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446 Phil. 404


[ G.R. No. 142293, February 27, 2003 ]




This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated February 29, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 52671, affirming with modification the decision[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission promulgated on June 20, 1996 in NLRC NCR CA No. 010526-96. Petitioners also pray for the reinstatement of the decision[4] of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-06717-94.

Culled from the records are the following facts of this case:

Sometime in 1958, private respondent Jaime Sahot[5] started working as a truck helper for petitioners’ family-owned trucking business named Vicente Sy Trucking. In 1965, he became a truck driver of the same family business, renamed T. Paulino Trucking Service, later 6B’s Trucking Corporation in 1985, and thereafter known as SBT Trucking Corporation since 1994. Throughout all these changes in names and for 36 years, private respondent continuously served the trucking business of petitioners.

In April 1994, Sahot was already 59 years old. He had been incurring absences as he was suffering from various ailments. Particularly causing him pain was his left thigh, which greatly affected the performance of his task as a driver. He inquired about his medical and retirement benefits with the Social Security System (SSS) on April 25, 1994, but discovered that his premium payments had not been remitted by his employer.

Sahot had filed a week-long leave sometime in May 1994. On May 27th, he was medically examined and treated for EOR, presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy G II (Annexes “G-5” and “G-3”, pp. 48, 104, respectively),[6] HPM, UTI, Osteoarthritis (Annex “G-4”, p. 105),[7] and heart enlargement (Annex G, p. 107).[8] On said grounds, Belen Paulino of the SBT Trucking Service management told him to file a formal request for extension of his leave. At the end of his week-long absence, Sahot applied for extension of his leave for the whole month of June, 1994. It was at this time when petitioners allegedly threatened to terminate his employment should he refuse to go back to work.

At this point, Sahot found himself in a dilemma. He was facing dismissal if he refused to work, But he could not retire on pension because petitioners never paid his correct SSS premiums. The fact remained he could no longer work as his left thigh hurt abominably. Petitioners ended his dilemma. They carried out their threat and dismissed him from work, effective June 30, 1994. He ended up sick, jobless and penniless.

On September 13, 1994, Sahot filed with the NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, a complaint for illegal dismissal, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-06717-94. He prayed for the recovery of separation pay and attorneys fees against Vicente Sy and Trinidad Paulino-Sy, Belen Paulino, Vicente Sy Trucking, T. Paulino Trucking Service, 6B’s Trucking and SBT Trucking, herein petitioners.

For their part, petitioners admitted they had a trucking business in the 1950s but denied employing helpers and drivers. They contend that private respondent was not illegally dismissed as a driver because he was in fact petitioner’s industrial partner. They add that it was not until the year 1994, when SBT Trucking Corporation was established, and only then did respondent Sahot become an employee of the company, with a monthly salary that reached P4,160.00 at the time of his separation.

Petitioners further claimed that sometime prior to June 1, 1994, Sahot went on leave and was not able to report for work for almost seven days. On June 1, 1994, Sahot asked permission to extend his leave of absence until June 30, 1994. It appeared that from the expiration of his leave, private respondent never reported back to work nor did he file an extension of his leave. Instead, he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal against the trucking company and its owners.

Petitioners add that due to Sahot’s refusal to work after the expiration of his authorized leave of absence, he should be deemed to have voluntarily resigned from his work. They contended that Sahot had all the time to extend his leave or at least inform petitioners of his health condition. Lastly, they cited NLRC Case No. RE-4997-76, entitled “Manuelito Jimenez et al. vs. T. Paulino Trucking Service,” as a defense in view of the alleged similarity in the factual milieu and issues of said case to that of Sahot’s, hence they are in pari materia and Sahot’s complaint ought also to be dismissed.

The NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, through Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, ruled that there was no illegal dismissal in Sahot’s case. Private respondent had failed to report to work. Moreover, said the Labor Arbiter, petitioners and private respondent were industrial partners before January 1994. The Labor Arbiter concluded by ordering petitioners to pay “financial assistance” of P15,000 to Sahot for having served the company as a regular employee since January 1994 only.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission modified the judgment of the Labor Arbiter. It declared that private respondent was an employee, not an industrial partner, since the start. Private respondent Sahot did not abandon his job but his employment was terminated on account of his illness, pursuant to Article 284[9] of the Labor Code. Accordingly, the NLRC ordered petitioners to pay private respondent separation pay in the amount of P60,320.00, at the rate of P2,080.00 per year for 29 years of service.

Petitioners assailed the decision of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated February 29, 2000, the appellate court affirmed with modification the judgment of the NLRC. It held that private respondent was indeed an employee of petitioners since 1958. It also increased the amount of separation pay awarded to private respondent to P74,880, computed at the rate of P2,080 per year for 36 years of service from 1958 to 1994. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. SB Trucking Corporation is hereby directed to pay complainant Jaime Sahot the sum of SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY (P74,880.00) PESOS as and for his separation pay.[10]
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following contentions:





Three issues are to be resolved: (1) Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and respondent Sahot; (2) Whether or not there was valid dismissal; and (3) Whether or not respondent Sahot is entitled to separation pay.

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the determination of the first issue. Before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established.[14]

Petitioners invoke the decision of the Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos which found that respondent Sahot was not an employee but was in fact, petitioners’ industrial partner.[15] It is contended that it was the Labor Arbiter who heard the case and had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and deportment of the parties. The same conclusion, aver petitioners, is supported by substantial evidence.[16] Moreover, it is argued that the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter was wrongly overturned by the NLRC when the latter made the following pronouncement:
We agree with complainant that there was error committed by the Labor Arbiter when he concluded that complainant was an industrial partner prior to 1994. A computation of the age of complainant shows that he was only twenty-three (23) years when he started working with respondent as truck helper. How can we entertain in our mind that a twenty-three (23) year old man, working as a truck helper, be considered an industrial partner. Hence we rule that complainant was only an employee, not a partner of respondents from the time complainant started working for respondent.[17]
Because the Court of Appeals also found that an employer-employee relationship existed, petitioners aver that the appellate court’s decision gives an “imprimatur” to the “illegal” finding and conclusion of the NLRC.

Private respondent, for his part, denies that he was ever an industrial partner of petitioners. There was no written agreement, no proof that he received a share in petitioners’ profits, nor was there anything to show he had any participation with respect to the running of the business.[18]

The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. The most important element is the employer’s control of the employee’s conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it.[19]

As found by the appellate court, petitioners owned and operated a trucking business since the 1950s and by their own allegations, they determined private respondent’s wages and rest day.[20] Records of the case show that private respondent actually engaged in work as an employee. During the entire course of his employment he did not have the freedom to determine where he would go, what he would do, and how he would do it. He merely followed instructions of petitioners and was content to do so, as long as he was paid his wages. Indeed, said the CA, private respondent had worked as a truck helper and driver of petitioners not for his own pleasure but under the latter’s control.

Article 1767[21] of the Civil Code states that in a contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.[22] Not one of these circumstances is present in this case. No written agreement exists to prove the partnership between the parties. Private respondent did not contribute money, property or industry for the purpose of engaging in the supposed business. There is no proof that he was receiving a share in the profits as a matter of course, during the period when the trucking business was under operation. Neither is there any proof that he had actively participated in the management, administration and adoption of policies of the business. Thus, the NLRC and the CA did not err in reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter that private respondent was an industrial partner from 1958 to 1994.

On this point, we affirm the findings of the appellate court and the NLRC. Private respondent Jaime Sahot was not an industrial partner but an employee of petitioners from 1958 to 1994. The existence of an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a question of fact[23] and the findings thereon by the NLRC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, deserve not only respect but finality when supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[24]

Time and again this Court has said that “if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.”[25] Here, we entertain no doubt. Private respondent since the beginning was an employee of, not an industrial partner in, the trucking business.

Coming now to the second issue, was private respondent validly dismissed by petitioners?

Petitioners contend that it was private respondent who refused to go back to work. The decision of the Labor Arbiter pointed out that during the conciliation proceedings, petitioners requested respondent Sahot to report back for work. However, in the same proceedings, Sahot stated that he was no longer fit to continue working, and instead he demanded separation pay. Petitioners then retorted that if Sahot did not like to work as a driver anymore, then he could be given a job that was less strenuous, such as working as a checker. However, Sahot declined that suggestion. Based on the foregoing recitals, petitioners assert that it is clear that Sahot was not dismissed but it was of his own volition that he did not report for work anymore.

In his decision, the Labor Arbiter concluded that:
While it may be true that respondents insisted that complainant continue working with respondents despite his alleged illness, there is no direct evidence that will prove that complainant’s illness prevents or incapacitates him from performing the function of a driver. The fact remains that complainant suddenly stopped working due to boredom or otherwise when he refused to work as a checker which certainly is a much less strenuous job than a driver.[26]
But dealing the Labor Arbiter a reversal on this score the NLRC, concurred in by the Court of Appeals, held that:
While it was very obvious that complainant did not have any intention to report back to work due to his illness which incapacitated him to perform his job, such intention cannot be construed to be an abandonment. Instead, the same should have been considered as one of those falling under the just causes of terminating an employment. The insistence of respondent in making complainant work did not change the scenario.

It is worthy to note that respondent is engaged in the trucking business where physical strength is of utmost requirement (sic). Complainant started working with respondent as truck helper at age twenty-three (23), then as truck driver since 1965. Complainant was already fifty-nine (59) when the complaint was filed and suffering from various illness triggered by his work and age.

x x x [27]
In termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination was for lawful cause and validly made.[28] Article 277(b) of the Labor Code puts the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee was for a valid or authorized cause on the employer, without distinction whether the employer admits or does not admit the dismissal.[29] For an employee’s dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.[30]

Article 284 of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to terminate an employee on the ground of disease, viz:
Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination- An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his co-employees: xxx
However, in order to validly terminate employment on this ground, Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Labor Code requires:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal- Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. (Italics supplied).
As this Court stated in Triple Eight integrated Services, Inc. vs. NLRC,[31] the requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy in the protection of labor.

In the case at bar, the employer clearly did not comply with the medical certificate requirement before Sahot’s dismissal was effected. In the same case of Sevillana vs. I.T. (International) Corp., we ruled:
Since the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter should likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public health authority, this Court has ruled against the validity of the employee’s dismissal. It is therefore incumbent upon the private respondents to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law that petitioner was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified. This Court will not sanction a dismissal premised on mere conjectures and suspicions, the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant his separation from work.[32]
In addition, we must likewise determine if the procedural aspect of due process had been complied with by the employer.

From the records, it clearly appears that procedural due process was not observed in the separation of private respondent by the management of the trucking company. The employer is required to furnish an employee with two written notices before the latter is dismissed: (1) the notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, which is the equivalent of a charge; and (2) the notice informing the employee of his dismissal, to be issued after the employee has been given reasonable opportunity to answer and to be heard on his defense.[33] These, the petitioners failed to do, even only for record purposes. What management did was to threaten the employee with dismissal, then actually implement the threat when the occasion presented itself because of private respondent’s painful left thigh.

All told, both the substantive and procedural aspects of due process were violated. Clearly, therefore, Sahot’s dismissal is tainted with invalidity.

On the last issue, as held by the Court of Appeals, respondent Jaime Sahot is entitled to separation pay. The law is clear on the matter. An employee who is terminated because of disease is entitled to “separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary or to one-half month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater xxx.”[34] Following the formula set in Art. 284 of the Labor Code, his separation pay was computed by the appellate court at P2,080 times 36 years (1958 to 1994) or P74,880. We agree with the computation, after noting that his last monthly salary was P4,160.00 so that one-half thereof is P2,080.00. Finding no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion on the part of appellate court, we are constrained to sustain its decision. To avoid further delay in the payment due the separated worker, whose claim was filed way back in 1994, this decision is immediately executory. Otherwise, six percent (6%) interest per annum should be charged thereon, for any delay, pursuant to provisions of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 29, 2000 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners must pay private respondent Jaime Sahot his separation pay for 36 years of service at the rate of one-half monthly pay for every year of service, amounting to P74,880.00, with interest of six per centum (6%) per annum from finality of this decision until fully paid.

Costs against petitioners.


Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., no part.

[1] Sometimes referred to as “SB Trucking Corp.” in some parts of the records.

[2] Rollo, pp. 9-17.

[3] Id. at 88-95.

[4] Id. at 145-150.

[5] Substituted herein by his wife Editha Sahot. Jaime Sahot died on May 1, 1996, per Certificate of Death, Rollo, p. 241.

[6] Rollo, pp. 131, 133.

[7] Id. at 132.

[8] Id. at 128.

[9] ART. 284 . Disease as ground for termination.—An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

[10] Rollo, p. 17.

[11] Id. at 32.

[12] Id. at 37.

[13] Id. at 42.

[14] Palomado v. National Labor Relations Commission, 257 SCRA 680, 695 (1996).

[15] The Labor Arbiter based this pronouncement on alleged res judicata. It appears that a decision was rendered in another case, NLRC Case No. RE 4997-76, where Labor Arbiter Crescencio J. Ramos declared that other drivers also in the same company, were declared to be industrial partners and not employees. Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos adopted said findings. See Rollo, p. 114.

[16] Consisting of the position paper of Petitioners and of a decision in a “similar” case decided by Labor Arbiter Crescencio J. Ramos in NLRC Case No. RG-4997-76, entitled “Manuelito Jimenez, et al. versus T. Paulino Trucking Service.” See Rollo, pp. 35, 112-121.

[17] Rollo, pp. 91-92.

[18] Id. at 236.

[19] Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union v. Laguesma, 286 SCRA 401, 420 (1998); Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 539, 552 (1998); APP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. NLRC, 267 SCRA 47, 57 (1997); Aurora Land Projects Corp. v. NLRC, 266 SCRA 48, 59 (1997); Encyclopedia Britannica (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, 264 SCRA 1,6-7 (1996).

[20] Rollo, p. 54.

[21] ART. 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.

Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession.

[22] Afisco Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 1, 13 (1999).

[23] Santos v. National Labor Relations Commission, 293 SCRA 113, 125 (1998).

[24] Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608, 614 (1998).

[25] Id. at 614-15.

[26] Rollo, p. 149.

[27] Id. at 93.

[28] Supra, note 24 at 615.

[29] Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corp., 356 SCRA 451, 466 (2001).

[30] Id. at 467.

[31] Supra, note 24 at 618.

[32] Supra, note 29 at 468.

[33] Tiu v. NLRC, 251 SCRA 540, 551 (1992).

[34] Labor Code, Art. 284, see note 9, supra.

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