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THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 238709, October 06, 2021 ]
HON. MARIA AMIFAITH S. FIDER-REYES, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH 42, PETITIONER, VS. EVERGLORY METAL TRADING CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
CARANDANG, J.:
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeks to annul and set aside the Decision[2] dated August 23, 2017 and the Resolution[3] dated April 12, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 138756 finding petitioner Hon. Maria Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes (petitioner), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42, guilty of Indirect Contempt of Court and imposing a fine on her.
Facts of the Case
This indirect contempt case arose from a complaint for infringement of patent and damages filed on August 16, 2013 by Colorsteel Systems Corporation (Colorsteel) and its president, Jose Rey S. Batomalaque (Batomalaque), against herein respondent Everglory Metal Trading Corporation (Everglory), docketed as IPR Civil Case No. 005, entitled Colorsteel Systems, Corp., et al. v. Everglory Metal Trading, Corp., and was raffled to the sala of petitioner.[4]
The factual background of this case showed that Batomalaque is the registered owner of three patents for specific designs of a tile roofing panel. Everglory then came up with the "Verona tile" which was an exact copy of the products manufactured under Colorsteel's patents without notice and consent of Batomalaque.[5]
Consequently, Colorsteel sent a demand letter to Everglory to cease and desist from manufacturing and selling said tile roofing panels. However, the demand went unheeded which prompted Colorsteel to file a complaint for patent infringement with application for preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the following sequence of events transpired.[6]
Everglory filed two motions for extension to file its responsive pleading, citing that the "complex issues of facts, laws, implementing rules, and jurisprudence, which requires an extensive and in-depth research, analysis, and technical investigation before an answer or a responsive pleading can be prepared"[7] to justify the prayer for extension.[8]
On October 8, 2013, Everglory filed an Answer with Ground for the Outright Dismissal of the Complaint and with Compulsory Counterclaim in the infringement case, maintaining that said industrial designs do not qualify as novel or original creation.[9]
On October 25, 2013, or during the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of evidence of Everglory against the application for preliminary injunction, petitioner rendered in open court the expunction from the records of the case all the motions and previous pleadings filed by Everglory and declaring the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction terminated and the principal case for infringement of patent submitted for decision.[10] Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration (On Verbal Order Expunging Pleadings Filed by Defendant) with Motion to Apply Regular Civil Procedure under the Rules of Court.[11] Everglory sought reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution dated December 4, 2013.[12]
Aggrieved, on February 11, 2014, Everglory filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 133942, assailing the Order dated October 25, 2013 and the Resolution dated December 4, 2013 of the RTC.[13]
On April 22, 2014, the CA issued a 60-day TRO and enjoined petitioner to conduct further proceedings in the infringement case pending decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 133942. The TRO expired on June 22, 2014.[14]
Before the TRO expired on June 22, 2014, the CA rendered a Decision[15] on June 25, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 133942, granting Everglory's petition and finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioner in the issuance of the Resolutions dated October 25, 2013 and December 4, 2013.[16] The dispositive portion reads:
Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the proceedings in the infringement case and called the case for hearing. On November 19, 2014, petitioner issued an Order stating that with the expiration of the TRO and the absence of any further restraining order, the pending incidents will be deemed submitted: (a) the Application for Preliminary Injunction from the Plaintiffs; and (b) the main IPR Civil Case No. 005.[19]
On December 3, 2014, petitioner rendered a Decision regarding the merits of the infringement case in favor of Colorsteel and Batomalaque.[20]
Aggrieved, Everglory filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA, docketed as CA GR. SP No. 138582.[21]
Meanwhile, on December 15, 2014, Everglory filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138410, which sought to nullify the Resolutions dated April 21, 2014 and October 1, 2014 of the RTC, which denied Everglory's Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of petitioner on the ground that she showed manifest bias or prejudice against Everglory.[22]
Subsequently, in its Resolution dated April 29, 2015, the CA consolidated CA-G.R. SP No. 138410 and CA-GR. SP No. 138582.[23]
On September 10, 2015,[24] the CA ruled in favor of Everglory, and ruled as follows; (a) the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 138410 is granted, and the Resolutions dated April 21, 2014 and October 1, 2014 are declared null and void; (b) the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 138582 is granted, and the Resolution dated December 3, 2014 is declared null and void; and (c) IPR Case No. 005 is remanded to the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga for re-raffle to another branch and for further proceedings.[25]
Colorsteel and Batomalaque filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution[26] dated February 2, 2016 of the CA.
The Indirect Contempt Case
The aforementioned events prompted Everglory to file a Petition for Indirect Contempt of Court against petitioner on January 15, 2015, before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 133942. In its petition, respondent alleged that petitioner defied the Decision dated June 25, 2014 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 133942, when she continued with the summary proceedings in the infringement case after the expiration of the 60-day TRO.[27]
For her defense, petitioner argued that: (a) she faithfully performed her duties; (b) there was no legal obstacle to continue with the summary proceeding; (c) and the Decision dated June 25, 2014 had not yet attained finality; hence, there was no judgment to defy.[28]
On August 23, 2017,[29] the CA found petitioner guilty of indirect contempt of court and imposed a fine on her for continuing with the proceedings in the infringement case despite being fully aware that in doing so she will be acting in direct contravention of the Decision dated June 25, 2014 of the CA.[30] The CA held that even in the absence of an injunctive writ, petitioner should have suspended the proceedings in the infringement case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Resolution dated April 12, 2018 of the CA.[31]
Undaunted, petitioner elevated the matter to this Court.
Petitioner argues that the CA acted without jurisdiction: (1) when it took cognizance of the contempt case against a lower court judge; and (2) when it found her guilty of indirect contempt of court and imposed a fine on her despite a clear showing that she acted in good faith and did not willfully defy any final and executory decision of the CA.[32]
In its Comment/Opposition,[33] respondent argues that: (1) the Decision dated June 25, 2014 is immediately executory, having been issued in a certiorari case; (2) the CA has the inherent power to cite petitioner in indirect contempt of court; and (3) petitioner is guilty of indirect contempt of court because she willfully defied the Decision dated June 25, 2014.
Issue
The sole issue of this petition is whether the appellate court can cite petitioner in indirect contempt of court.
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds merit in the petition.
In finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt of court and imposing a fine on her, the CA ratiocinated that:
Thereafter, petitioner proceeded with the summary proceedings in the infringement case because the Decision dated June 25, 2014 had yet to attain finality (in view of Colorsteel and Bartolomaque's other certiorari case in the CA) and the CA did not issue any injunctive writ against her in the certiorari case. Accordingly, petitioner rendered judgment in the infringement case on December 3, 2014 since there was no legal obstacle for her to do so.[36]
The Decision[37] dated June 25, 2014 of the CA, which found petitioner guilty of grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the Resolutions dated October 25, 2013 and December 4, 2013, became final and executory only on January 25, 2016, or a little over a year after petitioner rendered judgment in the infringement case.[38] After learning that the Decision dated June 25, 2014 had attained finality, petitioner reversed all the legal effects of the respondent's having been declared in default in the infringement case. In fact, the infringement case subsequently proceeded with respondent being accorded full opportunity to actively participate therein.[39]
Subsequently, petitioner issued the Order Ad Cautelam[40] dated March 2, 2016, showing her willingness to comply with any final and executory judgment of the CA. Then, the infringement case was re-raffled to another judge, thus petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to comply with the final and executory judgment of the CA.[41]
Besides, there was no legal obstacle for petitioner to continue with the proceedings of the infringement case despite the pendency of the certiorari case. The Decision dated June 25, 2014, being a judgment in a certiorari case, is not immediately executory. In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan[42] the Court held that:
Neither can petitioner's actions be considered violative of the principle of judicial courtesy. Under the principle of judicial courtesy, lower courts are called to suspend proceedings before it, even without the existence of an injunctive writ, until a final determination has been made by a higher court if there is a strong probability that the issues or proceedings before the latter would be rendered moot or moribund because of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court.[44] A case is deemed moot "when it presents no actual controversy or where the issues have ceased to exist."[45] Going forward in the conduct of summary proceedings in the infringement case would not have mooted the certiorari case before the CA.
The power of contempt
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, mandates of the court, and to the due administration of justice.[46] It safeguards the respect due to the courts and, consequently, ensures the stability of the judicial institution.[47]
The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual function, primarily, to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders, and, secondarily, to compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform. Due to this two-fold aspect of contempt, the punishment for contempt is classified into two: civil contempt and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge for the benefit of the other party. Criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.[48]
In our jurisdiction, there are two kinds of contempt punishable by law, namely direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. On the other hand, indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court.[49] A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.
Petitioner cannot be held guilty of
indirect contempt of court.
In this case, Everglory accuses petitioner of committing indirect contempt for disregarding the CA's decision and continuing with the summary proceedings in the infringement case after the expiration of the 60-day TRO.
There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt punishable under Section 3, paragraph (b),[50] Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. What is put in issue here is the validity of the proceedings that found petitioner liable for such misconduct.
It is very clear that the very purpose of filing this petition for indirect contempt against petitioner, as a judge handling the infringement case, is to punish her for the alleged defiance of the CA's decision. However, this petition for indirect contempt is not the proper action to determine the legality of petitioner's action.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive
power to discipline judges of lower courts.
As mandated by the Constitution under Section 11[51] Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court exercises the exclusive power and authority to discipline justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts. Similarly, Rule 4, Section 3(a)[52] of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court[53] provides that the administrative functions of this court include disciplinary and administrative matters involving justices, judges, and court personnel.
The exclusive power of the Court to discipline judges of lower courts is reiterated in A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC, which prescribes new rules of procedure for punishing judicial misconduct. Its whereas clauses explain that:
When this Court acts on complaints against judges or any personnel under its supervision, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies. In this case the issue to be resolved is whether petitioner should be held liable for indirect contempt for her failure to obey the lawful order of the appellate court. Clearly, what is involved is not this Court's power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in cases involving only questions of law. The present case involves the exercise of this Court's exclusive power to discipline judges.
Evidently, the CA overstepped the bounds of its authority when it took cognizance of the case and thereafter imposed a fine of P10,000.00 against petitioner.
Everglory should have filed an administrative case before this Court in order to determine whether petitioner disobeyed the lawful order of the appellate court.
This issue with respect to proper remedies against a member of the Bench should properly be addressed since conflicting and erroneous remedies are sometimes resorted to by aggrieved tribunals or parties.
There is no precedent jurisprudence on a litigant filing an indirect contempt case against a judge for allegedly not implementing the orders of an appellate court, moreso, at the instance of a litigant.
Instead of availing the proper legal remedies such as appeal and petitions for certiorari, as the case may be, the filing of indirect contempt cases against judges would open the floodgates to litigants to challenge errors of law and the exercise of discretion by judges. This will unduly delay the administration of justice because judges will then have to devote time and effort to defend themselves against these frivolous suits. The presumption of good faith in the performance of one's official duties will no longer be recognized.
Again, We reiterate that not every error implies ignorance of the law, for if committed in good faith, it does not warrant administrative sanctions.[54] A judge's failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for to hold them administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision they render, assuming that they erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make their position doubly unbearable. The judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[55]
Assuming, there was bad faith on the part of any judge in disobeying an order of an appellate court, there is still the judicial remedy of certiorari, or appeal, or a disciplinary proceeding which exclusively belongs only to this Court.
A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 23, 2017 and the Resolution dated April 12, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 138756 are SET ASIDE. The complaint for indirect contempt against petitioner Judge Maria Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen (Chairperson), Rosario, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.
Zalameda, J., with separate concurring opinion.
[1] Rollo, pp. 50-96.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Edwin D. Sorongon; id. at 10-28.
[3] Id. at 44-48.
[4] Id. at 11.
[5] Id. at 450-451.
[6] Id. at 451-452.
[7] Id. at 187.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 630-652.
[10] Id. at 435-436.
[11] Id. at 437.
[12] Id. at 437-438.
[13] Id. at 12.
[14] Id.
[15] Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguillas; id. at 186-197.
[16] Id. at 192-197.
[17] Id. at 196-197.
[18] Id. at 13.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. at 17.
[21] Id. at 111.
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at 217-218.
[24] Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes (former Member of this Court) and Marlene Gonzales-Sison; id. at 449-470.
[25] Id. at 469-470.
[26] Id. at 471-474.
[27] Id. at 16.
[28] Id. at 16-18.
[29] Supra note 2.
[30] Rollo, p. 24.
[31] Id. at 44-48.
[32] Id. at 72-73.
[33] Id. at 478-578.
[34] Id. at 21-22.
[35] Id. at 59.
[36] Id. at 61-62.
[37] Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid; id. at 186-197.
[38] Id. at 196-197
[39] Id. at 64.
[40] Id. at 407-411.
[41] Id. at 71.
[42] 525 Phil. 804 (2006).
[43] Id. at 807.
[44] Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 247 Phil. 387 (1988); Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, 736 Phil. 264 (2014).
[45] Black's Law Dictionary. 6th Edition, 1008.
[46] Regalado v. Go, 543 Phil. 578 (2007).
[47] Oca v. Custodio, 814 Phil. 641 (2017).
[48] Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1150 (1997).
[49] In Re: Adoracion Angeles, 567 Phil. 189 (2008).
[50] (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including, the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto.
[51] Section 11, Article VII provides that: "The members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon."
[52] RULE 4
THE EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION
x x x x
Section 3. Administrative functions of the Court. – The administrative functions of the Court en banc consist of, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) the discipline of justices, judges and court personnel, whether by en banc or by Division, subject to matters assignable to the Divisions, disciplinary matters involving justices, judges and court personnel[.]
[53] A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC.
[54] Baculi, v. Belen, 695 Phil. 598 (2012).
[55] Re: Ongjoco, 680 Phil. 467 (2012).
This indirect contempt case arose from a complaint for infringement of patent and damages filed on August 16, 2013 by Colorsteel Systems Corporation (Colorsteel) and its president, Jose Rey S. Batomalaque (Batomalaque), against herein respondent Everglory Metal Trading Corporation (Everglory), docketed as IPR Civil Case No. 005, entitled Colorsteel Systems, Corp., et al. v. Everglory Metal Trading, Corp., and was raffled to the sala of petitioner.[4]
The factual background of this case showed that Batomalaque is the registered owner of three patents for specific designs of a tile roofing panel. Everglory then came up with the "Verona tile" which was an exact copy of the products manufactured under Colorsteel's patents without notice and consent of Batomalaque.[5]
Consequently, Colorsteel sent a demand letter to Everglory to cease and desist from manufacturing and selling said tile roofing panels. However, the demand went unheeded which prompted Colorsteel to file a complaint for patent infringement with application for preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the following sequence of events transpired.[6]
Everglory filed two motions for extension to file its responsive pleading, citing that the "complex issues of facts, laws, implementing rules, and jurisprudence, which requires an extensive and in-depth research, analysis, and technical investigation before an answer or a responsive pleading can be prepared"[7] to justify the prayer for extension.[8]
On October 8, 2013, Everglory filed an Answer with Ground for the Outright Dismissal of the Complaint and with Compulsory Counterclaim in the infringement case, maintaining that said industrial designs do not qualify as novel or original creation.[9]
On October 25, 2013, or during the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of evidence of Everglory against the application for preliminary injunction, petitioner rendered in open court the expunction from the records of the case all the motions and previous pleadings filed by Everglory and declaring the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction terminated and the principal case for infringement of patent submitted for decision.[10] Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration (On Verbal Order Expunging Pleadings Filed by Defendant) with Motion to Apply Regular Civil Procedure under the Rules of Court.[11] Everglory sought reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution dated December 4, 2013.[12]
Aggrieved, on February 11, 2014, Everglory filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 133942, assailing the Order dated October 25, 2013 and the Resolution dated December 4, 2013 of the RTC.[13]
On April 22, 2014, the CA issued a 60-day TRO and enjoined petitioner to conduct further proceedings in the infringement case pending decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 133942. The TRO expired on June 22, 2014.[14]
Before the TRO expired on June 22, 2014, the CA rendered a Decision[15] on June 25, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 133942, granting Everglory's petition and finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioner in the issuance of the Resolutions dated October 25, 2013 and December 4, 2013.[16] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order dated October 25, 2013 and Resolution dated December 04, 2013, issued by public respondent RTC, insofar as they order, among others, to expunge from the records of the case the Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer dated September 12, 2013, Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer or Responsive Pleading dated September 28, 2013, and Answer with Ground for the Outright Dismissal of the Complaint and with Compulsory Counterclaim dated October 8, 2013, and to submit the case for decisions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Colorsteel and Batomalaque filed their Motion for Reconsideration before the CA but it was denied in its Resolution dated November 20, 2014. Thereafter, Colorsteel and Batomalaque filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 215921, but the same was denied in the Court's Resolution dated March 16, 2015. On September 2, 2015, the Court's Resolution was declared final and Entry of Judgment was directed to be made. [18]
Public Respondent RTC is DIRECTED to set the case for hearing for the presentation of petitioner's evidence, and thereafter, to decide the case on the merits with dispatch, in accordance with the regular civil procedure under the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Meanwhile, petitioner continued with the proceedings in the infringement case and called the case for hearing. On November 19, 2014, petitioner issued an Order stating that with the expiration of the TRO and the absence of any further restraining order, the pending incidents will be deemed submitted: (a) the Application for Preliminary Injunction from the Plaintiffs; and (b) the main IPR Civil Case No. 005.[19]
On December 3, 2014, petitioner rendered a Decision regarding the merits of the infringement case in favor of Colorsteel and Batomalaque.[20]
Aggrieved, Everglory filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA, docketed as CA GR. SP No. 138582.[21]
Meanwhile, on December 15, 2014, Everglory filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138410, which sought to nullify the Resolutions dated April 21, 2014 and October 1, 2014 of the RTC, which denied Everglory's Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of petitioner on the ground that she showed manifest bias or prejudice against Everglory.[22]
Subsequently, in its Resolution dated April 29, 2015, the CA consolidated CA-G.R. SP No. 138410 and CA-GR. SP No. 138582.[23]
On September 10, 2015,[24] the CA ruled in favor of Everglory, and ruled as follows; (a) the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 138410 is granted, and the Resolutions dated April 21, 2014 and October 1, 2014 are declared null and void; (b) the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 138582 is granted, and the Resolution dated December 3, 2014 is declared null and void; and (c) IPR Case No. 005 is remanded to the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga for re-raffle to another branch and for further proceedings.[25]
Colorsteel and Batomalaque filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution[26] dated February 2, 2016 of the CA.
The aforementioned events prompted Everglory to file a Petition for Indirect Contempt of Court against petitioner on January 15, 2015, before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 133942. In its petition, respondent alleged that petitioner defied the Decision dated June 25, 2014 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 133942, when she continued with the summary proceedings in the infringement case after the expiration of the 60-day TRO.[27]
For her defense, petitioner argued that: (a) she faithfully performed her duties; (b) there was no legal obstacle to continue with the summary proceeding; (c) and the Decision dated June 25, 2014 had not yet attained finality; hence, there was no judgment to defy.[28]
On August 23, 2017,[29] the CA found petitioner guilty of indirect contempt of court and imposed a fine on her for continuing with the proceedings in the infringement case despite being fully aware that in doing so she will be acting in direct contravention of the Decision dated June 25, 2014 of the CA.[30] The CA held that even in the absence of an injunctive writ, petitioner should have suspended the proceedings in the infringement case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Resolution dated April 12, 2018 of the CA.[31]
Undaunted, petitioner elevated the matter to this Court.
Petitioner argues that the CA acted without jurisdiction: (1) when it took cognizance of the contempt case against a lower court judge; and (2) when it found her guilty of indirect contempt of court and imposed a fine on her despite a clear showing that she acted in good faith and did not willfully defy any final and executory decision of the CA.[32]
In its Comment/Opposition,[33] respondent argues that: (1) the Decision dated June 25, 2014 is immediately executory, having been issued in a certiorari case; (2) the CA has the inherent power to cite petitioner in indirect contempt of court; and (3) petitioner is guilty of indirect contempt of court because she willfully defied the Decision dated June 25, 2014.
The sole issue of this petition is whether the appellate court can cite petitioner in indirect contempt of court.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
In finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt of court and imposing a fine on her, the CA ratiocinated that:
Judge Fider-Reyes' claim that she proceeded with the hearing of the case in the absence of any further restraining order from the Court is unacceptable considering that it is very clear from the subject Decision issued on June 25, 2014, that she was to set the case for hearing for the presentation of petitioner's evidence. The Court, also found in the said Decision, stated that there was grave abuse of discretion on her part in expunging the Answer filed by herein petitioner. With the said pronouncements of the Court and the previous temporary restraining order issued, it behooved respondent Judge Fider-Reyes to act with not only judicial circumspection but in full obeisance to the mandate of the higher court.Contrary to the CA's findings, the Court failed to consider the acts of petitioner as submission to the CA's authority. From the records, it was very clear that petitioner immediately held in abeyance the proceedings in the infringement case upon receipt of the CA's TRO in the certiorari case. Petitioner suspended the hearing on Everglory's motion for reconsideration in the infringement case during the effectivity of the TRO.[35]
x x x x
It is admitted that Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the general rule that the mere pendency of special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
There are, however, instances where even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy.
x x x x
Here, there was more reason for Judge Fider-Reyes to refrain from ruling on IPR Civil Case No. 005 on the merits without first complying with the Court's Former Special Sixth Division's directive to give EVERGLORY a chance to present its evidence, since said Decision was rendered on June 25, 2014 and Judge Fider-Reyes received her copy on July 9, 2014. Despite this, Judge Fider-Reyes issued her November 19, 2014 Order and December 3, 2014 Resolution.
The intent to defy this Court's authority is undeniable. Judge Fider-Reyes' patent disrespect for this Court's decisions and processes is highly contumacious and cannot be countenanced.[34]
Thereafter, petitioner proceeded with the summary proceedings in the infringement case because the Decision dated June 25, 2014 had yet to attain finality (in view of Colorsteel and Bartolomaque's other certiorari case in the CA) and the CA did not issue any injunctive writ against her in the certiorari case. Accordingly, petitioner rendered judgment in the infringement case on December 3, 2014 since there was no legal obstacle for her to do so.[36]
The Decision[37] dated June 25, 2014 of the CA, which found petitioner guilty of grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the Resolutions dated October 25, 2013 and December 4, 2013, became final and executory only on January 25, 2016, or a little over a year after petitioner rendered judgment in the infringement case.[38] After learning that the Decision dated June 25, 2014 had attained finality, petitioner reversed all the legal effects of the respondent's having been declared in default in the infringement case. In fact, the infringement case subsequently proceeded with respondent being accorded full opportunity to actively participate therein.[39]
Subsequently, petitioner issued the Order Ad Cautelam[40] dated March 2, 2016, showing her willingness to comply with any final and executory judgment of the CA. Then, the infringement case was re-raffled to another judge, thus petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to comply with the final and executory judgment of the CA.[41]
Besides, there was no legal obstacle for petitioner to continue with the proceedings of the infringement case despite the pendency of the certiorari case. The Decision dated June 25, 2014, being a judgment in a certiorari case, is not immediately executory. In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan[42] the Court held that:
The earlier quoted Section 7 of Rule 65 provides the general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for Certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.[43]From the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner acted in accordance with her legal duty to proceed with the summary proceedings in the infringement case, in due deference and regard to the existing judgments, orders and issuances of the CA, and without any iota of malice or bad faith to defy them.
Neither can petitioner's actions be considered violative of the principle of judicial courtesy. Under the principle of judicial courtesy, lower courts are called to suspend proceedings before it, even without the existence of an injunctive writ, until a final determination has been made by a higher court if there is a strong probability that the issues or proceedings before the latter would be rendered moot or moribund because of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court.[44] A case is deemed moot "when it presents no actual controversy or where the issues have ceased to exist."[45] Going forward in the conduct of summary proceedings in the infringement case would not have mooted the certiorari case before the CA.
The power of contempt
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, mandates of the court, and to the due administration of justice.[46] It safeguards the respect due to the courts and, consequently, ensures the stability of the judicial institution.[47]
The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual function, primarily, to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders, and, secondarily, to compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform. Due to this two-fold aspect of contempt, the punishment for contempt is classified into two: civil contempt and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge for the benefit of the other party. Criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.[48]
In our jurisdiction, there are two kinds of contempt punishable by law, namely direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. On the other hand, indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court.[49] A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.
Petitioner cannot be held guilty of
indirect contempt of court.
In this case, Everglory accuses petitioner of committing indirect contempt for disregarding the CA's decision and continuing with the summary proceedings in the infringement case after the expiration of the 60-day TRO.
There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt punishable under Section 3, paragraph (b),[50] Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. What is put in issue here is the validity of the proceedings that found petitioner liable for such misconduct.
It is very clear that the very purpose of filing this petition for indirect contempt against petitioner, as a judge handling the infringement case, is to punish her for the alleged defiance of the CA's decision. However, this petition for indirect contempt is not the proper action to determine the legality of petitioner's action.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive
power to discipline judges of lower courts.
As mandated by the Constitution under Section 11[51] Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court exercises the exclusive power and authority to discipline justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts. Similarly, Rule 4, Section 3(a)[52] of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court[53] provides that the administrative functions of this court include disciplinary and administrative matters involving justices, judges, and court personnel.
The exclusive power of the Court to discipline judges of lower courts is reiterated in A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC, which prescribes new rules of procedure for punishing judicial misconduct. Its whereas clauses explain that:
WHEREAS, under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof;In lodging the power to discipline judges of lower courts exclusively with the Court, it curtailed in the same breath the inherent power of the CA to punish for contempt. The CA have no authority to discipline judges or even the court personnel of lower courts. At most, the CA can only recommend to the Court the necessary disciplinary action.
WHEREAS, under Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court en banc has the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
WHEREAS, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests upon the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts[.]
When this Court acts on complaints against judges or any personnel under its supervision, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies. In this case the issue to be resolved is whether petitioner should be held liable for indirect contempt for her failure to obey the lawful order of the appellate court. Clearly, what is involved is not this Court's power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in cases involving only questions of law. The present case involves the exercise of this Court's exclusive power to discipline judges.
Evidently, the CA overstepped the bounds of its authority when it took cognizance of the case and thereafter imposed a fine of P10,000.00 against petitioner.
Everglory should have filed an administrative case before this Court in order to determine whether petitioner disobeyed the lawful order of the appellate court.
This issue with respect to proper remedies against a member of the Bench should properly be addressed since conflicting and erroneous remedies are sometimes resorted to by aggrieved tribunals or parties.
There is no precedent jurisprudence on a litigant filing an indirect contempt case against a judge for allegedly not implementing the orders of an appellate court, moreso, at the instance of a litigant.
Instead of availing the proper legal remedies such as appeal and petitions for certiorari, as the case may be, the filing of indirect contempt cases against judges would open the floodgates to litigants to challenge errors of law and the exercise of discretion by judges. This will unduly delay the administration of justice because judges will then have to devote time and effort to defend themselves against these frivolous suits. The presumption of good faith in the performance of one's official duties will no longer be recognized.
Again, We reiterate that not every error implies ignorance of the law, for if committed in good faith, it does not warrant administrative sanctions.[54] A judge's failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for to hold them administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision they render, assuming that they erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make their position doubly unbearable. The judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[55]
Assuming, there was bad faith on the part of any judge in disobeying an order of an appellate court, there is still the judicial remedy of certiorari, or appeal, or a disciplinary proceeding which exclusively belongs only to this Court.
A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 23, 2017 and the Resolution dated April 12, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 138756 are SET ASIDE. The complaint for indirect contempt against petitioner Judge Maria Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen (Chairperson), Rosario, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.
Zalameda, J., with separate concurring opinion.
[1] Rollo, pp. 50-96.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Edwin D. Sorongon; id. at 10-28.
[3] Id. at 44-48.
[4] Id. at 11.
[5] Id. at 450-451.
[6] Id. at 451-452.
[7] Id. at 187.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 630-652.
[10] Id. at 435-436.
[11] Id. at 437.
[12] Id. at 437-438.
[13] Id. at 12.
[14] Id.
[15] Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguillas; id. at 186-197.
[16] Id. at 192-197.
[17] Id. at 196-197.
[18] Id. at 13.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. at 17.
[21] Id. at 111.
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at 217-218.
[24] Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes (former Member of this Court) and Marlene Gonzales-Sison; id. at 449-470.
[25] Id. at 469-470.
[26] Id. at 471-474.
[27] Id. at 16.
[28] Id. at 16-18.
[29] Supra note 2.
[30] Rollo, p. 24.
[31] Id. at 44-48.
[32] Id. at 72-73.
[33] Id. at 478-578.
[34] Id. at 21-22.
[35] Id. at 59.
[36] Id. at 61-62.
[37] Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid; id. at 186-197.
[38] Id. at 196-197
[39] Id. at 64.
[40] Id. at 407-411.
[41] Id. at 71.
[42] 525 Phil. 804 (2006).
[43] Id. at 807.
[44] Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 247 Phil. 387 (1988); Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, 736 Phil. 264 (2014).
[45] Black's Law Dictionary. 6th Edition, 1008.
[46] Regalado v. Go, 543 Phil. 578 (2007).
[47] Oca v. Custodio, 814 Phil. 641 (2017).
[48] Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1150 (1997).
[49] In Re: Adoracion Angeles, 567 Phil. 189 (2008).
[50] (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including, the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto.
[51] Section 11, Article VII provides that: "The members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon."
[52] RULE 4
THE EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION
x x x x
Section 3. Administrative functions of the Court. – The administrative functions of the Court en banc consist of, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) the discipline of justices, judges and court personnel, whether by en banc or by Division, subject to matters assignable to the Divisions, disciplinary matters involving justices, judges and court personnel[.]
[53] A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC.
[54] Baculi, v. Belen, 695 Phil. 598 (2012).
[55] Re: Ongjoco, 680 Phil. 467 (2012).
ZALAMEDA, J.:
I concur with the ponencia that petitioner Hon. Maria Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes (Judge Reyes) did not commit any act constituting indirect contempt. The ponencia aptly ruled that Judge Reyes merely acted in accordance with her legal duty when she continued the proceedings in IPR Civil Case No. 005 upon the expiration of the Court of Appeals' (CA) temporary restraining order (TRO) in CA-G.R. SP No. 133942, a related certiorari proceeding.[1] Judge Reyes was not bound to execute the Decision dated 25 June 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 133942 which, during the relevant period, had yet to attain finality. As such, the CA erred when it cited Judge Reyes in indirect contempt for not immediately executing the CA Decision as a matter of judicial courtesy.
Nonetheless, my view on the scope of the contempt powers of the CA diverges with that of the ponencia. The latter ruled that the CA overstepped the bounds of its authority when it took cognizance of the petition for indirect contempt, considering that the case "involves the exercise of this Court's exclusive power to discipline judges," as vested by the Constitution in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.[2] According to the ponencia, the CA has no authority to discipline judges and court personnel; at most, it can only recommend to the Court the necessary disciplinary sanctions.[3] I submit that invoked constitutional provision neither curtails nor limits the inherent contempt powers of the courts.
The Court's exclusive power to
discipline judges of lower, courts does
not necessarily circumscribe the
contempt powers of the CA or other
courts
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof." Such administrative supervision includes the power of the Court en banc to discipline judges of lower courts or order their dismissal, as provided in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.[4]
We have relied on these constitutional provisions to prevent other offices of the government, such as the Office of the Ombudsman and the Civil Service Commission, from investigating members of the Bench and court personnel.[5] Notably, the Court has interpreted its constitutional authority to pertain to the administrative liability of judges and court personnel. In Maceda v. Vasquez,[6] the Court ruled as follows:
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.[7]Similarly, in Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman,[8] We emphasized that the Court's supervisory authority refers to administrative matters, thus:
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.[9]In my view, there is nothing in the cited constitutional provisions, or in the cases interpreting them, that restricts the authority of lower courts to punish for contempt. Such absence is consistent with the prevailing doctrine that the administrative or disciplinary power of the Court is distinct from the contempt powers inherent in all courts.
We have long acknowledged the distinction between contempt proceedings and administrative or disciplinary proceedings, both of which are sui generis.[10] Contempt proceedings are different in nature and purpose from disciplinary cases, and the two spring from different but related powers.[11]
A disciplinary proceeding involves an investigation by the Court of the conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary objective, public interest.[12] While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a punishment for contempt, the more recent view is that punishment is of secondary importance to the need to protect the courts and the people from improper professional practice.[13]
In contrast, the exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect, primarily, the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court, and, secondarily, his compulsory performance of some act or duty required of him by the court and which he refuses to perform.[14] Specific to civil contempt, its dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs.[15] The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.[16]
Contempt and disciplinary proceedings can proceed independently and simultaneously with each other.[17] The same act may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both.[18] The penalty for one cannot take the place of the other.[19]
Moreover, contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are governed by different procedures. Contempt of court is governed by Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions are governed by Rules 138, 139, and 140.
Succinctly put, different powers, doctrines, and procedures govern disciplinary and contempt proceedings. The Court's constitutional authority only pertains to the former, i.e., the power to administratively discipline judges and other court personnel.
Moreover, in issuing Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, this Court impliedly recognized that reviewing courts may cite lower court judges in contempt, especially since the directives in a certiorari decision are almost always addressed to the lower courts, and not to the private respondents. Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 9. Service and Enforcement of Order or Judgment. — A certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.[20]
On this point, the Court has previously taken cognizance of and resolved indirect contempt cases against members of the Bench.[21] Lu Ym v. Mahinay,[22] and Balindong v. Court of Appeals[23] involved contempt charges filed by litigants against judges, albeit both cases were decided in favor of the judges. In Limbona v. Lee,[24] the Court found a judge guilty of indirect contempt when he did not follow a decision rendered by the Court. Granted that, in all these cases, the decisions alleged to be defied were rendered by this Court, the fact remains that the Court has considered non-compliance with a higher court's decision as a ground for indirect contempt by a lower court judge.
On this score, the ponencia observed that, instead of filing a petition for indirect contempt, Everglory should have filed an administrative case before the Court in light of Our exclusive authority to discipline judges and court personnel.[25] However, this pronouncement may unduly and unwittingly diminish the strength of the courts' contempt powers. This ruling implies that no contempt proceeding may be initiated against any person under the administrative supervision of the Court, including court personnel.
For instance, it is well-accepted that stenographers and sheriffs may be cited in contempt by lower courts should they fail to obey judicial writs or orders.[26] However, the ponencia’s conclusion may tacitly suggest that stenographers and sheriffs may no longer be cited in contempt by lower courts, and they may only be held accountable through an administrative proceeding initiated with the Court. To my mind, the implications of the ponencia may be unnecessarily litigious and impede the efficient administration of justice. Conflating the doctrines on disciplinary and contempt powers may hinder lower courts from ensuring the timely enforcement of their directives.
In summary, I disagree with the ponencia's finding that the CA has no authority to take cognizance of a petition for indirect contempt against a member of the Bench. This notwithstanding, I join the ponencia's conclusion that Judge Reyes should not be punished for indirect contempt.
Non-compliance with a decision that
is not final and executory does not
constitute indirect contempt. Litigants
hear the responsibility of seeking
complete relief from the appropriate
court
Contempt of court is defined as disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice.[27]
I agree with the ponencia that Judge Reyes did not willfully disregard or disobey the CA Decision since, at the time she continued with the proceedings, the CA's TRO had already lapsed and the CA Decision had yet to attain finality. The CA Decision is not immediately executory. Moreover, the execution of the CA Decision was stayed by the timely motion for reconsideration and appeal filed by Colorsteel Systems Corporation (Colorsteel) and its president, Jose Rey S. Batomalaque (Batomalaque).[28] Non-execution of a decision that is neither final nor immediately executory does not constitute indirect contempt.
In addition to the points emphasized by the ponencia, I submit that litigants have the burden of thoroughly pursuing their cases, and such duty should not be shifted unto judges. Since Evergold sought to stay the proceedings after the expiration of the CA's TRO and the rendition of the CA Decision, it should have filed a motion with the CA, alleging good reasons to support the immediate execution of the CA Decision pending Colorsteel's and Batomalaque's motion for reconsideration.[29] Evergold could have also pursued injunctive relief in the Rule 45 proceedings initiated by Colorsteel and Batomalaque. In this case, however, Everglory chose to demand Judge Reyes to apply the very narrow, jurisprudential exception of judicial courtesy.
The conduct expected of Judge Reyes was in clear contravention of the second paragraph of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which states that "[t]he public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge."
I share the view of the ponencia that Judge Reyes' non-observance of judicial courtesy, assuming to be erroneous, does not rise to the level of indirect contempt. For one, the principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the rule. We have held that the precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[30] After all, judicial courtesy is simply that—a courtesy. In contrast, the obligation to proceed with a case is a duty under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
More importantly, the applicability of judicial courtesy was simply not clear-cut. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court or tribunal. A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.[31] Since the CA Decision did not state that it was immediately executory, Judge Reyes should not be held accountable for not complying with it.
At most, Judge Reyes' non-observance of judicial courtesy constitutes an error of judgment that should not be the subject of a petition for indirect contempt.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur with the ponencia's reversal of the CA Decision dated 23 August 2017 and the Resolution dated 12 April 2018. I vote to GRANT the petition.
[1] Ponencia, p. 9.
[2] Id. at pp. 12-14.
[3] Id. at p. 13.
[4] JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 1012 (2009).
[5] Civil Service Commission v. Andal, G.R. No. 185749, 16 December 2009 [per J. Carpio]; Maceda v. Vazquez, G.R. No. 102781, 22 April 1993 [per J. Nocon]; Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 167916, 26 August 2008 [per J. Reyes, R.T.].
[6] G.R. No. 102781, 22 April 1993 [per J. Nocon].
[7] Emphasis supplied.
[8] G.R. No. 132177, 19 July 2001 [per J. Buena].
[9] Emphasis supplied.
[10] Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty on Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, 8 March 2011 [per J. Leonardo-De Castro]; In re Merdegia, IPI Nos. 12-205-CA-J & 10300, 10 December 2013 [per J. Brion]; Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 155849, 31 August 2011 [per J. Bersamin]; People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908 & 115909, 29 March 1995 [per J. Regalado].
[11] In re Merdegia, IPI Nos. 12-205-CA-J & 10300, 10 December 2013 [per J. Brion]; People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908 & 115909, 29 March 1995 [per J. Regalado].
[12] In re Merdegia, IPI Nos. 12-205-CA-J & 10300, 10 December 2013 [per J. Brion].
[13] People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908 & 115909, 29 March 1995 [per J. Regalado].
[14] Id.
[15] Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 155849, 31 August 2011 [per J. Bersamin].
[16] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Calanza, G.R. No. 180699, 13 October 2010 [per J. Nachura].
[17] In re Merdegia, IPI Nos. 12-205-CA-J & 10300, 10 December 2013 [per J. Brion].
[18] In re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty on Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC (Resolution), 7 June 2011 [per J. Leonardo-De Castro].
[19] Angeles v. Gernale, Jr., A.M. No. P-96-1221 [Formerly A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. No. 96-87-P], 19 June 1997 [per curiam].
[20] Emphasis supplied.
[21] See Ponencia, p. 14: "There is no precedent jurisprudence on a litigant filing an indirect contempt case against a judge for allegedly not implementing the orders of an appellate court, moreso, at the instance of a litigant."
[22] G.R. No. 169476, 16 June 2006 [per J. Ynares-Santiago].
[23] G.R. Nos. 177600 & 178684, 19 October 2015 [per J. Bersamin].
[24] G.R. No. 173290, 20 November 2006 [per J. Ynares-Santiago].
[25] Ponencia, pp. 13-14.
[26] See e.g. Westmont Bank v. Funai Phils., Corp., G.R. Nos. 175733 & 180162, 8 July 2015 [per J. Perlas-Bernabe]; Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-39115, 26 May 1975 [per J. Aquino].
[27] Regalado v. Go, G R. No. 167988, 6 February 2007 [per J. Chico-Nazario].
[28] Section 4, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides: "The pendency of a motion for reconsideration filed on time and by the proper party shall stay the execution of the judgment or final resolution sought to be reconsidered unless the court, for good reasons, shall otherwise direct"
[29] Id.
[30] De Leon v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. Nos. 181970 & 182678, 3 August 2010 [per J. Peralta].
[31] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Calanza, G.R. No. 180699, 13 October 2010 [per J. Nachura].