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409 Phil. 88


[ G.R. No. 124110, April 20, 2001 ]




On March 1, 1989, private respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila, three (3) "Visit the U.S.A." tickets for himself, his wife and his minor son Mychal for the following routes:

(a)  San Francisco to Washington (15 April 1989);

(b)  Washington to Chicago (25 April 1989);

(c)  Chicago to Los Angeles (29 April 1989);

(d)  Los Angeles to San Francisco (01 May 1989 for petitioner's wife and 05 May 1989 for petitioner and his son).[1] All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.[2] The Fontanillas proceeded to the United States as planned, where they used the first coupon from San Francisco to Washington.  On April 24, 1989, Aniceto Fontanilla bought two (2) additional coupons each for himself, his wife and his son from petitioner at its office in Washington Dulles Airport.  After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets, the Fontanillas were issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words "CHECK-IN REQUIRED," for United Airlines Flight No. 1108, set to leave from Los Angeles to San Francisco at 10:30 a.m. on May 5, 1989.[3] The cause of the non-boarding of the Fontanillas on United Airlines Flight No. 1108 makes up the bone of contention of this controversy.

Private respondents' version is as follows:

Aniceto Fontanilla and his son Mychal claim that on May 5, 1989, upon their arrival at the Los Angeles Airport for their flight, they proceeded to United Airlines counter where they were attended by an employee wearing a nameplate bearing the name "LINDA." Linda examined their tickets, punched something into her computer and then told them that boarding would be in fifteen minutes.[4] When the flight was called, the Fontanillas proceeded to the plane.  To their surprise, the stewardess at the gate did not allow them to board the plane, as they had no assigned seat numbers.  They were then directed to go back to the "check-in" counter where Linda subsequently informed them that the flight had been overbooked and asked them to wait.[5] The Fontanillas tried to explain to Linda the special circumstances of their visit.  However, Linda told them in arrogant manner, "So what, I can not do anything about it."[6] Subsequently, three other passengers with Caucasian features were graciously allowed to board, after the Fontanillas were told that the flight had been overbooked.[7] The plane then took off with the Fontanillas' baggage in tow, leaving them behind.[8] The Fontanillas then complained to Linda, who in turn gave them an ugly stare and rudely uttered, "It's not my fault.  It's the fault of the company.  Just sit down and wait."[9] When Mr. Fontanilla reminded Linda of the inconvenience being caused to them, she bluntly retorted, "Who do you think you are?  You lousy Flips are good for nothing beggars.  You always ask for American aid." After which she remarked "Don't worry about your baggage.  Anyway there is nothing in there.  What are you doing here anyway?  I will report you to immigration.  You Filipinos should go home."[10] Such rude statements were made in front of other people in the airport causing the Fontanillas to suffer shame, humiliation and embarrassment.  The chastening situation even caused the younger Fontanilla to break into tears.[11] After some time, Linda, without any explanation, offered the Fontanillas $50.00 each.  She simply said "Take it or leave it." This, the Fontanillas declined.[12] The Fontanillas then proceeded to the United Airlines customer service counter to plead their case.  The male employee at the counter reacted by shouting that he was ready for it and left without saying anything.[13] The Fontanillas were not booked on the next flight, which departed for San Francisco at 11:00 a.m.  It was only at 12:00 noon that they were able to leave Los Angeles on United Airlines Flight No. 803.

Petitioner United Airlines has a different version of what occurred at the Los Angeles Airport on May 5, 1989.

According to United Airlines, the Fontanillas did not initially go to the check-in counter to get their seat assignments for UA Flight 1108. They instead proceeded to join the queue boarding the aircraft without first securing their seat assignments as required in their ticket and boarding passes.  Having no seat assignments, the stewardess at the door of the plane instructed them to go to the check-in counter. When the Fontanillas proceeded to the check-in counter, Linda Allen, the United Airlines Customer Representative at the counter informed them that the flight was overbooked.  She booked them on the next available flight and offered them denied boarding compensation.  Allen vehemently denies uttering the derogatory and racist words attributed to her by the Fontanillas.[14] The incident prompted the Fontanillas to file Civil Case No. 89-4268 for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.  After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint.  The counterclaim is likewise dismissed as it appears that plaintiffs were not actuated by legal malice when they filed the instant complaint.[15]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Fontanillas. The appellate court found that there was an admission on the part of United Airlines that the Fontanillas did in fact observe the check-in requirement.  It ruled further that even assuming there was a failure to observe the check-in requirement, United Airlines failed to comply with the procedure laid down in cases where a passenger is denied boarding.  The appellate court likewise gave credence to the claim of Aniceto Fontanilla that the employees of United Airlines were discourteous and arbitrary and, worse, discriminatory.  In light of such treatment, the Fontanillas were entitled to moral damages.  The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated 29 September 1995, states as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment appealed herefrom is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is entered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant the following:

a)  P200,000.00 as moral damages;

b)  P200,000.00 as exemplary damages;

c)  P50, 000.00 as attorney's fees.

No pronouncement as to costs.


Petitioner United Airlines now comes to this Court raising the following assignment of errors:











On the first issue raised by the petitioner, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled that when Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,[18] there was an implied admission in petitioner's answer in the allegations in the complaint that private respondent and his son observed the "check-in requirement at the Los Angeles Airport." Thus:

A perusal of the above pleadings filed before the trial court disclosed that there exists a blatant admission on the part of the defendant-appellee that the plaintiffs-appellants indeed observed the "check-in" requirement at the Los Angeles Airport on May 5, 1989.  In view of defendant-appellee's admission of plaintiffs-appellants' material averment in the complaint, We find no reason why the trial court should rule against such admission.[19]

We disagree with the above conclusion reached by respondent Court of Appeals.  Paragraph 7 of private respondents' complaint states:

7. On May 5, 1989 at 9:45 a.m., plaintiff and his son checked in at defendant's designated counter at the airport in Los Angeles for their scheduled flight to San Francisco on defendant's Flight No. 1108.[20]

Responding to the above allegations, petitioner averred in paragraph 4 of its answer, thus:

4. Admits the allegation set forth in paragraph 7 of the complaint except to deny that plaintiff and his son checked in at 9:45 a.m., for lack of knowledge or information at this point in time as to the truth thereof.[21]

The rule authorizing an answer that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue.[22] Whether or not private respondents checked in at petitioner's designated counter at the airport at 9:45 a.m. on May 5, 1989 must necessarily be within petitioner's knowledge.

While there was no specific denial as to the fact of compliance with the "check-in" requirement by private respondents, petitioner presented evidence to support its contention that there indeed was no compliance.

Private respondents then are said to have waived the rule on admission. It not only presented evidence to support its contention that there was compliance with the check-in requirement, it even allowed petitioner to present rebuttal evidence.  In the case of Yu Chuck vs. "Kong Li Po," we ruled that:

The object of the rule is to relieve a party of the trouble and expense in proving in the first instance an alleged fact, the existence or non-existence of which is necessarily within the knowledge of the adverse party, and of the necessity (to his opponent's case) of establishing which such adverse party is notified by his opponent's pleadings.

The plaintiff may, of course, waive the rule and that is what must be considered to have done (sic) by introducing evidence as to the execution of the document and failing to object to the defendant's evidence in refutation; all this evidence is now competent and the case must be decided thereupon.[23]

The determination of the other issues raised is dependent on whether or not there was a breach of contract in bad faith on the part of the petitioner in not allowing the Fontanillas to board United Airlines Flight 1108.

It must be remembered that the general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of proof of an essential fact must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon.[24] Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be entered in favor of the former, if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause of action.  The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's.[25] Proceeding from this, and considering the contradictory findings of facts by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, the question before this Court is whether or not private respondents were able to prove with adequate evidence his allegations of breach of contract in bad faith.

We rule in the negative.

Time and again, the Court has pronounced that appellate courts should not, unless for strong and cogent reasons, reverse the findings of facts of trial courts.  This is so because trial judges are in a better position to examine real evidence and at a vantage point to observe the actuation and the demeanor of the witnesses.[26] While not the sole indicator of the credibility of a witness, it is of such weight that it has been said to be the touchstone of credibility.[27] Aniceto Fontanilla's assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45 a.m., he immediately proceeded to the check-in counter, and that Linda Allen punched in something into the computer is specious and not supported by the evidence on record.  In support of their allegations, private respondents submitted a copy of the boarding pass.  Explicitly printed on the boarding pass are the words "Check-In Required." Curiously, the said pass did not indicate any seat number.  If indeed the Fontanillas checked in at the designated time as they claimed, why then were they not assigned seat numbers?  Absent any showing that Linda was so motivated, we do not buy into private respondents' claim that Linda intentionally deceived him, and made him the laughing stock among the passengers.[28] Hence, as correctly observed by the trial court:

Plaintiffs fail to realize that their failure to check in, as expressly required in their boarding passes, is the very reason why they were not given their respective seat numbers, which resulted in their being denied boarding.[29]

Neither do we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that private respondents' failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with. Notably, the appellate court relied on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales, which states:

250.6  Exceptions to eligibility for denied boarding compensation.

A passenger denied board involuntarily from an oversold flight shall not be eligible for denied board compensation if:

(a) The passenger does not comply with the carrier's contract of carriage or tariff provisions regarding ticketing, reconfirmation, check-in, and acceptability for transformation.

The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United States as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner's agent in Manila.  It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in Washington, D.C. However, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.

In the case of Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals,[30] this Court applied the doctrine of lex loci contractus.  According to the doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation.  This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making and the place of performance are the same.  Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, when the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline.

The law of the forum on the subject matter is Economic Regulations No. 7 as amended by Boarding Priority and Denied Boarding Compensation of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which provides that the check-in requirement be complied with before a passenger may claim against a carrier for being denied boarding:

SEC. 5.  Amount of Denied Boarding Compensation - Subject to the exceptions provided hereinafter under Section 6, carriers shall pay to passengers holding confirmed reserved space and who have presented themselves at the proper place and time and fully complied with the carrier's check-in and reconfirmation procedures and who are acceptable for carriage under the Carrier's tariffs but who have been denied boarding for lack of space, a compensation at the rate of:  xx

Private respondents' narration that they were subjected to harsh and derogatory remarks seems incredulous.  However, this Court will not attempt to surmise what really happened. Suffice to say, private respondent was not able to prove his cause of action, for as the trial court correctly observed:

xxx plaintiffs claim to have been discriminated against and insulted in the presence of several people. Unfortunately, plaintiffs limited their evidence to the testimony [of] Aniceto Fontanilla, without any corroboration by the people who saw or heard the discriminatory remarks and insults; while such limited testimony could possibly be true, it does not enable the Court to reach the conclusion that plaintiffs have, by a preponderance of evidence, proven that they are entitled to P1,650,000.00 damages from defendant.[31]

As to the award of moral and exemplary damages, we find error in the award of such by the Court of Appeals.  For the plaintiff to be entitled to an award of moral damages arising from a breach of contract of carriage, the carrier must have acted with fraud or bad faith.  The appellate court predicated its award on our pronouncement in the case of Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals, supra, where we stated:

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling passengers concerned to an award of moral damages.  In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, where passengers with confirmed booking were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date.  If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage.  Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for check in.  For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to moral damages.  (Emphasis supplied.)

However, the Court's ruling in said case should be read in consonance with existing laws, particularly, Economic Regulations No. 7, as amended, of the Civil Aeronautics Board:

Sec 3. Scope. - This regulation shall apply to every Philippine and foreign air carrier with respect to its operation of flights or portions of flights originating from or terminating at, or serving a point within the territory of the Republic of the Philippines insofar as it denies boarding to a passenger on a flight, or portion of a flight inside or outside the Philippines, for which he holds confirmed reserved space.  Furthermore, this Regulation is designed to cover only honest mistakes on the part of the carriers and excludes deliberate and willful acts of non-accommodation.  Provided, however, that overbooking not exceeding 10% of the seating capacity of the aircraft shall not be considered as a deliberate and willful act of non-accommodation.

What this Court considers as bad faith is the willful and deliberate overbooking on the part of the airline carrier.  The above-mentioned law clearly states that when the overbooking does not exceed ten percent (10%), it is not considered as deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad faith.  While there may have been overbooking in this case, private respondents were not able to prove that the overbooking on United Airlines Flight 1108 exceeded ten percent.

As earlier stated, the Court is of the opinion that the private respondents were not able to prove that they were subjected to coarse and harsh treatment by the ground crew of United Airlines.  Neither were they able to show that there was bad faith on part of the carrier airline. Hence, the award of moral and exemplary damages by the Court of Appeals is improper.  Corollarily, the award of attorney's fees is, likewise, denied for lack of any legal and factual basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTEDThe decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37044 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 89-4268 dated April 8, 1991 is hereby REINSTATED.


Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on sick leave.

[1] Records, p. 35.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Id.

[4] Records, pp. 35-36.

[5] Id., at 36.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Records, p. 37.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Id.

[13] Id., at 39.

[14] Id., at 119-204.

[15] CA Decision, Rollo, pp. 7-25.

[16] Rollo, p. 25

[17] Id., at 37.

[18] Section 1. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. - Material Averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically admitted when not specifically denied.  Allegations of usury are deemed not denied specifically when not denied specifically under oath.

[19] Rollo, p. 75.

[20] CA Rollo, p. 2.

[21] Id., at 14.

[22] Warner Barnes and Co. Ltd. vs. Reyes, 103 Phil 662 (1958); PNB vs. Utility Assurance and Surety Co., Inc., 177 SCRA 210 (1989).

[23] 46 Phil 608, 613.

[24] Ricardo J. Francisco, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES, EVIDENCE, Volume VII, Part II, 1997, citing I Moore on Facts 54.

[25] Nolan vs. Jalandoni, 23 Phil 292.

[26] Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc.  vs. CA,  263 SCRA 490 (1996) citing Bael vs. IAC, 169 SCRA 617 (1989).

[27] Connor vs. Connor, 77 A. 2d 697.

[28] Records, p. 39.

[29] CA Rollo, p. 40.

[30] 228 SCRA 23 (1993).

[31] CA Rollo, p. 41.

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