 352 (2003).
[28] Original Records, pp. 22-23.
[29] Id.
[30] See Tugade, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 407 SCRA 497 (2003).