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Parties who appear before a notary public to have their documents notarized should not be expected to follow up on the submission of the notarial reports. They should not be made to suffer the consequences of the negligence of the Notary Public in following the procedures prescribed by the Notarial Law. x x x^[118]

Hence, the negligence or failure of Atty. Cinco to comply with his duty to deliver his notarial reports should not affect the validity, much less the existence, of Vergara's Oath of Allegiance. If any, it merely exposes Atty. Cinco to administrative liabilities, in light of his failure to perform his duties as a notary public. Likewise, the authenticity of his signatures cannot be judiciously determined from the present documents available to the Court.

In sum, the existence, due execution and genuineness of Vergara's Oath of Allegiance stand as the same were not successfully refuted.

Vergara presented before the HRET her original IC No. 06-12955, the genuineness and existence of which are not contested.^[119] Under R.A. 9225 in relation to Administrative Order (AO) No. 91, Series of 2004 and the BI M.C. AFF-05-002, a petition for the Issuance of an IC (for the retention/acquisition of Philippine citizenship) requires, as part of the documentary support to the petition, the submission of a duly accomplished Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.^[120] Piccio, in the present Petition, likewise makes an admission that the "Certificate is given after application, verification and approval of the petition as required by [R.A.] 9225."^[121] Moreover, the BI officials presented as witnesses before the HRET testified that the original documents are required to be submitted for an R.A. 9225 Petition to be approved, and the same is likewise admitted by Piccio.^[122]

Hence, the mere issuance and existence of the genuine and authentic IC of Vergara, while not conclusive proof as correctly pointed out by Piccio,^[123] is, at the very least, prima facie proof of Vergara's compliance with R.A. 9225, including the submission of the petition therefor and its supporting documents as well as their due processing and approval by the BI.

Piccio maintains that the acquisition by Vergara of the IC was irregular because of her failure to produce the original documents supporting her R.A. 9225 Petition in accordance with the Rules on Evidence, and the concomitant failure of the BI to explain why it only has photocopies of the documents in its records. Piccio further faults Vergara for omitting to offer a plausible explanation why she only has photocopies in her possession and the original cannot be produced or found.^[124]

The contentions fail.

At the outset, the Court clarifies that the absence of the original documents is not fatal to Vergara's case. To emphasize, the issue in the present case pertains to the existence and due execution of these documents — and not their contents. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule, requiring the production of the original document, does not apply.

The Best Evidence Rule is embodied in Section 3,^[125] Rule 130 of the Rules, and stipulates that "in proving the terms" of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence, other than the original writing, to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.^[126]

In Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo Alvarez^[127] (Heirs of Prodon) the Court explained that the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the issues concern external facts like the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, the Rule cannot be invoked and secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original. Thus:

But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.^[128] (Italics in the original)

In Heirs of Prodon, the Court had occasion to mention the following:

The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the deed, although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title. Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution by other means that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.

A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the loss or explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation of secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his heart ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability to locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilao's belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public Razon, but no effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.^[129]

Hence, what Heirs of Prodon held were as follows: (1) although secondary evidence is admissible if the issue is not the terms of the document even without first accounting for the original, it is a matter of good trial tactics that the loss of the original document still be established and explained; (2) such proof of loss will be subjected to less stringent standards than if the Best Evidence Rule applies; (3) to prove such loss, there must be evidence submitted that the original document cannot be found in the possession of its alleged custodian, either by the latter or his or her representatives, and efforts should be made to obtain a duplicate original from the concerned Notary Public, if any; and (4) proof that consists of products of ministerial acts, such as registration of instruments for purposes of notice, may be rejected.

Applying the foregoing here, there is no question that Vergara (1) submitted proof that her documents could not be found in the possession of its last custodian — the BI. The BI itself, through several testimonies, documents and letters, admitted that the original documents are not in its custody, while likewise admitting that they were duly filed by Vergara; (2) the original of the Oath of Allegiance cannot likewise be found with the Notary Public, as shown by the Certificate dated May 24, 2016 of the OCC of Manila. Stated differently, the fact of loss of the original Oath of Allegiance and Vergara's other R.A. 9225 documents was duly proven.

Vergara had likewise reasonably explained such loss. She narrated that she submitted said original documents to the BI, together with her R.A. 9225 Petition, when she applied for re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship.^[130] This is confirmed by: (1) the BI itself through its officials; (2) the BI General Instructions for Petitions for Retention/Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship under R.A. 9225^[131] (General Instructions) which requires two originals of the Oath as supporting documents for R.A. 9225 petitions, and provides that such originals "will not be returned to the petitioner and will be part of the Bureau's record;" and (3) AO No. 91, Series of 2004 designating the BI as the "repository of Certificates of Oath of Allegiance."

Moreover, unlike the registration of a deed, the issuance of the IC is not a ministerial act by the BI. This requires careful exercise of discretion. Indeed, as may be drawn from the law and evidence, including the testimonies of the BI officials presented before the HRET, a thorough investigation is conducted — which in the case of Vergara was actually done by the BI Task Force on the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003^[132] — after which the investigating body makes a recommendation to the BI. The BI then exercises its own discretion by considering the investigation report and recommendation, after which it approves the petition and orders the issuance of an IC, or disapproves the same. In fact, the BI General Instructions advises applicants and petitioners to seek legal advice from lawyers and/or BI accredited entities in applying under R.A. 9225.^[133]

Hence, applying Heirs of Prodon, Vergara more than sufficiently observed the requirements of the law for the admission of her secondary evidence, specifically the photocopies of her R.A. 9225 documents.

In any case, as pointed out in the assailed Decision,^[134] the Revised Rules of the HRET (HRET Rules) provides that the Rules is applicable only by analogy or in a suppletory character.^[135] The HRET "is not strictly bound by technical rules of procedure" as "[it] may suspend [them] in the higher interest of justice and apply other rules of procedure as may be applicable at its discretion."^[136]

Indeed, legal technicalities aside, from the facts of the case, it was virtually impossible for Vergara to produce her original R.A. 9225 documents after she had filed them with the BI. With good reason, Vergara believed that the presentation of the original IC was sufficient to prove the existence of the documents which were required for its issuance. Hence, upon learning of Commissioner Geron's letters stating that her R.A. 9225 files purportedly do not exist in the BI records, she immediately sought clarification from the BI through incumbent BI Commissioner Morente.^[137] In response to this letter­ query, Commissioner Morente confirmed that her R.A. 9225 Petition was received, processed, and approved by the BI as a result of which she was issued an IC.^[138]

The Court deems these efforts as more than reasonable under the circumstances, considering that, in the end, Vergara was assured by the BI that its records reflect the existence and due processing of her R.A. 9225 documents. From these facts, there is nothing more that she could have done or was supposed to do. To be sure, it is established by the evidence that the original documents are not with the BI, as it only has possession of their photocopies. To the Court's mind, this only confirms the hopelessness of Vergara's situation — there was no way for her to produce said original documents because they went missing from the BI's custody. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The law does not require the impossible.^[139]

Hence, the HRET was more than correct when it considered and gave due weight to the following R.A. 9225 documents of Vergara, despite the absence of originals of the following:

1.	Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated November 26, 2006;
2.	Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 issued by the BI-TFCRRA through Arbas, recommending the approval of her R.A. 9225 Petition; and
3.	Order dated November 30, 2006 issued by the BI through Commissioner Fernandez, recognizing that she had taken an Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that she had complied with all the requirements of R.A. 9225 for re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship and thereby granting her R.A. 9225 Petition.

That the original documents do not appear to exist in the BI's records at the time when they were sought does not mean that they never existed. It does not — as it logically cannot — lead to a conclusion that Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents were never filed, duly processed, and granted.

In the Vitangcol case mentioned above — a Bigamy case against a husband who produced a Certification from the OCR, stating that it has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in the husband's and his first wife's favor — the Court ruled that such Certification does not prove that there was no marriage license, thus:

This Certification does not prove that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his first wife, Gina. The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner's first marriage. This "should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the marriage[.]"

x x x x

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.^[140]

Like Vitangcol, none of the evidence presented in the present case categorically stated that Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents do not exist. On the contrary, all of the BI officials declared that the BI has photocopies of such documents in its records. In fact, the BI admitted that the original documents existed, and were filed, processed and approved by it, according to its investigation, on the basis of its records, formal hearings conducted and the reports and comments of its relevant offices. Hence, the effective admission by the BI that the originals of the documents are presently not in its records cannot be taken to mean that such documents never existed.

Moreover, similar to Vitangcol's marriage certificate (a document bearing the signature of the adverse party which he admitted to be authentic), the genuineness and existence of Vergara's IC are also not disputed. Hence, it must likewise be treated as positive evidence of the existence and due processing of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents.

Both Piccio and Vergara presented in evidence several BI documents and testimonies of BI officials during the HRET trial, thus:

A. BI official documents:

B. Pertinent testimonies of BI officials during the HRET trial:

1)	Atty. Santos, Chief, BI Legal Division and Chairman, Investigation Committee, who testified that: a) an investigation was conducted on the alleged tampering of Vergara's R.A. 9225 records and the Investigation Report concluded that the files therein were duly received and processed, resulting to the issuance of IC No. 06-12955;[156] b) the Investigation Committee conducted formal hearings and several meetings, and required relevant officials to submit their comments and reports which they did;[157] c) the investigation centered on whether Vergara applied for re-acquisition of citizenship, if the same was approved and if there was tampering of the documents during that process;[158] and d) during the investigation in 2016, Vergara's records contained only photocopies of documents.[159]
	Atty. Santos likewise confirmed under oath that because the original documents are required to be submitted, the presumption is that these original documents are in the custody of the BI.[160]
2)	Atty. Canta, member of the BI-BSI, who testified that: a) there were entries in the electronic database of the dual citizenship office which indicates the processing of Vergara's documents;[161] b) that Vergara's documents have been implemented with Transaction Number/Entry Reference No. 1 0552;[162] c) the BI database records all transactions including the processing of documents;[163] d) tampering (of the BI electronic database) is highly unlikely (and will not go unnoticed) because any change will be reflected and all entries would be affected;[164] and e) original documents are required to be submitted in an application for re-acquisition of citizenship, especially the Oath of Allegiance.[165]
3)	Acting Records Officer Maria Graciella Maceda (Maceda) who testified that: a) the mandate of the Records Section is to safekeep records transmitted officially by the several BI offices, regardless of whether said documents transmitted are original or photocopies;[166] and b) the Records Section merely receives such transmitted documents, after which they conduct inventories and prepare record statistics. The documents are then stored in the BI warehouse.[167]
	Maceda likewise confirmed a statement that she made in a session of the Committee on Good Governance and Public Accountability of the House on August 16, 2017 to the effect that in the years 2005 and 2006, before the BI established a Verification and Compliance Division, it was not unusual that only photocopies of the original filings for R.A. 9225 were transmitted to the Records Section but that the same were considered valid documentation.[168]

Piccio challenges the conclusions of the BI officials in Vergara's favor for relying solely on the presumption of regularity.^[169] Associate Justice Ramon Paul Hernando (Justice Hernando), during the case deliberations, likewise raised the concern that the BI Investigation Committee, in concluding that Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition was duly received, processed, and approved, merely based such finding on the photocopies of Vergara's documents and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. He opines that the material contradictions coming from BI Commissioners Geron and Morente, cast doubt upon the reliability of Commissioner Morente's letter and defeats the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by the BI.

The Court must differ.

Foremost, the records clearly show that, in reaching their conclusions that suggest Vergara's valid re-acquisition of her Philippine citizenship, the BI officials did not rely on the presumption of regularity alone. From the clear language of the BI Investigation Report and the testimonies of the BI officials before the HRET, the BI's position is supported by the available records, the BI electronic database, the Dual Citizenship Office database, several meetings, formal hearings and investigations, as well as certifications, reports and comments from relevant BI offices.^[170]

From this, it becomes clear that only the June 2016 letters of Commissioner Geron are suspect, but these need not taint the credibility and evidentiary value of the numerous other pieces of evidence from the BI officials presented by the parties which are consistent, logical and supported by other evidence on record.

First, the very letters coming from Commissioner Geron contradict one another. As pointed out by the HRET, in his May 20, 2016 letter, Commissioner Geron narrated that the BI had photocopies of Vergara's documents and even enumerated the nature of these documents therein, thus:

Dear Mr. Piccio,

This refers to your letter dated 16 May 2016 requesting for certified true copies of the [R.A.] 9225 dual citizenship documents of ROSANNA VERGARA VERGARA.

Please be advised that upon verification, it was found that the Records Section only has photocopies of the following documents:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated 26 November 2006;
2. Memorandum dated 28 November 2006;
3. Order dated 30 November 2006; and
4. Identification Certificate No. 06-12955.

x x x x^[171]

Commissioner Geron thereafter directly contradicted his statements in the foregoing letter when he issued his succeeding June 2, 2016 letter which then stated that no record of IC No. 06-12955 exists in the BI's files (including photocopies thereof), and that based on existing records, Vergara's petition was never received and processed by the BI, thus:

Dear Mr. Piccio,

x x x [P]lease be informed that based on existing records of the Bureau of Immigration, no Petition for the Issuance of an Identification Certificate in favor of ROSANNA VALERIANA GARCIA VERGARA @ ROSANNA VERGARA (VERGARA) was received or processed by the Bureau. Further, no record of Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 allegedly issued to Vergara exists in the Bureau's files.

x x x x^[172]

The latter message is reiterated in Commissioner Geron's letter dated June 29, 2016.^[173]

Second, the June letters were apparently written with knowledge that, contrary to what they stated, the BI does have records of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents. To recall, per the Certification dated August 4, 2016 of Records Section Chief Maceda, Commissioner Geron borrowed Vergara's R.A. 9225 files on May 16, 2016, which thus accounts and substantiates the first letter dated May 20, 2016 where Commissioner Geron unequivocally stated the fact that the BI has photocopies of the documents. This leads to no other conclusion than that the subsequent issuance of the June letters, which contradicted the May letter and are inconsistent with Maceda's Certification, was deliberate and tainted with malice.

Therefore, the Court agrees with the HRET's conclusion that the obvious contradictions in the statements of Commissioner Geron impeaches his credibility in writing the June letters.^[174] In truth, it is difficult to see how the contradictions of Commissioner Geron's positions can impair the reliability of Commissioner Morente's letters.

Third, Commissioner Geron's June letters are belied by the subsequent letter of Commissioner Morente dated August 10, 2016, written in response to Vergara's letter, which sought to clarify the statements of Commissioner Geron that the BI has no records of her R.A. 9225 documents. Commissioner Morente therein declared that Vergara's petition "has been duly received, processed and approved by the [BI] and that [she has] been issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12955,"^[175] thus:

x x x x

Dear Congresswoman Vergara:

This is in response to your 04 July 2016 and 03 August 2016 letters seeking assistance and clarification regarding the 02 June 2016 letter of former Commissioner Ronaldo A. Geron (Annex "A") stating that no record of Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 exists in the Bureau's files.

The Acting Chief, Board of Special Inquiry confirmed that your petition for Reacquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship under R.A. 9225 has been duly received, processed[,] and approved by the Bureau of Immigration and that you have been issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 pursuant thereto (Annex "B").

We wish to inform you that based on our inquiry, we learned that on 16 May 2016, the Records Section brought to the Office of Commissioner Geron your [R.A.] 9225 records reportedly containing photocopied documents. On the same date, your [R.A.] 9225 records were returned to the Records Section in the same condition as [they] were borrowed according to the certification issued by Acting Chief, Records Section (Annex "C").

I have ordered for the conduct of an investigation as to the allegations that your [R.A.] 9225 records were tampered.

x x x x^[176]

Moreover, unlike the June letters of Commissioner Geron, Commissioner Morente's letter was based on two certifications, duly issued by the concerned BI offices:^[177] (1) Certification dated August 4, 2016 of Records Section Chief Maceda;^[178] and (2) Certification of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta.^[179] These certifications were attached to Commissioner Morente's letter. For obvious reasons, between Commissioner Geron's June letters — which contradict his own May 20, 2016 letter, and fails to cite any reasonable basis for his contradictory statements — and that of Commissioner Morente's letter, the latter deserves greater credence.

Finally, the June letters of Commissioner Geron are belied, not only by his own letter dated May 20, 2016, by the Certification dated August 4, 2016 of Records Section Chief Maceda, by the letter dated August 10, 2016 of Commissioner Morente, but also by all the other documents, letters, and testimonies coming from all the other BI officials submitted in evidence during the hearings before the HRET.

The contents and statements in these pieces of evidence may be summarized as follows:

1)	In 2006, the BI officials who evaluated Vergara's application for re-acquisition of her Philippine citizenship determined that she had taken her Oath of Allegiance, thereby resulting to her having reacquired her Philippine citizenship; that Vergara had complied with the requirements of R.A. 9225; that her R.A. 9225 Petition must be/was approved; and that, accordingly, an IC was issued in her favor.[180]
2)	In 2016, the BI's Records Section only has photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents.[181]
3)	Based on the series of investigations, meetings and formal hearings, the comments and reports of relevant BI officials, the entries in the BI electronic database and the database of the BI Dual Citizenship Office, as well as the available BI records, Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition and its accompanying documents were all received, processed, and approved by the BI on November 30, 2016, as a consequence of which she was issued IC No. 06-12955.[182]
4)	The filing, processing, and approval of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents in 2006 are recorded and reflected in the BI electronic database, which records all BI transactions including any changes in the entries therein. Hence, tampering of records will likewise be shown.[183]
5)	The BI requires the submission of original documents in an R.A. 9225 application.[184] However, in the years 2005 and 2006, before the BI established a Verification and Compliance Division, it was not unusual that only photocopies of the original filings for R.A. 9225 were transmitted to the Records Section but that the same were considered valid documentation.[185]

In short, the BI officials, including Commissioner Geron himself in his May 10, 2016 letter to Piccio, are consistent in saying that 1) the BI has photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents and 2) that such documents were duly filed, processed, and approved by the BI, as a consequence of which she was issued IC No. 06-12955.

Directly contradicting this substantial body of evidence are only the identical June letters of Commissioner Geron, which stated that 1) based on the records, no R.A. 9225 Petition was received or processed in favor of Vergara and 2) no record (photocopy or original) of IC No. 06-12955 exists in the BI's files.^[186]

Hence, the proper way to view the serious irregularities heavily relied upon by Piccio and Justice Hernando is this: it was Commissioner Geron ALONE who, by his June letters to Piccio, contradicted not only himself but likewise all of the BI officials called to testify, under oath, and all of the documents and letters coming from the BI. Viewed from this angle, it would be absurd to conclude from this that the Court should now question Commissioner Morente's reliability. The facts, established during trial and through testimonies made under oath, show that it is Commissioner Geron 's June letters, in response to Piccio, that should be doubted and not be given credence. In this light, given that all of the BI's officials were consistent in their statements before the HRET and on the documents they submitted, then it is Commissioner Geron's June letters that can be said to be "anomalous."

The records reveal that, as pointed out in the OSG's Comment,^[187] Piccio had filed several suits against Vergara, before different quasi-judicial and administrative agencies, based on the same main issue and collateral issues as the ones raised in the present case — Vergara's compliance with the requirements of R.A. 9225 to re-acquire her Philippine citizenship, and the alleged tampering, fraud, and irregularities surrounding her R.A. 9225 records with the BI.^[188] All of these suits were resolved in Vergara's favor and, hence, against Piccio, thus:

First, the said issue was already determined by the [BI] – the government agency tasked to implement [R.A.] 9225 – in favor of [Vergara] when it issued the Order on November 30, 2006 or more than thirteen (13) years ago, granting her Petition for the Issuance of Identification Certificate to reacquire Filipino citizenship. x x x

Second, when [Piccio] opposed the candidacy of [Vergara], he raised the same issue that the latter did not comply with [R.A.] 9225. However, the COMELEC First Division, in its Resolution dated June 7, 2016, DISMISSED for lack of merit [Piccio's] petition x x x. It found that [Vergara] had complied with the requirements of [R.A.] 9225.

Third, [Piccio] also filed x x x a deportation complaint against [Vergara] for allegedly tampering with her [R.A.] 9225 records. The complaint x x x was dismissed for lack of merit by Order dated October 7, 2016 issued by BI Commissioner [Morente]. It affirmed the Investigation Committee's findings that, "based on the Bureau's available records, and considering the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties," it appears that [Vergara's] petition x x x "was duly processed and approved by the [BI]."

Fourth, the Joint Resolution dated June 16, 2017 and the Resolution dated November 7, 2017 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila in NPS No. XV-07-INV-17C dismissing the complaints for falsification filed by [Piccio] against [Vergara], x x x involving the very same documents in the instant case x x x. The City Prosecutor found no probable cause for the imputations against [Vergara].^[189]

To emphasize, the BI (twice), the COMELEC, the City Prosecutor of Manila and the HRET — all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies tasked to enforce the relevant laws and charged with technical knowledge of the matters falling within their primary jurisdiction — all dismissed the different suits filed by Piccio against Vergara concerning the very factual issues brought before the Court at present, and involving the same R.A. 9225 documents of Vergara.

At this juncture, the Court quotes, with approval, the HRET's assailed Decision where it stated: "[t]o contradict the findings of these quasi-judicial bodies would run counter to the elementary principle that findings of administrative agencies deserve great respect, if not finality, by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said bodies over matters falling under their primary jurisdiction."^[190]

The foregoing discussion shows that the records are replete with competent evidence, offered by both Piccio and Vergara, supporting the conclusion that Vergara had duly re-acquired her Philippine citizenship, in compliance with the requirements of R.A. 9225.

First, Vergara's original and genuine IC No. 06-12955. This establishes prima facie that the documents required for its issuance, including her Oath of Allegiance, were all duly submitted to the BI. As testified to by the BI Legal Division Chief Atty. Santos and BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta, these submissions should have been in their original form.^[191]

Second, the photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents^[192] including her Oath of Allegiance itself. To emphasize, these secondary pieces of evidence are competent and admissible to prove the existence and due execution of the original documents.

Third, the letters, documents, and testimonies of different BI officials which, except only the June letters of Commissioner Geron, are all consistent in saying that: 1) Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition and its attachments were duly received, processed, and approved by the BI, as a result of which she was issued IC No. 06-12955; and 2) the BI has photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents.

These conclusions were based on the BI records, the BI electronic database, several formal hearings, investigations, and meetings conducted on the alleged tampering of Vergara's R.A. 9225 files, as well as on certifications, reports, and comments from the relevant BI offices.

Fourth, the rulings and decisions of other quasi-judicial bodies and government agencies, resolving the same issues as those raised in the present case, regarding Vergara's compliance with R.A. 9225, and the collateral issues of tampering, forgery, and irregularities in the processing of her R.A. 9225 Petition. These rulings — which dismissed all such suits filed — coming from administrative agencies possessing special knowledge and experience over the matters under their primary jurisdiction, deserve great respect, if not finality, by the Court.

Fifth, the BI electronic database and the Dual Citizenship's Office database, which record all BI transactions, showing that Vergara's R.A. 9225 application was duly received, supported by the required documents, processed and granted. As testified to by BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta, any tampering of records will reflect in the database. As pointed out by the HRET, these recordings are entries in official records under Section 44,^[193] Rule 130 of the Rules, hence, prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.^[194]

On the other hand, Piccio's scant pieces of evidence fail, not just because Vergara's own evidence is overwhelming, but likewise because they are inherently defective for being inadequate, tangential and anomalous.

First, the poor reproductions of Notary Public Atty. Cinco's signatures as appearing on Vergara's Oath of Allegiance and Atty. Cinco's notarial commission are gravely inadequate to prove Piccio's theory of forgery. It is settled that comparison of signatures requires the presentation of original documents.

Second, the Certification of the Manila City OCC merely demonstrates the failure of Atty. Cinco to comply with his duty to submit his notarial books to the court. It cannot be taken to prove that Vergara's Oath of Allegiance that was notarized by Atty. Cinco does not exist.

Third, the June 2016 letters of Commissioner Geron, as earlier discussed, are highly suspicious and cannot be given any credence. They are refuted by all the other BI officials as well as an earlier letter of Commissioner Geron himself. Moreover, they were maliciously written and lack any reasonable basis.

In the earlier-discussed case of Vitangcol, the Court rejected, as proof of the alleged non-existence of marriage between petitioner (the husband charged with Bigamy) and his first wife, the OCR Certification stating that the marriage license cannot be located. Apart from the lack of a categorical declaration in the Certification that no such marriage license exists, the Court likewise appreciated the "circumstance of suspicion" that the petitioner fraudulently caused the issuance of the document to evade conviction for Bigamy.

Vitangcol differentiated itself from Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro^[195] (Castro) — a case involving an action for declaration of nullity of a marriage, wherein the plaintiff presented a similar certification from the OCR that the marriage license "cannot be located as said license x x x does not appear from [the local civil registrar's] records".^[196] Thus:

This court held [in Castro] that "[t]he certification x x x enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license." This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of 'due search and inability to find' sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license x x x to the contracting parties."

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.^[197]

Hence, proof presented by a party with a "circumstance of suspicion" may be rejected by the Court in favor of more credible evidence produced by the opposing party, even when such rejected proof was issued by an official custodian of the document allegedly missing. In Castro, the Court explained that the doctrine is based on Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules,^[198] which provides:

SEC. 29. How judicial record impeached. — Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings. (26a)

Here, the party who can be said to have a "circumstance of suspicion" is Piccio, who not only filed multiple suits regarding the same issues which were all dismissed by the different concerned administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, but likewise maliciously presented the contradicting and misleading letters he secured from Commissioner Geron. To stress, the contradictions between Commissioner Geron's May 20, 2016 letter, on the one hand, and his two June letters, on the other, are so flagrant, that their presentation in evidence can hardly be said to have been innocently done. Hence, the fraudulent circumstances surrounding Piccio renders his already measly evidence all the weaker and less credible.

On the other hand, unlike petitioner in Vitangcol who had the primordial interest to escape criminal liability for Bigamy, Vergara had no interest at all in the non-existence or loss of her documents with the BI. In fact, that is the very reason why her disqualification is being sought — her original R.A. 9225 documents cannot be located with the BI where it was filed and which is its official repository under the law. Far from having such interest, Vergara vigorously tried to prove — as she did prove — the existence of her original Oath.

On the other hand, the BI, which admitted through its officials that the originals are not in its custody despite their submission by Vergara, has no motive to forge documents or make misrepresentations. In fact, it is against its own interest to admit that Vergara did file her original documents but that the same are not in its custody. It would have been so easy for the BI to "evade" censure by confirming Piccio's theory that Vergara did not at all submit her original documents. This way, the BI washes its hands of any liability which it may incur in the wrong handling of said documents. That it admitted that it did not have the originals speaks volumes about the credibility of the BI.

It is uncontroverted that the BI is the official repository of documents — including oaths of allegiance — relating to applications for retention of re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225. Indeed, this is categorically provided in AO No. 91, entitled "Designating the Bureau of Immigration as the Implementing Agency of Republic Act No. 9225 otherwise known as the 'Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,"' thus:

SEC. 2. Functions – The Bureau of Immigration, shall:

a.	Promulgate and issue rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003;
b.	Prescribe appropriate forms and documentary requirements as well as required fees for the processing of applications for retention and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the law;
c.	Act as repository of Certificates of Oath of Allegiance, Applications for Retention or Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, supporting documents and other pertinent documents in pursuance with the requirements of the law and its implementing rules and regulations;

x x x x

The same is also reflected in the BI General Instructions, which declares that sworn statements, the original of which must be filed with the BI as part of the R.A. 9225 petition, shall be retained by the BI and be made part of its record, thus:

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

To avoid summary dismissal/delay in the processing of your
application/petition, please be advised of the following:

x x x x

2.	All documents required for submission must be complied with, arranged in the order as listed in the Checklist of Documentary Requirements (CDR), compiled in a legal size (8 ½ x 14 in.) folder and shall be submitted within the prescribed period, if applicable. Otherwise, your application or petition shall not be accepted.
3.	All sworn statements or affidavits must be original, signed and duly notarized.
	x x x x
8.	All original documents submitted as part of the petition will not be returned to the petitioner and will be part of the Bureau's record.
	x x x x
10.	It is recommended that you seek legal advice from lawyers and/or BI-accredited entities.[199]

On the other hand, the BI General Instructions' R.A. 9225 Checklist^[200] (R.A. 9225 Checklist) requires the submission of two original copies of the Oath of Allegiance, taken before an authorized BI Legal Officer or otherwise.^[201]

Finally, the BI General Instructions form contains a Certification required to be filled up by the pertinent BI Officer that the supporting documents of the R.A. 9225 petitions filed are complete and complies with the requirements, thus:

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the documents submitted in support of the application/petition of (Name of Applicant) are complete and in accordance with the provided checklist.

Central Receiving Unit Evaluator: _______________________ Signature over Printed Name

_______________ Date[202]

As extensively discussed, there is overwhelming evidence — and the BI itself had admitted through several of its officers — that Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition and its supporting documents, including the original copy of her Oath of Allegiance, were duly filed and processed, resulting in the petition being granted by the BI which, in turn, resulted to the issuance of IC No. 06- 12955 in her favor on November 30, 2006. Hence, the same is established. This means that the BI, by law, should have in its records, these documents. However, as it appears, it only has photocopies of some of such documents and it cannot account for the apparent loss of the originals.

Piccio would have the Court believe that Vergara's inability to present the original documents and BI's failure to offer reasonable explanation for their absence in its records — in 2016, when Vergara's citizenship became the object of the public's attention after she filed her CoC for the 2016 elections — are proof that she did not re-acquire her Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225.

As earlier intimated, the Court disagrees.

At the outset, it bears clarifying that Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents, which were filed with the BI, are public records, defined under R.A. 9470,^[203] thus:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act, the following definitions shall hereby apply:

x x x x

(w) "Public records" refers to record or classes of records, in any form, in whole or in part, created or received, whether before or after the effectivity of this Act, by a government agency in the conduct of its affairs, and have been retained by that government agency or its successors as evidence or because of the information contained therein.

(x) "Records" refers to information, whether in its original form or otherwise, including documents, signatures, seals, texts, images, sounds, speeches, or data compiled, recorded, or stored, as the case may be:

(1) In written form on any material;

(2) On film, negative, tape or other medium so as to be capable of being reproduced; or

(3) By means of any recording device or process, computer or other electronic device or process.

x x x x

R.A. 9470 likewise mandates the State to "give utmost priority for the safeguard, protection and preservation of its public documents and records, x x x as fundamental instruments for efficient and effective governance x x x."^[204]

Piccio challenges the evidentiary value of Vergara's IC No. 06-12955, although he does not contest its existence and genuineness, because of allegedly evident irregularities uncovered in the BI, such as its failure to explain the absence in its records of Vergara's documents, and the conflicting statements of its officials.

To recall, among the numerous statements from the BI, only Commissioner Geron's June letters, which were submitted by Piccio to refute Vergara's IC, conflicted with the rest and seemed anomalous. Hence, only these pieces of evidence deserve no credence.

In any case, assuming arguendo that the BI or its officials are guilty of indiscretions in the custody of Vergara's documents, such may not be imputed against Vergara, absent any showing that she participated therein. Allowing such prejudice violates the basic legal maxim, res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules which states:

SEC. 28. Admission by third-party. — The rights of a third party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. (25a)

This is founded on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience — a man's own acts are binding upon himself or herself and are evidence against him or her. So are his or her conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man or woman should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers. And if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him or her.^[205]

Among the exceptions to the res inter alios acta rule are: (1) admission by third party, (2) admission by co-partner or agent, (3) admission by conspirator, and (4) admission by privies.^[206] None of these exceptions apply. There is neither allegation nor proof presented that Vergara had any hand in whatever irregularity the BI had committed, if any.

Hence, to prejudice Vergara with the acts, declarations or omissions of the BI or its officials would be to violate not only the res inter alios acta rule under the Rules but likewise the principles of good faith, mutual convenience, and justice that the rule is founded on.

Moreover, the allegations of irregularity on the part of the BI are premised solely on its failure to produce Vergara's original R.A. 9225 documents, without reasonable explanation, when they were sought in 2016, or 10 years after they were admittedly filed by Vergara in 2006. In other words, any such irregularities attended the documents' custody and safekeeping, after they were received by the BI. The conclusion that such irregularities likewise attended the receipt and processing of the documents which, again, occurred some 10 years prior, is non sequitur. More importantly, as repeatedly discussed, there is overwhelming evidence proving that these latter processes were above board and the same was admitted by the BI.

Further, from a practical and doctrinal standpoint, the failure of the BI to comply with its mandate under the law to safekeep said documents should not be imputed to Vergara who cannot be expected to regularly police the BI, and ensure that her documents are safely in the BI's custody. That there is a law mandating the BI to keep said documents safe must be enough basis for Vergara's trust that the documents are indeed safe in the possession of the agency.

A contrary interpretation — that Vergara must bear the consequence of BI's negligence or fault in safekeeping her files — would be grossly unjust to Vergara. More concerning is the dangerous precedent that the Court will then set, that is, that documents duly filed but have gone missing while in the custody of the receiving agency, without fault or even knowledge of the persons filing, will be rendered useless and void, as if they never existed at all. This will bestow great injustice, not just upon Vergara or other similarly situated public officials, but likewise upon the general public who, in the first place, is powerless to prevent such mishaps.

On the other hand, placing the burden on the erring government agency would encourage prudence and vigilance on the part of such agency and its officials and employees to safekeep documents entrusted to them by the public in accordance with the standards set by law.

The foregoing is consistent with the policy of the State to hold the government accountable in ensuring the maintenance and preservation of public records in its custody, and to strengthen public confidence on the safekeeping and preservation of such public records.

Piccio submits that the assailed Decision is an "obnoxious example of simple and mosaic plagiarism."^[207] He quotes portions of the assailed Decision and compares them to quoted portions of Vergara's Verified Answer and Memorandum, and concludes that as they are the same, the HRET had committed "mosaic plagiarism/patchwork plagiarism."^[208] He submits that this is "unacceptable, unethical[,] and open[s] [the HRET] to suspicion as to its fairness, impartiality[,] and integrity."^[209] He alleges that "such callous and dishonest conduct endangers the credibility and integrity of the Tribunal,"^[210] and then cites the case of In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, Etc., Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo^[211] (In re Del Castillo).

The Court rejects these submissions.

Foremost, it bears stressing that the charge of plagiarism in the In re Del Castillo case cited by Piccio was dismissed for lack of merit. In essence, the Court found therein that Justice Del Castillo (and his researcher) lacked any motive or reason for omitting attribution for the lifted passages to their authors.^[212] The Court stressed the element of fraudulent intent in plagiarism which it defined as "'to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as one's own.' The passing off of the work of another as one's own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism."^[213]

In the subsequent Resolution of the petitioners' motion for reconsideration in In re Del Castillo,^[214] the Court had occasion to clarify and distinguish judges from the academe where the element of malicious intent in plagiarism is disregarded — in the academe, original scholarship is highly valued because the writing is intended to earn for the student an academic degree, honor or distinction. In contrast, court decisions are not written to earn merit as an original piece of work or art. Rather, deciding disputes is a service rendered for the public good.^[215]

Moreover, as accuracy of words in law is foremost, the tendency to copy of judges and lawyers is explicable. Hence, the Court recognized the right of judges to use legal materials which belong to the public domain, even without attribution, including liftings from a party's pleading, thus:

"A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a party's brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism."

If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from the time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has not on occasion acknowledged the originators of passages and views found in its decisions. These omissions are true for many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the judiciary's more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.

x x x x

The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.^[216] (Emphasis omitted)

The Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (SAJ Carpio) in In re Del Castillo is more instructive for cases involving judges quoting or copying from pleadings of parties:

b. Copying from Pleadings of Parties

In writing judicial decisions, the judge may copy passages from the pleadings of the parties with proper attribution to the author of the pleading. However, the failure to make the proper attribution is not actionable.

Pleadings are submitted to the court precisely so that the pleas, or the arguments written on the pleadings, are accepted by the judge. There is an implied offer by the pleader that the judge may make any use of the pleadings in resolving the case. If the judge accepts the pleader's arguments, he may copy such arguments to expedite the resolution of the case. In writing his decision, the judge does not claim as his own the arguments he adopts from the pleadings of the parties. Besides, the legal arguments in the pleadings are in most cases merely reiterations of judicial precedents, which are Works of the Government.

However, misquoting or twisting, with or without attribution, any passage from the pleadings of the parties, if done to mislead the parties or the public, is actionable. Under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge "should perform official duties honestly." Rule 3.01 and Rule 3.02 of the Code provide that a judge must be faithful to the law, maintain professional competence, and strive diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law.^[217]

Hence, from the foregoing, failure of judges to make proper attributions when quoting pleadings of parties filed before them is not actionable. What can be said to be an exception is when there is twisting of such passages from pleadings done with intent to mislead the parties or the public. To twist means "to distort or pervert the meaning of."^[218]

In the present case, the Court does not find any misquoting or twisting of passages from Vergara's pleadings. Neither is there any showing of intent to mislead the parties by the HRET. Hence, there is no basis for the Court to sustain Piccio in this respect.

On this note, the Court takes exception to the rather callous language of this portion of Piccio's Petition, and its strong suggestion of partiality by the HRET — a constitutional body charged with the important mandate of resolving all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the country's legislators.^[219] Piccio's counsel is reminded to observe and maintain the respect due the HRET, as the same is essential to the orderly administration of justice.^[220]

The Court had enjoined lawyers, in the assertion of their clients' rights, to "rein up their tempers," even as it understands the frustration brought by a court's dismissal of one's cause, the merit of which he or she so passionately believes in, thus:

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

"We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right." (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines [v.] Ferrer, L-22979, June 26, 1967) ^[221]

The ascription of improper motives to the HRET is especially alarming for it implies that the HRET was moved by considerations other than its sense of justice and fair play, and calls into question its integrity and impartiality. This chips away at the public's confidence on the overall judicial and quasi-judicial system in its fair dispensation of justice. Such tone cannot be countenanced especially as the accusation of plagiarism, as discussed, lacks merit.

It bears noting that the Petition quotes a small portion of In re Del Castillo, leading to the fair assumption that the whole Decision and Resolution thereon were read and understood by Piccio's counsel. To stress the obvious, In re Del Castillo is the very case which declared the afore-discussed exceptional rules applying to plagiarism charges against courts and lawyers. These are the very doctrines applied by the Court herein, leading to the dismissal of Piccio's accusations of "mosaic plagiarism" by the HRET. It is, thus, curious that the Petition still fiercely insists on its claim, to the point of calling the HRET "unethical," "dishonest," and "callous," when a simple reading of the Court's discussion in In re Del Castillo would show its clear lack of merit.

To recall, the present case is one for certiorari, which means that no less than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the HRET is needed for the Petition to prosper.

"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. Time and again, this Court has held that mere abuse of discretion is not enough. The abuse of discretion must be grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.^[222]

However, as mentioned earlier, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.^[223] By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of an administrative body like the HRET over matters falling under its jurisdiction, it is in a better position to pass judgment upon such matters. Thus, its findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts,^[224] except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings.^[225]

Hence, a determination of whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in the present case necessarily requires a prior determination of the merits of the quo warranto petitions filed before it. On this note, the starting point is determined by the party who bears the burden of proof. In the case of a petition for quo warranto, that party is he or she who alleges the ineligibility or disqualification of the elected official.^[226]

Thus, Piccio and Umali, bore the burden of proving Vergara's ineligibility before the HRET. The creation of mere doubt is insufficient to discharge such burden.^[227]

In light of the above discussion, petitioners before the HRET clearly and utterly failed to prove their assertion that Vergara did not comply with the requirements of R.A. 9225 for the re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship. All of the evidence they adduced have been, and are, debunked by contrary evidence presented by Vergara and the relevant laws.

At this juncture, the Court qualifies Justice Hernando's point that the burden to show that the procedure in the retention of Philippine citizenship were strictly followed lies with the person claiming that he or she has complied with it. This burden of evidence shifts to the candidate if, and only if, the party challenging the elected official's citizenship and, hence, his or her eligibility, had adduced substantial evidence to prove such ineligibility.

Nevertheless, Vergara, while not carrying any burden of evidence as the burden of proof had not shifted from Piccio, proved, by sufficient and substantial evidence, that she had duly taken her oath and duly executed an affidavit of renunciation in compliance with the requirements of R.A. 9225.

Hence, the HRET — far from having committed grave abuse of discretion — was actually very correct in the issuance of its assailed Decision and Resolution, and in ruling that Vergara is qualified to continue sitting as a Member of the House. There is abundant evidence to support this conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 23, 2019 and Resolution dated June 27, 2019 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Inting, J., Zalameda, Rosario, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.
Hernando, J., dissent. See Dissenting Opinion.
Carandang, J., join the dissent of J. R. Hernando.
Lazaro-Javier, J., please see concurrence.
M. Lopez, J., join the dissent of J. Ramon Hernando.
Gaerlan, J., join the dissent of J. Ramon Hernando.
Dimaampao, J., concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Ramon Paul Hernando.
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., no part.
Leonen, J., on official leave.

^[1] Captioned "Petition for Review on Certiorari" rollo, pp. 3-36.

^[2] Rollo, pp. 37-64. Penned by then Associate Justice and Chairperson of the HRET Diosdado M. Peralta and signed by then Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, and Representatives Jorge T. Almonte, Gavini C. Pancho, Abigail Faye C. Ferriol-Pascual, Joaquin M. Chipeco, Jr., Wilter Wee Palma II, and Abdullah D. Dimaporo Associate Justice and then HRET Member Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe took no part.

^[3] Id. at 65.

^[4] Id. at 38.

^[5] Otherwise known as the "CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003," approved on August 29, 2003.

^[6] Rollo, p. 38.

^[7] Id.

^[8] Id. at 70.

^[9] REVISED RULES GOVERNING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP UNDER REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) No. 9225 AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER (A.O.) No. 91, SERIES OF 2004. See Whereas Clause designating the BI as the Implementing Agency of R.A. 9225; rollo, p. 38.

^[10] Rollo, pp. 38-39.

^[11] Id. at 40.

^[12] Id.

^[13] Id. at 41.

^[14] Id. at 41-42.

^[15] Id. at 42.

^[16] Id.

^[17] Id. at 43.

^[18] Id.

^[19] Id.

^[20] Id. at 44. Underscoring in the original.

^[21] Id. at 74.

^[22] Id. at 44.

^[23] Id.

^[24] Id. at 45.

^[25] Id.

^[26] Id. at 45-46.

^[27] Id. at 46.

^[28] Id. at 46-47.

^[29] Id. at 49.

^[30] Id.

^[31] Id. at 160.

^[32] Id.

^[33] Id. at 6.

^[34] Id.

^[35] Id. at 52.

^[36] Id. at 8-9.

^[37] Id. at 13.

^[38] Id. at 9.

^[39] Id. at 20-31.

^[40] Id. at 276-301.

^[41] Id. at 278-280.

^[42] Id. at 293-298.

^[43] Id. at 314-336.

^[44] Id. at 322-323.

^[45] Id. at 324.

^[46] Id. at 330.

^[47] Id. at 332-334.

^[48] Id. at 379-387.

^[49] Id. at 322-323.

^[50] De Guzman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 149, 155.

^[51] CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Sec. 6 provides:

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines x x x.

^[52] R.A. 7160 entitled, "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991," approved on October 10, 1991. See Section 39.

^[53] Section 39 of the LGC provides:

SECTION 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines x x x .

^[54] Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 105111 and 105384, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297, 308.

^[55] Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245, 255.

^[56] G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33 & 179240-41, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 434.

^[57] Id. at 447.

^[58] G.R. Nos. 192147& 192149, August 23, 2011, 656 SCRA 17.

^[59] Id. at 23-24.

^[60] Entitled, "SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF SEC. 12, ART. XVIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND COMPLEMENTING ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1 OF JANUARY 28, 1988 ON EXPEDITIOUS DISPOSITION OF CASES PENDING IN THE SUPREME COURT," dated July 1, 1991.

^[61] Technological Institute of the Philippines Teachers and Employees Organization (TIPTEO) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158703, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 112, 127.

^[62] Id.

^[63] Rollo, p. 65.

^[64] Id. at 254.

^[65] Id . at 279-280.

^[66] Id. at 66-84.

^[67] Id. at 90-114.

^[68] Id. at 271-280.

^[69] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1 provides:

SEC. 1. x x x The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (1a)

^[70] Union Industries, Inc. v. Vales, G.R. No. 140102, February 9, 2006,482 SCRA 17, 21.

^[71] Id.

^[72] Spouses Cordero v. Octaviano, G.R. No. 241385, July 7, 2020, accessed at <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/14876/>.

^[73] Id.

^[74] Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 10, 21.

^[75] G.R. No. 148247, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 59.

^[76] Id. at 69-70.

^[77] Rollo, p. 117.

^[78] Supra note 72.

^[79] Rollo, pp. 37-64.

^[80] Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Lee, 327 Phil. 521, 574-575 (1996). See also Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733; Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744; Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1; David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016, 803 SCRA 435.

^[81] David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, id. at 475.

^[82] Id. at 509.

^[83] Id. at 510.

^[84] Sinaca v. Mula, G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 266, 282.

^[85] Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 753.

^[86] Supra note 55.

^[87] Id. at 574-575.

^[88] Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 753.

^[89] See CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 17.

^[90] Lerias v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 97105, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 808, 841.

^[91] Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 & 92202-03, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692, 699.

^[92] Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, No. L-84297, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 391, 401.

^[93] Id. at 403-404.

^[94] Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, supra note 91, at 700.

^[95] Id.

^[96] Domalanta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125586, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 555, 573.

^[97] See Malabaguio v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 142507, December 1, 2000, 346 SCRA 699, 706.

^[98] Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 708 SCRA 197, 226.

^[99] David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 472, citing Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 670 Phil. 136, 151 (2011).

^[100] Mitra v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80, at 778.

^[101] Locsin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 204123, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 635, 644.

^[102] Id.

^[103] In Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018, 862 SCRA 654, the Court upheld the authority of the COMELEC to make factual determinations in relation to the election contests before it, as a consequence of its constitutional power to settle all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, thus:

As enunciated, the COMELEC's adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial in character since the COMELEC is a governmental body, other than a court, that is vested with jurisdiction to decide the specific class of controversies it is charged with resolving. In adjudicating the rights of persons before it, the COMELEC is not just empowered but is in fact required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. This is simply in congruence with the concept of due process that all administrative adjudicatory bodies are enjoined to observe.

The COMELEC is, thus, fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in relation to the election contests before it. This has been the thrust of the decades worth of constitutional revisions that transformed the COMELEC from a purely administrative body, whose scope of decision-making is limited to those incidental to its duty to enforce election laws, to a polling commission that also exercises original and exclusive, as well as appellate, jurisdiction over election contests. (Id. at 670.)

Similarly, the HRET, which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, wields the same power to determine factual questions relative to the election contests before it, such as the issue, in the present case, of Vergara's compliance with the requirements for re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship.

^[104] Rollo, p. 52.

^[105] Id. at 156-157.

^[106] Id. at 142-143.

^[107] Id. at 73.

^[108] Gepulle-Garbo v. Sps. Garabato, 750 Phil. 846, 856-857 (2015).

^[109] Heirs of the Late Felix Bucton v. Sps. Go, 721 Phil. 851, 860 (2013).

^[110] Id.

^[111] 787 Phil. 33 (2016).

^[112] Id. at 51. Citations omitted.

^[113] Spouses Cordero v. Octaviano, supra note 72.

^[114] Rollo, p. 44. Underscoring omitted.

^[115] Id. at 53-54.

^[116] G.R. No. 207406, January 23, 2016, 780 SCRA 598.

^[117] Id. at 604-608.

^[118] Destrezua v. Atty. Riñoza-Plazo, et al., 619 Phil. 775, 782-783 (2009).

^[119] Rollo, p. 53.

^[120] Id. at 38.

^[121] Id. at 14.

^[122] Id. at 14-15.

^[123] Id. at 14.

^[124] Id. at 10.

^[125] Under the 2019 Proposed Amendments to the Revised Rules on Evidence (A.M . No. 19-08-15-SC), this Rule now reads:

1. Original Document Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing, recording, photograph or other record, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a)	When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b)	When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice, or the original cannot be obtained by local judicial processes or procedures;
(c)	When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d)	When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; and
(e)	When the original is not closely-related to a controlling issue. (3a)

Sec. 4. Original of document. –

(a)	An "original" of a document is the document itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data is stored in a computer or similar device. any printout or other output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original."
(b)	A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording. or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original.
(c)	A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original, or (2) in the circumstances, it is unjust or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. (4a) (Underscoring in the original)

^[126] Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 150905, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 577, 584-585.

^[127] G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013, 704 SCRA 465.

^[128] Id. at 479. Citations omitted.

^[129] Id. at 483-484. Citations omitted.

^[130] Rollo, p. 38.

^[131] BI FORM 2014-01-004 Rev 1, accessed at <https://immigration.gov.ph/images/Retention Reacquisition/dualcitizenshipChecklist.pdf>.

^[132] Rollo, pp. 38-39.

^[133] Supra note 131. See General Instructions, Item No. 10.

^[134] Rollo, pp. 50-51.

^[135] 2015 REVISED RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Rule 3.

^[136] Id.

^[137] Rollo, p. 55.

^[138] Id.

^[139] Hughey v. JMS Development Corporation, 78 F.3d 1523 (11^th Cir. 1996); Black's Law Dictionary 1844 (9^th ed. 2009).

^[140] Vitangcol v. People, supra note 116, at 608-610.

^[141] Rollo, pp. 38-39; common evidence of Piccio and Vergara.

^[142] Id. at 40; common evidence of Piccio and Vergara.

^[143] Id. at 44; Offered in evidence by Piccio.

^[144] Id. at 45; Offered in evidence by Piccio.

^[145] Id. at 45-46; Offered in evidence by Piccio.

^[146] Id. at 46-47; Offered in evidence by Vergara.

^[147] Id. at 55; Offered in evidence by Vergara.

^[148] Id. at 56; Offered in evidence by Vergara.

^[149] Id. at 170-171.

^[150] Id. at 48, 167; Offered in evidence by Vergara.

^[151] Id. at 46-47; Offered in evidence by Vergara.

^[152] Id. at 168; Offered in evidence by Vergara.

^[153] Id. at 16.

^[154] Id. at 61.

^[155] Id.

^[156] Id. at 22.

^[157] Id. at 195-197.

^[158] Id. at 190.

^[159] Id.

^[160] Id. at 59.

^[161] Id. at 60.

^[162] Id.

^[163] Id.

^[164] Id. at 60-61.

^[165] Id. at 204-207.

^[166] Id. at 15-17.

^[167] Id. at 15-16.

^[168] Id. at 61.

^[169] Id. at 9.

^[170] Id. at 60, 195-197.

^[171] Id. at 44. Underscoring omitted.

^[172] Id. at 45. Underscoring omitted.

^[173] Id.

^[174] See Rule 132, Section 11, Rules on Evidence which states:

SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (15) (Emphasis supplied)

^[175] Rollo, p. 47.

^[176] Id. Underscoring omitted.

^[177] Id. at 47, 55-56.

^[178] Id. at 55.

^[179] Id. at 56.

^[180] As stated in: 1) Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 of BI-TFCRA through Arbas; and 2) Order dated November 30, 2006 of BI Commissioner Fernandez.

^[181] As stated in 1) Letter dated May 20, 2016 of BI Commissioner Geron; 2) Letter dated August 10, 2016 of BI Commissioner Morente; 3) Certification dated August 4, 2016 signed by BI Records Section Chief Maceda; 4) Testimony of BI Legal Division Chief Atty. Santos; and 5) Testimony of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta.

^[182] As stated in 1) Letter dated August 10, 2016 of BI Commissioner Morente; 2) Certification dated August 11, 2016 of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta; 3) BI Investigation Report dated August 28, 2016 of the BI Investigation Committee headed by Atty. Santos; 4) Testimony of Atty. Santos before the HRET; and 5) Testimony of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta before the HRET.

^[183] Rollo, pp. 60-61. As shown in the 1) BI electronic database; 2) Dual Citizenship Office database; 3) Certification dated August 11, 2016 of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta; and 4) Testimony of Atty. Canta before the HRET.

^[184] As stated in 1) Testimony of BI Investigation Committee headed Atty. Santos before the HRET; and 2) Testimony of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta before the HRET.

^[185] As stated in the Testimony of Records Section Chief Maceda before the HRET.

^[186] As stated in the Letters dated June 2 and June 29, 2016 of Commissioner Geron.

^[187] Rollo, pp. 314-338.

^[188] Id. at 328-330.

^[189] Id. at 56-57.

^[190] Id. at 57.

^[191] Id. at 49, 204-207.

^[192] 1) Oath of Allegiance; 2) Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 of BI-TFCRA through Arbas, recommending the approval of Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition; 3) the Order dated November 30, 2006 signed by Commissioner Fernandez, granting her petition; and 4) her Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated September 4, 2015.

^[193] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 44 provides:

SEC. 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38)

^[194] Rollo, p. 61.

^[195] G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.

^[196] Vitangcol v. People, supra note 116, at 609.

^[197] Id. at 609-610. Underscoring supplied.

^[198] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro, supra note 195, at 261-262.

^[199] Supra note 131.

^[200] Checklist Of Documentary Requirements For Petition For Retention/Re-Acquisition Of Philippine Citizenship Under R.A. 9225, id.

^[201] Id., Item nos. 3 and 4.

^[202] Id.

^[203] AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF ARCHIVAL RECORDS, ESTABLISHING FOR THE PURPOSE THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as the "NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES ACT OF 2007," approved on May 21, 2007.

^[204] R.A. 9470, Sec 2. Declaration of Policy.

^[205] People v. Bernardo, G .R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020, accessed <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/15680/>, p. 9.

^[206] Tan Siok Kuan v. Ho, G.R. No. 175085, June 1, 2016, 791 SCRA 567, 579.

^[207] Rollo, p. 19.

^[208] Id. at 20. Emphasis omitted.

^[209] Id. at 23.

^[210] Id.

^[211] A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 607.

^[212] Id. at 629.

^[213] Id. at 619.

^[214] A.M. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011, 642 SCRA 11.

^[215] Id. at 20.

^[216] Id. at 22-24.

^[217] Id. at 36-37. Emphasis in the original.

^[218] In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, supra note 212, at 632.

^[219] 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 17.

^[220] In the Matter of Proceeding for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay, 142 Phil. 353, 371 (1970).

^[221] Id. at 372.

^[222] Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 204637, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 573, 587.

^[223] Garcia v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 134792, August 12, 1999, 312 SCRA 353, 363.

^[224] See Malabaguio v. COMELEC, supra note 97, at 706.

^[225] Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 98.

^[226] David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 509-510.

^[227] See id. at 510.