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872 Phil. 873
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212717, March 11, 2020 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. ARIEL S. CALINGO AND CYNTHIA MARCELLANA-CALINGO, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J. JR., J.:
The Relevant Antecedents
As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:
In 1978, Ariel and Cynthia met when the latter was still the girlfriend of the former's friend. After a while, Cynthia and his then boyfriend broke up. From the conclusion of such relationship, there sprung a new one. After developing a strong sense of sexual desire and physical attraction towards each other, Ariel and Cynthia became a couple.[4]
On February 5, 1980, Ariel and Cynthia decided to get married civilly. The couple initially lived in Paco, Manila; and later on transferred to several places because of the alleged aggressive behavior of Cynthia.[5]
As they lived together, Ariel narrated that Cynthia kept herself occupied by gossiping and reading comic books. Once, he asked Cynthia to limit her visitation to their neighbors to gossip, but Cynthia got mad and told him there was nothing much to do in their house.[6]
Despite their marital problems, Ariel and Cynthia had their church wedding on February 22, 1998. At the time of their church celebration, Cynthia was five months pregnant. Ariel claimed that Cynthia's behavior was no different even after their second rites. She continued to gossip and pick fights with their neighbors.[7]
According to Ariel, not only did Cynthia showed aggressive behavior during their union, but she likewise exhibited unfaithfulness. Ariel recalled that Cynthia's first instance of marital infidelity was with Noli, their neighbor, who became close to them. When Ariel found out about the affair, he forgave Cynthia, who allegedly showed no remorse.[8]
Noli later on revealed to him that their twin children were not really Ariel's children, but his own. Ariel then remembered one incident between him and Cynthia wherein the latter told him "hindi mo anak yan ", as she got mad because Ariel spanked one of their children.[9]
Cynthia's second affair involved Louie, who was also their neighbor. Ariel testified that he discovered Louie hiding under their marital bed and wearing his pants only.[10]
Not long after, Ariel reached his peak and left their conjugal abode after Cynthia threw a knife at him, which fortunately hit the wall. Premised on Cynthia's irritable and irascible attitude, Ariel narrated that the same took place after he asked Cynthia to check the pressure cooker; and in the course thereof, the pressure cooker exploded. Surprised, Cynthia got so angry and started throwing curses at Ariel. Allegedly, Cynthia threw a knife against him which hit the wall.
Ariel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
To support his petition, Ariel secured the psychological evaluation of Dr. Arnulfo Lopez (Dr. Lopez). The result thereof shows that Ariel possesses an emotionally disturbed personality, but not severe enough to constitute psychological incapacity.[11] Dr. Lopez likewise conducted an assessment on Cynthia; and the same revealed that Cynthia is suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder with Histrionic Personality Disorder Features.[12]
In a Decision[13] dated August 3, 2009, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107 (RTC), denied the petition. Finding insufficiency of evidence, the RTC stressed that the totality of evidence presented did not exhibit Cynthia's psychological incapacity as there was absolutely no showing that her traits were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they were incurable. The fallo thereof reads:
Ariel's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[15] dated October 19, 2009.WHEREFORE, the instant petition for declaration of void marriage is denied. The above-entitled case is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Raising a lone enor, Ariel filed an appeal before the CA and insisted that the RTC erred in denying the petition for the evidence presented adequately established Cynthia's psychological incapacity.[16]
In a Decision dated September 9, 2013, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and granted the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Hinged on Cynthia's attitude of being "mabunganga" and having relationships with other men coupled with the diagnosis of Dr. Lopez, the CA was convinced that Cynthia is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations to Ariel. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 3, 2009 and Resolution dated October 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-06-57906 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Ariel S. Calingo and Cynthia Marcellana-Calingo is declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO.SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, this petition.
Defending the sanctity of marriage, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition.
In essence, the OSG was resolute in propounding Ariel's failure to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate Cynthia's psychological incapacity within the ambit of Article 36 of the Family Code.[18]
In his Comment,[19] Ariel reiterated that Cynthia's Histrionic Personality Disorder is a psychological incapacity which warrants the. nullity of their marriage.
In its Reply,[20] the OSG pointed out that Ariel failed to justify in his Comment sufficient basis to justify the denial of the instant petition.
The Issue
Whether or not the marriage between Ariel and Cynthia should be declared null on the basis of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court's Ruling
While marriage is considered by our fundamental law as an inviolable social institution, our laws allow the nullity of marriage entered into between parties who are incognizant of their obligations on the ground of pyschological incapacity. Specifically, Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Marriage nullified based on such justification is considered as void from the outset.
Jurisprudence defined psychological incapacity to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.[21] It ought to pertain to only the most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly demonstrate the party's/parties' utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[22]
To be accurate, such incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability:
In this case, Ariel presented the medical assessment of Dr. Lopez who found that Cynthia is suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder with Histrionic Personality Disorder Features rooted on her disorderly filial relationship as she was subjected to physical abuse and abandonment.[24] Such findings were based on the testimony of Ariel and their friends, Francisca Bilason (Bilason) and Ruben Kalaw (Kalaw).The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage it must be rooted in the history of the part y antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[23]
However, this Court refuses to accept as credible the assessment of Dr. Lopez as there was no other evidence which established the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Cynthia's alleged incapacity. While jurisprudence recognizes the dispensability of personal examination of the party alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity, it is but necessary to provide corroborative evidence to exhibit the required legal parameters.[25]
To recall, the report itself cited the testimonies of Ariel and their friends, Bilason and Kalaw as bases for the findings. However, in the same report, it displayed that Bilason and Kalaw are friends with the couple for more or less thirty years, and the same does not show that they have known Cynthia longer than such period of time so as to have personal knowledge of her circumstances. Neither was it shown that Ariel likewise had personal knowledge of Cynthia's family background. Thus, they could not have known Cynthia's childhood nor the manner as to how she was raised.
Likewise, Cynthia's sexual infidelity is not a satisfactory proof of psychological incapacity. To be a ground to nullify a marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which makes him/her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.[26]
As discussed, there was no evidence which proved that such raised to the level of psychological incapacity within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code, warranting the severance of Cynthia and Ariel's marital bonds.
Unequivocally, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person.[27]
Hence, contrary to CA's decision, the fact that Cynthia is "mabunganga" and had extra-marital affairs are not sufficient indicators of a psychological disorder.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated September 9, 2013 and Resolution dated May 29, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94407 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J., (Chairperson), and Gesmundo,[*] J., concur.
Caguioa (Working Chairperson), J., see concurring opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J., see dissenting opinion.
[*] Additional member per Raffle dated February 12, 2020 in lieu of Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez.
[1] Rollo, pp. 14-46.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, concurring; id. at 51-64.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a Member of this Court), concurring; id. at 66-67.
[4] Id. at 167.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 168.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 169.
[13] Id. at 167-171.
[14] Id. at 171.
[15] Id. at 185-187.
[16] Id. at 199.
[17] Id. at 64.
[18] Id. at 26-44.
[19] Id. at 268-271.
[20] Id. at 296-301.
[21] Mendoza v. Republic of the Philippines, 698 Phil. 241 (2012).
[22] Republic of the Philippines v. Tecag, G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018.
[23] Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 24.
[24] Rollo, pp. 122 and 125.
[25] Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017.
[26] Supra note 22.
[27] Supra note 25.
CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
I concur.
Article 36 of the Family Code details the concept of psychological incapacity in the context of marriage. It reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.In Republic v. Molina[1] (Molina), the Court set the guidelines for the application and interpretation of the foregoing provision on the basis of the discussions and written memoranda of amici curiae Reverend Oscar V. Cruz and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and /or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effective l y incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[2] (Emphasis supplied)
As the nomenclature suggests, the Molina guidelines only serve as a guide in determining the existence of psychological incapacity. The Molina guidelines are not meant to "straightjacket all petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage."[3] To stress, actions for declaration of nullity filed under Article 36 should be resolved "on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of Church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since [Article 36] was taken from Canon Law."[4]
Verily, an allegation of psychological incapacity, like any other allegation, must be supported by proof. Proof, in turn, requires the presentation of sufficient evidence. In this regard, actions filed under Article 36 must be resolved through the evaluation of the totality of evidence on record. When the totality of evidence fails to establish that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence, it does not assume the nature of psychological incapacity which Article 36 contemplates. These guidelines, "strict" as they are, stem from the law itself. Courts and litigants are thus bound to respect these guidelines until a subsequent law is passed espousing a contrary legislative intent.
Here, the totality of evidence presented by petitioner Ariel S. Calingo (Ariel) is not sufficient to sustain a finding that his wife, Cynthia Marcellana-Calingo (Cynthia) suffers from psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.
Ariel's petition for declaration of nullity is based on the psychological evaluation and testimony of Dr. Arnulfo Lopez (Dr. Lopez), and Ariel's own testimony alluding to Cynthia's unfaithfulness and hostile tendencies.
The psychological evaluation of Dr. Lopez states that Cynthia is afflicted with Borderline Personality Disorder with Histrionic Personality Disorder Features. In assessing the sufficiency of these findings, a distinction must be made between the credibility of Dr. Lopez's medical assessment and the credibility of the facts upon which such assessment is based.
To recall, Dr. Lopez found that Cynthia suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder with Histrionic Personality Features rooted on her disorderly filial relationship as she was subjected to physical abuse and abandonment.
That disorderly filial relationship may give rise to Borderline Personality Disorder is an established fact that is not disputed in this case, inasmuch as this finding falls well within the expertise of Dr. Lopez as an expert in the field of psychology. However, Cynthia's alleged disorderly relationship with her parents and exposure to physical abuse and abandonment do not appear to be supported by the evidence on record. While these circumstances were relayed by Ariel and the couple's friends, Francisca Bilaso and Ruben Kalaw, during the course of Dr. Lopez's assessment, none of them claim to have personal knowledge of Cynthia's childhood circumstances and filial relationship. In the absence of corroborating evidence, the information relayed by Dr. Lopez's informants cannot be taken as established facts, but merely uncorroborated allegations.
Moreover, as aptly observed by the ponencia, Ariel's allegations of marital infidelity and hostile tendencies, even if true, do not serve as sufficient basis to warrant the severance of his marriage with Cynthia.
Time and again, the Court has ruled that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof of psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which render the party completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.[5] Moreover, "irreconcilable differences x x x, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as [these] may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses."[6]
For these reasons, I vote to GRANT the Petition.
[1] 335 Phil. 664 (1997)
[2] Id.
[3] Republic v. Javier, G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018.
[4] Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (1998), p. 37.
[5] See generally Villalon v. Villalon, 512 Phil. 219 (2005).
[6] See generally Republic v. Tecag, G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018, citing Toring v. Toring, 640 Phil. 434 (2010).
DISSENTING OPINION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The ponencia reverses the Court of Appeals' Decision dated September 9, 2013[1] viz.:
However, this Court refuses to accept as credible the assessment of Dr. Lopez as there was no other evidence which established the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Cynthia's alleged incapacity, it is but necessary to provide corroborative evidence to exhibit the required legal parameters.
xxx
Likewise, Cynthia's sexual infidelity is not a satisfactory proof of psychological incapacity. To be a ground to nullify a marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which makes him/her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
As discussed, there was no evidence which prove that such rises to the level of psychological incapacity within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code, warranting the severance of Cynthia and Ariel's marital bonds.
Unequivocally, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person.
Hence, contrary to CA's decision, the fact that Cynthia is "mabunganga" and had extra-marital affairs are not sufficient indictors of a psychological disorder.[2]
I dissent.
I.
First. Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez's assessments were not unsubstantiated. They were based not only on his interview with Ariel himself but also on his interviews with Francisca A. Bilason[3] and Ruben Kalaw.[4] Although Bilason and Kalaw themselves did not testify in court, Dr. Lopez personally testified on the questions he asked of these witnesses and their corresponding answers. It cannot be said, therefore, that the narratives of these persons which Dr. Lopez himself examined and evaluated are hearsay.
The good doctor also factored in Cynthia's family background in his diagnosis. He, too, considered veritable facts on record pertaining to the character of the parties, their psychological profiles, their behavior, the people's perception of them vis-à-vis the criteria of antecedence, incurability, and gravity of Cynthia's supposed psychological incapacity. Ultimately, Dr. Lopez came out with his expert opinion that Cynthia was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations to her husband.
Notably, Dr. Lopez is the same doctor whose evaluations the Court had given credence to in cases where we granted petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage on ground of psychological incapacity, viz.:
Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, was presented as an expert witness. Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather information on her family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of psychological tests. Dr. Lopez also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend.
xxx
Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity."
Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of personality disorder, even more severe than the other personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic personality disorders. Dr. Lopez explained that Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably caused by a pathogenic parental model. Rodolfo's family background showed that his father was a psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic contamination called double insanity, a symptom similar to his father's. Dr. Lopez further claimed that Rodolfo's disorder was serious and incurable because of his severe paranoia.
Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's incapacity to perform his marital obligations.
(De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017; emphases supplied, citations omitted)
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
xxx
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent's testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common conclusion of respondent's psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert witnesses.
(Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006; emphases supplied, citations omitted)
Second. There was allegedly no evidence showing that Cynthia's psychological incapacity is within the level required by Article 36 of the Family Code. But what evidence can be more convincing, nay, credible, than the detailed account of Ariel himself who experienced his wife's psychological incapacity up close on countless occasions? Ariel testified, viz.:
FISCAL
Equally important is the reputation and credibility of Dr. Lopez as a psychologist whose findings the Court had accorded credence and reliance in various cases.
Third. According to the ponencia, the Court of Appeals erred when it deemed Cynthia's sexual infidelity and being "mabunganga" sufficient to warrant the nullity of her marriage to Ariel.
As it was, however, the Court of Appeals did not hinge its rulings on these grounds alone. In truth, there are many more, viz.:
His wife's being "mabunganga" and having relationships with other men, are strong indications of a psychological disorder.
xxx
Cynthia's quarrelsome attitude, and the incessant bickerings with neighbors and the spouses' landlords, which force the spouses to transfer from one place to another can be traced back to her [Histrionic Personality Disorder]. In addition, her being "mabunganga" is clearly an indication that she would not listen to reason in discussion and would be enraged for no apparent reason at all.
The totality of evidence all boils down to the fact that the marriage is doomed from the start.
Cynthia's sexual infidelity, by itself, is sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity given that she committed it not just once, but multiple times. In fact, she bore, not just a child but twins with a man other than her husband; in addition, she harbored a half-naked man under their maternal bed; she was verbally abusive, as she often got angry at Ariel and shouted curses at him;[6] she had aggressive tendencies towards others and would pick fights with neighbors and landlords because of constant gossiping, causing them to transfer residence five (5) times in just three (3) years of life together as husband and wife;[7] and she had, on separate occasions, thrown knives and other deadly objects at Ariel. If this is not psychological incapacity, what is?
II.
The Court has clarified that the guidelines in Republic v. Molina[8] are not meant to straightjacket all petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The merits are determined on a case-to-case basis, as no case is on all fours with another.[9]
In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[10] we ruled that the parties' marriage was void on the basis of psychological incapacity and noted:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a straightjacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
xxx
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage. (Emphasis supplied; Citations omitted)
In Republic v. Javier[11] for instance, respondent Martin Javier testified on his own behalf and presented the psychological findings of Dr. Elias D. Adamos. Based on her Psychological Report on Martin and Psychological Impression Report on Michelle Mercado-Javier, Martin and Michelle had Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
In his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, Martin testified that Michelle was confrontational even before their marriage, she always challenged his opinions on what was proper, and acted recklessly without consideration of his feelings. Dr. Adamos corroborated this and noted that Michelle's disorder was a result of her childhood trauma. He also added that she constantly lied to Martin and openly had extra-marital affairs.
Martin's disorder, on the other hand, was found to have been rooted in his traumatic childhood experiences with his violent and abusive father. He thus had unrealistic values and standards on his own marriage, proposed unconventional sexual practices, and often quarreled with Michelle. Worse, he had inflicted physical harm on her. He was found to be self-entitled, immature, and self-centered.
Taken together, the Court found these manifestations as proof of psychological incapacity and upheld the declaration of the marriage as void ab initio.
Here, records show that: (1) Ariel himself suffered an emotionally disturbed personality; (2) Cynthia was diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder with Histrionic Personality Disorder Features; (3) She was unfaithful to him and even once admitted that her children were not his; (4) He caught her with another man; (5) She was verbally abusive against him; and (6) She has attempted to take his life by throwing knives at him on different occasions.
Article 68 of the Family Code, under Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife provides:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a)True, each action or omission which Cynthia has done or incurred, taken singly, may constitute a mere ground for legal separation. Taken together, however, they constitute a solid ground for psychological incapacity. How can a seemingly incurable adulteress who is unapologetically verbally and physically abusive still be able to comply with her duties as a wife? Are her acts those of love, respect, and fidelity?
III.
The remedy of psychological incapacity, as the prototypical and prevailing doctrine understands it to be, does not work as well in practice as it is in theory. There are real needs and actual mischief that the remedy seeks to address - the dysfunctional marriage and the decaying family that the latter breeds. To make the remedy responsive and relevant, some adjustments have to be written to the prototypical and prevailing doctrine.
For one, proof by an expert of the existence of a personality disorder should only be one of the means of proving by presumption the existence of psychological incapacity. For another, it is high-time to abandon the prevailing insistence on proof of clinically-identified personality disorders as the sole elemental source of psychological incapacity. It should also be enough to prove mental state or state of mind of an inability to fulfil the marital and parental duties as a trigger to the ascription of psychological incapacity to a spouse.
It is also apt to abandon the requirement of juridical antecedence so that the trigger mental states or states of mind that develop post-marriage can be accounted for. To be sure, it is not illogical or contrary to common experience that love blinds only for so long, and thereafter, when emotions have subsided and the dynamics of having to interact with another breathes a life of its own, the mind has stopped to function in the marital partnership and duties are no longer being fulfilled, there is no love and respect but screaming silence, violence and poison, these experiences are relevant to a finding of psychological incapacity and should not be shut off only because they happen post-marriage.
Lastly, incurability or permanence should now be seen and analyzed in terms of a spouse's failure to reconcile with the other despite bona fide endeavours to do so.
A final note. We also cannot ignore the fact that Ariel and Cynthia have not been in contact since their separation in 1984 or for thirty-six (36) years now. What marriage, therefore, do we seek to preserve here? If these manifestations, taken together, do not establish psychological incapacity, what more are we looking for?
I, therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the dispositions of the Court of Appeals granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
[1] CA-G.R. CV No. 94407.
[2] Ponencia, pp. 5-6; citations omitted.
[3] A head therapist who has known both Ariel and Cynthia for more than 30 years.
[4] Friend of both Ariel and Cynthia both for longer than 25 years.
[5] Rollo, pp. 92-99.
[6] Rollo, p. 118.
[7] Id. at 92-93.
[8] 335 Phil. 664-693 (1997).
[9] Republic v. Javier, G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018, 861 SCRA 683, 691, citing Bier v. Bier, et al., 570 Phil. 442, 448-449 (2008).
[10] 598 Phil. 666, 695-698 (2009).
[11] G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018, 861 SCRA 683, 686.