| CONTACT: |
| Supreme Court of the Philippines Library Services, Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, Philippines 1000 |
| (632) 8524-2706 |
| libraryservices.sc@judiciary.gov.ph |
494 Phil. 557
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 148641, March 31, 2005 ]
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., PETITIONER, VS. EMILY ROSE GO KO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF “KD SURPLUS” AND KIDDY LIM CHAO, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. comes to this Court via this appeal by certiorari, challenging the resolutions of the Court of Appeals which dismissed its original action for certiorari for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
Respondents Emily Rose Go Ko and Kiddy Lim Chao filed a complaint against petitioner for Annulment/Reformation of Chattel Mortgage, Annulment of Restructuring Agreement, Fixing of Correct Principal, Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The complaint was raffled to Branch 5 of said court, presided by Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr.
The trial court, by Order of February 16, 2000, granted respondent’s prayer for preliminary injunction. Petitioner, which received a copy of the Order on February 18, 2000, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 2, 2000. The motion was denied by Order of May 22, 2000 on the ground that the lifting of the injunction would have rendered one of the substantive issues of the case moot and academic. Notice of the Order dated May 22, 2000 was received by counsel for petitioner on June 2, 2000.
On July 31, 2000, or fifty-nine (59) days after receipt of the Order denying its motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.[1] Petitioner claimed that therein public respondent Judge Gako acted with grave abuse of discretion by issuing the injunction notwithstanding respondents’ non-entitlement thereto, effectively disposing of the main case without trial, and not holding that the complaint was filed merely to preempt petitioner’s filing of a case for replevin.
By Resolution of August 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals, following Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which had incorporated the amendment introduced by this Court’s Circular No. 39-98 effective September 1, 1998, the relevant portion of which reads:
Thus the appellate court held:
By Resolution of June 6, 2001,[3] the appellate court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. No mention was also made by it about A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC.
Petitioner now questions the August 23, 2000 and June 6, 2001 resolutions of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 effected by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC should have been retroactively applied to its petition, it not having been finally disposed of at the time the amendment became effective.
The issue in this petition has been squarely resolved in the case of Narzoles v. NLRC.[4] It will suffice for this Court to repeat the ruling therein. Parenthetically, respondents candidly “admit that they cannot take a contrary stand” in resolving the petition at in accordance with this Court’s ruling in Narzoles.[5]
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo at 33-A to 61.
[2] Rollo at 28.
[3] Rollo at 31.
[4] 341 SCRA 533 (2000).
[5] Respondents state in their Memorandum, viz.: “After a thorough consideration of the matter however, respondents have to be candid to admit that they cannot take a contrary stand to the view that Circular No. 56-2000 [informing all concerned of the amendments effected by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC], being a curative rule, be given a retroactive effect.
“WHEREFORE, they submit this case to be resolved in accordance with Narzoles vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 341 SCRA 533.” (Rollo at 391).
[6] Supra at 536-538.
Respondents Emily Rose Go Ko and Kiddy Lim Chao filed a complaint against petitioner for Annulment/Reformation of Chattel Mortgage, Annulment of Restructuring Agreement, Fixing of Correct Principal, Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The complaint was raffled to Branch 5 of said court, presided by Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr.
The trial court, by Order of February 16, 2000, granted respondent’s prayer for preliminary injunction. Petitioner, which received a copy of the Order on February 18, 2000, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 2, 2000. The motion was denied by Order of May 22, 2000 on the ground that the lifting of the injunction would have rendered one of the substantive issues of the case moot and academic. Notice of the Order dated May 22, 2000 was received by counsel for petitioner on June 2, 2000.
On July 31, 2000, or fifty-nine (59) days after receipt of the Order denying its motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.[1] Petitioner claimed that therein public respondent Judge Gako acted with grave abuse of discretion by issuing the injunction notwithstanding respondents’ non-entitlement thereto, effectively disposing of the main case without trial, and not holding that the complaint was filed merely to preempt petitioner’s filing of a case for replevin.
By Resolution of August 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals, following Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which had incorporated the amendment introduced by this Court’s Circular No. 39-98 effective September 1, 1998, the relevant portion of which reads:
Sec. 4. Where and when petition to be filed.dismissed the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.[2]x x x
If the petitioner has filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order, or resolution, the period herein affixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition [for Certiorari, Prohibition, or Mandamus] within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except of the most compelling reason and in no case exceed fifteen (15) days. (Underscoring supplied),
Thus the appellate court held:
In the case at bar, petitioner received a copy of the assailed order of February 16, 2000 on February 18, 2000. Thirteen (13) days after, or on March 2, 2000, a motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner. Receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was on June 2, 2000. Thirteen (13) days having been consumed, petitioner had a remaining period of forty seven (47) days within which to file the petition for review reckoned from June 2, 2000, or until July 19, 2000. The petition having been filed only on July 31, 2000 is therefore filed twelve (12) days beyond the reglementary period. Rule 65 is an extraordinary relief that is open so long as it is availed of within the prescribed period. (Underscoring supplied)On September 1, 2000, Sec. 4 of Rule 65 was amended anew, by this Court’s A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, FURTHER AMENDING SECTION 4 RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE this time reverting to the old rule that the 60-day period of filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 was to be reckoned from the date of receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or motion for new trial. The rule, as thus amended, now states:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.Petitioner, which received on September 7, 2000 a copy of the appellate court’s August 23, 2000 Resolution dismissing its petition, filed a motion for reconsideration thereof on September 21, 2000. No mention was made of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC.x x x (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of June 6, 2001,[3] the appellate court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. No mention was also made by it about A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC.
Petitioner now questions the August 23, 2000 and June 6, 2001 resolutions of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 effected by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC should have been retroactively applied to its petition, it not having been finally disposed of at the time the amendment became effective.
The issue in this petition has been squarely resolved in the case of Narzoles v. NLRC.[4] It will suffice for this Court to repeat the ruling therein. Parenthetically, respondents candidly “admit that they cannot take a contrary stand” in resolving the petition at in accordance with this Court’s ruling in Narzoles.[5]
There is no question that the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, which took effect on September 1, 1998, were already in force, and therefore applicable when petitioners filed their petition. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense. No vested rights attach to procedural laws. Consequently, the CA, in accordance with Circular No. 39-98, correctly deducted the 16 days (the fifteenth day was a Sunday) it took for petitioners to file their motion for reconsideration from the 60 day reglementary period. As petitioners only had the remaining period of 44 days from 19 October 1998, when it received a copy of the resolution denying reconsideration, to file the petition for certiorari, or until 8 December 1998, the filing of the petition on 17 December 1998 was nine (9) days too late.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 23, 2000 and June 6, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are hereby vacated, and the case is hereby REMANDED to it for appropriate action in line with the foregoing discussion.
Petitioners, however, claim exception to the retroactive application of Circular No. 39-98 since it would work injustice to them. We do not deem it necessary to rule on this contention in view of further amendments to Section 4, Rule 65.
The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion resulting in the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because, historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would have been resolved on the merits. Hence, the Court deemed it wise to revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Earlier this year, the Court resolved, in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, to further amend Section 4, Rule 65 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in the Manila Bulletin on August 4, 2000 and in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 7, 2000, two newspapers of general circulation.
In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65 can only be described as curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable.
Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.
Accordingly, while the Resolution states that the same "shall take effect on September 1, 2000, following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," its retroactive application cannot be denied. In short, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court on 17 December 1998 is deemed to be timely, the same having been made within the 60-day period provided under the curative Resolution. We reach this conclusion bearing in mind that the substantive aspects of this case involves the rights and benefits, even the livelihood, of petitioner-employees.[6] (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo at 33-A to 61.
[2] Rollo at 28.
[3] Rollo at 31.
[4] 341 SCRA 533 (2000).
[5] Respondents state in their Memorandum, viz.: “After a thorough consideration of the matter however, respondents have to be candid to admit that they cannot take a contrary stand to the view that Circular No. 56-2000 [informing all concerned of the amendments effected by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC], being a curative rule, be given a retroactive effect.
“WHEREFORE, they submit this case to be resolved in accordance with Narzoles vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 341 SCRA 533.” (Rollo at 391).
[6] Supra at 536-538.