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Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision^[1] of the Sandiganbayan (SB), promulgated on November 17, 2016, which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of nine (9) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and sentenced him, for each count, to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one ( 1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office. The petition also questions the SB Resolution^[2] dated March 6, 2017 which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.^[3]

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Sometime in August to September 2010, the Designated Area Supervisor of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the Province of Occidental Mindoro received several reports from their mining and quarry checkers that there are persons who are conducting quarry operations within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of San Jose, in the same province, without the required Extraction Permits issued by the Provincial Government. Acting on these reports, the Designated Area Supervisor notified the quarry operators of their alleged violation, but upon being confronted by the former, the said quarry operators presented several documents, among which are Extraction Permits signed by herein petitioner who was then the Mayor of San Jose. Noting that the documents shown were not issued by the Provincial Governor's Office, Ruben P. Soledad (Soledad), the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer of Occidental Mindoro issued Cease-and-Desist Orders (CDOs) against these quarry operators, notifying them that it is the Provincial Governor who has sole authority to issue extraction permits and reminding them of the penalties that may be imposed upon them under the applicable provisions of the governing Provincial Tax Ordinance.

After acquiring information of the issuance of the above CDOs, herein petitioner wrote a letter, dated May 23, 2011, addressed to Soledad explaining his position on the matter and stating that he [Soledad] is guilty of "mockery of the whole legislative process" in considering certain provisions of the existing and applicable Provincial Tax Ordinance as repealed, and in supposedly giving effect to a proposed amendment of the said Ordinance without the benefit of public hearing and publication as required by law. As such, petitioner manifested that the Municipality of San Jose "shall not recognize [the] cease-and-desist order until such time that a proper legal process is adhered to by the Provincial Government." Petitioner also asked Soledad to "properly respect the inherent powers vested upon the Local Government Unit which was unmistakably and distinctly defined in the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 as a political subdivision" which "has substantial control of local affairs."^[4]

In a letter dated May 26, 2011, Soledad responded to petitioner by claiming that, pursuant to Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004 of Occidental Mindoro, as well as the Local Government Code of 1991, the authority to issue permits for the extraction of sand and gravel within the Province of Occidental Mindoro resides exclusively with the Provincial Governor. Soledad explained that the subject CDOs were issued for failure of the concerned quarry operators to present the legal permits because the ones they presented were issued by herein petitioner in his capacity as the Mayor of San Jose who is not authorized to do so. Soledad also insisted that the CDOs it issued were based on the strength of the provisions of the existing Provincial Tax Ordinance and not on the basis of any proposed amendments thereto.^[5]

On August 23, 2011, petitioner wrote a letter addressed to the Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Occidental Mindoro insisting that, under the LGC, the Municipal government is authorized to organize its Municipal Environment and Natural Resources and to enforce its own regulatory powers. Petitioner also manifested that he is not in conformity with the alleged amendment of Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004, and that he will just honor the provisions of the original version of the said Ordinance which supposedly authorizes the Municipal Treasurer to receive payments from applicants of extraction permits.^[6]

On October 4, 2011, Soledad filed, before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Complaint^[7] against petitioner for Usurpation of Authority, Violation of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, Grave Abuse of Authority in Office, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713), otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. In his Complaint, Soledad alleged that despite petitioner's knowledge that he lacks the requisite authority to issue extraction permits to quarry operators, petitioner, nonetheless, proceeded to issue several permits to several operators who were conducting quarry operations in San Jose.

In its Resolution^[8] dated January 16, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for issuing the subject extraction permits and directed the filing of the corresponding Informations. Thus, on even date, separate Informations were filed with the SB against petitioner for ten (10) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended. The Informations, which were similarly worded, except as to the dates of the commission of the offense and the recipients of the extraction permits, alleged as follows:

That on or about (24 August 2010), in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above­named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to (Gem CHB Maker), contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.^[9]

The Informations were docketed as SB-14-CRIM. CASE Nos. 0347-0356.

On November 12, 2014, the prosecution filed a Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Information^[10] praying for the withdrawal of the Information in SB-14-CRIM. CASE No. 0347 on the ground that the document attached in the Complaint was not an Extraction Permit as alleged in the Information but a Mayor's Permit to conduct business which was not illegally issued.

On February 23, 2015, petitioner was arraigned, and he entered a plea of not guilty in all ten cases.^[11]

However, in its Resolution^[12] dated February 24, 2015, the SB granted the prosecution's Motion to Withdraw the Information in SB-14-CRIM. CASE No. 0347 and deemed the said case dismissed.

Subsequently, trial ensued with respect to the nine (9) indictments against petitioner.

After trial, the SB rendered its November 17, 2016 questioned Decision finding petitioner, in all nine (9) cases (SB-14-CRIM. Case Nos. 0348-0356), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and imposing upon him, in each of the nine cases, the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month to ten (10) years, with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

The SB held that all the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are present in the instant case.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the SB denied it in its Resolution dated March 6, 2017.

Petitioner, then, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. However, his petition was denied via a minute Resolution^[13] dated September 13, 2017 for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment of the SB to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

Aggrieved by such denial, he filed a motion for reconsideration, but this Court denied the motion with finality in a Resolution^[14] dated November 22, 2017, as no substantial argument was adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought.

Petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration.

On July 17, 2018, this Court issued a Resolution^[15] which reinstated the instant petition. In the said Resolution, this Court noted that if an accused in a case decided by the SB, which completely disposes of the case, whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction, chooses to question such decision of the SB, the legal recourse he/she has is to file a petition for review on certiorari with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, this Court has observed that, in a number of cases, petitions for review of decisions of the SB were adjudicated via minute resolutions. While the disposition of cases through minute resolutions is an exercise of judicial discretion and constitutes sound and valid judicial practice under the Constitution,^[16] settled jurisprudence^[17] and the prevailing rules,^[18] this Court found it a better policy to limit the issuance of minute resolutions denying due course to a Rule 45 petition, which assails a decision of the SB, to cases decided by the said court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, with respect to cases resolved by the SB in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the mode of deciding the case is either through a decision or unsigned resolution.^[19] The reason behind this policy is because this Court is the first and last court which has the chance to review the factual findings and legal conclusions of the SB. Thus, by disposing of the case through a decision or unsigned resolution, this Court is required to take a "more than casual consideration" of the arguments raised by the appellant to support his cause as well as every circumstance which might prove his innocence.^[20] Moreover, by virtue of the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case, such appeal throws the whole case open for review in all its aspects. An examination of the entire records of the case may be made for the purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion. In doing so, the Court is always mindful of the precept that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.

Hence, the present petition raising the following Issues:

1. Whether the mere issuance of the Extraction Permits by herein Petitioner Villarosa as Municipal Mayor amounts to evident bad faith and giving of unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the Quarry Operators considering that: (i) Accused issued the Extraction Permits only upon recommendation of both the Municipal Environment and Resources Office and the Municipal Administrator; (ii) Taxes were collected and remitted to the Province, Municipality of San Jose, and the Barangay, and that the share of the Province even formed part of its general fund which was duly appropriated by the Province in its 2011 and 2012 Budget Ordinance; (iii) not one of the Quarry Operators[,] alleged of having received unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference were prosecuted; (iv) The Extraction Permits were issued without knowledge of the Cease-and-Desist Orders; and [v] the Cease and Desist Orders were issued only to the Quarry Operators.
   
   
2. Whether Section 138 of the Local Government Code is not a self­ executing provision such that Petitioner Villarosa cannot be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, in the absence of proof of publication of both SP Resolution No. 11, adopting and approving Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004, and Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004.^[21]
   

The petition is meritorious.

The settled rule is that conviction in criminal actions demands proof beyond reasonable doubt.^[22] This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused.^[23] Indeed, the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.^[24] Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved."^[25] Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution.

In the present case, petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides:

Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur, to wit:

(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.^[26]

The presence of the first and second elements are not disputed in the present case. Petitioner was the Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro at the time of the commission of the alleged offense and the acts complained of were done in the discharge of his official functions.

As to the third element, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to prove that there was evident bad faith on his part. First, petitioner contends that the applications for extraction permit went through a legitimate process as these were filed with the Municipal Environment and Natural Resources Office (MENRO), a body which was duly created by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose and approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Occidental Mindoro. Thereafter the applications were forwarded to the Municipal Administrator who, then, recommended its approval to the Mayor. Upon approval by the Mayor, the applicant paid the extraction fee to the Municipal Treasurer who issued Official Receipts. Second, petitioner argues that the taxes and fees paid by the applicants for extraction permit were duly collected by the Municipal Government of San Jose and were, in turn, remitted to the Provincial Government of Occidental Mindoro. The taxes which were remitted formed part of the Province's general fund and were duly appropriated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Petitioner avers that if he indeed had no authority to issue the subject extraction permits, why did the Provincial Government continue to accept the taxes which were generated from the issuance of these permits, and which were remitted by the Municipal Government of San Jose and never bothered to question them?

Under the third element, the crime may be committed through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence." As already held by this Court, Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence.^[27] There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.^[28] "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.^[29] "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.^[30] "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.^[31]

In the instant case, the prosecution alleges that petitioner is guilty of evident bad faith. However, the Court agrees with petitioner and finds that there is no sufficient evidence to prove that he is guilty of evident bad faith.

First, since he was not furnished copies of the CDOs nor was he previously notified of their issuance, petitioner was the one who took initiative in clarifying the validity of the said CDOs by writing a letter to Soledad and informing him of his position on the issue and the legal bases of such position.

Second, from the tenor of his letter to Soledad and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Occidental Mindoro, petitioner was very emphatic in his belief and reasoning, albeit mistakenly, that, under the Local Government Code, he wields authority, as Municipal Mayor, to issue the questioned permits. In fact, he even raised a legitimate question on the validity of the Provincial Tax Ordinance of Occidental Mindoro which governs, among others, the issuance of permits to extract and dispose of resources of the province. In other words, his claim and argument are not without any legal basis. However, he was mistaken in his reliance on the provisions of the Local Government Code as to his authority to issue the subject extraction permits. Such mistake, nonetheless, is not tantamount to evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as contemplated under the law as to make him liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Third, there is no showing that petitioner personally gained anything by his issuance of the questioned extraction permits. In fact, it was not disputed that all the pertinent taxes and fees in the issuance of the said permits were collected and the respective shares of the Provincial Government and the barangay were properly remitted and appropriated by them.

Fourth, there could have been no furtive design to issue the questioned permits because it is likewise undisputed that the application, the processing and the approval of the said permits went through the regular process. The applications were filed with the MENRO, which were then forwarded to the Municipal Administrator who, then, recommended its approval to the Mayor. Upon approval by the Mayor, the applicant paid the extraction fee to the Municipal Treasurer who issued Official Receipts. There was no evidence to show that there were favored applicants whose permits were surreptitiously issued for any ulterior motive or purpose.

Hence, the foregoing instances cast doubt on the culpability of petitioner for the crime charged. The prosecution was unable to present sufficient evidence to prove that in issuing the questioned extraction permits, petitioner was moved by a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another or of a palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose operating with furtive design to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing.

Anent the last element, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, it is required that the act constituting the offense consists of either (1) causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or (2) giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his official, administrative or judicial functions.^[32] Petitioner is charged under the second mode.

For one to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.^[33] The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason.^[34] "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action.^[35] "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.^[36]

In the instant case, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to prove that the persons in whose favor herein petitioner issued the subject extraction permits received unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. At the time of issuing the subject permits, petitioner was justified by his honest belief that he is authorized by law to issue the said permits. Moreover, as mentioned above, there is no dispute that the recipients of the permits went through the regular process in applying for the said permits and that they paid the taxes and fees imposed by the Municipal Government of San Jose. Neither was there any showing that they were given preference over other applicants.

Moreover, it bears to reiterate that an accused has in his/her favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his/her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he/she must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution, which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his/her behalf, and he/she would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.^[37]

In this regard, Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, in his Dissenting Opinion, posits that petitioner's alleged "brazen act of granting permits without any basis in law gives rise to a presumption of bad faith" on the part of respondent.

First, petitioner's issuance of the questioned permits proceeds from his belief, erroneous as it is, that he is authorized under Section 444(b)(3) (iv)^[38] of the Local Government Code to issue the same. A cursory reading of this provision would readily show that there is, in fact, basis to conclude that respondent, as municipal mayor, has authority to issue permits and licenses, although such power is not applicable in the present case. Hence, it would be inaccurate to say that petitioner's act of granting permits has no basis, whatsoever, in law as to make petitioner guilty of evident bad faith.

Second, petitioner's supposed brash act of granting permits without legal basis could not have given rise to a presumption of bad faith. There is no such thing as presumption of bad faith in cases involving violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On the contrary, as in all cases, the law presumes the accused innocent until proven guilty.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.^[39]

Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be absolved of the crime charged. Thus, in the instant case, good faith on the part of petitioner need not even be proved. It is for the prosecution to show beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty of evident bad faith. However, the prosecution has fallen short of discharging its burden of proving petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Yet, even as petitioner's actions were clearly not proven to be tinged with evident bad faith, there are still those that opine that an acquittal should not logically follow. The dissent advances the view that petitioner could still be convicted for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 because the latter's actions may be considered to fall under the rubric of gross inexcusable negligence regardless.^[40] The dissent fm1her points out that such a conviction would be justified-even if the Informations against petitioner do not contain any allegation of gross inexcusable negligence-following the case of Sistoza v. Desierto.^[41] This is plain error.

Contrary to the dissent's view, it would be highly improper, nay unconstitutional, to convict petitioner on the basis of gross inexcusable negligence. It must be emphasized that the Informations filed against petitioner all accuse the latter of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 through the modality of evident bad faith only. Not one Information accused petitioner of violating the same provision through gross inexcusable negligence. As can be derived from our earlier discussions, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence are two of the three modalities of committing violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.^[42] Also, by our previous discussion, we were able to establish that each modality of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is actually distinct from the others.^[43] Hence, while all three modalities may be alleged simultaneously in a single information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, an allegation of only one modality without mention of the others necessarily means the exclusion of those not mentioned. Verily, an accusation for a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 committed through evident bad faith only, cannot be considered as synonymous to, or includes an accusation of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 committed through gross inexcusable negligence.

To adopt the dissent's view, therefore, would inevitably sanction a violation of petitioner's due process rights, particularly of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.^[44] Convicting petitioner of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 on the basis of gross inexcusable negligence, when he was but charged of committing the violation by means of evident bad faith only, would be highly unfair as it effectively deprives the petitioner of the opportunity to defend himself against a novel accusation. This outcome simply cannot be countenanced. In People v. Manalili,^[45] we were taught as much:

The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of this constitutional right.^[46]

Neither would the case of Sistoza offer any refuge to the dissent's view. As astutely observed by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in his Concurring Opinion, the quotation in Sistoza that was relied upon by the dissent to justify their view is just an obiter dictum.^[47] In other words, Sistoza never intended to definitively settle the question of whether an information for a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 committed through evident bad faith only, can be sufficient to sustain a conviction for violation of the same provision albeit committed through the modality of gross inexcusable negligence. On this matter, we echo and adopt, as an integral part of this Decision, the following disquisition of Associate Justice Caguioa:^[48]

The portion of Sistoza relied upon by Justice Perlas-Bernabe is as follows:

We note that the Information against petitioner Sistoza, while specifying manifest partiality and evident bad faith, does not allege gross inexcusable negligence as a modality in the commission of the offense charged. An examination of the resolutions of the Ombudsman would however confirm that the accusation against petitioner is based on his alleged omission of effort to discover the supposed irregularity of the award to Elias General Merchandising which it was claimed was fairly obvious from looking casually at the supporting documents submitted to him for endorsement to the Department of Justice. And, while not alleged in the Information, it was evidently the intention of the Ombudsman to take petitioner to task for gross inexcusable negligence in addition to the two (2) other modalities mentioned therein. At any rate, it bears stressing that Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, is committed either by dolo or culpa and although the Information may have alleged only one (1) of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof.

It is important to note, however, that Sistoza was a case where the accused questioned the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him. The sufficiency of the Information filed against the accused therein was never the issue, as the main issue in the case was the propriety of the findings of the Ombudsman in the preliminary investigation. The absence of the phrase "gross inexcusable negligence" in the Information filed against him was not a material issue. "Gross inexcusable negligence" was only brought up tin the discussion to drive home the point that the Ombudsman erred in finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as the acts of the accused therein could not be considered to have been committed with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or even gross inexcusable negligence.

Simply put, the paragraph in question is obiter dictum.^[49]

Alas, even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner may be held accountable for the issuance of the subject extraction permits, such is not for the offense charged in the present Informations, as the acts being complained of do not constitute the elements of the crime presently charged. In fact, in his complaint filed with the Ombudsman, complainant Soledad accused petitioner not of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 but of Usurpation of Authority, Violation of Section 138 of RA 7160, Grave Abuse of Authority in Office, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of RA 6713; and Soledad presented evidence to support his accusations. However, the Ombudsman, instead chose to file the present Informations for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. In this respect, it is true, as Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier has pointed out in her Dissenting Opinion that it is the prerogative of the Ombudsman to determine what charges it shall file against petitioner. Indeed, the public prosecutor assumes and retains full discretion and control of the prosecution of all criminal actions and that the public prosecutor has the prerogative to determine the charge to be filed in court and who shall be charged. However, I hasten to add that such prerogative or discretion must always be based on evidence presented by the parties. It bears to reiterate that to hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, among the elements that must be proven was that the act complained of was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence and that the public officer charged gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. In the present case, there appears no evidence submitted by the private complainants to engender a well-founded belief that petitioner indeed violated such provision of law.

In sum, the evidence proven by the prosecution in this case failed to pass the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant petitioner's conviction. The prosecution has failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by petitioner. Hence, the failure of the prosecution's evidence to overcome such presumption of innocence entitles petitioner to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed November 17, 2016 Decision and the March 6, 2017 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in SB-14-CRIM. CASE Nos. 0348-0356, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of nine (9) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

J. Reyes, Jr., Carandang, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See separate dissenting opinion.
Caguioa, J., See Separate Conccurring Opinion.
Gesmundo, J., I join J. Caguioa's separate concurring opinion.
Hernando, J., I join J. Caguioa's Separate Concurring Opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J., Please See Dissenting Opinion.
Gaerlan, J., on leave.

---

^[1] Penned by Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and Michael Frederick L. Musngi, concurring, rollo, pp. 43-61.

^[2] Id. at 63-69.

^[3] Records, Vol. II, pp. 406-434.

^[4] See Exhibit "H," id at 74.

^[5] See Exhibit "J," id. at 76.

^[6] Exhibit "I," id. at 75.

^[7] Exhibit "E," id. at 17-27.

^[8] Records, Vol. I, pp. 5-16.

^[9] Id. at 1. (Emphasis ours)

^[10] Id. at 181-183.

^[11] See SB Order dated February 23, 2015, id. at 279.

^[12] Records, Vol. I, p. 280.

^[13] Records, Vol. I, pp. 123-124.

^[14] Id. at 149-150.

^[15] Id. at 177-178.

^[16] Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 14.

^[17] Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc., G.R. No. 196358, March 21, 2012; Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-82273, June 1, 1990.

^[18] See A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, Rule 13, Section 6(d).

^[19] In conformity with the above-discussed policy, the 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, which took effect on 16 November 2018, now provides that appeals to this Court, in criminal cases decided by the SB in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal, while appeals in cases decided by the SB, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, is by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

^[20] Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 186739-960, April 17, 2013.

^[21] Rollo, pp. 19-20.

^[22] Daayata, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 205745, March 8, 2017.

^[23] Id.

^[24] Id.

^[25] Id.

^[26] Valencerina v. People of the Philippines, 749 Phil. 886, 906 (2014).

^[27] Garcia, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 730 Phil. 521, 535 (2014).

^[28] Id.; Fuentes v. People, 808 Phil. 586, 594 (2017).

^[29] Id.

^[30] Id.

^[31] Id. at 593.

^[32] Ambil, Jr. v. Sandiganhayan, et al., 669 Phil. 32, 53 (2011).

^[33] Id. at 55.

^[34] Id.

^[35] Id.

^[36] Id.

^[37] Daayata, et al. v. People, supra note 22.

^[38] SEC. 444. The Chief Executive; Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. -

(a) The municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:

xxx   xxx   xxx

(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

xxx   xxx   xxx

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;

xxx   xxx   xxx

^[39] Id.

^[40] See Reflections of Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, p. 1.

^[41] 437 Phil. 117 (2002).

^[42] See notes 29-31.

^[43] Id.

^[44] Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).

^[45] 355 Phil. 652, 654 (1998).

^[46] Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.

^[47] Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, p. 9.

^[48] Id.

^[49] Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.

---

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

I dissent.

A municipal mayor who effectively usurps the functions of a provincial governor based on the flimsy and convenient excuse that he mistakenly understood the applicable provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC)^[1] despite their clear and straightforward nature commits "gross inexcusable negligence" and hence, should be held criminally liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.^[2]

To be sure, "gross inexcusable negligence" is one of the three (3) recognized modes of committing a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The other two (2) modes are "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith." In Sison v. People,^[3] the Court stated that:

The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e., through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is enough to convict.^[4]

Explaining what these terms mean, the Court has held:

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."^[5]

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that "gross inexcusable negligence," unlike "manifest partiality" or "evident bad faith," does not require proof of some fraudulent motive, self-interest, or ill will. However, it must be shown that the negligence committed by the public official is characterized "by the want of even slight care[;] acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally[,] with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected."^[6]

At this juncture, it is apt to mention that the fact that the Information contains the words "with evident bad faith"^[7] does not preclude a conviction for violation of Section 3 (e) through the modality of gross inexcusable negligence. In Sistoza v. Desierto,^[8] the Court held:

We note that the Information against petitioner Sistoza, while specifying manifest partiality and evident bad faith, does not allege gross inexcusable negligence as a modality in the commission of the offense charged. An examination of the resolutions of the Ombudsman would however confirm that the accusation against petitioner is based on his alleged omission of effort to discover the supposed irregularity of the award to Elias General Merchandising which it was claimed was fairly obvious from looking casually at the supporting documents submitted to him for endorsement to the Department of Justice. And, while not alleged in the Information, it was evidently the intention of the Ombudsman to take petitioner to task for gross inexcusable negligence in addition to the two (2) other modalities mentioned therein. At any rate, it bears stressing that Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, is committed either by dolo or culpa and although the Information may have alleged only one (1) of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the same vein, the Court, in Albert v. Sandiganbayan,^[9] explained that "a conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense,"^[10] viz.:

In Sistoza v. Desierto [see supra note 8], the Information charged the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, but specified only "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as the modalities in the commission of the offense charged. "Gross inexcusable negligence" was not mentioned in the Information. Nonetheless, this Court held that the said section is committed by dolo or culpa, and although the Information may have alleged only one of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof. In so ruling, this Court applied by analogy the pronouncement in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan [274 Phil. 369 (1991)] where an accused charged with willful malversation was validly convicted of the same felony of malversation through negligence when the evidence merely sustained the latter mode of perpetrating the offense. The Court held that a conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. x x x.^[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

When a person assumes a particular public office, he has the responsibility to equip himself with the basic knowledge of his fundamental duties, as well as the clear limits of his authority under the law. To fail in this regard is, to my mind, tantamount to gross inexcusable negligence, for which he or she may be rendered culpable. Case law exhorts that "[u]pon appointment to a public office, an officer or employee is required to take his oath of office whereby he solemnly swears to support and defend the Constitution, bear true faith and allegiance to the same; obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the position he will hold."^[12] Thus, unless a mistake is founded upon a doubtful or difficult question of law, or upon an honest mistake of fact, or there exists compelling circumstances that would justify otherwise, a public official's ignorance of the essential aspects of his office should not be countenanced. Otherwise, the constitutional provision, which states that "[p]ublic office is a public trust" and that all government officials and employees "must at all times be accountable to the people x x x,"^[13] would easily lose its fortitude and fervor.

RA 7160 or the LGC, is the primary statute that delineates the essential functions of local officials, such as a municipal mayor and a provincial governor. Under the LGC, the power to issue extraction permits is not given to the municipal mayor but is exclusively vested upon the provincial governor. Section 138 of the LGC unequivocally reads:

Section 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources. ­ The province may levy and collect not more than ten percent (10%) of fair market value in the locality per cubic meter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel, earth, and other quarry resources, as defined under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, extracted from public lands or from the beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks, and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction.

The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In conjunction, RA 7942,^[14] otherwise known as the "Philippine Mining Act of 1995," provides the procedure by which any qualified person may be granted a pe1mit to extract quarry resources, i.e., building and construction materials, from the ground. Under Section 43 thereof, the application is made before the "provincial/city mining regulatory board" and that the "provincial governor" grants the permit after the applicant has complied with all the prescribed requirements:

Section 43. Quarry Permit. - Any qualified person may apply to the provincial/city mining regulatory board for a quarry permit on privatel-y­owned lands and/or public lands for building and construction materials such as marble, basalt, andesite, conglomerate, tuff, adobe, granite, gabbro, serpentine, inset filling materials, clay for ceramic tiles and building bricks, pumice, perlite and other similar materials that are extracted by quarrying from the ground. The provincial governor shall grant the permit after the applicant has complied with all the requirements as prescribed by the rules and regulations. (Emphases supplied)

Undoubtedly, the wordings of the LGC, as well as the correlative provision of RA 7942, are clear and straightforward. Hence, one would be grossly negligent if he or she still misreads their import to come up with the conclusion that a municipal mayor, and not a provincial governor, has the power to issue permits for the extraction of sand, gravel and other quarry resources. Indeed, as the legal adage goes, absolute sentencia expositore non indiget - when the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required.^[15]

In this case, petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa (petitioner) ought to have known that the power to issue extraction permits exclusively belongs to the provincial governor because of the explicit and unequivocal provisions of the LGC and RA 7942. By remaining unaware or by failing to comprehend this basic limitation on his power, notwithstanding the clarity and explicitness of the above legal provisions, petitioner committed acts of indiscretion that smack of gross inexcusable negligence, ultimately resulting in unwarranted benefits in favor of the grantees-operators concerned.

Notably, the municipal mayor's general authority to issue licenses and permits under Section 444 (3) (iv) of RA 7160^[16] cannot prevail over the express and specific authority conferred upon the provincial governor to issue extraction permits. Equally basic is the rule that special provisions of law prevail over its general provisions. Neither should petitioner's gross inexcusable negligence be condoned by the Municipal Environment and Natural Resources Office's recommendation that he could approve the questioned permits nor the fact that the shares in the fees for these permits were received by the provincial government.^[17] To me, these proffered excuses do not sufficiently justify why petitioner failed to instead consult the clear and unequivocal provisions of the law which point to one singular reasonable conclusion - that is, that a municipal mayor has no power to issue extraction permits as that power exclusively belongs to the provincial governor plain and simple. In this regard, it is of no coincidence that the last sentence of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 reads:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

	x x x x
(e)	Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (Emphasis supplied)

The government would garner greater confidence from the people if, correlatively, greater vigilance in public service is not the exception but the norm. This is especially so when it comes to those charged with the duty of granting privileges and licenses to private persons, as these bureaucratic processes have been infamously known to be breeding grounds of graft and corruption. In this regard, the Court ought to be circumspect in discerning legitimate defenses from convenient excuses, and mulling over the consequences of flagrant ineptitude to the faith of our people.

Accordingly, I submit that petitioner's conviction under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as ruled by the Sandiganbayan, should be upheld on the basis of his gross inexcusable negligence for the reasons herein explained.

---

^[1] Republic Act No. 7160, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991" (January 1, 1992).

^[2] Entitled "ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT" (August 17, 1960).

^[3] 628 Phil. 573 (2010).

^[4] Id. at 583.

^[5] Id. at 583-584.

^[6] Id.

^[7] The Information reads (see ponencia, p. 4):

That on or about (24 August 2010), in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to (Gem CHB Maker), contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

^[8] 437 Phil. 117, 130-131 (2002).

^[9] 599 Phil. 439 (2009).

^[10] Id. at 452.

^[11] Id.

^[12] City Mayor of Zamboanga v. Court of Appeals, 261 Phil. 936, 938 (1990); emphases supplied.

^[13] 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 1.

^[14] Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING A NEW SYSTEM OF MINERAL RESOURCES EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, UTILIZATION, AND CONSERVATION," approved on March 3, 1995.

^[15] Barcellano v. Bañas, 673 Phil. 177, 187 (2011).

^[16] CHAPTER III
Officials and Offices Common to All Municipalities

ARTICLE I
The Municipal Mayor

Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - x x x.

x x x x
 

(3)

Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

x x x x
 

(iv)	Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance[.]

^[17] See ponencia, p. 10.

---

LEONEN, J.:

In issuing extraction permits when he had no power and in blatant disregard of the proper authority's orders, petitioner gave unwarranted advantage and preference to his permits' grantees with evident bad faith.

With respect, I regret that I cannot agree that petitioner should be acquitted on this Motion for Reconsideration.

For this Court's resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari^[1] challenging the Decision^[2] and Resolution^[3] of the Sandiganbayan in SB-14-Crim. Case Nos. 0348-0356. The Sandiganbayan found Jose T. Villarosa (Villarosa) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of nine (9) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In 2014, Villarosa Villarosa was charged with nine (9) counts of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e).^[4] The Informations uniformly read, apart from the dates the offense were allegedly committed and the grantee of the extraction permits. The accusatory portion read:

Criminal Case No. 0348

That on or about 14 September 2010, in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally, and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to Gem CHB Maker contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.


CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 0349

That on or about 17 November 2010, in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally, and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to Timoteo Aguilar contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 0350

That on or about 22 November 2010, in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally, and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to Arvi Dolojan contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 0351

That on or about 06 December 2010, in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally, and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to Andres Pablo contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 0352

That on or about 21 January 2011, in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally, and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to R.D. Go Concrete Products contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 0353

That on or about 30 March 2011, in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally, and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to Jojo Pojas contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 0354

That on or about 08 April 2011, in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally, and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to Emilia T. De Lara contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 0355

That on or about 03 May 2011, in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally, and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to Antonio Villaroza contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 0356

That on or about 07 June 2011, in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally, and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to Jessie Glass and Aluminum Enterprise contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.

CONTRARY TO LAW.^[5] (Emphasis supplied)

The charges originated from Occidental Mindoro Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer Ruben P. Soledad (Soledad)'s complaint against Villarosa. Soledad alleged that then Municipal Mayor Villarosa illegally issued sand and gravel extraction permits from September 2010 to June 2011, in violation of the Local Government Code.^[6]

In its November 17, 2016 Decision,^[7] the Sandiganbayan found Villarosa guilty as charged. His subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Sandiganbayan's March 6, 2017 Resolution.^[8] Assailing the judgment, Villarosa filed this Petition for Review before this Court.

On September 13, 2017, this Court issued a Resolution^[9] denying the petition for failing to show any reversible error in the assailed judgment.

Petitioner then moved for reconsideration.^[10]

In its November 22, 2017 Resolution, this Court denied the motion with finality, "no substantial argument having been adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought."^[11] Entry of final judgment was ordered to be issued immediately.

On December 22, 2017, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, with Motion for Leave to File and for the Admission of, the same, and Motion for the Referral of the Case to the Honorable Court En Banc.^[12] He invoked the observation in Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan that "the Sandiganbayan is the first and last recourse of the accused before [his or her] case reaches the Supreme Court where findings of fact are generally conclusive and binding."^[13] He pleaded that this Court reexamine its practice of issuing a minute resolution denying a petition for review assailing a judgment of conviction from the Sandiganbayan.^[14]

On July 9, 2018, this Court, through the Second Division, issued a Resolution^[15] granting petitioner's second motion for reconsideration and referring the case to the Court En Banc.

In its July 17, 2018 Resolution,^[16] the Court En Banc resolved to reinstate the Petition and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor, in behalf of respondent People of the Philippines, to file its comment. This Court held that "the better policy is to limit the rule on the issuance of a minute resolution denying due course to a Rule 45 petition to cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction."^[17] Moreover, it held that appeals from a judgment of conviction by the Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction, shall be resolved in a decision or resolution.^[18]

On August 1, 2018, respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment,^[19] praying for a period of 30 days from August 4, 2018 or until September 3, 2018. This was then followed by a Second Motion for Extension,^[20] requesting for an additional 20 days (from September 3, 2018 or until September 23, 2018), and a Third Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment, filed on September 20, 2018.^[21]

In its October 2, 2018 Resolution,^[22] this Court granted respondent's Motions for Extension, with a warning that no further extension shall be given. However, in its subsequent October 16, 2018 Resolution,^[23] this Court denied respondent's Third Motion for Reconsideration in view of the October 2, 2018 Resolution. It appears that the third motion was filed prior to this Court's October 2, 2018 Resolution.

Respondent then filed three (3) more Motions for Extension,^[24] praying for additional time to file its comment. Eventually, it filed its Comment^[25] on October, 29, 2018.

On November 13, 2018, this Court issued a Resolution^[26] denying respondent's motions. It also resolved to dispense with the comment filed, in compliance with the July 17, 2018 Resolution.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve Petition,^[27] praying that his petition be resolved without respondent's comment. This was noted in this Court's February 12, 2019 Resolution,^[28] where the Sandiganbayan was also directed to elevate the records of the case.

On June 18, 2019, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Permission to Travel,^[29] followed by a Supplement to the Urgent Motion.^[30] He alleged that he was planning to go to Japan for a family vacation from July 5, 2019 to July 10, 2019. He added that he plans to travel to Singapore as well on July 17, 2019 to July 20, 2019 for medical reasons. These were noted without action in this Court's August 14, 2019 Resolution.^[31]

Petitioner then filed a Second Motion to Resolve Petition^[32] and an Urgent Motion for Permission to Travel.^[33] In the latter, he requested permission to travel to Singapore from October 28, 2019 to October 31, 2019 for medical reasons. This was granted in this Court's October 1, 2019 Resolution, where he was ordered to post a cash bond of P5,000.00.^[34]

On November 27, 2019, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Permission to Travel,^[35] requesting permission to travel to Singapore from December 12, 2019 to December 14, 2019 for the same reason. This remains pending before this Court.

In my view, the petition should be denied with finality and the assailed judgment be affirmed. Petitioner should not be acquitted.

I

Republic Act No. 3019, Sec. 3(e) reads:

SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

....

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (Emphasis in the original)

To sustain convictions for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e), the prosecution must prove the following elements:

1)	The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2)	He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3)	That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[36] (Citation omitted)

It is undisputed that petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro when he was found to have committed the crime. However, it must also be shown that his action caused "undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference[,]"^[37] and that the crime was committed through any of the modes: "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence."^[38]

Albert v. Sandiganbayan^[39] differentiates the three (3) modes of committing a violation under this provision:

There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently Faudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.^[40] (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, as then Municipal Mayor of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, had absolutely no authority to issue extraction permits. Republic Act No. 7160, Section 138 is clear:

SECTION 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources. - The province may levy and collect not more than ten percent (10%) of fair market value in the locality per cubic meter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel, earth, and other quarry resources, as defined under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, extracted from public lands or from the beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks, and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction.

The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan.

The proceeds of the tax on sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be distributed as follows:

(1) Province - Thirty percent (30%);
(2) Component City or Municipality where the sand, gravel, and other quarry resources are extracted - Thirty percent (30%); and
(3) Barangay where the sand, gravel, and other quarry resources are extracted - Forty percent (40%). (Emphasis supplied)

The provision is categorical, unambiguous, and makes no room for interpretation. The Provincial Governor has the exclusive authority to issue permits to extract sand, gravel, and other quarry resources. Nothing in the provision is susceptible to an interpretation that a Mayor may issue extraction permits.

II

Consequently, I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that there was no evident bad faith because "petitioner was justified by his honest belief that he is authorized by law to issue the said permits."^[41]

First, basic is the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance.^[42]

We cannot exculpate an individual from liability for an illicit act when he or she pleads ignorance of the law. We have all the more reason not to condone a local chief executive's illegal and unauthorized exercise of power, especially when it is because of some patently erroneous personal view that he has the authority. It must be underscored that as a local chief executive, petitioner implements the law in his municipality's territorial jurisdiction.

Second, the majority excused petitioner's blatant disregard of the law "in his [mistaken] reliance on the provisions of the Local Government Code."^[43] It does not mention which particular provision of the Local Government Code was vague that warrants petitioner's acquittal. Records revealed that petitioner relied on Section 444 (3) (iv) of the Code:

SECTION 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers and performs such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.

....

(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

....

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance[.]

There is no difficult question of law here. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, this general authority-conferred upon the municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits--cannot prevail over the "specific and exclusive authority granted upon the provincial governor to issue extraction permits[.]"^[44]

Third, in my view, a public officer's brazen act of granting permits without any basis in law gives rise to a presumption of bad faith. Petitioner's mere issuance of invalid permits constitutes a serious transgression, considering sheer lack of legal basis or any color of law.

Luciano v. Estrella^[45] declared that Republic Act No. 3019 is malum prohibitum, and not malum in se:

In other words, the act treated thereunder partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of Republic officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Note that the law does not merely contemplate repression of acts that are unlawful or corrupt per se, but even of those that may lead to or result in graft and corruption. Thus, to require for conviction under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act that the validity of the contract or transaction be first proved would be to enervate, if not defeat, the intention of the Act. For what would prevent the officials from entering into those kinds of transactions against which Republic Act 3019 is directed, and then deliberately omit the observance of certain formalities just to provide a convenient leeway to avoid the clutches of the law in the event of discovery and consequent prosecution?^[46] (Citation omitted, emphasis in the original)

The majority's contemplation that "there is no showing that petitioner personally gained anything by his issuance of the questioned extraction permits"^[47] is immaterial. This is not an element of the crime that must be proven.

I also disagree that "the approval of the said permits went through the regular process."^[48] Nothing was regular in petitioner's unauthorized and infirm conduct. As the local chief executive, he has the prerogative on whether or not to approve his subordinates' recommendations. He is not an unwitting government official, but one who is mandated to execute laws and manage the affairs within his locality.

His subsequent acts exhibited badges of fraud which militate against his claim of good faith and excusable ignorance.

Soledad, the Occidental Mindoro Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, issued Cease and Desist Orders to his permit grantees. This then caused petitioner to write him two (2) letters, which he generously reproduced in his pleadings. Petitioner wrote that "the Municipality of San Jose shall not recognize your 'cease and desist order' until such time that a proper legal process is adhered to by the Provincial Government."^[49] Further, he berated Soledad who must "properly respect the inherent powers vested upon this Local Government Unit[.]"^[50] While the majority describes this as "emphatic,"^[51] this language hardly showed any compassion.

In any case, I fail to see how petitioner acted in good faith when he refused to heed the directive of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, who is mandated to protect our natural resources.

Executive Order No. 192, otherwise known as the Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, enumerates the functions of Regional Offices under which the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer serves:

SECTION 21. Functions of Environment and Natural Resources Regional Office. - Environment and Natural Resources Regional Offices shall be located in the identified regional capitals and shall have the following functions, but not limited to:

a)	Implement laws, policies, plans, programs, projects, rules and regulations of the Department to promote the sustainability and productivity of natural resources, social equity in natural resource utilization and environmental protection.
b)	Provide efficient and effective delivery of services to the people;
c)	Coordinate with regional offices of other departments, offices, agencies in the region and local government units in the enforcement of natural resource conservation laws and regulations, and in the formulation/implementation of natural resources programs and projects;
d)	Recommend and, upon approval, implement programs and projects on forestry, minerals, and land management and disposition;
e)	Conduct comprehensive inventory of natural resources in the region and formulate regional short and long-term development plans for the conservation, utilization and replacement of natural resources;
f)	Evolve respective regional budget in conformity with the priorities established by the Regional Development Councils;
g)	Supervise the processing of natural resources products, grade and inspect minerals, lumber and other wood processed products, and monitor the movement of these products;
h)	Conduct field researches for appropriate technologies recommended for various projects;
i)	Perform other functions as may be assigned by the Secretary and/or provided by law.

The natural resources provincial and community offices shall absorb, respectively, the functions of the district offices of the bureaus, which are hereby abolished in accordance with Section 24 (b) hereof. The provincial and community natural resource office shall be headed by a provincial natural resource officer and community natural resource officer, respectively. (Emphasis supplied.)

The majority stresses that Soledad filed the complaint for violation of laws which did not include Republic Act No. 3019, but that "the Ombudsman, instead chose to file the present Informations for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019."^[52]

It must be reiterated that "the Ombudsman's power to determine probable cause is executive in nature, and with its power to investigate, it is in a better position than this Court to assess the evidence on hand to substantiate its finding of probable cause or lack of it."^[53] The Ombudsman acted well-within its jurisdiction and competence in resolving to file informations for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, instead of the other laws Soledad claimed petitioner violated.

III

I disagree with the majority that there is "no sufficient evidence to prove that the persons in whose favor herein petitioner issued the subject extraction permits received unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference."^[54] As it pointed out, "unwarranted means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified, unauthorized, or without justification or adequate reason."^[55]

To sustain petitioner's conviction, there need not be actual proof of how the grantees preyed upon the municipality's resources to illustrate that they received unwarranted benefit. It is manifest that the grantees benefited from being issued extraction permits, despite having no source of right. Plainly, obtaining the permits from an unauthorized public officer enabled the grantees to extract sand and gravel resources without any legal authority, proper justification, and under no regulation from the concerned government agencies. This Court must not close its eyes when the unwarranted benefit extended to several persons is patent.

All told, in issuing extraction permits when he had no power to do so, and in blatant disregard of the proper authority's orders, petitioner gave unwarranted benefits to his permits' grantees. With no legitimate justification of his unlawful act, petitioner should not be acquitted from the charges.

Thus, I find no error in the Sandiganbayan's finding that petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti­-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This offense is punishable by "imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years [and] perpetual disqualification from public office[.]"^[56] Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not err in imposing for each count the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.

"Public office is a public trust."^[57] Public officers must perform their duties with "utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency."^[58] This Court must endeavor to exact accountability from our public officers, lest we unwittingly coddle erring leaders.

The least we must expect from our local chief executives, on whom public trust is reposed, is to know their mandate. Acquitting petitioner when he committed brazenly unlawful acts manifesting evident bad faith would be a disservice to the people.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the assailed Sandiganbayan Decision and Resolution. Petitioner Jose T. Villarosa should be held liable for nine (9) counts of violating Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e).

---

^[1] Rollo, pp. 7-42.

^[2] Id. at 43-62. The Decision dated November 17, 2016 was penned by Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz (Chair) and Michael Frederick L. Musngi of the First Division, Sandiganbayan, Quezon City.

^[3] Id. at 63-69. The Resolution dated March 6, 2017 was penned by Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz (Chair) and Michael Frederick L. Musngi of the Special First Division, Sandiganbayan, Quezon City.

^[4] See ponencia, p. 4. Initially, Villarosa was indicted for 10 counts of violating Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e). However, the prosecution moved to withdraw the information in SB-14-Crim. Case No. 0347. This was granted in the Sandiganbayan's February 24, 2015 Resolution.

^[5] Rollo, pp. 46-49.

^[6] Id. at 141, En Banc Resolution dated July 17, 2018.

^[7] Id. at 43-61. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz, and concurred in by Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz (Chair) and Michael Frederick L. Musngi of the First Division, Sandiganbayan, Quezon City.

^[8] Id. at 63-69. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz, and concurred in by Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz (Chair) and Michael Frederick L. Musngi of the Special First Division, Sandiganbayan, Quezon City.

^[9] Id. at 77-78.

^[10] Id. at 88-108.

^[11] Id. at 110-111.

^[12] Id. at 112-137.

^[13] Id. at 113.

^[14] Id. at 114.

^[15] Id. at 139-140.

^[16] Id. at 141-151.

^[17] Id. at 144.

^[18] Id. at 146.

^[19] Id. at 174-178.

^[20] Id. at 184-188.

^[21] Id. at 189-193. Despite its prior filing before this Court's October 2, 2018 Resolution, the Motion appears later in the rollo.

^[22] Id. at 188-A-188-B. A copy of this Resolution appears inserted in the rollo and is stapled to the previous page.

^[23] Id. at 193-A-193-B.

^[24] Id. at 194-206.

^[25] Id. at 207-238.

^[26] Id. at 239-240.

^[27] Id. at 241-245.

^[28] Id. at 246-247.

^[29] Id. at 249-257.

^[30] Id. at 258-263.

^[31] Id. at 263-A-263-8.

^[32] Id. at 264-268.

^[33] Id. at 269-271.

^[34] Id. at 282-283.

^[35] Id. at 284-291.

^[36] Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 237172, September 18, 2019 <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65745> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing Soriano v. Marcelo, 610 Phil. 72, 80 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].

^[37] Id.

^[38] Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, 308 Phil. 660, 693 (1994) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

^[39] 599 Phil. 439 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].

^[40] Id. at 450-451.

^[41] Ponencia, p. 10.

^[42] CIVIL CODE, art. 3.

^[43] Ponencia, p. 9.

^[44] Rollo, p. 65.

^[45] 145 Phil. 454 (1970) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc]. See also Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018, 863 SCRA 1 [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].

^[46] Id. at 464-465.

^[47] Ponencia, p. 9.

^[48] Id.

^[49] Rollo, p. 93.

^[50] Id.

^[51] Ponencia, p. 9.

^[52] Draft ponencia, p. 11.

^[53] Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 187794, November 28, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64814> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[54] Ponencia, p. 10.

^[55] Id.

^[56] Republic Act. No. 3019 (1960), sec. 9, as amended by Batas Blg. 195 (1982).

^[57] CONST., art. XI, sec. 1.

^[58] CONST., art. XI, sec. 1.

---

CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:

I concur with the ponencia that the accused-petitioner should be acquitted. A violation of a law that is not penal in nature does not, as it cannot, automatically translate into a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.

Brief review of the facts

The accused-petitioner, Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa), was the Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Believing, albeit erroneously, that he had the power to do so, Villarosa issued extraction permits to a number of quarry operators in the area. Before issuing a permit, however, the Office of the Municipal Environment and Natural Resources­ created pursuant to Section 443(b) in relation to Section 484 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC)-would accept and evaluate applications for extraction permits of gravel and sand. The Municipal Environment and Natural Resources Officer (MENRO) would evaluate individual applications for extraction permits, and if the application is qualified based on his evaluation, he would then endorse it to the Mayor for his approval after the payment of extraction fees.

The controversy in this case arose when the provincial government received reports that quarrying operations in the area were being conducted without the operators having secured the necessary permits. Some officers of the provincial government conducted an investigation, and the quarry operators showed them receipts issued by the Municipal Treasurer's Office (MTO) of San Jose and extraction permits signed by Villarosa. Because of this, Mr. Ruben P. Soledad (Soledad), the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO), issued Cease and Desist Orders (CDOs) against the quarry operators.

Villarosa sent a letter to Soledad objecting to the CDOs. Soledad, meanwhile, wrote back to insist that under Section 138 of the LGC, only the Provincial Governor may issue extraction permits for quarry resources. Section 138 of the LGC provides:

SECTION 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources. - The province may levy and collect not more than ten percent (10%) of fair market value in the locality per cubic meter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel, earth, and other quarry resources, as defined under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, extracted from public lands or from the beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks, and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction.

The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan.

The proceeds of the tax on sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be distributed as follows:

(1) Province - Thirty percent (30%);
(2) Component City or Municipality where the sand, gravel, and other quarry resources are extracted - Thirty percent (30%); and
(3) Barangay where the sand, gravel, and other quarry resources are extracted-Forty percent (40%). (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The provincial government averred that it passed an ordinance pursuant to the above provision of the LGC, namely Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004 (Tax Ordinance).

Villarosa, however, was of the belief that the Tax Ordinance was invalid and did not take effect because the said ordinance was not published as required by law. Thus, in the initial letter Villarosa wrote to the provincial government, he insisted that the municipal government "shall not recognize [the] cease-and-desist order until such time that a proper legal process is adhered to by the Provincial Government" and he also asked Soledad to "properly respect the inherent powers vested upon the Local Government Unit which was unmistakably and distinctly defined in the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 as a political subdivision" which "has substantial control of local affairs."^[1]

In response to the second letter that Soledad sent him, Villarosa replied and insisted that the municipal government has the power to organize its own environment and natural resources office and to enforce its own regulatory powers.^[2]

As the CDOs went unheeded, Soledad then filed a complaint against Villarosa in the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for Usurpation of Authority, violation of Section 138 of the LGC, Grave Abuse of Authority in Office, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and Violation of RA 6713.^[3]

The Ombudsman thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan 10 Informations charging Villarosa with violations of Section 3(e), RA 3019. Except as to the dates of the commission of the offense and the recipients of the extraction permits, the accusatory portions of the Informations similarly read as follows:

That on or about [relevant date], in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to [relevant grantee of extraction permit], contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.^[4]

The Sandiganbayan convicted Villarosa of nine counts^[5] of violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019.

Upon appeal to the Court, Villarosa's convictions were initially affirmed by a minute resolution. However, upon due consideration,^[6] the Court reinstated the case ratiocinating that it should not have dismissed the case by minute resolution only considering that the Court's review is merely the second - but already the last - level of review for the case.

The ponencia now rules that Villarosa should be acquitted of the charges.

As stated at the outset, I concur with the ponencia.
           

The prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the element of evident bad faith

To be found guilty of violating Section 3(e), RA 3019, the following elements must concur:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or judicial functions;

(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and

(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.^[7]

The existence of the first two elements - that Villarosa was a public officer and the acts in question were done in the discharge of his official functions - are not disputed. The disagreement lies in the existence of the third and fourth elements, particularly whether his act of granting extraction permits was done in evident bad faith and resulted in giving any private party unwarranted benefits.

The Sandiganbayan answered in the affirmative and convicted Villarosa of the charges, holding that there was evident bad faith because Section 138 of the LGC was clear and unambiguous and there was no room for interpretation.^[8] Therefore, Villarosa's act of issuing extraction permits was a stubborn and outright defiance of the clear directive of the LGC. As regards the last element, the Sandiganbayan ruled that Villarosa's act resulted in unwarranted benefits on the part of the quarry operators since they were able to conduct operations without securing the proper authorization under the law.^[9]

The ponencia, however, disagrees. According to the ponencia, there was no sufficient evidence to prove that he was guilty of evident bad faith. The ponencia took the following instances as evidence of good faith on the part of Villarosa:

First, since he was not furnished copies of the CDOs nor was he previously notified of their issuance, petitioner was the one who took initiative in clarifying the validity of the said CDOs by writing a letter to Soledad and informing him of his position on the issue and the legal bases of such position.

Second, from the tenor of his letter to Soledad and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Occidental Mindoro, petitioner was very emphatic in his belief and reasoning, albeit mistakenly, that, under the Local Government Code, he wields authority, as Municipal Mayor, to issue the questioned permits. In fact, he even raised a legitimate question on the validity of the Provincial Tax Ordinance of Occidental Mindoro which governs, among others, the issuance of permits to extract and dispose of resources of the province. In other words, his claim and argument are not without any legal basis. However, he was mistaken in his reliance on the provisions of the Local Government Code as to his authority to issue the subject extraction permits. Such mistake, nonetheless, is not tantamount to evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as contemplated under the law as to make him liable under Section3(e) of RA 3019.

Third, there is no showing that petitioner personally gained anything by his issuance of the questioned extraction permits. In fact, it was not disputed that all the pertinent taxes and fees in the issuance of the said permits were collected and the respective shares of the Provincial Government and the barangay were properly remitted and appropriated by them.

Fourth, there could have been no furtive design to issue the questioned permits because it is likewise undisputed that the application, the processing and the approval of the said permits went through the regular process. The applications were filed with the MENRO, which were then forwarded to the Municipal Administrator who then recommended its approval to the Mayor. Upon approval by the Mayor, the applicant paid the extraction fee to the Municipal Treasurer who issued Official Receipts. There was no evidence to show that there were favored applicants whose permits were surreptitiously issued for any ulterior motive or purpose.

Hence, the foregoing instances cast doubt on the culpability of petitioner for the crime charged. The prosecution was unable to present sufficient evidence to prove that in issuing the questioned extraction permits, petitioner was moved by a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another or of a palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose operating with furtive design to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing.^[10]

Associate Justice Marvic Marvio Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen), on the other hand, is of the view similar to the Sandiganbayan that all the elements of the crime were proven by the prosecution. According to Justice Leonen, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith, and Villarosa's acts were a blatant disregard of the letter of the law. Moreover, according to Justice Leonen, "a public officer's brazen act of granting permits without any basis in law gives rise to a presumption of bad faith."^[11] and Villarosa's actions belie his claim of good faith.

Similarly, Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (Justice Lazaro-­Javier) is of the position that Villarosa acted in bad faith because he violated "the clear, unmistakable and elementary rule in Section 138 of the Local Government Code vesting the power to issue extraction permits and allow private persons to extract quarry resources exclusively in the Provincial Governor" and "subject[ed] State resources to illegal private gain of the private persons so allowed."^[12]

My own review of the facts and the records of the case, however, leads me to the conclusion that not all the elements of the crime were proven by the prosecution.

The element of evident bad faith was not present

I do not disagree with the view that Section 138 is clear and unambiguous and that Villarosa violated the said provision of law. Nevertheless, it is my view that the said violation, on its own, does not automatically translate into the element of "evident bad faith" contemplated by Section 3(e) or RA 3019.

It is settled by a plethora of cases that evident bad faith "does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence"^[13] but of having a "palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes."^[14] Simply put, it partakes of the nature of fraud.^[15]

The presence of evident bad faith requires that the accused acted with a malicious motive or intent, or ill will. It is not enough that the accused violated a provision of law. It is not enough that the provision of law is "clear, unmistakable and elementary." To constitute evident bad faith, it must be proven that the accused acted with fraudulent intent.

As explained by the Court in Sistoza v. Desierto^[16] (Sistoza), "mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or manifest."^[17]

To stress anew the jurisprudential pronouncements, evident bad faith "contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes."^[18] It connotes "a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage. It contemplates a breach of sworn duty through some perverse motive or ill will."^[19]

Because evident bad faith entails manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage, it must be shown that the accused was "spurred by any corrupt motive[.]"^[20] Mistakes, no matter how patently clear, committed by a public officer are not actionable "absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith."^[21]

In Jacinto v. Sandiganbayan,^[22] evident bad faith was not appreciated by the Court because

x x x the actions taken by the accused were not entirely without rhyme or reason; he refused to release the complainant's salary because the latter failed to submit her daily time record; he refused to approve her sick­leave application because he found out that she did not suffer any illness; and he removed her name from the plantilla because she was moonlighting during office hours. Such actions were measures taken by a superior against an erring employee who studiously ignored, if not defied, his authority.^[23]

In Alejandro v. People,^[24] evident bad faith was ruled out "because the accused therein gave his approval to the questioned disbursement after relying on the certification of the bookkeeper on the availability of funds for such disbursement."^[25]

Here, as pointed out by the ponencia, the records are replete with facts negating the existence of bad faith on the part of Villarosa. Specifically, in doing the acts in question, Villarosa was relying - albeit mistakenly - that he had the power to do so under Section 444 of the LGC, which states:

SECTION 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:

x x x x

(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

x x x x

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this connection, I agree with the ponencia that the circumstances it mentioned negate a finding of any dishonest purpose or perverse motive constituting evident bad faith on the part of Villarosa. In particular, (1) that Villarosa did not personally gain from anything as a result of the issuance of the extraction permits, (2) that the permits were awarded only to the applicants who went through the regular process, i.e., applying with the MENRO, and (3) that the municipality religiously remitted to the provincial government the required portions of the fees paid by the quarry operators - all of these established facts negative any finding of Villarosa having been motivated by self-interest, ill will, or any ulterior purpose in the issuance of the extraction permits.

The clear language of Section 138 of the LGC notwithstanding, Villarosa's zeal in generating income for his municipal government on the basis of Section 444 cannot simply be brushed aside or labeled as a "brazen" act that gives rise to a presumption of bad faith. That this zeal was premised on a wrong understanding of Villarosa that Section 444 trumped Section 138 does not equate to evident bad faith especially where, as here, the evidence shows that all the monies and fees collected went to the coffers of the municipal and provincial governments. In other words, there is no corruption here; there is no self-interest or ill will.

Moreover, even as the Courts, steeped in the law, can now claim, with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, that Section 138 is "clear," this is not necessarily so with an ordinary layman.

In fact, as acknowledged by Justice Lazaro-Javier herself in her Dissenting Opinion, Villarosa had "issued the extraction permits thinking that he was not subjected to Section 138, because it was his position that as Municipal Mayor he was exempt from Section 138 and that he was merely following the practice of precedents."^[26] This precisely and only shows that Villarosa was not motivated by any malicious intent and evil design in issuing the extraction permits. While his belief was incorrect, he was nonetheless in good faith in believing that his actions were duly supported by law. To stress, when the accused is alleged to have acted with evident bad faith under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, which is the case here, the crime alleged is a crime of dolo^[27] - an offense committed with wrongful or malicious intent.^[28] The admitted fact that Villarosa acted on the genuine, albeit erroneous, belief that his acts were based on law and past precedents negates dolo or wrongful or malicious intent.

Villarosa cannot he convicted under Section 3(e), RA 3019 for alleged "gross inexcusable negligence"

In this connection, Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Perlas-Bernabe) argues in her own Dissenting Opinion that Villarosa should still be convicted for violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019, not because there was evident bad faith, but because there was gross inexcusable negligence. Relying primarily on Sistoza, Justice Perlas-Bernabe argues that even if the Informations filed against Villarosa only contain the words "with evident bad faith," it "does not preclude a conviction for violation of Section 3 (e) through the modality of gross inexcusable negligence."^[29]

I strongly disagree.

The portion of Sistoza relied upon by Justice Perlas-Bernabe is as follows:

We note that the Information against petitioner Sistoza, while specifying manifest partiality and evident bad faith, does not allege gross inexcusable negligence as a modality in the commission of the offense charged. An examination of the resolutions of the Ombudsman would however confirm that the accusation against petitioner is based on his alleged omission of effort to discover the supposed irregularity of the award to Elias General Merchandising which it was claimed was fairly obvious from looking casually at the supporting documents submitted to him for endorsement to the Department of Justice. And, while not alleged in the Information, it was evidently the intention of the Ombudsman to take petitioner to task for gross inexcusable negligence in addition to the two (2) other modalities mentioned therein. At any rate, it bears stressing that Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, is committed either by dolo or culpa and although the Information may have alleged only one (1) of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof.^[30]

It is important to note, however, that Sistoza was a case where the accused therein questioned the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him. The sufficiency of the Information filed against the accused therein was never the issue, as the main issue in the case was the propriety of the findings of the Ombudsman in the preliminary investigation. The absence of the phrase "gross inexcusable negligence" in the Information filed against him was not a material issue. "Gross inexcusable negligence" was only brought up in the discussion to drive home the point that the Ombudsman erred in finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as the acts of the accused therein could not be considered to have been committed with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or even gross inexcusable negligence.

Simply put, the paragraph in question is obiter dictum.

I thus disagree that Villarosa can be convicted through the modality of "gross inexcusable negligence" when the same was not alleged in the Informations. To recall, the Informations only accused Villarosa of doing certain acts "with evident bad faith." It will be utterly unfair, and will be offensive to his right to due process for him to suddenly be convicted under "gross inexcusable negligence" when it was not even part of the Informations; nor was he given any opportunity to be heard on the same. To emphasize, "Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence."^[31] In simple terms, "evident bad faith" entails willfulness to do something wrong, whereas "gross inexcusable negligence" entails failure to exercise the required diligence that either results in a wrong or in the failure to prevent the occurrence of a wrongdoing. Thus, "gross inexcusable negligence" and "evident bad faith" are separate and distinct from each other. Alleging one in an Information should not, and does not, mean that the other is likewise alleged.

In the recent landmark ruling of People v. Solar,^[32] the Court en banc emphasized the importance of specificity in Informations:

The Court stresses that the starting point of every criminal prosecution is that the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent. Further to this, the courts, in arriving at their decisions, are instructed by no less than the Constitution to bear in mind that no person should be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law. An essential component of the right to due process in criminal proceedings is the right of the accused to be sufficiently informed, in writing, of the cause of the accusation against him. x x x

x x x x

It is thus fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the Information. No Information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. The test in determining whether the information validly charges an offense is whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered. To repeat, the purpose of the law in requiring this is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense, as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

In addition, the Court remains mindful of the fact that the State possesses vast powers and has immense resources at its disposal. Indeed, as the Court held in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, the individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-a-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government and his only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need.

In the particular context of criminal prosecutions, therefore, it is the State which bears the burden of sufficiently informing the accused of the accusations against him so as to enable him to properly prepare his defense. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Here, the Informations charged Villarosa only with "evident bad faith." Again, he was not charged with "gross inexcusable negligence." Following the ultimate purpose laid down above - that is, to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense - it cannot be said here that Villarosa was given the proper opportunity to prepare his defense as regards the element of "gross inexcusable negligence." As Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan^[33] reminds, "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence must be alleged with particularity in the information sufficiently to inform the accused of the charge against him and to enable the court properly to render a decision."^[34]

It will thus be grossly unfair for the Court to now rule that he is guilty of a charge that he has not been even given the opportunity to defend himself against.

Justice Perlas-Bernabe, however, in arguing for Villarosa's conviction for violation of Section 3(e) under the modality of gross inexcusable negligence, reasons that:

When a person assumes a particular public office, he has the responsibility to equip himself with the basic knowledge of his fundamental duties, as well as the clear limits of his authority under the law. To fail in this regard is, to my mind, tantamount to gross inexcusable negligence, for which he or she may be rendered culpable. Case law exhorts that "[u]pon appointment to a public office, an officer or employee is required to take his oath of office whereby he solemnly swears to support and defend the Constitution, bear true faith and allegiance to the same; obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the position he will hold." Thus, unless a mistake is founded upon a doubtful or difficult question of law, or upon an honest mistake of fact, a public official should not be permitted to simply feign ignorance to the essential aspects of his office. Otherwise, the Constitutional provision, which states that "[p]ublic office is a public trust" and that all government officials and employees "must at all times be accountable to the people x x x," would easily lose its fortitude and fervor.

x x x x

As I see it, the government would do well if greater vigilance is expected from its public servants, especially those charged with the duty of granting privileges and licenses to private persons. In this regard, We ought to be circumspect in discerning legitimate defenses from convenient excuses, and mulling over the consequences of flagrant ineptitude to the faith of our people.^[35]

While I am in full agreement with the call to hammer the point that "public office is a public trust," I cannot, in good conscience, agree to punishing with imprisonment any and all violations of non-penal laws. It is true that public servants have a duty to know the limits of the authority granted to them. Yet, I cannot subscribe to the thinking that to do an act outside of those limits already constitutes "gross inexcusable negligence" that is criminally punishable. If that is the case, then we might as well dispense with administrative proceedings - whether in the Civil Service Commission or in the Ombudsman - against public officials, for what is the sense of having a distinction between administrative and criminal cases when every single misstep merits a criminal sanction.

It is also true that every person is presumed to know the law, and that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.^[36] However, it is likewise true that it is unjust to automatically punish someone with a criminal sentence by virtue of his non-compliance with a non-penal rule.

The absurdity of it all becomes all the more apparent once the call for Villarosa's head for his non-compliance in this case is compared with the Court's attitude towards members of the judiciary who do the exact same thing.

To be sure, the Court, in the exercise of its disciplinary power over members of the judiciary - persons who are expected to have a much deeper knowledge and understanding of the law and the rules - normally punishes "gross ignorance of the law" with only a fine accompanied by a warning, admonition, or reprimand.^[37] Acts committed by judges that the Court deemed as "gross ignorance of the law" such as (1) granting bail without a standing warrant of arrest against the accused, and in a case pending in another court without ascertaining the unavailability of the judge therein;^[38] or (2) incorrect application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,^[39] were simply punished by a comparatively small fine accompanied by a warning or admonition.

In Vercide v. Hernandez,^[40] for instance, the judge dismissed a civil case on the ground that the case was immediately filed without having been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Despite the plaintiff raising the law's "clear," "unmistakable" and "elementary" language, along with Court decisions on the matter, supporting the argument that prior conciliation is not needed when the parties are residents of barangays situated in different cities or municipalities, the judge still insisted on her own interpretation that prior conciliation proceedings were needed and then dismissed the case. Because of this, an administrative complaint was filed against the judge by the aggrieved party - the plaintiff whose case was dismissed. The Court, in ruling on the administrative case, made the following observations against the judge:

The ruling in Tavora v. Veloso, reiterated in other cases, should be familiar to the bench and the bar. As we have held in Espiritu v. Jovellanos, the phrase "Ignorance of the law excuses no one" has a special application to judges who, under the injunction of Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, "should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence." In Bacar v. De Guzman, it was held that when the law violated is basic, the failure to observe it constitutes gross ignorance. Reiterating this ruling, it was emphasized in Almeron v. Sardido that the disregard of an established rule of law amounts to gross ignorance of the law and makes the judge subject to disciplinary action.

In the case at bar, respondent showed patent ignorance - if not disregard - of this Court's rulings on the jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapamayapa by her erroneous quotations of the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing R.A. No. 7160. While a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders, his error may be so gross or patent that he should be administratively disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.

In this case, respondent at first cited P.D. No. 1508, §3 as basis of her action. When her attention was called to the fact that this had been repealed by §409(c) of R.A. No. 7160, respondent, who obviously was more intent in justifying her previous order than correcting her error, quoted out of context the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing the Katarungang Pambarangay provisions of R.A. No. 7160. She thus violated Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interest, public opinion or fear of criticism."^[41]

Despite finding the judge's actions to be contrary to the "clear", "unmistakable" and "elementary" letter of the law and the jurisprudence on the matter - along with findings of the judge even misquoting the law ­ the Court only imposed a "FINE of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely."^[42]

If one were to make a deeper analysis, however, all the elements of Section 3(e), as currently formulated, are present. The judge was a public officer, and the act committed was done in the discharge of official judicial functions, thereby satisfying the first two elements. The third element would also be present as there was arguably evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, given that the judge stubbornly stuck with her interpretation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law despite having been confronted with the express letter of the law and jurisprudence that both say otherwise. The fourth element was likewise present, as the judge also caused undue injury to the party whose case was dismissed and/or gave the opposing party unwarranted benefits by dismissing the case filed against them. In spite of these, the judge was not even dismissed from the service. A mere fine with a warning sufficed.

This happens to a lot of cases of gross ignorance of the law^[43] despite the Court's recognition in another case that judges "are not common individuals" and that their errors have a far larger implication on the public's confidence in the judiciary as a whole:

Respondent judge fell short of these standards when he failed in his duties to follow elementary law and to keep abreast with prevailing jurisprudence. Service in the judiciary involves continuous study and research from beginning to end.

Exacting as these standards may be, judges are expected to be personifications of justice and rule of the law and, as such, to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Essential to every one of them is faithfulness to the laws and maintenance of professional competence.

Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors "men forgive and time forgets." For when they display an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, they erode the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts. Such lack is gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands and rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, of which no one is excused, and surely not a judge.^[44] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

I raise this to make two points.

First, if the Court can impose only light administrative sanctions on erring judges who are "expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws,"^[45] I do not see any reason why the Court cannot afford the same, if not more, understanding to other public servants who are not learned in the law.

Second, punishing Villarosa criminally would create a dangerous atmosphere for public servants, particularly judges, because, as demonstrated, all the elements of Section 3(e) are present in most cases of gross negligence committed by judges. If the Court were to convict someone of violating Section 3(e), RA 3019 simply because "elementary" rules were not followed, it is only a matter of time before judges are saddled with criminal cases filed against them for simple violations of "elementary" rules. I thus invite the Court to steer away from this path as it is fraught with unwarranted peril.

In this light, I reiterate that Villarosa's violation of a law that is not penal in nature does not, as it should not, automatically translate into evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence that makes one guilty of a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. For it to amount to a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 through the modality of evident bad faith, established jurisprudence demands that the prosecution must prove the existence of factual circumstances that point to fraudulent intent.

Here, the prosecution was unable to adduce evidence proving such fraudulent intent. On the contrary, there is an abundance of evidence on record negating the presence of evident bad faith.

Similarly, as already discussed, there is also no gross inexcusable negligence that can be appreciated because it was not alleged in the Information. Moreover, Villarosa's act of granting permits is one of dolo, not culpa. The entire case was litigated on the charge that Villarosa willfully and purposefully did the acts under the impression that he had authority to do so. That he even replied to the cease and desist order from the provincial government in order to assert his authority is a fact that has been harped on numerous times to support his conviction. In Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan,^[46] the Court stated that "[i]n criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without malice," and "that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence"^[47] which is a form of negligence.

In Villarosa's case, all the questioned acts were willful in nature. Hence, there is no gross inexcusable negligence or culpa, as there could not have been any. Again, to convict him for violating Section 3(e), RA 3019 under the modality of gross inexcusable negligence - simply because he violated a "clear," "unmistakable," and "elementary" provision of law - would be to set a dangerous precedent that would send a chilling effect to all public servants, particularly members of the judiciary, that working in the government would more likely lead to their imprisonment. Because of the all ­ encompassing nature of the argument, i.e., that failure to follow an "elementary" rule constitutes gross inexcusable negligence, then mistakes, no matter how small, as long as the rule violated is later on considered to be "elementary," would automatically merit a criminal punishment under RA 3019. I once again implore the Court to avoid this path so as not to unduly punish public servants, and thereby discourage even the good people from joining the public service.

Having established that there is no evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in this case, it is now clear that one of the elements of the crime was not proven. Hence, Villarosa should perforce be acquitted.

The prosecution was also not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the element of giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference

The element of evident bad faith is not the only element absent in the present case. Regarding the last element, the ponencia held that there was likewise no sufficient evidence that the quarry operators received unwarranted benefits. Similar to its ratiocination on the third element, the ponencia took into consideration Villarosa's honest belief that he had power to issue the extraction permits, along with the fact that the quarry operators went through the regular process of applying for the issuance of the permits, including the payment of extraction fees.

In this regard, I fully concur with the ponencia.

As its name implies, and as what can be gleaned from the deliberations of Congress, RA 3019 was crafted as an anti-graft and corruption measure. At the heart of the acts punishable under RA 3019 is corruption. As explained by one of the sponsors of the law, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, "[w]hile we are trying to penalize, the main idea of the bill is graft and corrupt practices. x x x Well, the idea of graft is the one emphasized."^[48] Graft entails the acquisition of gain in dishonest ways.^[49]

Hence, in saying that a public officer gave "unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference," it is not enough that the benefits, advantage, or preference was obtained in transgression of laws, rules, and regulations. Such benefits must have been given by the public officer to the private party with corrupt intent, a dishonest design, or some unethical interest. This is in alignment with the spirit of RA 3019, which centers on the concept of graft.

I recognize that this is not the understanding under the current state of jurisprudence. Jurisprudence has defined the term "unwarranted" as simply lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.^[50] The term "private party" may be used to refer to persons other than those holding public office,^[51] which may either be a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.^[52]

Thus, under current jurisprudence, in order to be found guilty for giving any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference, it is enough that the public officer has given an unauthorized or unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.^[53] By giving any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference, damage is not required. It suffices that the public officer has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official functions.^[54] Proof of the extent or quantum of damage is not even essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or benefit received could be perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.^[55]

I respectfully submit, and evidently the majority agrees, that it is high time for the Court to revisit this line of reasoning.

The foregoing understanding of "unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference" is too broad that every single misstep committed by public officers that result in benefits to private parties falls under the definition and would thus possibly be criminally punishable. Every little error - no matter how minor - would satisfy the fourth element as the threshold is simply that the benefit be "unjustified," "unauthorized," or "without justification." For instance, a contract awarded in good faith based on an interpretation of the law that would later on be judicially declared incorrect would be sufficient basis for affirming the existence of the fourth element, which may lead to the incarceration of a public officer simply because a private party received a benefit "without justification," yet was revealed to be so only in hindsight.

While it is true that public office is a public trust, the Court is called upon to likewise play its part in not interpreting the laws to effectively be a disincentive to individuals in joining the public service. It is simply absurd to criminally punish every minute mistake that incidentally caused a benefit to private parties even when these acts were not done with corrupt intent.

In the instant case, for example, Villarosa's act of issuing the extraction permits was motivated, not by any corrupt intent to favor one operator over another or to unduly receive any pecuniary benefit. Based on the evidence, his actuations were simply based on his honest belief that he had the authority to issue the permits. To be sure, the evidence in fact shows that all the pertinent taxes and fees in the issuance of the said permits were collected, creating revenue for the provincial government, the municipality, and the barangay. No pecuniary benefit went to the wrong person or entity - in other words, the evidence clearly showed that no graft and corruption actually transpired.

This view that "unwarranted benefits" should likewise be viewed from the lens of corruption is not novel, although it has been rarely applied in the past. One such case was Posadas v. Sandiganbayan^[56] (Posadas), where the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor for Administrative Affairs (Vice-Chancellor) of University of the Philippines-Diliman (UP Diliman) were charged with violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The case stemmed from the creation of the Technology Management Center (TMC) within the UP system. The Chancellor then had a proposal to have a project "aimed to design and develop ten new graduate courses in technology management for the diploma, master's and doctoral programs to be offered by TMC,"^[57] (the TMC Project) which would be funded by the Canadian International Development Agency. The proposal was approved and a memorandum of agreement was entered into between the relevant parties.

Sometime after, the Chancellor, along with some other high-ranking officers of UP Diliman, were invited to a conference in China. The Chancellor then designated the Vice-Chancellor as the Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of UP Diliman for the duration of his time in China. During the period that the Vice­Chancellor was UP Diliman's OIC, he appointed the Chancellor as the Project Director of the TMC. He also signed a "contract for consultancy services" wherein the Chancellor was also hired as Consultant for the TMC Project. The Chancellor then received "honoraria" (P30,000.00 per month) and consultancy fees (totaling P100,000.00) as Project Director and Consultant of the TMC Project until a few months after when the Commission on Audit (COA) raised questions on the legality of the said fees.^[58]

The COA initially disallowed the amounts paid to the Chancellor, but it reversed its ruling upon the sufficient explanation provided by UP's Chief Legal Officer. However, because of the initial disallowance (and other supervening events), an investigation was ordered which eventually led to the filing of Informations for violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019 against the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor.

The Sandiganbayan convicted both the Chancellor and Vice-­Chancellor. Upon appeal to the Court, the convictions were affirmed. However, upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the Court reversed its ruling and acquitted both of them. In the Resolution ruling on the motion for reconsideration, the Court reasoned:

The bad faith that Section 3 (e) of Republic 3019 requires, said this Court, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imputes a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity, and a conscious doing of a wrong. Indeed, it partakes of the nature of fraud.

Here, admittedly, Dr. Dayco appears to have taken advantage of his brief designation as OIC Chancellor to appoint the absent Chancellor, Dr. Posadas, as Director and consultant of the TMC Project. But it cannot be said that Dr. Dayco made those appointments and Dr. Posadas accepted them, fraudulently, knowing fully well that Dr. Dayco did not have that authority as OIC Chancellor.

All indications are that they acted in good faith. They were scientists, not lawyers, hence unfamiliar with Civil Service rules and regulations. The world of the academe is usually preoccupied with studies, researches, and lectures. Thus, those appointments appear to have been taken for granted at UP. It did not invite any immediate protest from those who could have had an interest in the positions. It was only after about a year that the COA Resident Auditor issued a notice of suspension covering payments out of the Project to all UP personnel involved, including Dr. Posadas.

x x x x

If the Court does not grant petitioners' motions for reconsideration, the common disallowances of benefits pai[d] to government personnel will heretofore be considered equivalent to criminal giving of "unwarranted advantage to a private party," an clement of graft and corruption. This is too sweeping, unfair, and unwise, making the denial of most benefits that government employees deserve the safer and better option.

x x x x

Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 requires the prosecution to prove that the appointments of Dr. Posadas caused "undue injury" to the government or gave him "unwarranted benefits."

This Court has always interpreted "undue injury" as "actual damage." What is more, such "actual damage" must not only be capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A finding of "undue injury" cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture, or guesswork. The Court held in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan that the element of undue injury cannot be presumed even after the supposed wrong has been established. It must be proved as one of the elements of the crime.

Here, the majority assumed that the payment to Dr. Posadas of P30,000.00 monthly as TMC Project Director caused actual injury to the Government. The record shows, however, that the P247,500.00 payment to him that the COA Resident Auditor disallowed was deducted from his terminal leave benefits.

The prosecution also failed to prove that Dr. Dayco gave Dr. Posadas "unwarranted advantage" as a result of the appointments in question. The honoraria he received cannot be considered "unwarranted" since there is no evidence that he did not discharge the additional responsibilities that such appointments entailed.^[59] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court in Posadas correctly viewed the element of giving "unwarranted benefits" from the perspective of graft and corruption. The Court took into account good faith, the fact that the accused therein were not learned in the law, and the fact that they truly rendered service, to rule that the element of "unwarranted benefit" was not present despite the missteps that both accused admittedly took.

It must be emphasized, however, that Posadas is not the rule. Under the general understanding of "unwarranted benefits" in most jurisprudence, the Chancellor's receipt of the honoraria would be considered as an unwarranted benefit because the one who appointed him to the position did not have authority to do so. Yet, because the Chancellor indeed rendered service in reality, the Court in Posadas correctly did not consider the receipt of the honoraria to be an "unwarranted benefit."

In the present case, it is important to reiterate for emphasis that (1) the accused believed in good faith - because of a general provision of the LGC - that he had the authority to issue the permits; (2) the quarry operators went through the regular process of securing the permits; and (3) the mandated shares of the other local government units from the revenues of the quarry operations were properly distributed to each. Similar to Posadas, therefore, the incidental benefit that these quarry operators received could not thus be considered "unwarranted" given that they were awarded the permits in the regular course of business, and they had paid the necessary taxes and fees arising from the quarry operations.

While the benefit of hindsight allows us to have the clear view that Villarosa indeed had no power to issue the permits, it does not automatically mean that the quarry operators received "unwarranted benefits." The benefits these operators received do not at once become "unwarranted" simply because they arose from Villarosa's misinterpretation of the LGC. They would only be "unwarranted" had they been granted out of corrupt motives or ill-intent, as shown by, for example, grants of permits without going through the regular process, or allowing these operators to not pay the corresponding taxes or fees.

The Court may also refer to its ruling in Rivera v. People,^[60] wherein the Court upheld the conviction of the accused therein under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for entering into a negotiated contract with a corporation, i.e., PAL Boat Industry (PAL Boat), for the construction of seven floating clinics despite the fact that the said entity was not qualified.

In discussing the element of unwarranted benefit, the Court explained that the said element was satisfied because the totality of the circumstances clearly established that the accused therein deliberately sought to give an unwarranted benefit particularly to PAL Boat, exhibiting obvious and specific preference for the latter:

x x x PAL Boat was not financially and technically capable of undertaking the floating clinics project. The court a quo believed that the petitioners knew that and still awarded the project to PAL Boat. They also failed to follow the proper procedure and documentations in awarding. This Court is convinced that all these circumstances taken together clearly demonstrate the manifest partiality of the petitioners towards PAL Boat, giving the latter unwarranted benefits to obtain the government project. x x x These unwarranted benefits were due to the manifest partiality exhibited by them in numerous instances.^[61]

Hence, as demonstrated in this ruling, the element of unwarranted benefit is inextricably linked with the malefactor's purposeful and deliberate intent to give preference or benefit to another. Applying the foregoing to the instant case, Villarosa's act of issuing the extraction permits was, to reiterate, not motivated by the desire to favor one operator over another or to unduly receive any pecuniary benefit. Villarosa's acts were simply driven by his honest, yet incorrect, belief that he had the ample authority to issue the permits.

In sum, Villarosa should be acquitted of the present charges as both the elements of "evident bad faith" and "giving unwarranted benefit or advantage" are absent in this case. To stress, a violation of the LGC - a law that is not penal in nature-does not, as it cannot, automatically translate into a violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019.

A Final Word
Contrary to Justice Leonen and Justice Lazaro-Javier's views, I believe that the ponencia does not derogate whatsoever from the time-honored principle that ignorance of the law excuses no one. The ponencia merely holds that in prosecuting a public officer accused of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 particularly by means of manifest partiality or evident bad faith, proving the accused's non-compliance with a non-penal law is not enough to produce a conviction under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Fraudulent intent and evil design should be established beyond reasonable doubt - a burden which the prosecution failed to discharge in the instant case.

In the course of the deliberations, this question was posed: "Has ignorance of the law now become a bliss that sets the ignorant free?" To be sure, the answer is no. The ponencia does not give Villarosa the gift of impunity. The ponencia does not make the conclusion that Villarosa did not commit an act contravening the law and that he should not be held responsible for such act. The ponencia merely holds that Villarosa cannot be held particularly liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as certain elements of the said offense were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Villarosa may be held responsible under the appropriate laws. For instance, he may be charged for Usurpation of Official Functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.^[62] He may even be disciplined for either insubordination or misconduct under the Administrative Code.^[63] Simply stated, Villarosa may be held accountable for his act of issuing extraction permits, but under the correct law.

In other words, this stand to acquit Villarosa in this case is not meant to allow a wrongdoing to go unpunished. Accountability of public officers is, of course, a laudable objective. However, convicting someone just for the sake of punishment is not the answer. This is not what justice demands. Conviction under the appropriate law should still be the goal. Simply put, in this case, Section 3(e), RA 3019 is simply not the appropriate law to hold Villarosa accountable.

Justice Lazaro-Javier likewise shares her apprehension of the ponencia's holding because it is "contrary to long-established doctrines."^[64] I would like to emphasize, however, that the Court should not shy away from reversing erroneous doctrines when warranted, even if these doctrines are "long-established." The Court exists precisely to rectify incorrect doctrines, not to perpetuate error and injustice. Furthermore, Justice Lazaro-Javier's apprehension on the possible retroactive effect of ponencia's ruling^[65] is misguided, considering that new judicial doctrines have only prospective operation and do not apply to cases previously decided.^[66]

As a final word, I would like to reiterate anew my sentiment that our penal laws on corrupt public officials are meant to enhance, instead of stifle, public service. If every mistake, error, or oversight is met with criminal prosecution, then no one would ever dare take on the responsibility of serving in the government. We cannot continue to weaponize each little misstep lest we lose even the good people in government. Indeed, while public office is a public trust, the constitutionally enshrined right to presumption of innocence encompasses all persons-private individuals or public servants alike.

Based on these premises, I vote to GRANT the Petition.

---

^[1] Ponencia, p. 2, citing Exhibit "H," rollo, p. 74.

^[2] Id. at 3.

^[3] Otherwise known as CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES.

^[4] See Rollo, pp. 46-49.

^[5] One of the Informations was withdrawn by the Ombudsman because what was attached was not an extraction permit but a business permit which was not illegally issued.

^[6] After Villarosa filed a second motion for reconsideration.

^[7] Sison v. People, 628 Phil. 573, 583 (2010).

^[8] Rollo, p. 56.

^[9] Id. at 59.

^[10] Ponencia, pp. 9-10.

^[11] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen, p. 10.

^[12] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lazaro-Javier, p. 12.

^[13] Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, 308 Phil. 660, 693 (1994). (Emphasis supplied)

^[14] Fuentes v. People, 808 Phil. 586, 594 (2017).

^[15] Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 13.

^[16] 437 Phil. 117 (2002).

^[17] Id. at 130. (Italics in the original)

^[18] Air France v. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 722, 737 (1966).

^[19] Reyes v. People, 641 Phil. 91, 104 (2010).

^[20] Republic v. Desierto, 641 Phil. 91, 104 (2010).

^[21] Collantes v. Marcelo, 516 Phil. 509, 516 (2006).

^[22] 258-A Phil. 20 (1989).

^[23] Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 820, 843-844 (1998).

^[24] 252 Phil. 413 (1989).

^[25] Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 23 at 844.

^[26] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lazaro-Javier, p. 13.

^[27] Uriarte v. People, 540 Phil. 477, 494 (2006).

^[28] Beradio v. Court of Appeals, 191 Phil. 153, 163 (1981).

^[29] Reflections of Justice Perlas-Bernabe, p. 2.

^[30] Sistoza v. Desierto, supra note 16 at 130-131.

^[31] Albert v. Sandiganbayan, 599 Phil. 439, 450 (2009).

^[32] G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 2019, accessed at <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65742>.

^[33] 462 Phil. 712 (2003).

^[34] Id. at 722.

^[35] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Perlas-Bernabe, pp. 3, 6.

^[36] CIVIL CODE, Art. 3.

^[37] See the rulings in the following cases: Boston Finance and Investment Corp. v. Gonzalez, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520, October 9, 2018, accessed at Carbajosa v. Patricio, 718 Phil. 534 (2013); Perfecto v. Desales-Esidera, 682 Phil. 397 (2012); Medina v. Canoy, 682 Phil. 397 (2012); Bautista v. Causapin, Jr., 667 Phil. 574 (2011); Ricablanca v. Barillo, 658 Phil. 135 (2011); Tan v. Usman, 658 Phil. 145 (2011); Office of the Court Administrator v. Estrada, 654 Phil. 638 (2011); Heirs of Piedad v. Estrera, 623 Phil. 178 (2009); Untalan v. Sison, 567 Phil. 420 (2008); Enriquez v. Caminade, 519 Phil. 781 (2006); Abbariao v. Beltran, 505 Phil. 510 (2005); Ruiz v. Beldia, Jr., 491 Phil. 581 (2005); Mina v. Vianzon, 469 Phil. 896 (2004); Victory Liner, Inc. v. Bellosillo, 469 Phil. 15 (2004); Baldado v. Bugtas, 460 Phil. 516 (2003); Abella v. Calingin, 457 Phil. 488 (2003); Adriano v. Villanueva, 445 Phil. 675 (2003); Guyud v. Pine, 443 Phil. 33 (2003); Martinez, Sr. v. Paguio, 442 Phil. 516 (2002); Jaucian v. Espinas, 431 Phil. 597 (2002); Guillen v. Cañon, 424 Phil. 81 (2002); Tabao v. Lilagan, 416 Phil. 710 (2001); Pascual v. Dumlao, 414 Phil1 (2001); Vercide v. Hernandez, 386 Phil. 245 (2000); Spouses Dumo v. Perez, 379 Phil. 588 (2000); Enojas, Jr. v. Gacott, Jr., 379 Phil. 277 (2000); Garcia v. Pasia, 375 Phil. 571 (1999); Spouses Almeron v. Sardido, 346 Phil. 424 (1997); Spouses Bacar v. De Guzman, Jr., 338 Phil. 41 (1997); Del Rosario, Jr. v. Bartolome, 337 Phil. 330 (1997); Carpio v. De Guzman, 331 Phil. 115 (1996); Mamolo, Sr. v. Narisma, 322 Phil. 670 (1996); Tucay v. Domagas, 312 Phil. 135 (1995).

^[38] See Tejano v. Marigomen, 818 Phil. 781 (2017).

^[39] See Spouses Bacar v. De Guzman, Jr., 338 Phil. 41 (1997).

^[40] 386 Phil. 245 (2000).

^[41] Vercide v. Hernandez, 386 Phil. 245, 253-254.

^[42] Id. at 256.

^[43] See footnote 37.

^[44] Enriquez v. Caminade, 519 Phil. 781, 788 (2006).

^[45] QBE Insurance Phils., v. Laviña, 562 Phil. 355, 371 (2007).

^[46] 689 Phil. 75 (2012).

^[47] Id. at 123.

^[48] Senate Deliberations of RA 3019 dated July 1960.

^[49] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (9th ed. 2009).

^[50] Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 350, 364 (2004).

^[51] Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, 387 Phil. 872, 884 (2000)

^[52] Ambit, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 669 Phil. 32 (2011).

^[53] Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, 201 Phil. 379, 384 (1982).

^[54] Sison v. People, 628 Phil. 573, 585 (2010).

^[55] Soriquez v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), 510 Phil. 709, 718 (2005).

^[56] 722 Phil. 118 (2013).

^[57] Id. at 258.

^[58] Id. at 259.

^[59] Id. at 123-128.

^[60] 749 Phil. 124 (2014).

^[61] Id. at 144.

^[62] ARTICLE 177. Usurpation of Official Functions. - Any person who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

^[63] Book V, Title I, Chapter 7, Section 46, E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987.

^[64] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lazaro-Javier, p. 24.

^[65] Id.

^[66] Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons, 107 Phil. 50, 54 (1960).

---

DISSENTING OPINION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

On petitioner's second motion for reconsideration, and after the Court had denied petitioner's first motion for reconsideration with finality and directed that no further pleadings or motions shall be entertained in this case, and entry of judgment be issued immediately,^[1] the ponencia now decides to acquit petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa of nine (9) counts of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (RA) 3019.^[2]

I respectfully dissent.

THE FACTS
The Sandiganbayan Decision which the ponencia reverses and sets aside bears the facts, viz.:

The following narration of facts is based on the documentary and testimonial evidence found on record, as well as on the stipulations made between the parties:

The controversy started when private complainant Soledad, PENRO of Occidental Mindoro, issued several CDOs to the quarry operators from the Municipality of San Jose who failed to present the necessary extraction permit issued by the Governor of the said province. These quarry operators were found to have been conducting quarrying activities within the municipality by virtue of the Extraction Permits issued by its then Mayor, herein accused.

When the accused learned about this, he wrote a letter dated 23 May 2011, informing private complainant Soledad that the Municipality of San Jose will not obey the CDOs until the Provincial Government observes the proper legal process of conduction public hearings and complying with the publication requirements provided under the LGC for the proposed amendments of the pertinent provisions of the Provincial Tax Ordinance. Furthermore, he insists that the inherent powers vested upon the local government unit to have substantial control over its local affairs be respected.

In his letter dated 26 May 2011, private complainant Soledad tried to explain that none of the provisions of the proposed ordinance that will amend Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004 was applied. He stated that the CDOs were justified under Section 65 of the existing Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004 adopted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as per SP Resolution No. 11, Series of 2005 dated 07 February 2005. Section 65 thereof mandates that such permit to extract is exclusively issued by the Provincial Governor upon recommendation of the Environment and Natural Resources Office. This is consistent with Section 138 of the LGC which confirms that only the Provincial Governor has the sole and exclusive authority to grant permit to extractors of sand and gravel within the province.

The accused wrote another letter dated 23 August 2011, addressed to the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Occidental Mindoro. Here, he expressed his objection to SP Resolution No. 128, which adopted the amendments to Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004, deleting the authority of the Municipal Government to enforce its own regulatory powers provided under the LGC. Accordingly, he emphasized, the local government unit has the power to organize its own MENRO, which necessarily carries the authority to impose policies on the matter. He declared that the municipality will religiously remit the shares due to the province and the barangay, but it will only honor the original provisions of Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004, allowing the payment of the permittees to be done through its MTO.

The directive of the CDOs went unheeded. Thus, on 04 October 2011, private complainant Soledad filed a Complaint for Usurpation of Authority, Violation of Section 138 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code), Grave Abuse of Authority in Office, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards), against herein accused before the Office of the Ombudsman ("Ombudsman," for brevity). On 19 March 2012, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause for ten (10) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and directed the filing of the corresponding Informations against the accused.

THE REASONS
First. The ponencia rules that:

Alas, even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner may be held accountable for the issuance of the subject extraction permits, such is not for the offense charged in the present Informations, as the acts being complained of do not constitute the elements of the crime presently charged. In fact, in his complaints filed with the Ombudsman, complainant Soledad accused petitioner not of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 but of Usurpation of Authority, Violation of Section 138 of RA 7160, Grave Abuse of Authority in Office, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of RA 6713; and Soledad presented evidence to support his accusations. However, the Ombudsman, instead chose to file the present Informations for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.^[3]

I beg to disagree with the ponencia's statements that the Office of the Ombudsman is hostage to complainant's designation of the offense which respondent public official should be charged with, and that the proper offense for the acts committed by petitioner here is Usurpation of Authority and not violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

As regards the first statement, the truth is that complainant's opinion in this regard does not bind the Office of the Ombudsman. It is the latter, not the complainant who determines what offense to charge an accused with.

The doctrine has remained unchanged through several decades now - the public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial prerogative to determine what crime should be filed in court and who should be charged therefor; he or she always assumes and retains full discretion and control of the prosecution of all criminal actions.^[4] Arroyo v. Department of Justice^[5] reiterates this doctrine:

The office of a prosecutor does not involve an automatic function to hold persons charged with a crime for trial. Taking the cudgels for justice on behalf of the State is not tantamount to a mechanical act of prosecuting persons and bringing them within the jurisdiction of court. Prosecutors are bound to a concomitant duty not to prosecute when after investigation they have become convinced that the evidence available is not enough to establish probable cause. This is why, in order to arrive at a conclusion, the prosecutors must be able to make an objective assessment of the conflicting versions brought before them, affording both parties to prove their respective positions. Hence, the fiscal is not bound to accept the opinion of the complainant in a criminal case as to whether or not a prima facie case exists. Vested with authority and discretion to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of a corresponding information and having control of the prosecution of a criminal case, the fiscal cannot be subjected to dictation from the offended party or any other party for that matter. Emphatically, the right to the oft-repeated preliminary investigation has been intended to protect the accused from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. In fact, the right to this proceeding, absent an express provision of law, cannot be denied. Its omission is a grave irregularity which nullifies the proceedings because it runs counter to the right to due process enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

In any event, petitioner was not and could not have been prejudiced at all by the divergence of opinion between the complainant and the Office of the Ombudsman as to the nature and designation of the offense with which to charge petitioner. What matters are the facts recited in the Information because these facts determine the defense that an accused would have to raise and the offense that an accused may be convicted of. As we held in Consigna v. People:^[6]

Entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. As held in People v. Dimaano:

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charge or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense....

As early in United States v. Lim San, this Court has determined that:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits..... That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime named murder." If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the name of the crime is or what it is named... (Emphases added)

The ponencia's second statement that petitioner could be held guilty only of the lesser offense of Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions under Article 177 of The Revised Penal Code, is, with due respect, erroneous.

It is not out of the ordinary for one who usurped the functions of another in the context of the elements of Article 177 to be also charged with and found guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 if the usurpation was done with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence and resulted in undue injury to any private or public party or unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to any private party.

This was the situation in Tiongco v. People^[7] where the accused was charged with these two (2) offenses. Tiongco signed disbursement vouchers and checks pertaining to the retirement gratuity of an employee of the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation despite her lack of authority to do so. Like herein appellant, Tiongco argued she was of belief that she had authority to sign the documents and her actions were indicative of good faith. Despite Tiongco's defense of good faith, the Court nevertheless found her guilty as charged.

Tiongco held that there is no incompatibility between the elements of Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions and those of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and depending on the facts proved beyond reasonable doubt, an accused may be found guilty of these two (2) crimes. Thus:

The petition has no merit and should be denied.

Usurpation of Official Functions

Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code defines Usurpation of Official Functions:

....

This provision actually speaks of two ways of committing the offense under Article 177. Tiongco is charged with Usurpation of Official Functions. As established by this Court in Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, usurpation of official functions is committed when "under pretense of official position, [a person] shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so."

To put simply, Usurpation of Official Functions has the following elements:

• The offender may be a private person or public officer.
  
  
• The offender performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine government, any of its agencies, or of a foreign government.
  
  
• The offender performs the act under pretense of official function.
  
  
• The offender performs the act without being legally entitled to do so.
  

First, it has been conclusively established that Tiongco was a public officer at the time of the commission of the crime. She herself admitted such in her Counter-Affidavit dated 10 October 2006, where she stated that she was then "currently the Acting Senior Vice President of the [PCIC] with a salary grade of 27."

Second, she performed an act that rightfully pertained to the President of PCIC as head of the agency, and not to her as Acting Senior Vice President.

Based on evidence she herself presented, Tiongco's designation as Acting Senior Vice President, Regional Management Group, carried with it the following responsibilities:

....

None of the functions pertain to approving the release of retirement gratuity.

While Tiongco's claim that Barbin "asked for help" in running the agency, which was the reason for her designation as Acting Senior Vice President, she has not shown any specific assignment or conferment of authority related to approving release of retirement benefits. Meanwhile, OMB MC No. 10 specifically states:

In the event the certification presented states that the prospective retiree has a pending case, the responsibility of determining whether to release his retirement benefits, as well as the imposition of necessary safeguards to ensure restitution thereof in the event retiree is found guilty, rests upon and shall be left at the sound discretion of the head of the department, office or agency concerned.

Hence, the assignment cannot be presumed or inferred from the general statement in number 8 of the above-quoted list of responsibilities. It must be specifically granted in light of the explicit mandate of OMB MC No. 10 and that conferment of authority must be clearly shown. Tiongco has not done so.

Third, that Tiongco signed Estacio's disbursement voucher "under pretense of official function" is clear. Tiongco argues that she believed she had the authority to sign and that her acts "are indicative of good faith."

The Court, in Ruzol, recognized good faith as a defense in prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. However, the Court also ruled that:

It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano, this Court enunciated that good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. The term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render the transaction unconscientious." Good faith is actually a question of intention and although something internal, it can be ascertained by relying not on one's self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.

Tiongco cannot claim good faith because it has been established that she had "knowledge of circumstances which ought to put [her] upon inquiry." She admitted that she saw the notation "no pending cases except OMB-0-00-0898 and 0-00-1697" in Estacio's request for clearance.

Tiongco also admitted that she was well aware of the provisions of OMB MC No. 10. She said she did it because Barbin was always absent, an admission that she knew the authority was vested in the PCIC President. She nonetheless arrogated such authority unto herself, justifying her action with urgency of the situation bringing Section 20.4 of the PCIC CASA into effect. However, even acting under that authority was wrong, as will be discussed later.

Next, PCIC Board Resolution No. 2006-012 states:

....

While OMB MC No. 10 requires only certification, the PCIC Board required a clearance from the Office of the Ombudsman. In other words, the approval of Estacio's retirement was conditional - "subject to" fulfillment of the requirements the Board of Directors set. Since Estacio only presented a certification, which stated that he had two pending cases, he had not met the requirements of the Board of Directors.

In cases of such non-fulfillment, OMB MC No. 10 gives the discretion to allow a prospective retiree to retire and receive benefits only to the "head of the department, office or agency." Thus, in cases where the head is absent or the agency currently has no president, the authority is granted to whoever is designated officer-in-charge or acting as head of agency, not to the one designated merely as Acting Senior Vice President.

Fourth, Tiongco was legally not entitled to act on the release of Estacio's retirement gratuity. As discussed above, the authority was vested in Barbin as head of PCIC under OMB MC No. 10.

Tiongco, however, argues that she acted pursuant to PCIC's CASA, Section 20.4, which states that in case the President is absent or an urgent matter needs his signature, "any two Class A signatories or any Class A signatory signing with any Class B signatory may approve/sign the transaction in behalf of the President."

As will be discussed later, the absence of Barbin was not such that he could no longer exercise his discretionary powers. He continued to perform his functions, although he admitted that he was not physically present at the PCIC premises at times. He, however, testified that he regularly went to the PCIC office during that period.

Further, the release of Estacio's retirement gratuity was not an urgent matter. At that time, he was not yet entitled to its release pending compliance with the Board's requirement of an Ombudsman clearance.

Based on the foregoing, the undeniable conclusion is that Tiongco is guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Official Functions.

Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019

In Rivera v. People, the Court discussed the two ways by which a public official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the performance of his functions:

x x x (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

It is not enough that undue injury was caused or unwarranted benefits were given as these acts must be performed through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to convict.

The elements of the offense are as follows:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or judicial functions;

(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and

(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.

The prohibited act of either causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference may be committed in three ways: through (1) manifest partiality, (2) evident bad faith, or (3) gross inexcusable negligence.

In People v. Atienza, the Court defined these elements:

x x x. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.

The Court finds that Tiongco acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in this case.

Manifest Partiality

Tiongco's partiality is clear. Her willingness to disregard the PCIC Board's directive and OMB MC No. 10 in order to grant Estacio's request speaks of such partiality. Her actions all point to facilitating whatever course of action would be favorable to Estacio.

The Court also finds, in this case, an inclination by Tiongco to take advantage of Barbin's absence from the premises of PCIC to accommodate Estacio, who is, not insignificantly, her former boss. Tiongco made her own determination and characterized Estacio's request for retirement gratuity as urgent, knowing that doing so, taken with Barbin's absence, would trigger the mechanism under Section 20.4 of the PCIC CASA that would allow her and another Class "A" signatory (in this case, Mordeno, who had fled and left her to suffer the consequences) to sign on the request.

Evident Bad Faith

In Antonino v. Desierto, the Court held that "[b]ad faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable under the law; bad faith must be evident. Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will."

As discussed above, Tiongco's bad faith was clearly exhibited in her willful disregard for OMB MC No. 10 and for the requirements of the PCIC Board. It is clear as well that she knowingly encroached on Barbin's authority to approve the payment of retirement gratuity to one who has pending cases before the Ombudsman.

She herself admitted that she was faced with a difficult question of law. Yet, instead of seeking guidance from PCIC's legal counsel or from Barbin himself, she simply decided on her own and took her own course of action that did not conform to established rules.

Moreover, her failure to ensure restitution from Estacio in case he is found guilty in his pending cases is clearly a breach of her sworn duty as a government official tasked with safeguarding the interest of the service.

Undue Injury or Unwarranted Benefit, Advantage or Privilege

For violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, "what contextually is punishable is the act of causing undue injury to any party, or giving to any private party of unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of the public officer's functions."

The Court has clarified that "the use of the disjunctive word 'or' connotes that either act of (a) 'causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government'; [or] (b) 'giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference,' qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended." Thus, an accused "may be charged under either mode or both, x x x. In other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction."

The Court has treated undue injury in the context of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 to have "a meaning akin to" the civil law concept of "actual damage," to wit:

Undue injury in the context of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 should be equated with the civil law concept of "actual damage." Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury, or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.

In this case, undue injury to the government was caused by the unauthorized disbursement of P1,522,849.48 in public funds, in that, first, the person who approved said disbursement did not have the authority to do so, and second, because the beneficiary was not yet entitled to the release of the retirement gratuity.

As such, Estacio also enjoyed an unwarranted benefit because non-compliance with the requirements under OMB MC No. 10 disqualified him to receive his retirement gratuity at that time. On top of that, Estacio was given said unwarranted benefit through Tiongco's usurpation of Barbin's official functions and the violation of OMB MC No. 10.

Estacio's former position afforded him access to the highest officials of the agency, the same ones who were in a position to know how to work through PCIC's processes. Tiongco's overreach was obviously targeted to expedite the process in favor of the former president.

....

Moreover, it will not change the ruling of the Court since it has been already determined that the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 were proven in this case. (Emphases added)

Here, the identical wording of the nine (9) Informations, except as to the circumstances of the private party benefitted by petitioner's usurpation of authority, states:

That on or about (24 August 2010); in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above­ named accused, JOSE T. VILLAROSA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally and with evident bad faith, give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction Permit to (e.g. GemCI-IB Maker), contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160, which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from mid take advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support.

The ponencia does not have to bother with the crime of Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions because petitioner was not charged with this crime or convicted thereof. The charge is for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, which each of the Informations so clearly alleges and the pieces of evidence establish beyond reasonable doubt.

Second. Section 3(e) of RA 3019 states:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions x x x

Sabio v. Sandiganbayan^[8] likewise penned by then Associate Justice now Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, and concurred in by Justice Mario Victor "Marvic" F. Leonen, now retired Justice Andres Bernal Reyes, Jr., Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, and Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, held:

To constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements should be proved:

1. The offender is a public officer;
   
   
2. The act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative, or judicial functions;
   
   
3. The act was done through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
   
   
4. The public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.

I took the liberty of using Sabio's sequence of analysis and importing the very words in Sabio in determining petitioner's criminal liability.

The first element - the offender is a public officer - was established, in that the prosecution and the defense stipulated that petitioner is a public officer.

The second element is also present, in that petitioner issued the assailed extraction permits as Mayor of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.

The third element is, likewise, present. In several cases, the Court has held that this element may be committed in three (3) ways, i.e., through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to convict.

Explaining what "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" mean, Sabio ruled:

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."^[9]

In Sabio, the Court affirmed the conviction of then PCGG Chairperson Sabio for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for leasing eleven (11) vehicles on behalf of PCGG without undertaking the proper procurement process. As held, Section 10 of RA 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act, mandated all government procurement to be done through competitive bidding, except as provided for in Article XVI of the same law. The words of the statute were clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, thus, must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Applying the principle of verba legis, Sabio had this to say:

Petitioner clearly disregarded the law meant to protect public funds from irregular or unlawful utilization. In fact, petitioner admitted that the lease agreements were not subjected to public bidding, because it is their position that the PCGG is exempted from the procurement law and that they were merely following the practice of their predecessors. This is totally unacceptable, considering that the PCGG is charged with the duty, among others, to institute corruption preventive measures. As such, they should have been the first to follow the law. Sadly, however, they failed.

Indeed, Sabio's act of violating the clear command of the law unmistakably reflected "a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will," indicative of bad faith.

Here, there was bad faith on the part of petitioner in issuing extraction permits and allowing private persons to quarry resources based on the following: (1) for not following the clear, unmistakable, and elementary rule in Section 138 of the Local Government Code vesting the power to issue extraction permits and allow private persons to extract quarry resources exclusively in the Provincial Governor; and (2) subjecting State resources to illegal private gain of the private persons so allowed.

The extraction permits were awarded to private persons by petitioner when he did not have the power and authority to do so. This is a clear violation of Section 138 of the Local Government Code. More, it was shown that his defiance of Section 138 was blatant, overt, and undisguised. He knew his act was contrary to Section 138 but he persisted in doing so.

Petitioner clearly disregarded the law meant to protect quarry resources from irregular or unlawful extraction and utilization. In fact, petitioner admitted that he issued the extraction permits thinking that he was not subjected to Section 138, because it was his position that as Municipal Mayor he was exempt from Section 138 and that he was merely following the practice of precedents. This is totally unacceptable, considering that the Municipal Mayor is charged with the duty, among others, to champion and abide by the provisions of the Local Government Code. As such, he should have been the first to follow the law.

In the inimitable prose of his Concurrence, the learned Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa pounces on one of the sentences above-stated, i.e., [i]n fact, petitioner admitted that he issued the extraction permits thinking that he was not subjected to Section 138, because it was his position that as Municipal Mayor he was exempt from Section 138 and that he was merely following the practice of precedents, to support the ruling that petitioner acted in good faith.

With due respect, the language of this sentence merely followed the language in Sabio where the Court in fact found the accused therein guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the same exact crime charged in the instant case. To stress, Sabio held:

Petitioner clearly disregarded the law meant to protect public funds from irregular or unlawful utilization. In fact, petitioner admitted that the lease agreements were not subjected to public bidding, because it is their position that the PCGG is exempted from the procurement law and that they were merely following the practice of their predecessors. This is totally unacceptable, considering that the PCGG is charged with the duty, among others, to institute corruption preventive measures. As such, they should have been the first to follow the law. Sadly, however, they failed.

There is more to the present case than what was proved in Sabio. Verily, at the time of the issuance of the extraction permits, petitioner was aware that the private persons who were the beneficiaries of his illegal permits continued quarrying resources despite the imposition of cease and desist orders. This fact bolstered the presence of the fourth element, that there was unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference given to these private persons.

In Sabio's succinct conclusion, "as correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner's acts unmistakably reflect 'a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong: a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will.'"

I respectfully stress that here, we should abide by what the Court has said and done in Sabio. There should only be one and the same rule for the goose and the gander. I am one with the judiciary's motto that "let us be united and let us follow the rules."

Let me address petitioner's defense.

Petitioner argues that he acted in good faith when he issued the extraction permits. The applications for extraction permit had undergone legitimate process upon approval from the Municipal Environment and Natural Resources (MENRO).^[10] Thereafter, the applications were forwarded to the Municipal Administrator who recommended its approval to him as then mayor. The taxes and fees paid by the quarrying applicants have already been remitted to the Provincial Government of Occidental Mindoro. He did not know that Cease and Desist Orders were issued by the Provincial Government because he was not furnished copies of the same.^[11]

The ponencia agrees with petitioner that he was not guilty of bad faith when he issued the questioned permits because he "mistakenly" believed that under the Local Government Code, he wielded authority to issue them. In any case, petitioner never gained anything from the issuance of the extraction permits nor did he unduly favor the applicants in the issuance of the same.

Again, I beg to disagree.

Petitioner could not have been "mistaken" that he wielded authority to issue extraction permits. His attention has been precisely called to his lack of power to do so. He confessed having knowledge thereof when he wrote a letter arguing otherwise. He had been put on actual notice. These facts have been settled with finality by the Sandiganbayan, and these factual findings tally squarely with the evidence on record. None of the exceptions to deviate from the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan has been alleged and established to apply here.

Petitioner's protestations against the law do not amend the law and do not grant him the power and authority to issue extraction permits. He was and still is bereft of power to confer power and authority upon himself. His only duty was to enforce the law. He is not a legislator. Neither is he an arbiter of the divergence of opinions - his opinion and the opinion of the rest of the world so to speak - as he is duty-bound to respect the law, especially when doing so makes the playing field level, and not doing so, as in the present case, favored private persons, the beneficiaries of his unwarranted beneficence.

In any event, assuming without admitting that petitioner was not given by any other party actual notice of the breadth of his powers vis-a-vis extraction permits, I must stress that the term "good faith" is used to describe "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render the transaction unconscientious."^[12]

Petitioner here clearly failed to demonstrate that he acted in good faith in issuing subject extraction permit, because he could not but have had knowledge of circumstances unmistakably pointing to the fact that he utterly had no power to issue extraction permits as such was vested exclusively in the provincial governor. At the very least he was reckless; but then again, prescinding from the evidence before the Sandiganbayan, and the latter's factual findings, he intentionally violated Section 138 of RA 7160, the Local Government Code, that was his sworn-duty to abide by.

The statutes are clear and unmistakable. The statutes are to him elementary rules of conduct, because as a local chief executive it was his duty to know and enforce them.

Section 138 of the Local Government Code provides that the issuance of extraction permits is exclusively vested in the provincial governor pursuant to a promulgated Sangguniang Panlalawigan ordinance, thus:

SECTION 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources. - The province may levy and collect not more than ten percent (10%) of fair market value in the locality per cubic meter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel, earth, and other quarry resources, as defined under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, extracted from public lands or from the beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks, and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction.

The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan.

Section 43 of RA 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, embodies in substance a similar provision, thus:

Section 43. Quarry Permit. - Any qualified person may apply to the provincial/city mining regulatory board for a quarry permit on privately­ owned lands and/or public lands for building and construction materials such as marble, basalt, andesite, conglomerate, tuff, adobe, granite, gabbro, serpentine, inset filling materials, clay for ceramic tiles and building bricks, pumice, perlite and other similar materials that are extracted by quarrying from the ground. The provincial governor shall grant the permit after the applicant has complied with all the requirements as prescribed by the rules and regulations x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Relevantly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Occidental Mindoro promulgated Provincial Ordinance No. 2005-004, stating:

Section 65. Administrative Provisions.

a. Permit to extract and dispose of materials applied. No person, partnership or corporation or government entity or private owner shall be allowed to take, extract, or dispose of any resources from public or private land or from the beds of public waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the province, unless authorized by a permit exclusively issued by the Provincial Governor, upon recommendation of the Environment and Natural Resources Office. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A plain reading of these provisions clearly shows that the only way for quarrying operators to legally extract quarrying resources was upon securing an extraction permit exclusively from the Provincial Governor, and in this case, the Governor of Occidental Mindoro. There was and still is no room for the interpretation of these laws. The Municipality of San Jose, through petitioner as then Mayor, did not have the authority to issue extraction permits. Petitioner effectively bypassed the provincial government. He arrogated to himself the exclusive authority of the Provincial Governor to grant extraction permits, in clear contravention of the express provisions of the Local Government Code, the Philippine Mining Act, and Occidental Mindoro's Provincial Ordinance No. 2005-004.

The result of petitioner's issuance of extraction permits was not a simple case of having done something that had no impact elsewhere. For by issuing the extraction permits, petitioner gave unwarranted benefits to the beneficiaries who conducted quarrying operations that were illegal from the start, and continued to do their business on the basis of illegally issued permits and in defiance of cease and desist orders.

To emphasize, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the law as he was San Jose's chief executive. He assumed not just an ordinary post but one that imposes greater responsibility in the knowledge of the law, being the person who actually executes and enforces it. As provided under Section 4 of RA 6713,^[13] a public officer shall at all times refrain from doing acts contrary to law. Petitioner as public officer is expected to uphold the law, not act against it, and to do so, he could not have but known the law he is to execute, most especially the Local Government Code which he is presumed not only to know but in fact to master as his principal rule book.

Again, petitioner's situation is no different from the situation we dealt with and the person whom we adjudged guilty in Ferrer v. People, penned by now Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and concurred in by now retired Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Justice Caguioa:^[14]

Ferrer's arguments are untenable. As the SB correctly pointed out, even if a development clearance was belatedly granted to OCDC, the construction had already reached 75% completion by then. As the IA Administrator, Ferrer is presumed aware of the requirements before any construction work may be done on the Intramuros Walls. This is also palpably clear in the tenor of the lease agreement which provides that the Lessor will "[a]ssist the Lessee in securing all required government permits and clearances for the successful implementation of this agreement and to give its conformity to such permits and clearances or permits whenever necessary." Despite knowing the requirements and conditions precedent mandated by law, he knowingly allowed OCDC to proceed with construction without such permits or clearances. This amounted to gross inexcusable negligence on his part. Gross negligence has been defined as "negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."

In Alpay v. Sandiganbayan,^[15] we affirmed the Sandiganbayan when it found Alpay to have acted with evident bad faith in distributing the one million peso-fund of the One Million, One Town, One Product Program, in violation of a law that he ought to have known:

First, the prosecution's evidence clearly established the irregular issuance of the disbursement vouchers-it was "reversed-processed" with Alpay pre-signing and pre-approving the release of funds before the responsible officers affixed their signatures.

Second, the series of transactions from the issuance of the disbursement vouchers up to the receipt of the equipment and machines by the beneficiaries, all transpired only in one day-the last day of Alpay's term as mayor.

Third, Alpay cannot feign ignorance of the requirements of EO 176 considering that the funds were released and distributed on June 30, 2004, while EO 176 and its IRR were already then effective.

Fourth, Alpay made it appear that the distribution of the proceeds of the one million peso-fund was a direct financial assistance and not a loan, despite the clear directive for repayment of the loan under EO 176.

We concluded that Alpay's overt acts of eschewing the procedures and requirements of EO 176 in the supposed distribution of cash loans to deserving MSEs sufficiently established his evident bad faith. Alpay could not have claimed good faith or honest mistake in the release and distribution of the one million peso-fund considering that EO 176 clearly mandated the release of the loans to MSEs and not as a direct financial assistance without strings attached to beneficiaries.

In the En Banc's Resolution in Locsin v. People^[16] it was held that manifest partiality and evident bad faith were evident on the part of Mayor Locsin when despite the disqualification of Europharma due to lack of accreditation from the Department of Health, he nonetheless proceeded with the award of the bid to Europharma and Mallix Drug upon the recommendation of a local committee. Further, his contentions that he was without any knowledge that Europharma was disqualified and that Pharmawealth did not actually participate were held to be unacceptable. Mayor Locsin was authorized by virtue of the MOA and Resolution to lead the bidding process. Thus, it was incumbent upon him to check and authenticate the attached documents and authority of the companies intending to bid the multi-million contract. A mere review of the documents submitted before the actual bidding process would have easily revealed to him that no competitive bidding had been made since two out of the three bidders bore the same business address, hinting an idea that the two were related entities.

In Tiongo, supra, the Court dismissed Tiongco's defense of good faith in view of the circumstances which ought to have put her upon inquiry. For one, Tiongco admitted being aware of her lack of authority to sign disbursement vouchers and checks for retirement gratuities, but did it anyway. For another, she also admitted knowing that the retiree in issue had a pending case before the Ombudsman, barring anyone, except for the head of the agency, from acting on the retiree's application for retirement benefits. Yet another, the sheer urgency and haste with which Tiongco processed the retirement application was highly suspect.

We cannot ignore our precedents and lay down a new set of rules for petitioner. There is nothing in his situation and the equities of this case that require us to call upon angels to re-write the law.

As already referred to above, records show that petitioner's attention was called pertaining to his utter lack of authority to issue the questioned extraction permits. In fact, the ponencia mentions as a central factual incident that petitioner actually had knowledge about the issued Cease and Desist Orders. Petitioner even wrote a letter dated May 23, 2011 to PENRO Ruben Soledad informing the latter of his alleged "mockery of the whole legislative process," and warning with the bravado anathema to the rule of law that he "shall not recognize the Cease and Desist Orders until legal process is adhered to by the provincial government." The PENRO, on the other hand, explained in his letter to petitioner that the Cease and Desist Orders were based on Section 65 of Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 2005-004 in relation to Section 138 of the Local Government Code.

Indubitably, petitioner's purported good faith was belied by his knowledge of the duly issued Cease and Desist Orders, his recalcitrant response thereto, and his receipt of the PENRO's letter. At the outset, these events should have already prompted him to automatically recall the extraction permits he had issued. Instead, petitioner issued more extraction permits, and at the same time, blamed the Provincial Government for alleged "mockery of the legislative process," without explaining what he meant by this.

The Sandiganbayan found as a fact that after petitioner had notice of his lack of authority, he still continued to issue extraction permits^[17] that allowed the quarrying operators to continue their illegal extraction activities. This fact cannot be overturned by the Court.

Ferrer^[18] ordained:

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to overturn these findings, as there was no showing that the SB overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. "[I]t bears pointing out that in appeals from the [SB], as in this case, only questions of law and not questions of fact may be raised. Issues brought to the Court on whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whether the presumption of innocence was sufficiently debunked, whether or not conspiracy was satisfactorily established, or whether or not good faith was properly appreciated, are all, invariably, questions of fact. Hence, absent any of the recognized exceptions to the above­mentioned rule, the [SB's] findings on the foregoing matters should be deemed as conclusive." As such, Ferrer's conviction for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 must stand.

In any event, whether the Cease and Desist Orders had reached petitioner's ears, he should have known from the start, according to our existing rules, that he was utterly bereft of authority to issue extraction permits.

Petitioner cannot also rely upon the recommendation of the MENRO for the grant of questioned permits. To repeat, upon recommendation of the application from MENRO, the authority to grant the extraction permits is exclusively within the power of the Provincial Governor and not within the power of a Municipal Mayor. As petitioner swore to protect the interest of the municipality he was serving, it was incumbent upon him to have been curious, careful, and competent in knowing the confines and restrictions of his authority.^[19] Instead, petitioner was stubborn and unbending in usurping an authority he did not have. His ignorance of the law is feigned, at the very least grossly and inexcusably reckless, and in reality, indicative of evident bad faith and manifest partiality, and cannot therefore be used to negate his criminal liability.

For us to accept petitioner's claim as good faith is to distort grotesquely the otherwise legitimate defense of good faith.

Petitioner insists that the taxes and fees pertaining to the issued extraction pern1its were remitted to the provincial government. He infers from this payment that the "provincial government expressly, if not tacitly, gave him the authority to issue extraction permits."

We should not accept this argument. For one, the evidence below and referred to by the Ombudsman in its Comment, readily and immediately shows that no such remittances were ever made by petitioner. The documents referred to by the prosecution before the Sandiganbayan and reiterated by the Ombudsman in its Comment prove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt.

In any event, I reiterate the law vesting in the provincial government the power to levy and collect taxes from quarrying operations held within its jurisdiction.^[20] Hence, even if there was supposedly a remittance of the proceeds of the quarrying here, which the evidence belie beyond reasonable doubt, the Provincial Government had every right to accept the taxes and fees paid for these operations. The alleged remittance of these taxes and fees did not in any way legitimize petitioner's illegal act of issuing the questioned extraction permits.

The alleged payment and acceptance of these taxes and fees are apart and different from the authority to issue extraction permits. The latter is exclusively vested in the Provincial Governor, and there is no law authorizing expressly or impliedly the delegation of this exclusive duty to other public officers. The Court cannot and should not simply turn a blind eye, and tolerate petitioner's repeated feigned and confused interpretation of the laws.

Lastly, it is of no moment that there is no evidence pointing to petitioner as having gained anything from the issuance of the extraction permits. Here, as the evidence bears out, no money was remitted to the barangay, the municipality and the province. At any rate, wherever the money went, whether he himself obtained pecuniary gain does not hinder the prosecution of petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 because his own benefit is not an element of this offense. It also cannot be denied that private persons benefitted from the illegally issued permits. It was petitioner's act of issuing the extraction permits that gave these select and privileged persons an advantage in the form of the resources so extracted by them. These private persons did not share this advantage with other persons in the Municipality of San Jose. The permits were a favor to each of them, a favor illegally granted by petitioner.

Being a local chief executive, petitioner is vested with the public's trust and confidence where he should have knowledgeably observed the rules and regulations not only within the scope of his jurisdiction, but the laws encompassing the parameters and conditions of his authority. He, therefore, cannot feign ignorance of the law while at the same time use this ignorance as a shield against liability. In the end, petitioner's supposed "mistake" should not be recognized by this Court as a saving tool to excuse his explicit transgressions of the law.

Given the legal and factual antecedents of petitioner's case, it cannot be said that he acted in good faith. He knew it was not within his power to issue extraction permits. At the very least, he was not only grossly and inexcusably negligent but grossly and inexcusably reckless in not knowing his lack of power to issue extraction permits. In reality, he intentionally flouted among others Section 138 of the Local Government Code.

We held in Sanchez v. People^[21] that a public officer's failure to appreciate the extent of his or her basic powers is gross negligence amounting to gross bad faith and manifest partiality:

Second, the failure of petitioner to validate the ownership of the land on which the canal was to be built because of his unfounded belief that it was public land constitutes gross inexcusable negligence.

In his own testimony, petitioner impliedly admitted that it fell squarely under his duties to check the ownership of the land with the Register of Deeds. Yet he concluded that it was public land based solely on his evaluation of its appearance, i.e., that it looked swampy:

x x x x

Petitioner's functions and duties as City Engineer, are stated in Section 477 (b) of R.A. 7160, to wit:

The engineer shall take charge of the engineering office and shall:

x x x x

(2) Advise the governor or mayor, as the case may be on infrastructure, public works, and other engineering matters;

(3) Administer, coordinate, supervise, and control the construction, maintenance, improvement, and repair of roads, bridges, and other engineering and public works projects of the local government unit concerned;

(4) Provide engineering services to the local government unit concerned, including investigation and survey, engineering designs, feasibility studies, and project management;

x x x x

The Court in Ambil v. Sandiganbayan^[22] was as emphatic in ruling that a local chief executive's disregard of the extent of his power to act on a particular matter that resulted in a benefit or advantage to a third party "betray[s] his unmistakable bias and the evident bad faith that attended his actions." Thus we held:

In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. Petitioner did just that. The fact that he repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning suppliers. These suppliers were awarded the procurement contract without the benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible price for the government. The private suppliers, which were all personally chosen by respondent, were able to profit from the transactions without showing proof that their prices were the most beneficial to the government. For that, petitioner must now face the consequences of his acts.

There can be no good faith where the circumstances point to the necessary mental element of the offense charged - manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence. As noted, our case law has already settled the legal impact of petitioner's feigned ignorance of the utter lack of power to issue extraction permits. Petitioner gave out extraction permits repeatedly, albeit he had no authority to do so under the clear and unequivocal provision of Section 138 of the Local Government Code, Section 43 of the Philippine Mining Act, and Provincial Ordinance No. 2005-004. As a result, petitioner's unlawful act benefited and gave advantage to private parties that used the unduly permits to illegally extract resources. Despite petitioner's actual or at least strongly presumed knowledge of his lack of power to do so, he disputed, nay, breaded the plain and categorical language of the Local Government Code, the Philippine Mining Act, and the Provincial Ordinance No. 2005-004. His actions manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence.

My esteemed senior colleague, Justice Caguioa, proposes two (2) interesting ideas that somehow charts the direction where Villarosa is headed:

One. He says:

In this light, I reiterate that Villarosa's violation of a law that is not penal in nature does not, as it should not, automatically translate into evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence that makes one guilty of a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. For it to amount to a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 through the modality of evident bad faith, established jurisprudence demands that the prosecution must prove the existence of factual circumstances that point to fraudulent intent.^[23]

Two. He also opines:

I recognize that this is not the understanding under the current state of jurisprudence. Jurisprudence has defined the term "unwarranted" as simply lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. The term "private party" may be used to refer to persons other than those holding public office, which may either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.

Thus, under current jurisprudence, in order to be found guilty for giving any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference, it is enough that the public officer has given an unauthorized or unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. By giving any private patty unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference, damage is not required. It suffices that the public officer has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official functions. Proof of the extent or quantum of damage is not even essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or benefit received could be perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.

I respectfully submit that it is high time for the Court to revisit this line of reasoning.^[24]

As regards Justice Caguioa's first point, let me stress that just as the infringement of a non-criminal rule, regulation, protocol or directive does not automatically translate into a finding of evident bad faith, it also does not erase per se the existence of evident bad faith. As we have seen in our established case law, many of the rules, regulations, protocols or directives violated were non-criminal but administrative in character, yet ultimately, the violations were found to prove manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Thus, the criminal or non-criminal nature of the infringed rule, regulation, protocol or directive has nothing to do really with whether the assailed violation translates to evident bad faith. The controlling aspect would still be the attendant circumstances which of course must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The reference to judges being merely administratively penalized is I believe beside the point. If the factual antecedents of the complained action or inaction satisfy the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, then the administrative decision does not preclude a criminal prosecution. Again, it really adds nothing to the discussion to say if warranted because that is the pre-condition of all legally binding events.

Justice Caguioa also uses the bogeyman that judges may soon be facing a deluge of criminal cases of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 if the Court were to reject the ponencia's ruling. With due respect, the argument against the ponencia's ruling is based on precedents, meaning, the interpretation of Section 3(e) that I am espousing has been culled from existing case law, and not something I have just invented. But even with this state of our case law, we have never seen the feared escalation of criminal cases against judges for violation of Section 3(e) as a result of our findings of administrative liability for gross ignorance of basic statements of the law.

In any event, it is my most respectful submission that instead of frightening our judges, the Court should also start according them the benefit of the doubt and conferring upon their actions the cover of good faith even when they have violated the most basic and clearest statements of the law, and avoid equating their ignorance even if gross and patent with the ineluctable inference of bad faith. This is just to be fair with the judges.

As regards the second point, I do not know what the impact of this change in the doctrine would have on the fight against graft and corruption. Public respondents were not heard on this issue. All along, the criminal cases were prosecuted on the basis of the doctrinal understanding of the elements of the offense charged. I am amenable to change the doctrine and go along with how Justice Caguioa has interpreted it. I humbly posit though that since this change in the doctrine benefits an accused and it has been applied retroactively to petitioner, it should also be made to apply retroactively to all those who have been prosecuted and convicted of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

With all due respect to Justice Caguioa, this is not a "misguided" apprehension but a legitimate concern. Pursuant to Article 8 of the New Civil Code, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, including the one at bar, form part of the law of the land.^[25] Corollarily, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code calls for the retroactivity of penal statutes so long as they are beneficial to the accused, even if the accused is already serving his or her final sentence.

As the Court pronounced in People v. Pare/:^[26]

In most states of the American Union the rule prevails that a statute of limitations of criminal actions is on a parity with a similar statute for civil actions and has no retroactive effect unless the statute itself expressly so provides, and practically all of the authorities cited in support of the theory that such is also the rule here, are upon that point. As from our point of view the rule stated does not obtain in the Philippine Islands, these authorities have, in our opinion, no bearing whatever upon the question here at issue and we shall therefore devote neither time nor space to their further discussion.

In our opinion, the determination of the present case clearly hinges upon the construction of article 22 of the Penal Code,^[27] which reads as follows:

Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving same.

This article is of Spanish origin, is based on Latin principles, and it seems, indeed, too obvious for arguments that we, in its interpretation, must have recourse to Spanish or Latin jurisprudence. In the case of United States vs. Cuna, this court held that "neither English nor American common law is in force in these Islands, nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our courts, save only in so far as they are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in conflict with existing law." In that case the Spanish doctrine invoked was more unfavorable to the accused that the common law rule, but was, nevertheless, adopted by the court. In the present case, the Spanish doctrine is more favorable to the accused and considering the well-known principle that penal laws are to be construed most liberally in favor of the accused, we have stronger reasons here than existed in the Cuna case for rejecting the American doctrine as to the irretroactivity of penal statutes. Both consistency and sound legal principles, therefore, demand that we, in this case, seek our precedents in Latin rather than in American jurisprudence.

For a long period, it has been the settled doctrine in countries whose criminal laws are based on the Latin system that such laws are retroactive in so far as they favor the accused. In Spain and in the Philippine Islands this doctrine is, as we have seen, re-inforced by statutory enactment, and is even made applicable to cases where "final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving same."

I also refer to People v. Bernal:^[28]

In Criminal Case No. 1647 for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (violation of PD 1866), we should apply the ruling enunciated in the recent case of People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam where we declared: "... if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms ... The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. In the above-cited case of Ladjaalam, the appellant was convicted by the trial court of (1) illegal possession of firearms, (2) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide and (3) violation of the dangerous drugs law. We acquitted him of the first crime (illegal possession) but affirmed his conviction of the latter two. In justifying the acquittal, we said inter alia that "when the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 ..." and no "conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime" was thus possible. In the present case, the illegal possession of firearms (as a separate offense) was committed by accused-appellant before RA 8294 took effect. Since the amendment contained in RA 8294 is favorable to him in the sense that it would mean his acquittal (from the charge of illegal possession of firearms), then the law should be given retroactive effect. We cannot therefore affirm the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 1647.

People v. Delos Santos^[29] also ruled:

Likewise, although accused-appellant was convicted on September 17, 1998, before this Court enunciated the Garcia doctrine, the same must be applied retroactively to the instant case, in consonance with our ruling in People v. Gallo where we declared that:

The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line of cases that the tribunal retains control over a case until a full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with established legal processes. It has the authority to suspend the execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.

Moreover, our ruling in Garcia forms part of our penal statutes, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall for part of the legal system of the land." And since Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same," the Garcia doctrine must perforce, be given retroactive effect in this case, said ruling being favorable to accused-appellant, who is not a habitual criminal.

This series of case laws does show that I have not been "misguided"
after all.

In this sense, and if this clarification were adopted by the ponencia, I would have withdrawn my dissent and concurred with the ponencia.

Another. A violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may also be committed through gross inexcusable negligence. So it may not be accurate to dispense with any discussion on gross inexcusable negligence though the Informations only alleged evidence bad faith. This omission in the Informations' averments is not significant because:

We note that the Information against petitioner Sistoza, while specifying manifest partiality and evident bad faith, does not allege gross inexcusable negligence as a modality in the commission of the offense charged. An examination of the resolutions of the Ombudsman would however confirm that the accusation against petitioner is based on his alleged omission of effort to discover the supposed irregularity of the award to Elias General Merchandising which it was claimed was fairly obvious from looking casually at the supporting documents submitted to him for endorsement to the Department of Justice. And, while not alleged in the Information, it was evidently the intention of the Ombudsman to take petitioner to task for gross inexcusable negligence in addition to the two (2) other modalities mentioned therein. At any rate, it bears stressing that Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, is committed either by dolo or culpa and although the Information may have alleged only one (1) of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof.^[30]

Further, the allegation of "bad faith includes an allegation of gross negligence." This is because, applying mutatis mutandis, "[m]alice or bad faith implies moral obliquity or a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose. However, a conscious or intentional design need not always be present since negligence may occasionally be so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Bad faith, in the context of Art. 2220 of the Civil Code, includes gross negligence."^[31]

Hence, assuming without admitting that no evidence of evident bad faith has been shown, it cannot be denied that petitioner had been grossly inexcusably negligent in violating Section 138 of the Local Government Code as his attention to this violation has been called several times. Whether we agree with this definition of gross inexcusable negligence is beside the point. It is either we abide by the definition, or jettison it for another perhaps more humane and practical explanation, and apply it not pro hac vice but retroactively to all accused and convicts similarly situated.

I am not against re-defining doctrines in the hope of becoming a better society. My only call is for the process to be clear and transparent so that at least in theory everyone will be equal before and under the law.

Despite the telltale signs of petitioner's open defiance and flagrant violation of the law and the ordinance, the ponencia, with due respect, has belabored its own fact-finding. But instead of giving a holistic view of the case, it presents its own conclusions without bothering to present, let alone, distill the arguments raised by the prosecutor either during the trial or on appeal, the ponencia seemingly adopts the arguments of petition without weighing them against the counter-arguments of the prosecution. It applies the constitutional presumption of innocence and readily concludes that this presumption was not overcome; but conveniently omits to mention the endeavors of the prosecution to overthrow this presumption.

I daresay, this manner and style of presentation translates to serious constitutional violations. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution requires:

SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

....

The failure of any court, the Court included, to adhere to this constitutional mandate would deprive party-litigants of their fundamental right to due process of law. Indeed, the Sandiganbayan here would be at a loss on why its verdict of conviction was reversed; the prosecution would have no clue at all where it went wrong in presenting its case; and respondent would be left wondering how petitioner was able to evade his criminal liability for violating the laws which he could not have possibly been unaware of.

EPILOGUE
I strongly and humbly believe that there are stark contradictions between the doctrines pronounced in the ponencia and the long established doctrines in many other rulings of the Court.

The ponencia does not face head on these contradictions. As a result, we will likely have a situation where in the future the Court will be compelled to reckon with cases made difficult by why Villarosa was decided the way it was when others similarly situated were not.

I do not relish seeing the Court proclaiming in future cases that Villarosa is a "stray" decision and must not be followed as it was rendered "pro hac vice."

Penned by no less than the Honorable Chief Justice Peralta, whom I highly and sincerely regard as today's guru of criminal law and criminal procedure, I would not want the ponencia to leave the impression that its ruling is ambiguous or contrary to long-established doctrines.

As it was, the Majority fails to settle expressly the contradictions in clear terms, specifically if the Court is in fact abandoning our long-established doctrines. The Majority utterly fails to distinguish the fact situation in the instant case (how it is distinct); or otherwise carve out the case at bar as an exception to the general rule "pro hac vice," and why it is special or exceptional.

The truth is the Majority has added a new exempting or justifying circumstance in our criminal jurisprudence, that is, IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; and has effectively amended Article 3 of the New Civil Code from "[i]gnorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith" to IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS A BLISS THAT SETS EVERY SELF­CONFESSED IGNORANT FREE OF ACCOUNTABILITY.

Finally, this question hangs in the air: Considering the beneficial effect of the ponencia to the accused, will it apply retroactively to those who are similarly situated with petitioner? Can they too demand as a matter of right the reopening of their otherwise terminated cases for another round of review to avail of the ponencia?

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition for Review on Certiorari and AFFIRM in full the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan.

---

^[1] Resolution dated November 22, 2017.

^[2] Resolution dated July 17, 2018. Notably, instead of simply tackling the injustice of dismissing petitions for review on certiorari from judgments of conviction from the Sandiganbayan through minute resolutions, as was done in the case at bar, to which I wholeheartedly concur, page 6 of the Resolution de facto discussed the merits of petitioner's second motion for reconsideration by expressing therein that "the need to dispose this case through a decision or unsigned resolution is bolstered by the apparent persuasive merit of Villarosa's defense." The next pages of the Resolution should give any reasonably thinking lawyer the clear impression that, even before the prosecution on appeal is heard, an acquittal is already forthcoming. This very real prospect then, has come to pass now.

^[3] Decision, p. 14.

^[4] Leviste v. Alameda, 640 Phil. 620 (2010); Insular Life Assurance v. Serrano, 552 Phil. 469 (2007); Potot v. People, 432 Phil. 1028 (2002).

^[5] 695 Phil. 302 (2012).

^[6] 731 Phil. 108 (2014).

^[7] G.R. Nos. 218709-10, November 14, 2018.

^[8] G.R. Nos. 233853-54, July 15, 2019.

^[9] Supra note 8.

^[10] Rollo, pp. 23-25.

^[11] Id. at 29.

^[12] See Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, 709 Phil. 708 (2013).

^[13] Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:

x x x x

(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.

^[14] G.R. No. 240209, June 10, 2019.

^[15] G.R. No. 205976, August 5, 2013.

^[16] G.R. No. 218681, September 14, 2015.

^[17] Rollo, pp.67-68. The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner issued another extraction permit on June 7, 2011, in favor of Jessie Glass and Aluminum, despite being informed on his lack of authority by Provincial Governor Soledad on his letter addressed to petitioner dated May 26, 2011.

^[18] Supra note 14.

^[19] See Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, 504 Phil. 321 (2005).

^[20] See Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Ambanloc, 636 Phil. 233 (2010).

^[21] 716 Phil. 397 (2013).

^[22] 669 Phil. 32 (2011).

^[23] Concurring Opinion of Justice Caguioa, p. 15.

^[24] Id. at 17.

^[25] Article 8 of the New Civil Code.

^[26] G.R. No. L-18260, January 27, 1923.

^[27] Reenacted in Article 22 of Act 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code.

^[28] 437 Phil. 11 (2002).

^[29] 386 Phil. 121 (2000).

^[30] Sistoza v. Disierto, 437 Phil. 117 (2002).

^[31] BPI Express Card Corporation v. Armovit, 745 Phil. 31 (2014); Bankard Inc. v. Feliciano, 529 Phil. 53, (2006).