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664 Phil. 168

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 183569, April 13, 2011 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE PUBLICO Y AMODIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:

This is a review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, in CA-G.R. CEB-CR.-H.C. No. 00290, [1] which affirmed the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, Branch 35, in Criminal Case Nos. 5521-0 and 5522-0 [2]  finding accused-appellant Vicente Publico y Amodia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and attempted rape.

The facts of these cases, culled from the records, are as follows:

Criminal Case No. 5521-0

On the evening of 21 February 1999, AAA, the twelve-year-old daughter of accused-appellant, was in their house. After AAA put her younger sister to sleep, she heard her father call for her saying, “Day, come here.” She approached her father and saw that he was holding a bolo. He ordered AAA to take off her panty. She refused to take it off, so accused-appellant removed it himself. He then mounted AAA and attempted to insert his penis into her vagina. The physiological state of AAA made full penetration impossible—she was only a twelve-year-old virgin and her vagina was still too tight; the mere attempt to have sexual intercourse with her caused her immense pain.  Frustrated and enraged, accused-appellant started hurling tirades at her. Soon thereafter one of their neighbors, Iking Carmones, knocked on their door. Accused-appellant opened the door and left the house with the former.

The following day AAA, together with her elder brother CCC, reported the matter to the police.

An Information charging accused-appellant with attempted rape was filed. Its accusatory portion reads:

That on or about the 21st day of February, 1999 at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, at XXX, barangay XXX, XXX City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: VICENTE  PUBLICO y AMODIA, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously attempt to have carnal knowledge of his legitimate 12 year old daughter — AAA, by trying to insert his organ into the female organ of AAA but failed, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts, and that, if said accused did not accomplish his unlawful purpose, it was not because of his own voluntary desistance but because the female organ of AAA was still too tight, she being a virgin.

In violation of Art. 335 in relation to Art. 6, Revised Penal Code.

Criminal Case No. 5522-0

BBB, also a daughter of accused-appellant, is the older sister of AAA.

When BBB reached the age of ten, she started giving her father massages.  Accused-appellant would get angry if it was not BBB who would massage him. He would only be in his underwear whenever she massaged him.

At the age of fifteen, BBB started having sexual intercourse with a boyfriend, with whom she lived without the benefit of marriage. In May 1996, she started having sexual intercourse with him in the same room where her parents and sister also slept. Roughly two weeks after BBB and her lover started living together, the two had a quarrel. Accused-appellant took his daughter’s side and mauled her lover, who then left their house and never returned.

Sometime in June 1996, at around three o’clock in the afternoon, while her mother and her brothers were out working and her younger sister AAA was in school, BBB was sent by her father to buy kerosene to be used for his massage. When she arrived at their house, accused-appellant suddenly dragged her inside the room. He then poked a sharp weapon at BBB and took her shorts off. After removing her shorts, he removed his briefs and had sexual intercourse with her.  BBB claims that after that fateful day in June 1996, accused-appellant raped her several more times for a period of two years or until she reached the age of eighteen. According to BBB whenever she tried to resist her father’s attempts to have sexual intercourse with her, he would maul her until she was left with no other choice but to yield to his desires. She never revealed the sexual abuses committed by accused-appellant, because he threatened to kill her and their entire family should she divulge the matter to her mother.

Eventually, accused-appellant got BBB pregnant. She gave birth to their child in June 1997.

In November 1998, BBB left home and moved to Cebu City. Sometime after leaving their house, she received a visit from her older brother, CCC. Her brother informed her that accused-appellant had also tried to rape their younger sister, AAA.

This information prompted BBB to file a Complaint for rape against accused-appellant on 24 February 1999. The Complaint charged appellant with rape allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the month of June 1996, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at XXX, barangay XXX, XXX City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: VICENTE PUBLICO y Amodia, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his legitimate daughter –BBB, a sixteen (16) year old lass, against her will.

In violation of Article 355, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.

Criminal Cases Nos. 5521-0 and 5522-0 were consolidated.

Upon arraignment on 25 March 1999, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.

During trial, the prosecution presented 19-year-old BBB and 13-year-old AAA as witnesses. BBB testified as to how her father raped her the first time and several times thereafter for a period of two years, [3] while AAA recounted the events that transpired on the day her father attempted to rape her. [4]

BBB’s testimony was supported by the testimony of Dr. Regino Mercado, who identified the Medical Certificate [5] he issued on 23 February 1999 after his physical examination of BBB. Dr. Mercado found: “1. Old hymenal lacerated wound at 3 o’clock, 6 o’clock and 9 o’clock based on the face of the clock.”

The physical examination conducted by Dr. Mercado on AAA [6] did not show any hymenal laceration.

Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Nestor Sicsic further strengthened the prosecution’s case through his testimony about Entry No. 7698 [7] in the police blotter of Police Precinct No. 2 at XXX, XXX City. The police blotter showed that BBB lodged a Complaint for rape against her own father. SPO1 Sicsic also corroborated AAA’s story through his testimony identifying Entry Nos. 7683, 7685, and 7686 [8] in the police blotter of Police Precinct No. 2 at XXX, XXX City. These entries proved that AAA reported to the police her father’s attempt to rape her on 22 February 1999.

AAA’s older brother, CCC, testified that on 22 February 1999, when he arrived from work at around 7:30 a.m., his younger sister AAA came to his house crying. She then told her brother that their father had attempted to rape her. He then accompanied his sister to the police at Barangay Valencia to report the incident. [9]

The sole witness for the defense was accused-appellant himself. He denied the accusations of his daughters against him and presented alibis as main defenses.

Accused-appellant claimed that on 4 June 1996 he left for Manila to look for a job. He said that he worked as a laborer digging canals for the skyway construction project in Western Bicutan, Taguig. He further said that he returned to XXX City only in October for All Saints’ Day. [10]

Accused-appellant also claimed that on 21 February 1999, he was at home drinking Tanduay Rhum with his compadre Dionisio Cadenes. They were allegedly drinking from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. When his compadre left, he went to sleep. At around three o’clock in the morning, accused-appellant woke up. He tried to wake AAA up to make her boil some water, so that he could have coffee. She did not comply, so he himself went into the kitchen to boil some water. [11]

On 13 July 2007, the trial court, giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution, convicted accused-appellant and meted out to him the penalty of death, viz:

WHEREFORE, after duly considering all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Vicente Publico y Amodia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 5522-0 and of the crime of Attempted Rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 5521-0, and accordingly hereby sentences the said accused under Criminal Case No. 5522-0 to the supreme penalty of Death, whereas under Criminal Case No. 5521-0, the Court penalizes  the accused to an indeterminate sentence of 6 years and 1 day prision mayor  as minimum to 12 years and 1 day reclusion temporal as maximum, and in both cases to pay the offended party as follows: P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, in Criminal Case No. 5522-0; P50,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal Case No. 5521-0.

For Criminal Case No. 5521-0, if the accused is a detainee, the period of his detention shall be credited to him in full if he abides in writing by the terms for convicted prisoners, otherwise, for only 4/5 thereof.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals on automatic review. On 9 January 2008, the appellate court promulgated its Decision affirming the Decision of trial court, but with the following modifications:

  1. In Criminal Case No. 5522-0, appellant is found guilty of Simple Rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay private complainant BBB P50,000.00  as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

  2. In criminal Case No. 5521-0, appellant is found guilty of Attempted Rape and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision coreccional as minimum , to eleven (11) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. He is also ordered to pay private complainant AAA P30,000.00 as civil liability, plus P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages
Costs against appellant

SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant is now before us, seeking the reversal of the judgment of the court below, raising this sole assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF BBB AND AAA.

The appeal is bereft of merit.

In deciding rape cases, this Court is well aware of its duty to both the victim and the accused. Bearing in mind that the conviction of the accused depends heavily on the credibility of the victim, courts are mandated to thoroughly examine the testimony of the offended party. [12] Although the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim’s testimony is justified. Courts are mandated to ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. [13] If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.

As a general rule, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. As we have held many times, “evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination.” [14]  Unless trial courts are found to have plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value, their conclusions on the credibility of witnesses should be respected. [15]

In the case at bar, we see no reason to deviate from this rule or to disturb the findings of the trial court.

After a thorough examination of the testimonies of complainants BBB and AAA, it is clear to this Court that the testimonies are spontaneous, clear, candid, and free from serious contradictions. This Court maintains that testimonies of rape victims who are young and of tender age are credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence. [16]

Furthermore, we have held that a rape victim's testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of having raped her, to wit:

Indeed, a young girl would not ordinarily file a complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if it were not true. Thus, the victim's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out details on an assault to her dignity cannot be dismissed as mere concoction. We also take judicial notice, and it can be considered of public knowledge, that the scene of the rape is not always or necessarily isolated or secluded. Lust is no respecter of time or place. It goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for her natural instinct is to protect her honor. More so, where her charges could mean the death of her own father, as in this case. Undoubtedly, the accused-appellant was correctly found guilty of raping his daughter. [17]

In his Appellant’s Brief, [18] accused-appellant argues that the testimonies of BBB and AAA should not have been given credence for being incredible and contrary to human experience. Specifically, he claims that it was impossible for him to have dragged BBB into the bedroom. He points out that BBB herself testified that she had been massaging her father since she was 10; thus, there was no need for him use force just to get her to massage him. [19]

The Solicitor General’s rebuttal of this argument is correct. It is settled that in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy over her substitutes for the violence and intimidation. [20] Even though it was customary for BBB to massage her father since she was 10 years old, it is not totally impossible or contrary to human experience to believe that when she was already 16 and her father decided to rape her, he had to use force by dragging her into the bedroom in order to achieve his purpose.

Accused-appellant contends that the testimony of BBB that she did not resist because she was afraid that her father might stab her with the sharp weapon with which he poked her should not be given weight, since it is “to [sic] presumptuous or imaginary considering there is yet not [sic] testimony on her part that accused had attempted to stab her.” [21] This Court cannot fathom why it should require rape victims to establish that the accused attempted to stab them before the accused can be convicted of the crime of rape. The poking with a sharp weapon to coerce BBB into submission already establishes force and/or intimidation as contemplated by the Revised Penal Code.

The act of poking a knife at a woman is sufficient to render her powerless, leaving her with the impossible choice of either allowing the accused to use her to satisfy his lust or to resist the desires of the accused at the risk of her own life. It has been held that the mere display of a knife is sufficient to bring a woman to submission. [22] In testifying that accused-appellant used weapons in order for complainants to submit to his desire, the latter sufficiently established that he had used force and intimidation in committing the offenses charged.

Accused-appellant also makes an issue of the fact that the prosecution failed to present as evidence the sharp weapon or weapons supposedly used by him to force his children to have sexual intercourse with him. [23] This Court has already ruled that the presentation of the weapon supposedly used by the accused to commit rape is not necessary for conviction, to wit:

The defense further complains that the alleged knife, and the dress and panty of complainant, were not presented in evidence. The non-presentation of the knife, however, does not negate the existence of intimidation. As We stated in another prosecution for rape where a bolo was used by therein accused to intimidate his victim, "(c)onsidering that the bolo was in the hands of appellant and presumably belonged to him, it should not be a cause for wonder why complainant could not present it in evidence. It was not likely that appellant would just leave it at the scene of the crime." Likewise, the non-presentation of the torn and blood-stained dress and underwear of complainant does not destroy the case for the prosecution, there being sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the rape charges beyond reasonable doubt. [24]

Accused-appellant also asserts that BBB’s failure to promptly report to the authorities what her father did to her, thus allowing herself to be sexually abused for three years, is contrary to human experience and thus casts doubt on her credibility. [25]  We have ruled that the failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge and does not detract from the fact that rape was committed. [26] BBB's failure to report the rape incident earlier has been fully and satisfactorily explained. She testified that she never revealed the sexual abuses committed by her father, as he had threatened that he would kill all of them should she divulge the matter to her mother. The fear of BBB that her father would kill her and the other members of her family, should she report the incident to her mother or the police, is not so unbelievable nor is it contrary to human experience. In People v. Casil [27] this Court ruled:

The threats of appellant to kill her and all members of her family should she report the incidents to anyone were etched in her gullible mind and sufficed to intimidate her into silence. Add to this the fact that she was living with appellant during the entire period of her tribulation, with her mother often away working for a living, and one can readily visualize the helplessness of her plight.

Against all the evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant presents nothing but denials and alibis as his defense. Denial and alibi are the most common defenses used in rape cases. We have always held that these are inherently weak and must be supported by clear and convincing evidence in order to be believed. [28] Thus,

An alibi may be considered with favor only when established by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence. Significantly, where no one corroborates the alibi of an accused, such defense becomes all the weaker for this deficiency. Neither can plain denial, a negative and self-serving evidence stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony made by a victim of rape. A mere denial is seldom given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a witness who creditably testifies on affirmative matters. All told, the proffered alibi of accused-appellant can not stand against the positive identification by the private complainant that he is the culprit. Basic is the rule that alibi which is easy to concoct can not prevail over the positive identification; what is more, appellant utterly failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. Consequently, accused-appellant's defense of alibi can not prosper. Indeed, the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit, as the willingness of complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint. Stated differently, it is most improbable for a five-year old girl of tender years, so innocent and so guileless as the herein offended party, to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true. [29]

As to the defense that, on 21 February 1999, he could not have committed the attempted rape as he was at home drinking Tanduay Rhum with his compadre, accused-appellant failed to prove and demonstrate the physical impossibility of his being at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission.

In addition, aside from his self-serving testimony, no other evidence or witness was presented by accused-appellant to corroborate his testimony that he was working as a laborer in Manila from June 1996 to October 1996, or that on 21 February 1999 he was having a drinking session with his compadre. Consequently, accused-appellant’s defenses cannot be given credence and must therefore fail.

Moreover, being negative defenses, denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the complainants. Between the positive and categorical testimony of the rape victim on one hand and the accused’s bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. [30]

Lastly, accused-appellant relies heavily on Dr. Regino Mercado’s Medical Certificate, which states that no hymenal laceration was found on AAA. According to accused-appellant, the negative findings in the Medical Certificate only show or indicate that the accused did not attempt to insert his penis into the vagina of AAA. [31]

This argument of the accused is wrong and does not exculpate him from the charge of attempted rape.  Had there been a hymenal laceration, it would no longer be merely an attempted rape. It would already be indicative that the crime of rape was indeed consummated.  As held in People v. Collado: [32]

In other words, "touching" of the female organ will result in consummated rape if the penis slid into or touched either labia of the pudendum. Anything short of that will only result in either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. Significantly, People v. Campuhan did not set a demarcation line separating attempted rape from acts of lasciviousness. The difference lies in the intent of the perpetrator deducible from his external acts. Thus when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed. Otherwise, it is merely acts of lasciviousness.

After examining the evidence, as well as the testimonies of complainants and the prosecution’s witnesses, this Court is strongly convinced that accused-appellant is guilty as charged.  Based on AAA’s testimony, the intent of the accused was to commit the crime of rape, but its commission was prevented due to the physical difficulty he encountered.

Accused-appellant insists that the qualifying circumstances that the victims were minors or persons under eighteen years old and that the offender was the victims’ father were not alleged in the Information. [33] Consequently, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of qualified rape; and neither can the death penalty be imposed upon him without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. This, of course, is not true. A plain reading of the two Informations filed against accused-appellant will reveal that the ages of the victims and the fact that accused-appellant is their father have been alleged in the Informations. The Information in Criminal Case No. 5521-0 states that accused-appellant attempted “to have carnal knowledge of his legitimate 12 year old daughter,” while the Information in Criminal Case No. 5522-0 states that accused appellant had “carnal knowledge of his legitimate daughter –BBB, a sixteen (16) year old lass.”

This Court has held that for minority to be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape, minority must not only be alleged in the Information, but must also be established with moral certainty. We note that while the Information alleged that BBB was only 16 years old at the time she was first raped, no other evidence, documentary or otherwise--except for BBB’s testimony--was presented to prove her minority at the time of the commission of the offense. The same is true for AAA. Thus, the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving the minority of AAA and BBB. In People v. Javier, [34] this Court ruled:

...[I]t is significant to note that the prosecution failed to present the birth certificate of the complainant. Although the victim's age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of the victim is particularly necessary in this case considering that the victim's age which was then 16 years old is just two years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of modernism, there is hardly any difference between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one insofar as physical features and attributes are concerned. A physically developed 16-year old lass may be mistaken for an 18-year old young woman, in the same manner that a frail and young looking 18-year old lady may pass as a 16-year old minor. Thus, it is in this context that independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659.

We hold that the qualifying circumstance of minority under Republic Act No. 7659 cannot be appreciated in these cases.

In Criminal Case No. 5522-0, the alleged crime was committed in June 1996, or before the effectivity of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8353, otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."  Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659, which is applicable in this case, whenever a crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. [35]  In the case at bar, the use of a deadly weapon, although alleged in the Complaint and proved at the trial, was not alleged in the Information as required by Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the use of a deadly weapon by accused-appellant cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance without violating his right to be informed of the charges against him. [36] Consequently, accused-appellant may only be held liable for simple rape. The penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua.

The alleged crime in Criminal Case No. 5521-0 was committed on 29 February 1999. The law applicable to the said case is R.A. 8353, which took effect on October 22, 1997. Articles 266-A and 266-B of this law read:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

xxx                                          xxx                                          xxx

Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxx                                         xxx                                          xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

xxx                                         xxx                                          xxx

5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old.

Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable to Criminal Case No. 5521-0, which is a case for attempted rape.  The aforementioned article imposes a penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated felony. The use of deadly weapons was not alleged in the Information and thus cannot aggravate the penalty pursuant to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and is hereby made to retroact to benefit the accused as required by well-established constitutional and criminal law doctrines. Since the crime of rape was merely attempted, the imposable penalty is two degrees lower than the prescribed penalty, which is prision mayor, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. One degree below prision mayor is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law generously, the minimum penalty to be imposed shall be within the medium period. Thus, the minimum sentence imposed is four years.

The damages to be awarded for simple rape are (a) PhP50,000 as civil indemnity; (b) PhP50,000 as moral damages; and (c) PhP30,000 as exemplary damages. [37] For attempted rape, the proper amount of damages are (a) PhP30,000 as civil indemnity; (b) PhP25,000 as moral damages; and (c) PhP10,000 as exemplary damages. [38]

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

Accused-appellant Vicente Publico y Amodia is sentenced to  suffer:

  1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua for Criminal Case No. 5522-0;

  2. The indeterminate penalty of 4 years as minimum to 10 years of prision mayor as maximum for Criminal Case No. 5521-0.

He is also ordered to pay:

  1. Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000) as civil indemnity for Criminal Case No. 5522-0 and thirty thousand pesos (PhP30,000) as civil indemnity for Criminal Case No. 5521-0;

  2. Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000) as moral damages for Criminal Case No. 5522-0 and twenty five thousand pesos (PhP25,000) as moral damages for Criminal Case No. 5521-0.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Brion, Bersamin, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.



[1] Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor and concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.

[2] Penned by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona.

[3] TSN, 23 June 1999, at 8-11.

[4] TSN, 23 June 1999, at 10-13.

[5] Exhibit “D”; TSN, 8 September 1999, at 11.

[6] Exhibit “E”; TSN, 8 September 1999, at 15.

[7] Exhibit “B”; TSN, 17 August 1999, at 6-7.

[8] Exhibit “C”; TSN, 17 August 1999, at 7.

[9] TSN, 17 August 1999, at 19.

[10] TSN, 25 October 1999, at 5-7.

[11] TSN, 25 October 1999, at 8-12.

[12] People v. Perez, G.R. No. 118332, March 26, 1997, 270 SCRA 526.

[13] People v. Gabayron, G.R. No. 102018.  August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 78.

[14] People v. Tormis, G.R. No. 183456, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 903.

[15] People v. Padre-e, G.R. No. 112969, October 24, 1995, 249 SCRA 422.

[16] People v. Gagto, G.R. No. 113345, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 455.

[17] People v. Daganio, 425 Phil 186 (2002).

[18] On 6 November 2008, this Court received accused-appellant’s Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief wherein the accused-appellant states that he is submitting his Appellant’s Brief as his Supplemental Brief.

[19] Rollo  at 48-49.

[20] People v. Nava, Jr., G.R. No. 130509-12, June 19, 2000, 333 SCRA 749.

[21] Rollo at 50.

[22] People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 139834, February 19, 2001 352 SCRA 228 citing People v. Rabang, Jr., G.R. No. 105374, September 29, 1999, 315 SCRA 451.

[23] Rollo at 50.

[24] People v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. L-45280-81, June 11, 1981, 105  SCRA 6.

[25] Rollo at 50-51.

[26] People v. Casil, G.R. No. 105834,  February 13, 1995, 241 SCRA 285.

[27] Id.

[28] People v. Mingming, G.R. No. 174195.  December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 509.

[29] People v. Marquez, G.R. Nos. 137408-10, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 510.

[30] People v. Cambi, G.R. No. 127131, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 305.

[31] Rollo at 55-56.

[32] G.R. Nos. 135667-70.

[33] Rollo at 54.

[34] G.R. No. 126096, July 26, 1999, 311 SCRA 122.

[35] People v. Cula, G.R. No. 133146, March 28, 2000, 329 SCRA 101.

[36] People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 132923-24, June 6, 2002 citing People v. De la Cuesta, 304 SCRA 83, 92 (1999).

[37] People v. Rata, G.R. Nos. 145523-24, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 237; People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 168.

[38] People v. Brioso, G.R. No. 182517, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 485; citing People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 168.

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