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450 Phil. 411


[ G.R. No. 142435, April 30, 2003 ]



This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41536 which dismissed herein petitioners’ appeal from the Decision[2] dated February 10, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, in Civil Case No. Q-89-4152.  The trial court had dismissed petitioners’ complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and the extra-judicial foreclosure thereof.  Likewise brought for our review is the Resolution[3] dated February 23, 2000 of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The facts, as culled from records, are as follows:

Petitioners, the spouses Alfredo Lipat and Estelita Burgos Lipat, owned “Bela’s Export Trading” (BET), a single proprietorship with principal office at No. 814 Aurora Boulevard, Cubao, Quezon City.  BET was engaged in the manufacture of garments for domestic and foreign consumption.  The Lipats also owned the “Mystical Fashions” in the United States, which sells goods imported from the Philippines through BET.  Mrs. Lipat designated her daughter, Teresita B. Lipat, to manage BET in the Philippines while she was managing “Mystical Fashions” in the United States.

In order to facilitate the convenient operation of BET, Estelita Lipat executed on December 14, 1978, a special power of attorney appointing Teresita Lipat as her attorney-in-fact to obtain loans and other credit accommodations from respondent Pacific Banking Corporation (Pacific Bank).  She likewise authorized Teresita to execute mortgage contracts on properties owned or co-owned by her as security for the obligations to be extended by Pacific Bank including any extension or renewal thereof.

Sometime in April 1979, Teresita, by virtue of the special power of attorney, was able to secure for and in behalf of her mother, Mrs. Lipat and BET, a loan from Pacific Bank amounting to P583,854.00 to buy fabrics to be manufactured by BET and exported to “Mystical Fashions” in the United States.  As security therefor, the Lipat spouses, as represented by Teresita, executed a Real Estate Mortgage over their property located at No. 814 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.  Said property was likewise made to secure “other additional or new loans, discounting lines, overdrafts and credit accommodations, of whatever amount, which the Mortgagor and/or Debtor may subsequently obtain from the Mortgagee as well as any renewal or extension by the Mortgagor and/or Debtor of the whole or part of said original, additional or new loans, discounting lines, overdrafts and other credit accommodations, including interest and expenses or other obligations of the Mortgagor and/or Debtor owing to the Mortgagee, whether directly, or indirectly, principal or secondary, as appears in the accounts, books and records of the Mortgagee.”[4]

On September 5, 1979, BET was incorporated into a family corporation named Bela’s Export Corporation (BEC) in order to facilitate the management of the business.  BEC was engaged in the business of manufacturing and exportation of all kinds of garments of whatever kind and description[5] and utilized the same machineries and equipment previously used by BET.  Its incorporators and directors included the Lipat spouses who owned a combined 300 shares out of the 420 shares subscribed, Teresita Lipat who owned 20 shares, and other close relatives and friends of the Lipats.[6] Estelita Lipat was named president of BEC, while Teresita became the vice-president and general manager.

Eventually, the loan was later restructured in the name of BEC and subsequent loans were obtained by BEC with the corresponding promissory notes duly executed by Teresita on behalf of the corporation.  A letter of credit was also opened by Pacific Bank in favor of A. O. Knitting Manufacturing Co., Inc., upon the request of BEC after BEC executed the corresponding trust receipt therefor.  Export bills were also executed in favor of Pacific Bank for additional finances.  These transactions were all secured by the real estate mortgage over the Lipats’ property.

The promissory notes, export bills, and trust receipt eventually became due and demandable.  Unfortunately, BEC defaulted in its payments.  After receipt of Pacific Bank’s demand letters, Estelita Lipat went to the office of the bank’s liquidator and asked for additional time to enable her to personally settle BEC’s obligations.  The bank acceded to her request but Estelita failed to fulfill her promise.

Consequently, the real estate mortgage was foreclosed and after compliance with the requirements of the law the mortgaged property was sold at public auction. On January 31, 1989, a certificate of sale was issued to respondent Eugenio D. Trinidad as the highest bidder.

On November 28, 1989, the spouses Lipat filed before the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of the real estate mortgage, extrajudicial foreclosure and the certificate of sale issued over the property against Pacific Bank and Eugenio D. Trinidad.  The complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-4152, alleged, among others, that the promissory notes, trust receipt, and export bills were all ultra vires acts of Teresita as they were executed without the requisite board resolution of the Board of Directors of BEC.  The Lipats also averred that assuming said acts were valid and binding on BEC, the same were the corporation’s sole obligation, it having a personality distinct and separate from spouses Lipat.  It was likewise pointed out that Teresita’s authority to secure a loan from Pacific Bank was specifically limited to Mrs. Lipat’s sole use and benefit and that the real estate mortgage was executed to secure the Lipats’ and BET’s P583,854.00 loan only.

In their respective answers, Pacific Bank and Trinidad alleged in common that petitioners Lipat cannot evade payments of the value of the promissory notes, trust receipt, and export bills with their property because they and the BEC are one and the same, the latter being a family corporation.  Respondent Trinidad further claimed that he was a buyer in good faith and for value and that petitioners are estopped from denying BEC’s existence after holding themselves out as a corporation.

After trial on the merits, the RTC dismissed the complaint, thus:

WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the facts contained in the record, the complaint filed in this case must be, as is hereby, dismissed.  Plaintiffs however has five (5) months and seventeen (17) days reckoned from the finality of this decision within which to exercise their right of redemption.  The writ of injunction issued is automatically dissolved if no redemption is effected within that period.

The counterclaims and cross-claim are likewise dismissed for lack of legal and factual basis.

No costs.


The trial court ruled that there was convincing and conclusive evidence proving that BEC was a family corporation of the Lipats.  As such, it was a mere extension of petitioners’ personality and business and a mere alter ego or business conduit of the Lipats established for their own benefit.  Hence, to allow petitioners to invoke the theory of separate corporate personality would sanction its use as a shield to further an end subversive of justice.[8] Thus, the trial court pierced the veil of corporate fiction and held that Bela’s Export Corporation and petitioners (Lipats) are one and the same.  Pacific Bank had transacted business with both BET and BEC on the supposition that both are one and the same.  Hence, the Lipats were estopped from disclaiming any obligations on the theory of separate personality of corporations, which is contrary to principles of reason and good faith.

The Lipats timely appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41536.  Said appeal, however, was dismissed by the appellate court for lack of merit.  The Court of Appeals found that there was ample evidence on record to support the application of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.  In affirming the findings of the RTC, the appellate court noted that Mrs. Lipat had full control over the activities of the corporation and used the same to further her business interests.[9] In fact, she had benefited from the loans obtained by the corporation to finance her business.  It also found unnecessary a board resolution authorizing Teresita Lipat to secure loans from Pacific Bank on behalf of BEC because the corporation’s by-laws allowed such conduct even without a board resolution.  Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that the mortgage property was not only liable for the original loan of P583,854.00 but likewise for the value of the promissory notes, trust receipt, and export bills as the mortgage contract equally applies to additional or new loans, discounting lines, overdrafts, and credit accommodations which petitioners subsequently obtained from Pacific Bank.

The Lipats then moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution of February 23, 2000.[10]

Hence, this petition, with petitioners submitting that the court a quo erred—






In sum, the following are the relevant issues for our resolution:

1. Whether or not the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is applicable in this case;

2. Whether or not petitioners' property under the real estate mortgage is liable not only for the amount of P583,854.00 but also for the value of the promissory notes, trust receipt, and export bills subsequently incurred by BEC; and

3. Whether or not petitioners are liable to pay the 15% attorney’s fees stipulated in the deed of real estate mortgage.

On the first issue, petitioners contend that both the appellate and trial courts erred in holding them liable for the obligations incurred by BEC through the application of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction absent any clear showing of fraud on their part.

Respondents counter that there is clear and convincing evidence to show fraud on part of petitioners given the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that BEC was organized as a business conduit for the benefit of petitioners.

Petitioners’ contentions fail to persuade this Court.  A careful reading of the judgment of the RTC and the resolution of the appellate court show that in finding petitioners’ mortgaged property liable for the obligations of BEC, both courts below relied upon the alter ego doctrine or instrumentality rule, rather than fraud in piercing the veil of corporate fiction.  When the corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, the separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded.[12] This is commonly referred to as the “instrumentality rule” or the alter ego doctrine, which the courts have applied in disregarding the separate juridical personality of corporations.  As held in one case,

Where one corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are conducted so that it is, in fact, a mere instrumentality or adjunct of the other, the fiction of the corporate entity of the ‘instrumentality’ may be disregarded.  The control necessary to invoke the rule is not majority or even complete stock control but such domination of finances, policies and practices that the controlled corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its own, and is but a conduit for its principal. xxx[13]

We find that the evidence on record demolishes, rather than buttresses, petitioners’ contention that BET and BEC are separate business entities. Note that Estelita Lipat admitted that she and her husband, Alfredo, were the owners of BET[14] and were two of the incorporators and majority stockholders of BEC.[15] It is also undisputed that Estelita Lipat executed a special power of attorney in favor of her daughter, Teresita, to obtain loans and credit lines from Pacific Bank on her behalf.[16] Incidentally, Teresita was designated as executive-vice president and general manager of both BET and BEC, respectively.[17] We note further that: (1) Estelita and Alfredo Lipat are the owners and majority shareholders of BET and BEC, respectively;[18] (2) both firms were managed by their daughter, Teresita;[19] (3) both firms were engaged in the garment business, supplying products to “Mystical Fashion,” a U.S. firm established by Estelita Lipat; (4) both firms held office in the same building owned by the Lipats;[20] (5) BEC is a family corporation with the Lipats as its majority stockholders; (6) the business operations of the BEC were so merged with those of Mrs. Lipat such that they were practically indistinguishable; (7) the corporate funds were held by Estelita Lipat and the corporation itself had no visible assets; (8) the board of directors of BEC was composed of the Burgos and Lipat family members;[21] (9) Estelita had full control over the activities of and decided business matters of the corporation;[22] and that (10) Estelita Lipat had benefited from the loans secured from Pacific Bank to finance her business abroad[23] and from the export bills secured by BEC for the account of “Mystical Fashion.”[24] It could not have been coincidental that BET and BEC are so intertwined with each other in terms of ownership, business purpose, and management.  Apparently, BET and BEC are one and the same and the latter is a conduit of and merely succeeded the former.  Petitioners’ attempt to isolate themselves from and hide behind the corporate personality of BEC so as to evade their liabilities to Pacific Bank is precisely what the classical doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity seeks to prevent and remedy.  In our view, BEC is a mere continuation and successor of BET, and petitioners cannot evade their obligations in the mortgage contract secured under the name of BEC on the pretext that it was signed for the benefit and under the name of BET.  We are thus constrained to rule that the Court of Appeals did not err when it applied the instrumentality doctrine in piercing the corporate veil of BEC.

On the second issue, petitioners contend that their mortgaged property should not be made liable for the subsequent credit lines and loans incurred by BEC because, first, it was not covered by the mortgage contract of BET which only covered the loan of P583,854.00 and which allegedly had already been paid; and, second, it was secured by Teresita Lipat without any authorization or board resolution of BEC.

We find petitioners’ contention untenable.  As found by the Court of Appeals, the mortgaged property is not limited to answer for the loan of P583,854.00.  Thus:

Finally, the extent to which the Lipats’ property can be held liable under the real estate mortgage is not limited to P583,854.00.  It can be held liable for the value of the promissory notes, trust receipt and export bills as well.  For the mortgage was executed not only for the purpose of securing the Bela’s Export Trading’s original loan of P583,854.00, but also for “other additional or new loans, discounting lines, overdrafts and credit accommodations, of whatever amount, which the Mortgagor and/or Debtor may subsequently obtain from the mortgagee as well as any renewal or extension by the Mortgagor and/or Debtor of the whole or part of said original, additional or new loans, discounting lines, overdrafts and other credit accommodations, including interest and expenses or other obligations of the Mortgagor and/or Debtor owing to the Mortgagee, whether directly, or indirectly principal or secondary, as appears in the accounts, books and records of the mortgagee.[25]

As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court, provided they are borne out by the record or based on substantial evidence.[26] As noted earlier, BEC merely succeeded BET as petitioners’ alter ego; hence, petitioners’ mortgaged property must be held liable for the subsequent loans and credit lines of BEC.

Further, petitioners’ contention that the original loan had already been paid, hence, the mortgaged property should not be made liable to the loans of BEC, is unsupported by any substantial evidence other than Estelita Lipat’s self-serving testimony.  Two disputable presumptions under the rules on evidence weigh against petitioners, namely: (a) that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;[27] and (b) that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.[28] Here, if the original loan had indeed been paid, then logically, petitioners would have asked from Pacific Bank for the required documents evidencing receipt and payment of the loans and, as owners of the mortgaged property, would have immediately asked for the cancellation of the mortgage in the ordinary course of things.  However, the records are bereft of any evidence contradicting or overcoming said disputable presumptions.

Petitioners contend further that the mortgaged property should not bind the loans and credit lines obtained by BEC as they were secured without any proper authorization or board resolution.  They also blame the bank for its laxity and complacency in not requiring a board resolution as a requisite for approving the loans.

Such contentions deserve scant consideration.

Firstly, it could not have been possible for BEC to release a board resolution since per admissions by both petitioner Estelita Lipat and Alice Burgos, petitioners’ rebuttal witness, no business or stockholder’s meetings were conducted nor were there election of officers held since its incorporation.  In fact, not a single board resolution was passed by the corporate board[29] and it was Estelita Lipat and/or Teresita Lipat who decided business matters.[30]

Secondly, the principle of estoppel precludes petitioners from denying the validity of the transactions entered into by Teresita Lipat with Pacific Bank, who in good faith, relied on the authority of the former as manager to act on behalf of petitioner Estelita Lipat and both BET and BEC.  While the power and responsibility to decide whether the corporation should enter into a contract that will bind the corporation is lodged in its board of directors, subject to the articles of incorporation, by-laws, or relevant provisions of law, yet, just as a natural person may authorize another to do certain acts for and on his behalf, the board of directors may validly delegate some of its functions and powers to officers, committees, or agents.  The authority of such individuals to bind the corporation is generally derived from law, corporate by-laws, or authorization from the board, either expressly or impliedly by habit, custom, or acquiescence in the general course of business.[31] Apparent authority, is derived not merely from practice.  Its existence may be ascertained through (1) the general manner in which the corporation holds out an officer or agent as having the power to act or, in other words, the apparent authority to act in general, with which it clothes him; or (2) the acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or constructive knowledge thereof, whether within or beyond the scope of his ordinary powers.[32]

In this case, Teresita Lipat had dealt with Pacific Bank on the mortgage contract by virtue of a special power of attorney executed by Estelita Lipat.  Recall that Teresita Lipat acted as the manager of both BEC and BET and had been deciding business matters in the absence of Estelita Lipat.  Further, the export bills secured by BEC were for the benefit of “Mystical Fashion” owned by Estelita Lipat.[33] Hence, Pacific Bank cannot be faulted for relying on the same authority granted to Teresita Lipat by Estelita Lipat by virtue of a special power of attorney.  It is a familiar doctrine that if a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers or any other agent to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it holds him out to the public as possessing the power to do those acts; thus, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in good faith dealt with it through such agent, be estopped from denying the agent’s authority.[34]

We find no necessity to extensively deal with the liability of Alfredo Lipat for the subsequent credit lines of BEC.  Suffice it to state that Alfredo Lipat never disputed the validity of the real estate mortgage of the original loan; hence, he cannot now dispute the subsequent loans obtained using the same mortgage contract since it is, by its very terms, a continuing mortgage contract.

On the third and final issue, petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals for not taking cognizance of the issue on attorney’s fees on the ground that it was raised for the first time on appeal.  We find the conclusion of the Court of Appeals to be in accord with settled jurisprudence.  Basic is the rule that matters not raised in the complaint cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[35]  A close perusal of the complaint yields no allegations disputing the attorney’s fees imposed under the real estate mortgage and petitioners cannot now allege that they have impliedly disputed the same when they sought the annulment of the contract.

In sum, we find no reversible error of law committed by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision and resolution herein assailed by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The Decision dated October 21, 1999 and the Resolution dated February 23, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41536 are AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioners.


Bellosillo, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 45-62. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona, with Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole concurring.

[2] Id. at 65-74.

[3] Id. at 63-64.

[4] Records, Civil Case No. Q-89-4152, pp. 12-14.

[5] Id. at  77-85.

[6] Id. at 81-82.

[7] Rollo, p. 74.

[8] Id. at 70.

[9] Id. at 56.

[10] Supra, note 3.

[11] Rollo, pp. 14-15.

[12] Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78413, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA 218, 230.

[13] Concept Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108734, 29 May 1996, 257 SCRA 149, 158.

[14] TSN, 17 August 1990, p. 3.

[15] Id. at 16-17.

[16] Rollo, p. 87.

[17] TSN, 17 August 1990, pp. 26-27.

[18] Supra, note 14.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Rollo, p. 50.

[21] Id. at 51.

[22] Id. at 56; TSN, 20 March 1992, p. 7.

[23] TSN, 17 August 1990, p. 19.

[24] Id. at 21.

[25] Rollo, pp. 60-61,

[26] Milestone Realty and Co., Inc. and William L. Perez v. CA, G.R. No. 135999, 19 April 2002, p. 8.

[27] Revised Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(d).

[28] Id. at Sec. 3(y).

[29] See TSN, 17 August 1990, p. 29 and TSN, 20 March 1992, p. 6.

[30] See TSN, 20 March 1992, p. 7.

[31] See People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117847, 7 October 1998, 297 SCRA 170, 182.

[32] Id. at 183-184.

[33] TSN, 17 August 1990, p. 21.

[34] Supra, note 31 at 184-185.

[35] Orosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111080, 5 April 2000, 329 SCRA 652, 661.

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