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EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 201631, December 07, 2021 ]
ANGELINA DAYRIT, REPRESENTED BY JULIE E. DAYRIT, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE I. NORQUILLAS, ROGELIO I. NORQUILLAS, ROMIE I. NORQUILLAS, HERDANNY I. NORQUILLAS, DANILO M. NORQUILLAS, ANTHONY APUS, TECLO P. MUGOT, ALLAN A. OMPOC, JONI CLARIN, CANDELARIA MEJORADA, LILIA O. TAGANAS, SYLVIA SABAYANON, ARSENIO CATIIL, VERONICO MAESTRE, AND MARIO TAGAYLO, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
HERNANDO, J.:
Formerly, G.R. No. 201631 was consolidated with G.R. No. 201076.[1] The consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assail the rulings of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02564-MIN (G.R. No. 201076) and CA-G.R. SP No. 03121-MIN (G.R. No. 201631).
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] in G.R. No. 201076, petitioner Angelina Dayrit (Angelina) is contesting the December 20, 2011 Decision[3] and February 22, 2012 Resolution[4] of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 02564-MIN, affirming the January 17, 2008 Resolution[5] of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 13439.
DARAB Case No. 13439 is an appeal from the December 22, 2004 Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator for Misamis Oriental, which ordered the cancellation of three Certificates of Land Ownership Award[6] (CLOA) in a petition for annulment initiated by Angelina.[7] The DARAB ordered[8] the archiving of the annulment case until the resolution of the separate application for exemption from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage of two parcels of land located in Bolisong, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental as filed earlier by Angelina before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
In a Resolution[9] dated June 13, 2012, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 201076 for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA and for failure to comply with the formal requirements under the Rules of Court. The Resolution became final and executory on August 1, 2012.[10]
In G.R. No. 201631, petitioner Angelina filed a petition for review on certiorari[11] assailing the CA's January 27, 2012 Decision[12] and March 28, 2012 Resolution[13] in CA-G.R. SP No. 03121, that reversed and set aside the December 10, 2008 Decision[14] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, Cagayan de Oro City.
The RTC Decision affirmed the April 17, 2007 Decision[15] of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, which ruled in favor of Angelina in an action for forcible entry which the latter initiated against respondents Jose I. Norquillas, Rogelio I. Norquillas, Romie I. Norquillas,[16] Herdanny I. Norquillas, Danilo M. Norquillas, Anthony Apus, Teclo P. Mugot,[17] Allan A. Ompoc, Joni Clarin,[18] Candelaria Mejorada, Lilia O. Taganas, Sylvia Sabayanon, Arsenio Catiil,[19] Veronico Maestre, and Mario Tagaylo (collectively, respondents).
In the same Resolution[20] dated June 13, 2012, this Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 201631 with G.R. No. 201076 to avoid conflicting decisions on related cases. However, in view of the finality of the Resolution in G.R. No. 201076, the Court resolves to deconsolidate G.R. No. 201076 from G.R. No. 201631. Thus, what remains for the resolution of the Court is G.R. No. 201631.
The Factual Antecedents:
G.R. No. 201631 arose from a complaint for forcible entry filed by Angelina against respondents before the MCTC.
Angelina was the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Bolisong, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental.[21] The first lot is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-13388, and the second lot by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. T-1804.[22]
In 1993, the parcels of land were placed under the coverage of the CARP.[23] Hence, Angelina's titles to the parcels of land were cancelled, and new titles (pursuant to CLOAs) were issued in favor of respondents.[24] Angelina filed a petition for the annulment of the CLOAs before the DARAB (Misamis Oriental Provincial Office).[25] She also applied for exemption from CARP coverage with the DAR.[26] The petition for annulment before the DARAB became the subject of G.R. No. 201076 in this Court.
While the appeal of the petition for annulment was pending in the DARAB Manila Office, Angelina claimed that on September 17, 2006, respondents surreptitiously entered the property and refused to vacate despite repeated demands.[27] This prompted Angelina to file the instant complaint for forcible entry.
Respondents, in their answer,[28] acknowledged that Angelina was the previous owner of the parcels of land.[29] However, they alleged that Angelina lost her ownership over 16.6927 hectares of the properties when these were awarded to respondents as CARP beneficiaries.[30] It follows that Angelina lost her right of possession.[31] Respondents also argued that they remain owners of the parcels of land despite Angelina's pending petition for annulment of the CLOAs.[32] Hence, Angelina cannot claim forcible entry as she already lost her right of possession.[33]
Proceedings ensued.
In its April 17, 2007 Decision,[34] the MCTC ruled in favor of Angelina. Evidence showed that Angelina was in prior possession of the parcels of land.[35] The MCTC held that respondents should not have taken the law into their own hands by entering the property; they should have filed an appropriate action to enforce their ownership pursuant to the CLOAs.[36]
The MCTC also resolved the question of whether the forcible entry suit is barred by the pending case in the DARAB. The MCTC ruled that the issue in the forcible entry suit pertains only to the possession in fact or physical possession of the property, the resolution of which is for the maintenance of public order; it does not relate to the issue of ownership in relation to agrarian disputes that are cognizable and are already pending before the DARAB.[37] Hence, the MCTC is not bound to wait for the resolution of the pending DARAB case.
The dispositive portion of the MCTC Decision reads:
In its December 10, 2008 Decision,[39] the RTC affirmed the MCTC Decision in its entirety. The RTC added that a mere allegation of an agrarian dispute does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction especially because the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,[40] as amended, provides that the lower courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.[41] The issue of physical possession over agricultural lands is different from the issue of disposition and alienation, which is cognizable by the DAR.[42]
With respondents still aggrieved, they further elevated the case to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
In its January 27, 2012 Decision,[43] the CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the MCTC and the RTC and dismissed the complaint. The CA ruled that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the CARP.[44] In the instant case, petitioner's parcels of land in dispute were included in the CARP.[45] Portions were awarded to respondents pursuant to the CLOAs that resulted to the issuance of new titles.[46] As beneficiaries, respondents occupied the parcels of land, which was considered by Angelina as unlawful entry, resulting in the filing of the instant case to recover possession.[47]
The CA therefore found that the issue of possession in this instant case is linked to an agrarian dispute.[48] Respondents entered the properties by virtue of the CLOAs issued to them.[49] The MCTC should have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, or at least have heard the parties to determine if it has jurisdiction.[50] Finally, the CA added that the complaint should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia as the trial court was aware that there was a separate proceeding in the DARAB.[51]
The dispositive portion of the CA's Decision reads:
Angelina now comes to this Court assailing the CA's disposition of the case. She maintains that while the DAR has the power of administration and disposition of agricultural lands, the courts have jurisdiction on actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer.[54] The instant case involves the issue of mere possession; it does not involve the adjudication of ownership or an agrarian matter.[55]
Angelina cites case law that upholds the courts' jurisdiction over possessory matters despite involving agricultural lands, as the issue is independent from the question of disposition or alienation.[56] Maintenance of public order, which is the purpose of having summary remedies on actions for forcible entry, cannot be hindered by invoking agrarian dispute.[57] Angelina also adds that the DAR, in its June 8, 2011 Decision, has already resolved her application for exemption and ruled that the parcels of land are exempted from coverage.[58] Finally, Angelina argues that the DAR proceedings was an administrative prejudicial question that warranted the abeyance of judicial proceedings.[59]
In their comment,[60] respondents maintain that the case is an agrarian dispute under the original and primary jurisdiction of the DARAB.[61] The filing of the instant complaint for forcible entry is an offshoot of the enforcement of respondents' rights and obligations under the CLOAs issued to them.[62] The case relates to the terms and conditions of the transfer of ownership, which necessarily includes possession, from the landowner to the beneficiaries.[63]
Angelina filed her Reply[64] and reiterated her arguments. She attached a copy of the June 8, 2011 Decision[65] and January 19, 2012 Resolution[66] of the DAR Secretary exempting her parcels of land from CARP coverage.
Issue
The issue for the resolution of the Court is whether the MCTC has jurisdiction on the instant complaint for forcible entry.
Our Ruling
The Petition has no merit. The Court rules that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the instant action for forcible entry.
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court or a tribunal to hear, try, and decide a case before it.[67] A judgment rendered by a body without jurisdiction is void and may be attacked any time.[68] It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for.[69]
In contention here is the conflict of jurisdiction between the MCTC and the DARAB. Angelina maintains that the MCTC has jurisdiction over the instant complaint for forcible entry, while respondents maintain that the DARAB has jurisdiction as the action is considered as an agrarian dispute stemming from the enforcement of the CLOAs issued to them.
The Court takes this opportunity to clarify this seeming overlap.
Section 33 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,[70] as amended, provides for the jurisdiction of first-level courts. Paragraph two of the provision specifically states:
On the other hand, Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988[74] (CARL), as amended, provides for the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR, to wit:
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] in G.R. No. 201076, petitioner Angelina Dayrit (Angelina) is contesting the December 20, 2011 Decision[3] and February 22, 2012 Resolution[4] of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 02564-MIN, affirming the January 17, 2008 Resolution[5] of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 13439.
DARAB Case No. 13439 is an appeal from the December 22, 2004 Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator for Misamis Oriental, which ordered the cancellation of three Certificates of Land Ownership Award[6] (CLOA) in a petition for annulment initiated by Angelina.[7] The DARAB ordered[8] the archiving of the annulment case until the resolution of the separate application for exemption from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage of two parcels of land located in Bolisong, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental as filed earlier by Angelina before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
In a Resolution[9] dated June 13, 2012, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 201076 for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA and for failure to comply with the formal requirements under the Rules of Court. The Resolution became final and executory on August 1, 2012.[10]
In G.R. No. 201631, petitioner Angelina filed a petition for review on certiorari[11] assailing the CA's January 27, 2012 Decision[12] and March 28, 2012 Resolution[13] in CA-G.R. SP No. 03121, that reversed and set aside the December 10, 2008 Decision[14] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, Cagayan de Oro City.
The RTC Decision affirmed the April 17, 2007 Decision[15] of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, which ruled in favor of Angelina in an action for forcible entry which the latter initiated against respondents Jose I. Norquillas, Rogelio I. Norquillas, Romie I. Norquillas,[16] Herdanny I. Norquillas, Danilo M. Norquillas, Anthony Apus, Teclo P. Mugot,[17] Allan A. Ompoc, Joni Clarin,[18] Candelaria Mejorada, Lilia O. Taganas, Sylvia Sabayanon, Arsenio Catiil,[19] Veronico Maestre, and Mario Tagaylo (collectively, respondents).
In the same Resolution[20] dated June 13, 2012, this Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 201631 with G.R. No. 201076 to avoid conflicting decisions on related cases. However, in view of the finality of the Resolution in G.R. No. 201076, the Court resolves to deconsolidate G.R. No. 201076 from G.R. No. 201631. Thus, what remains for the resolution of the Court is G.R. No. 201631.
The Factual Antecedents:
G.R. No. 201631 arose from a complaint for forcible entry filed by Angelina against respondents before the MCTC.
Angelina was the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Bolisong, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental.[21] The first lot is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-13388, and the second lot by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. T-1804.[22]
In 1993, the parcels of land were placed under the coverage of the CARP.[23] Hence, Angelina's titles to the parcels of land were cancelled, and new titles (pursuant to CLOAs) were issued in favor of respondents.[24] Angelina filed a petition for the annulment of the CLOAs before the DARAB (Misamis Oriental Provincial Office).[25] She also applied for exemption from CARP coverage with the DAR.[26] The petition for annulment before the DARAB became the subject of G.R. No. 201076 in this Court.
While the appeal of the petition for annulment was pending in the DARAB Manila Office, Angelina claimed that on September 17, 2006, respondents surreptitiously entered the property and refused to vacate despite repeated demands.[27] This prompted Angelina to file the instant complaint for forcible entry.
Respondents, in their answer,[28] acknowledged that Angelina was the previous owner of the parcels of land.[29] However, they alleged that Angelina lost her ownership over 16.6927 hectares of the properties when these were awarded to respondents as CARP beneficiaries.[30] It follows that Angelina lost her right of possession.[31] Respondents also argued that they remain owners of the parcels of land despite Angelina's pending petition for annulment of the CLOAs.[32] Hence, Angelina cannot claim forcible entry as she already lost her right of possession.[33]
Proceedings ensued.
Rulings of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court: |
In its April 17, 2007 Decision,[34] the MCTC ruled in favor of Angelina. Evidence showed that Angelina was in prior possession of the parcels of land.[35] The MCTC held that respondents should not have taken the law into their own hands by entering the property; they should have filed an appropriate action to enforce their ownership pursuant to the CLOAs.[36]
The MCTC also resolved the question of whether the forcible entry suit is barred by the pending case in the DARAB. The MCTC ruled that the issue in the forcible entry suit pertains only to the possession in fact or physical possession of the property, the resolution of which is for the maintenance of public order; it does not relate to the issue of ownership in relation to agrarian disputes that are cognizable and are already pending before the DARAB.[37] Hence, the MCTC is not bound to wait for the resolution of the pending DARAB case.
The dispositive portion of the MCTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding plaintiff's [petitioner] cause of action to be sufficiently established, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to vacate the land in question, remove their houses therefrom[,] and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff.Aggrieved, respondents appealed the case to the RTC.
SO ORDERED.[38]
In its December 10, 2008 Decision,[39] the RTC affirmed the MCTC Decision in its entirety. The RTC added that a mere allegation of an agrarian dispute does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction especially because the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,[40] as amended, provides that the lower courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.[41] The issue of physical possession over agricultural lands is different from the issue of disposition and alienation, which is cognizable by the DAR.[42]
With respondents still aggrieved, they further elevated the case to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
In its January 27, 2012 Decision,[43] the CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the MCTC and the RTC and dismissed the complaint. The CA ruled that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the CARP.[44] In the instant case, petitioner's parcels of land in dispute were included in the CARP.[45] Portions were awarded to respondents pursuant to the CLOAs that resulted to the issuance of new titles.[46] As beneficiaries, respondents occupied the parcels of land, which was considered by Angelina as unlawful entry, resulting in the filing of the instant case to recover possession.[47]
The CA therefore found that the issue of possession in this instant case is linked to an agrarian dispute.[48] Respondents entered the properties by virtue of the CLOAs issued to them.[49] The MCTC should have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, or at least have heard the parties to determine if it has jurisdiction.[50] Finally, the CA added that the complaint should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia as the trial court was aware that there was a separate proceeding in the DARAB.[51]
The dispositive portion of the CA's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 10 December 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, of Cagayan de Oro City, affirming the Decision dated 17 April 2007 of the Municipal Trial Court of Opol and El Salvador are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. 2006-09-16 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to cost.Angelina moved for reconsideration but was subsequently denied by the CA in its Resolution[53] dated March 28, 2012.
SO ORDERED.[52]
Angelina now comes to this Court assailing the CA's disposition of the case. She maintains that while the DAR has the power of administration and disposition of agricultural lands, the courts have jurisdiction on actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer.[54] The instant case involves the issue of mere possession; it does not involve the adjudication of ownership or an agrarian matter.[55]
Angelina cites case law that upholds the courts' jurisdiction over possessory matters despite involving agricultural lands, as the issue is independent from the question of disposition or alienation.[56] Maintenance of public order, which is the purpose of having summary remedies on actions for forcible entry, cannot be hindered by invoking agrarian dispute.[57] Angelina also adds that the DAR, in its June 8, 2011 Decision, has already resolved her application for exemption and ruled that the parcels of land are exempted from coverage.[58] Finally, Angelina argues that the DAR proceedings was an administrative prejudicial question that warranted the abeyance of judicial proceedings.[59]
In their comment,[60] respondents maintain that the case is an agrarian dispute under the original and primary jurisdiction of the DARAB.[61] The filing of the instant complaint for forcible entry is an offshoot of the enforcement of respondents' rights and obligations under the CLOAs issued to them.[62] The case relates to the terms and conditions of the transfer of ownership, which necessarily includes possession, from the landowner to the beneficiaries.[63]
Angelina filed her Reply[64] and reiterated her arguments. She attached a copy of the June 8, 2011 Decision[65] and January 19, 2012 Resolution[66] of the DAR Secretary exempting her parcels of land from CARP coverage.
The issue for the resolution of the Court is whether the MCTC has jurisdiction on the instant complaint for forcible entry.
The Petition has no merit. The Court rules that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the instant action for forcible entry.
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court or a tribunal to hear, try, and decide a case before it.[67] A judgment rendered by a body without jurisdiction is void and may be attacked any time.[68] It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for.[69]
In contention here is the conflict of jurisdiction between the MCTC and the DARAB. Angelina maintains that the MCTC has jurisdiction over the instant complaint for forcible entry, while respondents maintain that the DARAB has jurisdiction as the action is considered as an agrarian dispute stemming from the enforcement of the CLOAs issued to them.
The Court takes this opportunity to clarify this seeming overlap.
Clarifying the jurisdiction of DARAB in relation to possessory and ejectment actions involving agricultural lands. |
Section 33 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,[70] as amended, provides for the jurisdiction of first-level courts. Paragraph two of the provision specifically states:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.In actions for forcible entry, the party is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.[71] The inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.[72] Plaintiff's proof of prior physical possession of the usurped property is essential for the action to prosper.[73] This is determined by examining the allegations in the complaint.
On the other hand, Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988[74] (CARL), as amended, provides for the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR, to wit:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).DAR exercises this adjudicatory power through the DARAB, which is created by Executive Order No. 129-A (series of 1987).[75]
x x x x
In 2009, the CARL was amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9700.[76] Section 50 of the CARL was amended as follows:
Relevantly, in the case of David v. Cordova[78] (David), the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the MCTC over a complaint for forcible entry. The Court found that complainant therein sufficiently alleged in his complaint that he had prior physical possession of the property and that he was unlawfully deprived thereof.[79] The Court also discussed that the alleged public character of the land does not deprive the first-level court of jurisdiction over the forcible entry case.[80] The appellate court held that the courts lack jurisdiction because the land in question is allegedly a public agricultural land.[81] In this wise, the Court held:
Thus, David should not be understood that jurisdiction on ejectment cases of whatever nature falls on first-level courts; it should be read and understood to provide that first-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is public in character as long as the case is not an agrarian dispute. The public character of the land does not divest the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases. However, if the ejectment case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will be divested of jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended. The controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of the subject land.
Then there is the more recent case of Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon[85] (Chailese), which clarifies the jurisdiction of the DARAB over agrarian disputes:
Based on the foregoing, David and Chailese can be viewed as guides for the courts in tackling ejectment and possessory actions allegedly involving agrarian disputes. David instructs that not all ejectment cases are cognizable by the first-level courts - those involving agrarian disputes are not cognizable by the first-level courts. In this relation, Chailese clarifies the requisites for an agrarian dispute, and highlights the mandate of the amendatory law of automatic referral of cases involving agrarian disputes to the DAR.
Chailese further provides for the retroactive application of Section 50-A of RA 9700:
While Chailese involves a complaint for recovery of possession and damages filed before the RTC, there is no reason to not apply RA 9700 retroactively to cases before the first-level courts, such as complaints for forcible entry. After all, the amendment did not distinguish and it mentions of municipal trial courts: "[I]n cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court xxx"[87] To add, the Court has once stated that any doubts as to the jurisdiction of the DAR on the implementation of the CARP should be resolved in its favor, as the law has granted it special authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.[88]
Thus, the Court can apply RA 9700 to the instant case.
Application to the instant case.
Guided by David and Chailese, the Court now resolves the instant case.
Preliminarily, as found by the trial courts and the appellate court in the instant case, it is undisputed that the allegations in the complaint herein pertain to forcible entry. However, pursuant to David, it is not automatic that the MCTC has jurisdiction over the forcible entry case. There is a need to determine if the case involves an agrarian dispute.
From this, the Court rules that the MCTC has no jurisdiction on the instant complaint for forcible entry. As pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, this case meets the two requirements for automatic referral, as set out by RA 9700 and as summarized in Chailese.[89] Thus, the Court finds that the case is cognizable by the DAR through the DARAB.
The first requirement is the presence of an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature. Here, despite the filing of the forcible entry case, respondents have been consistent on alleging that the controversy is agrarian in nature. In their answer filed before the MCTC, they alleged that the land in dispute were awarded to them as CARP beneficiaries.[90] The RTC, on appeal, also touched upon matters of allegations of agrarian dispute in relation with jurisdiction of the courts.[91] The CA also did the same and in fact dismissed the complaint after finding that the issue of possession was linked to an agrarian dispute brought by the issuance of CLOAs to respondents.[92] In their comment filed before this Court, respondents maintain that the case is an agrarian dispute.[93]
As stated by RA 9700, mere allegation of the existence of an agrarian dispute is enough. In this case, this requirement was met when respondents made consistent allegations of the existence of an agrarian dispute pursuant to the CLOAs issued to them.
As to the second requirement, Chailese adds that proof must be adduced as to the person's status as farmer, farmworker, or tenant.[94] In this case, it is undisputed that respondents are farmers of the subject lands. Indeed, the records did not expressly show any agreement of whatever kind that respondents were farmers of Angelina's lands. However, the CA and the DAR Secretary (in the exemption from CARP case) here recognized the status of respondents as farmers.[95] This was not disputed by Angelina. Further, their status as farmers was cemented by the subsequent award of Angelina's lands to them by virtue of CLOAs. This is also shown by the cases Angelina initiated regarding the annulment of CLOAs, exemption from CARP coverage, and this forcible entry case. Thus, the second requirement is met.
In any case, even without the mandate of automatic referral at that time, the MCTC should have dismissed the case after hearing the parties as the law is clear prior to the amendment that the DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction on agrarian disputes involving transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries.[96] CLOAs were issued to respondents being the beneficiaries of CARP. Recipients of CLOAs acquire ownership of the lands awarded.[97] As respondents entered the subject parcel of lands by virtue of the CLOAs, this entry, despite being characterized by Angelina as forcible entry, is clearly a controversy relating to and arising from the terms and conditions of transfer of ownership to agrarian reform beneficiaries.
The Court, therefore, agrees with the CA in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction over the instant case for forcible entry for being an agrarian dispute.
Nonetheless, the Court is aware that Angelina herself also availed of remedies by moving for the cancellation of the CLOAs and requesting for the exemption of the subject lands from CARP coverage. The Court takes note of the DAR Secretary's June 8, 2011 Decision and January 19, 2012 Resolution of the DAR Secretary exempting her parcels of land from CARP coverage.[98] However, as based from the records, these suits have not yet attained conclusion or finality; thus, the rights of the parties may still change. Still, the Court must resolve the instant case as it still presents a justiciable controversy regarding jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 201076 is ordered DECONSOLIDATED from G.R. No. 201631. The Petition in G.R. No. 201631 is hereby DENIED. The January 27, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03121-MIN are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C. J., Carandang, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Marquez, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see Separate Concurring Opinion.
Leonen, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.
Caguioa, J., See Concurring Opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J., See Separate Opinion.
Dimaampao, J., on official leave but voted.
[1] Angelina Dayrit, represented by Julie E. Dayrit, v. Eusebio U. Mejorada, Jose I. Norquillas, Rogelio I. Norquillas, Romie I. Norquillas, Herdanny I. Norquillas, Danilo M. Norquillas, represented by Eusebio U. Mejorada, Agustin M. Espirat, Felomino M. Nob, Allan A. Ompoc, Carmelito B. Bonayog, Sr., Anthony R. Apus, Cipriano B. Taganas, Evan B. Sabayanon, Teclo P. Mugot, as represented by Agustin M. Espirat, [all from Bolisong, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental].
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 201076), pp. 15-35. Filed on April 19, 2012.
[3] Id. at 37-45. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by Associate Justices Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan and Melchor Q. C. Sadang.
[4] Id. at 47-48.
[5] Id. at 58-60. Penned by DARAB Member Delfin B. Samson, and concurred in by Chairman Nasser C. Pangandaman and Members Nestor R. Acosta, Renato F. Herrera, Augusto P. Quijano, Edgar A. Igano, and Ma. Patricia P. Rualo-Bello.
[6] Id. at 39. TCT No. T-9454, CLOA No. 00208237 awarded to Agustin M. Espirat, et al.; TCT No. T-9453, CLOA No. 00208228 awarded to Eusebio U. Mejorada, et al.; and TCT No. 9455, CLOA No. 00208238 awarded to Carmelito B. Bonayog, et al. The awardees are impleaded as respondents in both cases.
[7] Id. at 53-57.
[8] Id. at 60.
[9] Id. at 97-99.
[10] Id. at 102-103.
[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 201631), pp. 14-33. Filed on May 25, 2012.
[12] Id. at 34-44. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by Associate Justices Melchor Q. C. Sadang and Pedro B. Corales.
[13] Id. at 45-46.
[14] Id. at 54-64. Penned by Presiding Judge Downey C. Valdevilla.
[15] Id. at 47-53. Penned by Presiding Judge Michelia O. Capadocia.
[16] Romy I. Norquillas in some parts of the rollo.
[17] Ticlo I. Norquillas in some parts of the rollo.
[18] Junny Clarin in some parts of the rollo.
[19] Arsenio Catil in some parts of the rollo.
[20] Id. at 66-68.
[21] Id. at 35.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id. Supra note 6 for more information on the TCTs and CLOAs.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Id. at 36.
[28] Id.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
[32] Id.
[33] Id.
[34] Id. at 47-53.
[35] Id. at 50.
[36] Id.
[37] Id. at 50-53.
[38] Rollo (G.R. No. 201631), p. 53.
[39] Id. at 54-64.
[40] Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes [THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980], as amended."
[41] Rollo (G.R. No. 201631), p. 62.
[42] Id. at 63.
[43] Id. at 34-44.
[44] Id. at 41.
[45] Id.
[46] Id.
[47] Id.
[48] Id.
[49] Id. at 40-41.
[50] Id. at 41.
[51] Id. at 43.
[52] Id.
[53] Id. at 45-46.
[54] Id. at 23.
[55] Id. at 23-24.
[56] Id. at 24.
[57] Id.
[58] Id. at 25.
[59] Id. at 27-28.
[60] Id. at 69-98.
[61] Id. at 80-86.
[62] Id. at 81.
[63] Id. at 85-86.
[64] Id. at 125-135.
[65] Id. at 136-151.
[66] Id. at 155-158.
[67] See Gomez v. People, G.R. No. 216824, November 10, 2020.
[68] Id.
[69] Gabrillo v. Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No. 234255, October 2, 2019.
[70] THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980, supra note 40.
[71] Barber v. Chua, G.R. No. 205630, January 12, 2021.
[72] See Nabo v. Buenviaje, G.R. No. 224906, October 7, 2020, citing Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 557, 578-579 (2004).
[73] Alcantara v. Dumacon-Hassan, G.R. No. 241701, September 16, 2020.
[74] Republic Act No. 6657, entitled "An Act Instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program to Promote Social Justice and Industrialization, Providing the Mechanism for its Implementation, and for Other Purposes [COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988)."
[75] Executive Order No. 129-A, entitled "Modifying Executive Order No. 129 Reorganizing and Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for Other Purposes."
[76] An Act Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), Extending the Acquisition and Distribution of All Agricultural Lands, Instituting Necessary Reforms, Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Otherwise Known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as Amended, and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
[77] See Octavio v. Perovano, 608 Phil. 378, 389 (2009). COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, as amended, Section 3(d), states that an "An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under [the CARL] and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
[78] 502 Phil. 626 (2005).
[79] Id. at 642.
[80] Id. at 645.
[81] Id. at 639.
[82] Id. at 645-647.
[83] Id. at 646. Letter of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa dated September 20, 2021, p. 8.
[84] Letter of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa dated September 20, 2021, p. 10.
[85] 826 Phil. 51 (2018).
[86] Id. at 62.
[87] Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as amended, section 50-A.
[88] Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca, 482 Phil. 208, 211 (2004).
[89] Reflections of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, pp. 4-5.
[90] Rollo (G.R. No. 201631), p. 36.
[91] Id. at 62.
[92] Id. at 40-41.
[93] Id. at 80-81.
[94] Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon, supra note 85.
[95] Rollo (G.R. No. 201631), pp. 41, 139.
[96] Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as amended, Section 3.
[97] See Philcontrust Resources, Inc. v. Aquino, G.R. No. 214714, October 7, 2020.
[98] Rollo (G.R. No. 201076), pp. 24, 136-151, and 155-158.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur with the ponencia that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Opol and El Salvador (MCTC) has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioner Angelina Dayrit (petitioner) against respondents Jose I. Norquillas, Rogelio I. Norquillas, Romie I. Norquillas, Herdanny I. Norquillas, Danilo M. Norquillas, Anthony Apus, Teclo P. Mugot, Allan A. Ompoc, Joni Clarin, Candelaria Mejorada, Lilia O. Taganas, Sylvia Sabayanon, Arsenio Catiil, Veronica Maestre, and Mario Tagaylo (respondents).
As a general rule, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129[1] provides that the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), and MCTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, viz.:
In 2009, RA 9700[7] amended RA 6657, adding Section 50-A. Essentially, the amendment reinforced the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR over cases involving agrarian disputes by mandating the automatic referral of cases by the judge or prosecutor to the DAR upon an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature, and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant,[8] viz.:
Essentially, an agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3 (d) of RA 6657 as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon[11] (Chailese), the Court clarified that the amendment introduced by RA 9700 should be applied retroactively. Thus, the automatic referral procedure applies "to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage":
However, it is discerned that despite the retroactive application of RA 9700 (which should have perforce triggered the automatic referral procedure), records show that the case is clearly agrarian in nature based on the submissions of the parties and hence, evidently outside the jurisdiction of the MCTC. In this limited instance, it is my view that the need to automatically refer the case to the DAR may be dispensed with and the first level courts may already proceed to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. As held in Chailese, the amendment brought about by RA 9700 (i.e., automatic referral procedure) is essentially procedural in nature and hence, despite its being contained in the statute, falls within the rule making authority of the Court. In Carpio-Morales v. CA,[14] this Court explained:
Here, it was sufficiently established, based on the submissions of the parties, that the case falls within the above-discussed exception which consequently validates the ponencia's disposition (albeit for different reasons) to dismiss (and not to automatically refer) the case. In particular, it was shown that:
(a) the subject lands formerly covered by two (2) certificates of title[18] in the name of petitioner have been covered by the CARP in 1993, and respondents, who are petitioner's farmworkers,[19] were awarded by the government three (3) certificates of land ownership award (CLOAs) over an aggregate of 16.6927-hectare (ha.) portion of the 27.4093 ha. lands in November 2001, and now hold certificates of title[20] (CLOA titles) over the said portions. Accordingly, petitioner's certificates of title were cancelled to the extent of the said portions;
(b) prior to the filing of the forcible entry case before the MCTC in 2006, petitioner filed before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, Cagayan de Oro City (PARAD) a petition for annulment of respondents' CLOAs[21] (annulment case), as well as a petition for CARP exemption of the 27.4093 ha. subject lands (exemption case);
(c) while the annulment case was initially granted by the PARAD in a Decision[22] dated December 22, 2004, it was eventually set aside on the ground of prematurity, and the petition was archived until the resolution of the exemption case.[23] Hence, respondents' CLOA titles remain valid and subsisting;
(d) subsequently, the DAR issued an Order[24] dated March 12, 2008 in the exemption case, excluding from CARP coverage a 21.3376 ha. portion of the subject lands, and placing under CARP the remaining 6.0717 ha. There is no information that the exemption case had been finally resolved; and
(e) on May 16, 2011, the DAR installed respondents over the 6.0717 ha. portion covered by TCT No. C-9453.[25]
Considering that respondents' CLOA titles are their asserted source of possessory rights over the said property, it is highly apparent that the issue of possession will ultimately impact the matter of whether or not the grant of CLOA in favor of respondents is valid.[26] As such, the case is inextricably intertwined with an agrarian dispute, or at least, incidental to the implementation of the CARP, which hence, clearly situates the same within the jurisdiction of the DAR, and conversely, outside of the jurisdiction of the MCTC. In consequence, pursuant to the framework explicated above, the need to automatically refer the case to the DAR pursuant to RA 9700 is dispensed with since the dismissal of the same is already warranted.
Notably, the ponencia arrives at the same conclusion to dismiss the case based on the following reasons:
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the petition. In light of the reasons above, Civil Case No. 2006-09-16 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Opol and El Salvador should be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
[1] Entitled "AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (August 14, 1981).
[2] Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"; approved on June 10, 1988.
[3] Hilado v. Chavez, 482 Phil. 104, 126 (2004). See also Dela Cruz v. Spouses Mendoza, 534 Phil. 642, 646 (2006).
[4] Heirs of Jose M. Cervantes v. Miranda, 641 Phil. 553, 560 (2010). See also Spouses Carpio v. Sebastian, 635 Phil. 1, 6-7 (2010), citing DAR v. Abdulwahid, 570 Phil. 356, 361 (2008).
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 561.
[7] Entitled "AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR"; approved on August 7, 2009.
[8] See Section 19 of RA 9700.
[9] See Section 10 of DAR Administrative Order No. 4, Series of 2009, entitled "RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING SECTION 19 OF R.A. No. 9700 (JURISDICTION ON AND REFERRAL OF AGRARIAN DISPUTE)"; signed on October 15, 2009.
[10] Id. at Section 11.
[11] 826 Phil. 51 (2018).
[12] Id. at 62.
[13] See rollo (G.R. No. 201631), p. 55.
[14] 772 Phil. 672 (2015).
[15] Id. at 733-736.
[16] Hilado v. Chavez, supra note 3. See also Dela Cruz v. Spouses Mendoza, supra note 3.
[17] Heirs of Jose M. Cervantes v. Miranda, supra note 4. See also Spouses Carpio v. Sebastian, supra note 4, citing DAR v. Abdulwahid, supra note 4.
[18] Consisting of the following:
[20] Consisting of the following:
[22] Id.
[23] See DARAB Resolution dated January 17, 2008; id. at 58-60. Penned by Member Delfin B. Samson with Members Augusto P. Quijano, Edgar A. Igano, and Ma. Patricia P. Rualo-Bello, concurring. Chairman Nasser C. Pangandaman and Members Nestor R. Acosta and Renator F. Herrera did not sign the Resolution. See also ponencia, p. 2.
[24] Id. at 65-69. Signed by OIC-Regional Director John M. Maruhom.
[25] See rollo (G.R. No. 201631), p. 72.
[26] Succinctly put, the issuance of CLOA titles in respondents' favor ostensibly vest on them a right to retain possession over the subject portions as an attribute of the ownership granted in their favor. A CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to the qualified farmer-beneficiary, and contains the restrictions and conditions of such grant. (See Dalit v. Balagtas, Sr., G.R. No. 202799, March 27, 2019, 898 SCRA 506, 521.)
[27] Ponencia, p. 16.
LEONEN, J.:
Any adjudication on the rights of the parties in this case must rest on the fact that the lands subject of this dispute are now covered by the government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. As early as 1993, petitioner's Original Certificate of Title and Transfer Certificate Title had already been cancelled, and new titles pursuant to Certificates of Land Ownership Award were issued to respondents.[1]
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the rulings of the trial courts in the forcible entry suit, citing the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board's primary jurisdiction. It said that the Adjudication Board is tasked to try and decide disputes relating to the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.[2] The Court of Appeals noted that Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 confers this jurisdiction on the Department of Agrarian Reform:
I agree with the ponencia's observation that the reason for denying the Department of Agrarian Reform's jurisdiction in David v. Cordova[5] was because the issue was not even an agrarian dispute in the first place. David is thus not controlling in this case. David states that "the instant case does not involve the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter nor an agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the [Department of Agrarian Reform]. As such, possessory actions involving the land in dispute rightfully falls within the jurisdiction of the [First Municipal Circuit Trial Court]."[6]
Therefore, David sustaining the regular courts' jurisdiction is not a rejection of the Department of Agrarian Reform's jurisdiction over agrarian disputes under Section 50-A of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, but a finding that the lack of an agrarian dispute removes the case from the agency's jurisdiction. Moreover, David only involved an ejectment complaint and the parties to that case did not have a pending case before the Department of Agrarian Reform. The lack of an agrarian dispute in David clearly differentiates it from the case at bar.
To recall, the issue in this case began because of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award—and subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title—issued to respondents under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner's titles over the 16.6927-hectare property were cancelled and new ones were issued to respondents pursuant to the program.[7] It was on this basis that respondents occupied the property.[8] While it is true that the issue here concerns possession, this question of possession remains inextricably connected to an agrarian dispute. The facts of this case establish this.
Thus, I reiterate Court of Appeals' observation that "[c]learly, the issue of possession in this case is linked to an agrarian dispute. [Respondents] would not have entered the subject properties if not for the award (CLOAs) given to them by the government under its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program."[9] Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that there was a pending appeal before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board for the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award. The issue in such appeal should have prevented the Municipal Circuit Trial Court from ruling on the ejectment case as it might result in conflicting decisions.
This Court previously pronounced that mere allegation of tenancy before the first level courts does not automatically remove the case from the courts' jurisdiction.[10] However, such rule does not obtain in this case. The facts here as established distinctly show its connection to an agrarian dispute. Petitioner herself even filed a petition before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board over the same parcels of land and against the same parties, impliedly admitting that the dispute is undeniably agrarian in nature.
In Spouses Tirona v. Alejo,[11] a case decided even prior to the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 9700, this Court noted the existence of a case for the recovery of possession of the disputed property filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, as well as two cases for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court. It observed that a resolution in the case before the Adjudication Board would necessarily resolve the question of possession in the forcible entry case. Thus, "the issue of possession was inextricably intertwined with the agrarian dispute, an issue which was beyond the jurisdiction and competence of the inferior court to settle."[12] Under the concept of litis pendentia, Spouses Tirona ruled that the pendency of the case before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board barred the filing of the forcible entry cases.[13]
Spouses Tirona was reiterated in Hilado v. Chavez,[14] also decided before the amendments by Republic Act No. 9700, where the Court ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities loses jurisdiction over an ejectment case if, after receiving evidence, it determines that the real issue is tenancy, as alleged in the pleadings:
The more recent case of Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon[17] is also instructive. Chailese involved a complaint for recovery of possession filed before the Regional Trial Court, and a prior case for conversion of agrarian land to commercial and light industrial uses filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform. The Regional Trial Court initially dismissed the complaint for recovery of possession, saying that the issue was "intertwined with the propriety of conversion and compliance with the agreement on disturbance compensation, issues that are yet to be resolved with finality by the [Department of Agrarian Reform]," but resolved on reconsideration to proceed with trial.[18]
During the pendency of the original action in Chailese, Republic Act No. 9700 took effect, mandating the automatic referral of cases to the Department of Agrarian Reform "[i]f there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant[.]"[19] Thus, Dizon et al. moved to refer the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform, citing the amendment of the law. The Regional Trial Court denied the motion, but on certiorari, the Court of Appeals found merit in the argument.[20]
On this point, this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in Chailese, saying that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 9700 merely confirmed the existing jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform under the original law: "[s]imply, [Republic Act] No. 9700 does not deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of the [Department of Agrarian Reform] set forth under Section 50 of [Republic Act] No. 6657."[21] Moreover, the specific amendment on the referral of cases by the regular courts to the Department of Agrarian Reform is "essentially procedural in nature [and] is deemed to apply to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage," and is applicable to the case.[22]
Indeed, a well-recognized exception to the prospective application of laws is when the statute is a procedural law:
However, in this case, I agree with the ponencia that both requirements under Chailese were met.
First, respondents' consistent allegations that the dispute is agrarian in nature is on record. The allegations were already present in their Answer before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.[27] They restate these in their Comment filed before this Court.[28]
Second, the ponencia also refers to the Court of Appeals' and the Secretary of Agrarian Reform's recognition of respondents' status as farmers.[29] This fact was never disputed by petitioner. The award of the lands in respondents' favor by virtue of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award also affirms that the dispute is agrarian in nature.[30] Moreover, as mentioned earlier, petitioner herself even filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board a Petition for Cancellation of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award covering the same parcels of land.
Undeniably, the factual context of this case demonstrates that it is impossible to resolve the issue of possession without considering the agrarian nature of the dispute. This is precisely the reason why the amendment in Republic Act No. 9700 was introduced—to clarify that, in resolving agrarian disputes, which principally involve issues on the ownership of lands, incidents relating to who can possess the property will also necessarily arise. To ensure a comprehensive resolution of the issues, the Department of Agrarian Reform's jurisdiction over these types of cases was reaffirmed. We therefore sustain the Department of Agrarian Reform's jurisdiction in this case to the exclusion of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
A mechanical application of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court's jurisdiction over regular ejectment cases in this case would be a betrayal of the primary purpose of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. It would be close to ignoring what is obvious on the records. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law as well as its amendments are social justice measures mandated by the Constitution towards an equitable distribution and ownership of land.[31] A formalistic reading of it, divorced from the case's factual milieu, will not resolve the very core of the issue. This Court must always be conscious of this mandate when deciding cases that ultimately affect those the Constitution and the law intend to protect.
As a final note, I observe that petitioner's filing of multiple cases prevented respondents' full enjoyment of their rights to their parcels of land. The case for the cancellation of the certificates of land ownership award before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board was ultimately sought to dispossess respondents of their properties. Similarly, the complaint for forcible entry intends the same goal.
On the one hand, these legal remedies are available to any litigant for the enforcement of their rights. But when one looks at the power relationship between landlord and tenant, as in this case, it reveals that the ulterior motive is not to win the case, but to add to respondents' burden in defending their rights. The enforcement and defense of rights in our courts and agencies necessarily entail costs, financial or otherwise, and not all are able to bear these burdens equally.
Suits that stifle rights imbued with public interest are frowned upon. In our jurisdiction, strategic lawsuits against public participation or SLAPP suits are recognized as obnoxious schemes that deter the assertion of environmental rights.[32] But the concept of SLAPP suits as generally understood is not exclusive to environmental laws.[33] In legal issues where the public interest is at stake, similar kinds of lawsuits should be met with disapproval. This, too, should apply to agrarian reform cases.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petitions.
[1] Ponencia, p. 4.
[2] Id. at 6.
[3] Executive Order No. 129-A (1987), sec. 13.
[4] Department of Agrarian Reform Rules of Procedure (2003), Rule II, sec. 1.
[5] 502 Phil. 626 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
[6] Id. at 647. Citations omitted.
[7] Rollo, p. 41.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 41-42.
[10] See Ofilada v. Spouses Andal, 752 Phil. 27, 44 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]. Similar to the case at bar, the dispute in Ofilada arose prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9700 in 2009, which amended Republic Act No. 6657 to extend the acquisition and distribution of agricultural lands.
[11] 419 Phil. 285 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
[12] Id. at 303.
[13] Id.
[14] 482 Phil. 104 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
[15] Id. at 126-127. See also Bayog v. Natino, 327 Phil. 1019 (1996) [Per J. Davide Jr., Third Division].
[16] Rollo, p. 43.
[17] 826 Phil. 51 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
[18] Id. at 56-57.
[19] Id. at 61. See Republic Act No. 9700 (2009), Section 19 amended Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657 (1988) by adding Section 50-A.
[20] Id. at 58.
[21] Id. at 62.
[22] Id.
[23] See Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 556, 570 (2002) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
[24] Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon, 826 Phil. 51, 62 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
[25] Ponencia, p. 13.
[26] Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon, 826 Phil. 51, 63 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
[27] Ponencia, p. 15.
[28] Id.
[29] Id. at 15-16.
[30] Id. at 4. See Republic Act No. 6657 (1988). Section 22 on the qualified beneficiaries of the Program.
[31] CONST., art. XIII, sec. 4. The State, shall by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
[32] A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC (2010), Rule 1, sec. 4(g). Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) refers to an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person, institution or any government agency or local government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights.
[33] GEORGE W. PRING AND PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 8-9 (1996). While A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases creates an anti-SLAPP suit remedy by raising it as an affirmative defense, this remedy is not available in agrarian reform cases. However, the policy of social justice and the recognition that agrarian relationships and the disputes that arise from them are imbued with public interest ought to persuade this Court to adopt the same attitude of disapproval. The term SLAPP was first coined by Professors Penelope Canan and George W. Pring. It is defined as "a lawsuit... involv[ing] communications made to influence a governmental action or outcome, which ... resulted in (a) a civil complaint or counterclaim (b) filed against nongovernment individuals or organizations ... on (c) a substantive issue of some public interest or social significance."
CAGUIOA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari (Petition) stems from a complaint for forcible entry (Complaint) filed by petitioner Angelina Dayrit against herein named respondents before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. It assails the January 27, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03121 which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The ponencia resolves to deny the Petition based on the finding that the present case for forcible entry is an agrarian dispute cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its adjudicatory arm, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).[1]
I concur.
I submit this opinion only to further clarify the interplay between the jurisdiction of the first level courts over summary actions for ejectment as conferred by the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980[2] (Batas Pambansa Blg. [BP] 129), and the jurisdiction of the DAR over agrarian disputes, vested by Republic Act No. (RA) 6657,[3] as amended by RA 9700.[4]
As emphasized by the ponencia, jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court or a tribunal to hear, try and decide a case before it. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for.[5] Hence, as a starting point, reference to the statutes governing jurisdiction over summary actions for ejectment on the one hand, and agrarian disputes on the other, is proper.
Section 33 of BP 129, passed in 1980, states in part:
As pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Section 50 was later amended by RA 9700 which was passed in 2009. As its title implies, RA 9700 was passed to strengthen the State's comprehensive agrarian reform program.[7]
Among the amendments implemented through RA 9700 are those which relate to the afore-quoted Section 50 of RA 6657.
Foremost, Section 18 of RA 9700 amended the last paragraph of Section 50 of RA 6657 by carving out an exception to the immediately executory nature of DAR decisions, thus:
Thus, under Section 50-A, referral to the DAR shall be mandatory when: (i) there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant. Notably, the conditions that trigger the mandatory referral mechanism mirror the elements of an agrarian dispute as reflected in its statutory definition under RA 6657, that is, any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Through this mechanism, DAR is given the opportunity to make a preliminary determination on the nature of the case so referred precisely to avert situations where cases involving agrarian disputes are resolved by the first level courts, resulting in null and void decisions rendered without jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the preliminary determination of the DAR that a case is not an agrarian dispute does not preclude the courts from later dismissing the case in question for lack of jurisdiction if it later becomes apparent during trial that the case is, in fact, agrarian in nature which must be resolved by the DAR at the first instance. Conversely, a preliminary determination by the DAR that the case is an agrarian dispute does not preclude it from referring the case back to the regular courts if its preliminary determination is later negated by the matters that come to fore during its own proceedings. To stress, jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for. Thus, if further proceedings reveal that the nature of the case differs from how it had been initially characterized, it becomes incumbent upon the adjudicative body concerned to dismiss the case, as any decision rendered without jurisdiction shall be null and void.
Hence, lest there be any confusion, it should be clarified that the mandatory referral mechanism does not limit the jurisdiction of the referring court or DARAB, as the case may be, to subsequently take cognizance of cases properly falling within their respective jurisdictions when the preliminary determination made pursuant to the mandatory referral mechanism is later found to be erroneous. To be sure, a contrary interpretation would effectively defeat the jurisdiction vested by law upon the adjudicative body concerned.
Reconciling David and Chailese
After the passage of RA 6657 and the subsequent amendments set forth in RA 9700, confusion ensued as to whether subject matter jurisdiction over actions for ejectment involving agricultural lands placed under the CARP remained with the first level courts. This confusion appears to stem from an erroneous interpretation of the Court's ruling in David v. Cordova[9] (David) and the seemingly contrary ruling in Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon[10] (Chailese). While these cases are often viewed to be at odds, a cursory reading of these decisions show that they can, in fact, be reconciled.
In David, the Court was called upon to determine whether the MCTC may take cognizance of an action for forcible entry involving public agricultural land. There, petitioner Leonardo David (Leonardo) filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondents Nelson and Danny Cordova (collectively, the Cordovas). The complaint alleged that Leonardo is co-owner of a certain parcel of land denominated as Lot 774. Sometime in 1997, Leonardo purportedly discovered that the Cordovas had forcibly entered Lot 774 and had begun constructing improvements thereon. Subsequently, Leonardo demanded that the Cordovas vacate and cease construction to no avail. Thus, Leonardo filed said complaint before the MCTC.
For their part, the Cordovas averred that Leonardo is not a co-owner of Lot 774, as said lot is owned by the government. They added that Lot 774 forms part of the Dinalupihan Landed Estate which had been placed under the administration of the DAR. On this score, the Cordovas argued that the complaint falls under the jurisdiction of the DAR as Lot 774 had been earmarked for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
The MCTC and RTC were one in finding that Leonardo's complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. However, the CA reversed, noting that Lot 774 was subject of a pending "application for purchase" filed by respondent Danny with the DAR. Leonardo thus filed a Rule 45 petition before the Court assailing the CA's Decision.
The Court ruled in favor of Leonardo and reversed the Decision of the CA. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court held:
On the other hand, in Chailese, Chailese Development Co., Inc. (CDCI) filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) concerning 10 parcels of land registered in its name. The complaint was filed against 51 defendants. In its complaint, CDCI alleged that the defendants therein were illegally occupying the disputed lots. Eight of these defendants stood as respondents in Chailese.
Respondents filed their answer claiming that the case fell under the jurisdiction of the DAR. Respondents claimed that they were tenants of the disputed lots. However, without their knowledge and consent, the disputed lots were transferred to CDCI in order to avoid compulsory distribution under RA 6657. After a series of motions, the case was eventually set for pre-trial. Meanwhile, RA 9700 took effect which, as discussed, amended RA 6657.
On the basis of the mandatory referral mechanism under Section 50-A, respondents filed a motion seeking to refer the case to the DAR. However, the RTC denied said motion for lack of merit. The CA reversed on certiorari and directed the referral of the case to DAR for proper disposition. CDCI thus filed a Rule 45 petition before the Court assailing such referral.
The Court ruled in favor of CDCI, reasoning as follows:
As clarified in Chailese, a dispute is agrarian in nature and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the DAR, when: (i) there is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or agricultural tenant. Conversely, when either of these two elements is absent, the dispute is not agrarian in nature and thus remains under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. As explained, these are the very same elements that trigger the mandatory referral mechanism under Section 50-A of RA 6657.
A close reading of the circumstances in David and Chailese shows that the pronouncements therein are consistent with each other. In both cases, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the regular courts as the controversies involved therein were not agrarian disputes.
In Chailese, the Court held that the controversy therein was not an agrarian dispute as respondents therein failed to present proof that they were farmers, farmworkers, or agricultural tenants. Hence the second requirement necessary to vest jurisdiction in the DAR was absent. Albeit not discussed in detail in the Decision, the controversy in David also did not qualify as an agrarian dispute as the Cordovas similarly failed to show that they were farmers, farmworkers, or agricultural tenants. As in Chailese, the second requirement necessary to vest jurisdiction in the DAR was also absent.
The confusion appears to stem from the emphasis placed by David on the summary nature of ejectment proceedings. To quote:
As clarified in Chailese, RA 6657 vests the DAR with exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. As explained, a dispute is agrarian in nature when: (i) there is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or agricultural tenant. The jurisdiction of the DAR attaches only when these two elements concur.
Hence, the interplay between RA 6657 vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of the first level courts over ejectment cases can be laid out as follows — the first level courts have original jurisdiction over all ejectment cases, except those involving agrarian disputes. Pursuant to the specific provisions of RA 6657, said agrarian disputes fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. The same principle applies with respect to subject matter jurisdiction over ordinary possessory actions. The regular courts have jurisdiction over ordinary possessory actions, except those involving agrarian disputes which fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR.
As aptly stressed by the ponencia, the controlling aspect which determines jurisdiction over ejectment cases is the nature of the dispute.[14] By explicit provision of Section 50-A of RA 6657, DAR is charged with the duty to make a preliminary determination on the nature of the dispute through the mandatory referral mechanism. However, as earlier emphasized, this preliminary determination does not operate to preclude the referring court or DARAB, as the case may be, to subsequently take cognizance of cases properly falling within their respective jurisdictions when the preliminary determination made pursuant to the mandatory referral mechanism is later found to be erroneous.
Contextualizing the Pitargue ruling
It is significant to note that the concerns expressed by the Court in Pitargue v. Sorilla[15] (Pitargue), which had been quoted by the Court extensively in David, were raised in 1952. At such time, the authority of what was known as the Lands Department was limited to the administration, disposition, and alienation of public lands.[16] The Court's observations as to the Land Department's lack of authority to "stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace" were, at the time, well founded.[17]
However, it should be stressed that, at present, the 2021 DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure provide:
To reiterate once more, a dispute is agrarian in nature when: (i) there is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is proven to be a farmer, farmworker, or agricultural tenant. The concurrence of these two elements places the dispute under the jurisdiction of the DAR.
Proceeding from the foregoing, it is clear that the CA correctly ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction since the elements of an agrarian dispute unequivocally concur.
As to the first element, the ponencia aptly notes that respondents have consistently alleged that the issues herein stem from an agrarian dispute, inasmuch as they anchor their physical possession on their respective Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).[18] Moreover, as emphasized by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations, petitioner herself previously filed before the DARAB a Petition for Cancellation of the CLOAs issued in favor of respondents, as well as a Petition for CARP exemption involving the disputed lands. The CLOAs subject of these DARAB cases are the very same ones assailed by petitioner in the present case. The prior filing of the DARAB cases thus shows that petitioner herself recognizes that the issues involved herein are agrarian in nature.
As to the second element, I submit that the subsistence of the CLOAs in the names of respondents sufficiently serve as evidence of respondents' status as tenants, farmers, or farmworkers. To note, Section 24 of RA 6657 specifies those who are qualified to stand as beneficiaries of the CARP, thus:
Considering that the two elements of an agrarian dispute concur, I find the dismissal of the Complaint proper. Accordingly, I vote to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the January 27, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
[1] Ponencia, p. 16.
[2] AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as "THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980," approved on August 14, 1981, as amended by Republic Act No. 11576, AN ACT FURTHER EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980," As AMENDED, approved on July 30, 2021.
[3] AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as the "COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988," approved on June 10, 1988.
[4] AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT No. 6657, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, approved on August 7, 2009.
[5] Ponencia, p. 8.
[6] RA 6657, Sec. 3(d).
[7] Supra note 4.
[8] Section 57 of RA 6657 prescribes the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Special Agrarian Courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation, and all criminal offenses punishable thereunder.
[9] 502 Phil. 626 (2005).
[10] 826 Phil. 51 (2018).
[11] David v. Cordova, supra note 9, at 645-647. Citation omitted.
[12] Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon, supra note 10, at 60-65.
[13] David v. Cordova, supra note 9, at 646-650.
[14] Ponencia, p. 13.
[15] 92 Phil. 5 (1952).
[16] Id. at 11-12.
[17] See id. at 12.
[18] Ponencia, p. 15.
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
I agree with the ponencia that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), not the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, has jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint against respondents for forcible entry, considering that the case involves an agrarian dispute. This is in accordance with Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon[1] and the amendment introduced in 2009 by Republic Act No. 9700[2] (RA 9700) to Republic Act No. 6657[3] (RA 6657). Chailese pertinently ordained:
The exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR over agrarian cases was further amplified by the amendment introduced by Section 19 of RA 9700 to Section 50. The provision reads:
Thence, having settled that Section 19 of RA 9700 is applicable in this controversy, the Court now proceeds with the examination of such amendment. Based on the said provision, the judge or prosecutor is obligated to automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the following requisites are present:
The allegations in petitioner's complaint make a case for recovery of possession, over which the regular courts have jurisdiction. In response thereto, however, the respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim, assailing the jurisdiction of the regular court to rule on the matter on the ground that it is agrarian in nature, which thus complies with the first requisite, viz.:
The pertinent portion of Section 19 of RA 9700 reads:
Had it been the intention that compliance with the second element would likewise be sufficient by a mere allegation from one of the parties that he or she is a farmer, farm worker, or tenant, the legislature should have used the plural form when referring to "allegation" as the concurrence of both requisites is mandatory for the automatic referral clause to operate.
Further instructive is this Court's ruling in the previously cited case of Chico. Therein, the Court held that for the purpose of divesting regular courts of its jurisdiction in the proceedings lawfully began before it and in order for the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the elements of a tenancy relationship must be shown by adequate proof. It is not enough that the elements are alleged.[5] Likewise, self-serving statements in the pleadings are inadequate.
Section 3 (d) of RA 6657 as amended defines an "agrarian dispute" as:
Their action to sneak into the landholdings and petitioner's court case involved incidents arising from their landlord-tenant relationship.[6] This too is amply documented in the ponencia. Thus, the second requisite is present.
Indeed, there would have been no dispute between the parties and no present cases before us (before the Court resolved to deconsolidate G.R. No. 201076 from G.R. No. 201631) had it not been for their agrarian relationship and agrarian contest at the DAR through the DARAB.
Under the 2009 amendment to RA 6657, it is the DAR through the DARAB that has subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioner's ejectment case.
It may be true that respondents had been issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs). Ordinarily, they would have already acquired vested rights of absolute ownership over the landholdings and would have already ceased to be mere tenants.[7] But the CLOAs did not attain finality. Petitioner initiated and in fact won a petition for annulment of these CLOAs at the PARAD level. She also applied for exemption of the landholdings from CARP coverage at DAR. This application has been granted. Just like the CLOAs, nonetheless, the annulment of the CLOAs and the exemption of the landholdings from CARP coverage have not become final and executory. All these incidents mean that the agrarian relationship and agrarian dispute have not been terminated. As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR through the DARAB.[8]
Insofar as the case is concerned, neither the first nor the second level courts had then the benefit of Section 50-A of RA 6657 as amended – they did not have then the mandate to refer the dispute to the DAR for certification as an agrarian or non-agrarian dispute. In any event, our doctrine is that this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or by the courts.[9] As we have consistently held: "Laws can only be amended by a subsequent law, and nothing that parties do in any case can change it. Thus, the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised even for the first time on appeal, not simply because it is jurisdiction over the subject matter, but mainly because it is the law that prescribes it."[10]
THUS, I vote to DISMISS the Petition in G.R. No. 201631 and AFFIRM the January 27, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03121. I also vote to reverse and set aside the April 17, 2007 Decision of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental in Civil Case No. 2000-09-16, as well as the December 10, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Cagayan de Oro City in Civil Case No. 2007-116 affirming the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court's (MCTC) Decision.
[1] G.R. No. 206788, February 14, 2018.
[2] AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, OTHERWISE, KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.
[3] AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
[4] 348 Phil. 37, 43 (1998).
[5] See supra note 4.
[6] See Ofilada v. Spouses Andal, 752 Phil. 27 (2015).
[7] See Bumagat v. Arribay, 735 Phil. 27 (2014).
[8] Spouses Amurao v. Spouses Villalobos, 524 Phil. 762, 773 (2006).
[9] See Republic v. Mangotara, 638 Phil. 353 (2010).
[10] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Corporation v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019.
Section 19. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding Section 50-A to read as follows:As can be gleaned from these laws, the MCTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry, while the DARAB has primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, as related to the instant case, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture and transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries.[77] The amended CARL adds that the judge or prosecutor shall automatically refer the case to the DAR if there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature, and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker or tenant.
"Sec. 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. — No court or prosecutor's office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, That from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court, and in cases referred by the regional trial court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals.
"In cases where regular courts or quasi-judicial bodies have competent jurisdiction, agrarian reform beneficiaries or identified beneficiaries and/or their associations shall have legal standing and interest to intervene concerning their individual or collective rights and/or interests under the CARP."
"The fact of non-registration of such associations with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or Cooperative Development Authority, or any concerned government agency shall not be used against them to deny the existence of their legal standing and interest in a case filed before such courts and quasi-judicial bodies."
Relevantly, in the case of David v. Cordova[78] (David), the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the MCTC over a complaint for forcible entry. The Court found that complainant therein sufficiently alleged in his complaint that he had prior physical possession of the property and that he was unlawfully deprived thereof.[79] The Court also discussed that the alleged public character of the land does not deprive the first-level court of jurisdiction over the forcible entry case.[80] The appellate court held that the courts lack jurisdiction because the land in question is allegedly a public agricultural land.[81] In this wise, the Court held:
Next, the point that the property in dispute is public land. The matter is of no moment and does not operate to divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry involving such property. Indeed, the public character of the land does not preclude inferior courts from exercising jurisdiction over forcible entry cases. We have ruled in the case of Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et al., that the land spoken of in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural or mineral. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.From this disquisition, it seems that courts have exclusive jurisdiction on all ejectment cases, including those lands that are "public in character." This is not the case, however. As observed by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa), the seeming confusion is brought about by this portion of David:
Moreover, ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings only intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. Our ruling in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals illustrates this point, thus:The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is — who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.Also worth noting is the case of Pitargue v. Sevilla, wherein, as in this case, the government owned the land in dispute. The government did not authorize either the plaintiff or the defendant in the forcible entry case to occupy the land. Both parties were in effect squatting on government property. Yet we upheld the court's jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession even if title remained with the government.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.
Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical possession because of the public need to preserve the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances.
Thus, the better rule is that even while the power of administration and disposition of public or private agricultural lands belongs to DAR, courts retain jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry involving such lands. To restate this, courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or private agricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession as this issue is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of such lands which should be threshed out in DAR.
In addition, the instant case does not involve the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter nor an agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction of DAR. As such, possessory actions involving the land in dispute rightfully falls within the jurisdiction of the [First Municipal Circuit Trial Court].[82] (Citations omitted)
Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical possession because of the public need to preserve the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances.It must be stressed that David did not lay down the rule that all ejectment cases, whether involving an agrarian dispute or not, are cognizable by the first-level courts. As Justice Caguioa has pointed out, the reason why the Court sustained the MCTC's jurisdiction therein is not because the case is summary in nature, but because it does not involve an agrarian dispute.[84] David clearly states that the dispute therein is not an agrarian matter. Also, there is indeed an allegation that the land is public in nature - this was even discussed in the ruling. However, the land being public in character is completely separate from the existence of an agrarian dispute. When a dispute involves a public land, it does not necessarily amount to an agrarian dispute; an agrarian dispute is specifically defined in the law.
Thus, the better rule is that even while the power of administration and disposition of public or private agricultural lands belongs to DAR, courts retain jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry involving such lands. To restate this, courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or private agricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession as this issue is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of such lands which should be threshed out in DAR.[83] (Citations omitted)
Thus, David should not be understood that jurisdiction on ejectment cases of whatever nature falls on first-level courts; it should be read and understood to provide that first-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is public in character as long as the case is not an agrarian dispute. The public character of the land does not divest the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases. However, if the ejectment case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will be divested of jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended. The controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of the subject land.
Then there is the more recent case of Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon[85] (Chailese), which clarifies the jurisdiction of the DARAB over agrarian disputes:
Thence, having settled that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 is applicable in this controversy, the Court now proceeds with the examination of such amendment. Based on the said provision, the judge or prosecutor is obligated to automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the following requisites are present:RA 9700 reinforced the jurisdiction of DAR as already provided in the original CARL. It made clear the requisites for a case to be considered to be an agrarian dispute. It also mandated the automatic referral upon concurrence of the requisites. In Chailese, the Court retroactively applied RA 9700 to the case and ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction over the possessory action due to absence of evidence on the existence of a tenancy relation, thus failing to satisfy the second requisite.
a. There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and
b. One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.[86]
Based on the foregoing, David and Chailese can be viewed as guides for the courts in tackling ejectment and possessory actions allegedly involving agrarian disputes. David instructs that not all ejectment cases are cognizable by the first-level courts - those involving agrarian disputes are not cognizable by the first-level courts. In this relation, Chailese clarifies the requisites for an agrarian dispute, and highlights the mandate of the amendatory law of automatic referral of cases involving agrarian disputes to the DAR.
Retroactive application of RA 9700 and Chailese on cases before first-level courts |
Chailese further provides for the retroactive application of Section 50-A of RA 9700:
In this regard, it must be said that there is no merit in the contention of petitioner that the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9700 cannot be applied retroactively in the case at bar. Primarily, a cursory reading of the provision readily reveals that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 merely highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR to rule on agrarian cases by adding a clause which mandates the automatic referral of cases upon the existence of the requisites therein stated. Simply, R.A. No. 9700 does not deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of the DAR set forth under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Moreover, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, as the amendment is essentially procedural in nature it is deemed to apply to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.Chailese states that RA 9700 merely highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR already provided in the CARL in requiring the automatic referral of cases to it. Further, this amendment is procedural in nature that can be applied to pending cases before RA 9700's passage. The Court thus applied the amendment in ruling that the complaint, even if filed prior to the amendatory law's passage, is cognizable by the RTC.
While Chailese involves a complaint for recovery of possession and damages filed before the RTC, there is no reason to not apply RA 9700 retroactively to cases before the first-level courts, such as complaints for forcible entry. After all, the amendment did not distinguish and it mentions of municipal trial courts: "[I]n cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court xxx"[87] To add, the Court has once stated that any doubts as to the jurisdiction of the DAR on the implementation of the CARP should be resolved in its favor, as the law has granted it special authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.[88]
Thus, the Court can apply RA 9700 to the instant case.
Application to the instant case.
Guided by David and Chailese, the Court now resolves the instant case.
Preliminarily, as found by the trial courts and the appellate court in the instant case, it is undisputed that the allegations in the complaint herein pertain to forcible entry. However, pursuant to David, it is not automatic that the MCTC has jurisdiction over the forcible entry case. There is a need to determine if the case involves an agrarian dispute.
From this, the Court rules that the MCTC has no jurisdiction on the instant complaint for forcible entry. As pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, this case meets the two requirements for automatic referral, as set out by RA 9700 and as summarized in Chailese.[89] Thus, the Court finds that the case is cognizable by the DAR through the DARAB.
The first requirement is the presence of an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature. Here, despite the filing of the forcible entry case, respondents have been consistent on alleging that the controversy is agrarian in nature. In their answer filed before the MCTC, they alleged that the land in dispute were awarded to them as CARP beneficiaries.[90] The RTC, on appeal, also touched upon matters of allegations of agrarian dispute in relation with jurisdiction of the courts.[91] The CA also did the same and in fact dismissed the complaint after finding that the issue of possession was linked to an agrarian dispute brought by the issuance of CLOAs to respondents.[92] In their comment filed before this Court, respondents maintain that the case is an agrarian dispute.[93]
As stated by RA 9700, mere allegation of the existence of an agrarian dispute is enough. In this case, this requirement was met when respondents made consistent allegations of the existence of an agrarian dispute pursuant to the CLOAs issued to them.
As to the second requirement, Chailese adds that proof must be adduced as to the person's status as farmer, farmworker, or tenant.[94] In this case, it is undisputed that respondents are farmers of the subject lands. Indeed, the records did not expressly show any agreement of whatever kind that respondents were farmers of Angelina's lands. However, the CA and the DAR Secretary (in the exemption from CARP case) here recognized the status of respondents as farmers.[95] This was not disputed by Angelina. Further, their status as farmers was cemented by the subsequent award of Angelina's lands to them by virtue of CLOAs. This is also shown by the cases Angelina initiated regarding the annulment of CLOAs, exemption from CARP coverage, and this forcible entry case. Thus, the second requirement is met.
In any case, even without the mandate of automatic referral at that time, the MCTC should have dismissed the case after hearing the parties as the law is clear prior to the amendment that the DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction on agrarian disputes involving transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries.[96] CLOAs were issued to respondents being the beneficiaries of CARP. Recipients of CLOAs acquire ownership of the lands awarded.[97] As respondents entered the subject parcel of lands by virtue of the CLOAs, this entry, despite being characterized by Angelina as forcible entry, is clearly a controversy relating to and arising from the terms and conditions of transfer of ownership to agrarian reform beneficiaries.
The Court, therefore, agrees with the CA in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction over the instant case for forcible entry for being an agrarian dispute.
Nonetheless, the Court is aware that Angelina herself also availed of remedies by moving for the cancellation of the CLOAs and requesting for the exemption of the subject lands from CARP coverage. The Court takes note of the DAR Secretary's June 8, 2011 Decision and January 19, 2012 Resolution of the DAR Secretary exempting her parcels of land from CARP coverage.[98] However, as based from the records, these suits have not yet attained conclusion or finality; thus, the rights of the parties may still change. Still, the Court must resolve the instant case as it still presents a justiciable controversy regarding jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 201076 is ordered DECONSOLIDATED from G.R. No. 201631. The Petition in G.R. No. 201631 is hereby DENIED. The January 27, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03121-MIN are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C. J., Carandang, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Marquez, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see Separate Concurring Opinion.
Leonen, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.
Caguioa, J., See Concurring Opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J., See Separate Opinion.
Dimaampao, J., on official leave but voted.
[1] Angelina Dayrit, represented by Julie E. Dayrit, v. Eusebio U. Mejorada, Jose I. Norquillas, Rogelio I. Norquillas, Romie I. Norquillas, Herdanny I. Norquillas, Danilo M. Norquillas, represented by Eusebio U. Mejorada, Agustin M. Espirat, Felomino M. Nob, Allan A. Ompoc, Carmelito B. Bonayog, Sr., Anthony R. Apus, Cipriano B. Taganas, Evan B. Sabayanon, Teclo P. Mugot, as represented by Agustin M. Espirat, [all from Bolisong, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental].
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 201076), pp. 15-35. Filed on April 19, 2012.
[3] Id. at 37-45. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by Associate Justices Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan and Melchor Q. C. Sadang.
[4] Id. at 47-48.
[5] Id. at 58-60. Penned by DARAB Member Delfin B. Samson, and concurred in by Chairman Nasser C. Pangandaman and Members Nestor R. Acosta, Renato F. Herrera, Augusto P. Quijano, Edgar A. Igano, and Ma. Patricia P. Rualo-Bello.
[6] Id. at 39. TCT No. T-9454, CLOA No. 00208237 awarded to Agustin M. Espirat, et al.; TCT No. T-9453, CLOA No. 00208228 awarded to Eusebio U. Mejorada, et al.; and TCT No. 9455, CLOA No. 00208238 awarded to Carmelito B. Bonayog, et al. The awardees are impleaded as respondents in both cases.
[7] Id. at 53-57.
[8] Id. at 60.
[9] Id. at 97-99.
[10] Id. at 102-103.
[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 201631), pp. 14-33. Filed on May 25, 2012.
[12] Id. at 34-44. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by Associate Justices Melchor Q. C. Sadang and Pedro B. Corales.
[13] Id. at 45-46.
[14] Id. at 54-64. Penned by Presiding Judge Downey C. Valdevilla.
[15] Id. at 47-53. Penned by Presiding Judge Michelia O. Capadocia.
[16] Romy I. Norquillas in some parts of the rollo.
[17] Ticlo I. Norquillas in some parts of the rollo.
[18] Junny Clarin in some parts of the rollo.
[19] Arsenio Catil in some parts of the rollo.
[20] Id. at 66-68.
[21] Id. at 35.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] Id. Supra note 6 for more information on the TCTs and CLOAs.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Id. at 36.
[28] Id.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
[32] Id.
[33] Id.
[34] Id. at 47-53.
[35] Id. at 50.
[36] Id.
[37] Id. at 50-53.
[38] Rollo (G.R. No. 201631), p. 53.
[39] Id. at 54-64.
[40] Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes [THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980], as amended."
[41] Rollo (G.R. No. 201631), p. 62.
[42] Id. at 63.
[43] Id. at 34-44.
[44] Id. at 41.
[45] Id.
[46] Id.
[47] Id.
[48] Id.
[49] Id. at 40-41.
[50] Id. at 41.
[51] Id. at 43.
[52] Id.
[53] Id. at 45-46.
[54] Id. at 23.
[55] Id. at 23-24.
[56] Id. at 24.
[57] Id.
[58] Id. at 25.
[59] Id. at 27-28.
[60] Id. at 69-98.
[61] Id. at 80-86.
[62] Id. at 81.
[63] Id. at 85-86.
[64] Id. at 125-135.
[65] Id. at 136-151.
[66] Id. at 155-158.
[67] See Gomez v. People, G.R. No. 216824, November 10, 2020.
[68] Id.
[69] Gabrillo v. Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No. 234255, October 2, 2019.
[70] THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980, supra note 40.
[71] Barber v. Chua, G.R. No. 205630, January 12, 2021.
[72] See Nabo v. Buenviaje, G.R. No. 224906, October 7, 2020, citing Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 557, 578-579 (2004).
[73] Alcantara v. Dumacon-Hassan, G.R. No. 241701, September 16, 2020.
[74] Republic Act No. 6657, entitled "An Act Instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program to Promote Social Justice and Industrialization, Providing the Mechanism for its Implementation, and for Other Purposes [COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988)."
[75] Executive Order No. 129-A, entitled "Modifying Executive Order No. 129 Reorganizing and Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for Other Purposes."
[76] An Act Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), Extending the Acquisition and Distribution of All Agricultural Lands, Instituting Necessary Reforms, Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Otherwise Known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as Amended, and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
[77] See Octavio v. Perovano, 608 Phil. 378, 389 (2009). COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, as amended, Section 3(d), states that an "An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under [the CARL] and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
[78] 502 Phil. 626 (2005).
[79] Id. at 642.
[80] Id. at 645.
[81] Id. at 639.
[82] Id. at 645-647.
[83] Id. at 646. Letter of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa dated September 20, 2021, p. 8.
[84] Letter of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa dated September 20, 2021, p. 10.
[85] 826 Phil. 51 (2018).
[86] Id. at 62.
[87] Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as amended, section 50-A.
[88] Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca, 482 Phil. 208, 211 (2004).
[89] Reflections of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, pp. 4-5.
[90] Rollo (G.R. No. 201631), p. 36.
[91] Id. at 62.
[92] Id. at 40-41.
[93] Id. at 80-81.
[94] Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon, supra note 85.
[95] Rollo (G.R. No. 201631), pp. 41, 139.
[96] Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as amended, Section 3.
[97] See Philcontrust Resources, Inc. v. Aquino, G.R. No. 214714, October 7, 2020.
[98] Rollo (G.R. No. 201076), pp. 24, 136-151, and 155-158.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur with the ponencia that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Opol and El Salvador (MCTC) has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioner Angelina Dayrit (petitioner) against respondents Jose I. Norquillas, Rogelio I. Norquillas, Romie I. Norquillas, Herdanny I. Norquillas, Danilo M. Norquillas, Anthony Apus, Teclo P. Mugot, Allan A. Ompoc, Joni Clarin, Candelaria Mejorada, Lilia O. Taganas, Sylvia Sabayanon, Arsenio Catiil, Veronica Maestre, and Mario Tagaylo (respondents).
As a general rule, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129[1] provides that the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), and MCTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, viz.:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:However, as an exception, if the complaint for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is actually a matter or incident relative to the implementation of the agrarian reform program (and hence, an agrarian dispute), the jurisdiction therefore lies in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Verily, under Section 50 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6657,[2] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law," the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program, viz.:
x x x x
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).Although generally it is the MeTC, MTC, or MCTC that has jurisdiction over an ejectment case, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the Court has held that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction over an ejectment case where the issue of possession is inextricably interwoven with an agrarian dispute,[3] or when a case is merely an incident of the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).[4] In Heirs of Jose M. Cervantes v. Miranda,[5] the Court ruled that even if no landowner-tenant vinculum Juris was alleged between the parties, the controversy can be characterized as an agrarian dispute based on their submissions and allegations during the hearings over which the DARAB can assume jurisdiction.[6]
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, RA 9700[7] amended RA 6657, adding Section 50-A. Essentially, the amendment reinforced the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR over cases involving agrarian disputes by mandating the automatic referral of cases by the judge or prosecutor to the DAR upon an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature, and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant,[8] viz.:
Section 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. — No court or prosecutor's office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section 57 of [RA] 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, That from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court, and in cases referred by the regional trial court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals [CA].Note that upon automatic referral, the DAR does not assume jurisdiction yet but "shall [first] determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists[.]" If it certifies that the case is not an agrarian dispute and hence, PROPER FOR TRIAL, the judge or prosecutor shall assume jurisdiction over the controversy or dispute. On the other hand, if the case is an agrarian dispute and hence, NOT PROPER FOR TRIAL, the prosecutor or court shall motu propio, or upon proper application of the party concerned, dismiss the case.[9] In either instance, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office is duty-bound to immediately return the complete records of the case together with the DAR certification and pertinent documentation to the court of origin or Office of the Public Prosecutor for further proceedings as the court or prosecutor may deem proper.[10]
In cases where regular courts or quasi-judicial bodies have competent jurisdiction, agrarian reform beneficiaries or identified beneficiaries and/or their associations shall have legal standing and interest to intervene concerning their individual or collective rights and/or interests under the CARP.
The fact of non-registration of such associations with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or Cooperative Development Authority, or any concerned government agency shall not be used against them to deny the existence of their legal standing and interest in a case filed before such courts and quasi-judicial bodies. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Essentially, an agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3 (d) of RA 6657 as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon[11] (Chailese), the Court clarified that the amendment introduced by RA 9700 should be applied retroactively. Thus, the automatic referral procedure applies "to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage":
Primarily, a cursory reading of the provision readily reveals that Section 19 of [RA] 9700 merely highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR to rule on agrarian cases by adding a clause which mandates the automatic referral of cases upon the existence of the requisites therein stated. Simply, [RA] 9700 does not deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of the DAR set forth under Section 50 of [RA] 6657. Moreover, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, as the amendment is essentially procedural in nature it is deemed to apply to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.Here, there is an allegation in the Answer that the case involves an agrarian dispute,[13] and that the subject landholding was awarded to respondents as farmer beneficiaries under the CARP. Thus, considering the retroactive application of RA 9700, the general rule is that the case should have been automatically referred to the DAR in accordance with the procedure above-stated.
Thence, having settled that Section 19 of [RA] 9700 is applicable in this controversy, the Court now proceeds with the examination of such amendment. Based on the said provision, the judge or prosecutor is obligated to automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the following requisites are present:
a. There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and
b. One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.[12] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
However, it is discerned that despite the retroactive application of RA 9700 (which should have perforce triggered the automatic referral procedure), records show that the case is clearly agrarian in nature based on the submissions of the parties and hence, evidently outside the jurisdiction of the MCTC. In this limited instance, it is my view that the need to automatically refer the case to the DAR may be dispensed with and the first level courts may already proceed to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. As held in Chailese, the amendment brought about by RA 9700 (i.e., automatic referral procedure) is essentially procedural in nature and hence, despite its being contained in the statute, falls within the rule making authority of the Court. In Carpio-Morales v. CA,[14] this Court explained:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:As I see it, to still refer the case to the DAR when the case is clearly agrarian in nature based on the submissions of the parties and hence, evidently outside the jurisdiction of the first level courts would not only be inefficient and inexpedient, it would also stray from the trend of prevailing case law wherein the Court had consistently dismissed the case upon a sufficient showing that the case clearly partakes of an agrarian dispute,[16] or is merely an incident of the implementation of the CARP.[17] As such, the Court, by virtue of its rule making authority, must carve out the foregoing exception to the retroactive application of RA 9700 as may be warranted by the facts of the case.Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:x x x xThus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. As pronounced in Echegaray [361 Phil. 73 (1999)]:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
x x x xThe rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Here, it was sufficiently established, based on the submissions of the parties, that the case falls within the above-discussed exception which consequently validates the ponencia's disposition (albeit for different reasons) to dismiss (and not to automatically refer) the case. In particular, it was shown that:
(a) the subject lands formerly covered by two (2) certificates of title[18] in the name of petitioner have been covered by the CARP in 1993, and respondents, who are petitioner's farmworkers,[19] were awarded by the government three (3) certificates of land ownership award (CLOAs) over an aggregate of 16.6927-hectare (ha.) portion of the 27.4093 ha. lands in November 2001, and now hold certificates of title[20] (CLOA titles) over the said portions. Accordingly, petitioner's certificates of title were cancelled to the extent of the said portions;
(b) prior to the filing of the forcible entry case before the MCTC in 2006, petitioner filed before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, Cagayan de Oro City (PARAD) a petition for annulment of respondents' CLOAs[21] (annulment case), as well as a petition for CARP exemption of the 27.4093 ha. subject lands (exemption case);
(c) while the annulment case was initially granted by the PARAD in a Decision[22] dated December 22, 2004, it was eventually set aside on the ground of prematurity, and the petition was archived until the resolution of the exemption case.[23] Hence, respondents' CLOA titles remain valid and subsisting;
(d) subsequently, the DAR issued an Order[24] dated March 12, 2008 in the exemption case, excluding from CARP coverage a 21.3376 ha. portion of the subject lands, and placing under CARP the remaining 6.0717 ha. There is no information that the exemption case had been finally resolved; and
(e) on May 16, 2011, the DAR installed respondents over the 6.0717 ha. portion covered by TCT No. C-9453.[25]
Considering that respondents' CLOA titles are their asserted source of possessory rights over the said property, it is highly apparent that the issue of possession will ultimately impact the matter of whether or not the grant of CLOA in favor of respondents is valid.[26] As such, the case is inextricably intertwined with an agrarian dispute, or at least, incidental to the implementation of the CARP, which hence, clearly situates the same within the jurisdiction of the DAR, and conversely, outside of the jurisdiction of the MCTC. In consequence, pursuant to the framework explicated above, the need to automatically refer the case to the DAR pursuant to RA 9700 is dispensed with since the dismissal of the same is already warranted.
Notably, the ponencia arrives at the same conclusion to dismiss the case based on the following reasons:
In any case, even without the mandate of automatic referral at that time, the MCTC should have dismissed the case after hearing the parties as the law is clear prior to the amendment that the DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction on agrarian disputes involving transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries. CLOAs were issued to respondents being the beneficiaries of CARP. Recipients of CLOAs acquire ownership of the lands awarded. As respondents entered the subject parcel of lands by virtue of the CLOAs, this entry, despite being characterized by [petitioner] as forcible entry, is clearly a controversy relating to and arising from the terms and conditions of transfer of ownership to agrarian reform beneficiaries.However, the ponencia unfortunately failed to reconcile its disposition to dismiss the case with the ruling in Chailese that the automatic referral procedure is retroactive in application and thus, applies "to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage." Given the retroactive application of the automatic referral procedure, it behooves the Court to explain why the present case is not being automatically referred to the DAR but instead dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. As such, I am unable to fully concur with the ponencia's disquisition and instead, proffer my own reasons leading to the same result.
The Court, therefore, agrees with the CA in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction over the instant case for forcible entry for being an agrarian dispute.[27]
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the petition. In light of the reasons above, Civil Case No. 2006-09-16 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Opol and El Salvador should be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
[1] Entitled "AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (August 14, 1981).
[2] Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"; approved on June 10, 1988.
[3] Hilado v. Chavez, 482 Phil. 104, 126 (2004). See also Dela Cruz v. Spouses Mendoza, 534 Phil. 642, 646 (2006).
[4] Heirs of Jose M. Cervantes v. Miranda, 641 Phil. 553, 560 (2010). See also Spouses Carpio v. Sebastian, 635 Phil. 1, 6-7 (2010), citing DAR v. Abdulwahid, 570 Phil. 356, 361 (2008).
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 561.
[7] Entitled "AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR"; approved on August 7, 2009.
[8] See Section 19 of RA 9700.
[9] See Section 10 of DAR Administrative Order No. 4, Series of 2009, entitled "RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING SECTION 19 OF R.A. No. 9700 (JURISDICTION ON AND REFERRAL OF AGRARIAN DISPUTE)"; signed on October 15, 2009.
[10] Id. at Section 11.
[11] 826 Phil. 51 (2018).
[12] Id. at 62.
[13] See rollo (G.R. No. 201631), p. 55.
[14] 772 Phil. 672 (2015).
[15] Id. at 733-736.
[16] Hilado v. Chavez, supra note 3. See also Dela Cruz v. Spouses Mendoza, supra note 3.
[17] Heirs of Jose M. Cervantes v. Miranda, supra note 4. See also Spouses Carpio v. Sebastian, supra note 4, citing DAR v. Abdulwahid, supra note 4.
[18] Consisting of the following:
[19] See id. at 61.
(See rollo [G.R. No. 201631], p. 35.)
[20] Consisting of the following:
[21] See PARAD Decision dated December 22, 2004; id. at 51-52. Signed by Adjudicator Abeto A. Salcedo, Jr.
[22] Id.
[23] See DARAB Resolution dated January 17, 2008; id. at 58-60. Penned by Member Delfin B. Samson with Members Augusto P. Quijano, Edgar A. Igano, and Ma. Patricia P. Rualo-Bello, concurring. Chairman Nasser C. Pangandaman and Members Nestor R. Acosta and Renator F. Herrera did not sign the Resolution. See also ponencia, p. 2.
[24] Id. at 65-69. Signed by OIC-Regional Director John M. Maruhom.
[25] See rollo (G.R. No. 201631), p. 72.
[26] Succinctly put, the issuance of CLOA titles in respondents' favor ostensibly vest on them a right to retain possession over the subject portions as an attribute of the ownership granted in their favor. A CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to the qualified farmer-beneficiary, and contains the restrictions and conditions of such grant. (See Dalit v. Balagtas, Sr., G.R. No. 202799, March 27, 2019, 898 SCRA 506, 521.)
[27] Ponencia, p. 16.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
Any adjudication on the rights of the parties in this case must rest on the fact that the lands subject of this dispute are now covered by the government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. As early as 1993, petitioner's Original Certificate of Title and Transfer Certificate Title had already been cancelled, and new titles pursuant to Certificates of Land Ownership Award were issued to respondents.[1]
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the rulings of the trial courts in the forcible entry suit, citing the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board's primary jurisdiction. It said that the Adjudication Board is tasked to try and decide disputes relating to the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.[2] The Court of Appeals noted that Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 confers this jurisdiction on the Department of Agrarian Reform:
SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).Executive Order 129-A created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board to perform this quasi-judicial function.[3] The Adjudication Board's Rules of Procedure enumerate the cases that fall under its primary and exclusive jurisdiction:
In 2009, Republic Act No. 9700 introduced amendments to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Particularly, it added Section 50-A, which reads in part:Rule II
Jurisdiction of the Board and its Adjudicators
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. – The Adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate the following cases:
1.1 The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered by Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), and other related agrarian laws;
. . . .
1.4 Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants and/or leaseholders;
. . . .
1.6 Those involving the correction, partition, cancellation, secondary and subsequent issuances of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;
. . . .
1.11 Those cases involving the determination of title to agricultural lands where this issue is raised in an agrarian dispute by any of the parties or a third person in connection with the possession thereof for the purpose of preserving the tenure of the agricultural lessee or actual tenant-farmer or farmer-beneficiaries and effecting the ouster of the interloper or intruder in one and the same proceeding; and
1.12 Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of PD No. 946 except those cases falling under the proper courts or other quasi-judicial bodies;
1.13 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.[4]
SECTION 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. - No court or prosecutor's office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, That from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court, and in cases referred by the regional trial court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)It is thus clear that when disputes arise from the implementation of the agrarian reform program, it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board which has jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the trial courts. Section 50-A is meant to ensure that agrarian cases are, at the earliest instance, removed from the regular courts and first resolved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The law's grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform is a recognition of the government agency's expertise in handling agrarian issues, and that it is the most appropriate tribunal to resolve these cases. Courts only get involved through judicial review.
I agree with the ponencia's observation that the reason for denying the Department of Agrarian Reform's jurisdiction in David v. Cordova[5] was because the issue was not even an agrarian dispute in the first place. David is thus not controlling in this case. David states that "the instant case does not involve the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter nor an agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the [Department of Agrarian Reform]. As such, possessory actions involving the land in dispute rightfully falls within the jurisdiction of the [First Municipal Circuit Trial Court]."[6]
Therefore, David sustaining the regular courts' jurisdiction is not a rejection of the Department of Agrarian Reform's jurisdiction over agrarian disputes under Section 50-A of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, but a finding that the lack of an agrarian dispute removes the case from the agency's jurisdiction. Moreover, David only involved an ejectment complaint and the parties to that case did not have a pending case before the Department of Agrarian Reform. The lack of an agrarian dispute in David clearly differentiates it from the case at bar.
To recall, the issue in this case began because of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award—and subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title—issued to respondents under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner's titles over the 16.6927-hectare property were cancelled and new ones were issued to respondents pursuant to the program.[7] It was on this basis that respondents occupied the property.[8] While it is true that the issue here concerns possession, this question of possession remains inextricably connected to an agrarian dispute. The facts of this case establish this.
Thus, I reiterate Court of Appeals' observation that "[c]learly, the issue of possession in this case is linked to an agrarian dispute. [Respondents] would not have entered the subject properties if not for the award (CLOAs) given to them by the government under its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program."[9] Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that there was a pending appeal before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board for the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award. The issue in such appeal should have prevented the Municipal Circuit Trial Court from ruling on the ejectment case as it might result in conflicting decisions.
This Court previously pronounced that mere allegation of tenancy before the first level courts does not automatically remove the case from the courts' jurisdiction.[10] However, such rule does not obtain in this case. The facts here as established distinctly show its connection to an agrarian dispute. Petitioner herself even filed a petition before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board over the same parcels of land and against the same parties, impliedly admitting that the dispute is undeniably agrarian in nature.
In Spouses Tirona v. Alejo,[11] a case decided even prior to the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 9700, this Court noted the existence of a case for the recovery of possession of the disputed property filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, as well as two cases for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court. It observed that a resolution in the case before the Adjudication Board would necessarily resolve the question of possession in the forcible entry case. Thus, "the issue of possession was inextricably intertwined with the agrarian dispute, an issue which was beyond the jurisdiction and competence of the inferior court to settle."[12] Under the concept of litis pendentia, Spouses Tirona ruled that the pendency of the case before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board barred the filing of the forcible entry cases.[13]
Spouses Tirona was reiterated in Hilado v. Chavez,[14] also decided before the amendments by Republic Act No. 9700, where the Court ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities loses jurisdiction over an ejectment case if, after receiving evidence, it determines that the real issue is tenancy, as alleged in the pleadings:
The MTCC does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. If after hearing, tenancy had in fact been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.[15] (Citations omitted)In a similar vein, the Petition for Cancellation of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is established on record. This precludes the trial courts from exercising jurisdiction over the ejectment case. As found by the Court of Appeals, "the properties that [respondents] are claiming in the [Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board] case are the same properties which [petitioner] seeks the ejectment of [respondents]. Hence, the evident and logical conclusion then is that any decision that may be rendered in the [Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board] case regarding the question of possession will also resolve the question of possession in the forcible entry cases."[16] Being aware of the existence of the pending case before the Adjudication Board, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental should not have ruled to eject respondents from the property and should have dismissed the case instead.
The more recent case of Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon[17] is also instructive. Chailese involved a complaint for recovery of possession filed before the Regional Trial Court, and a prior case for conversion of agrarian land to commercial and light industrial uses filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform. The Regional Trial Court initially dismissed the complaint for recovery of possession, saying that the issue was "intertwined with the propriety of conversion and compliance with the agreement on disturbance compensation, issues that are yet to be resolved with finality by the [Department of Agrarian Reform]," but resolved on reconsideration to proceed with trial.[18]
During the pendency of the original action in Chailese, Republic Act No. 9700 took effect, mandating the automatic referral of cases to the Department of Agrarian Reform "[i]f there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant[.]"[19] Thus, Dizon et al. moved to refer the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform, citing the amendment of the law. The Regional Trial Court denied the motion, but on certiorari, the Court of Appeals found merit in the argument.[20]
On this point, this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in Chailese, saying that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 9700 merely confirmed the existing jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform under the original law: "[s]imply, [Republic Act] No. 9700 does not deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of the [Department of Agrarian Reform] set forth under Section 50 of [Republic Act] No. 6657."[21] Moreover, the specific amendment on the referral of cases by the regular courts to the Department of Agrarian Reform is "essentially procedural in nature [and] is deemed to apply to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage," and is applicable to the case.[22]
Indeed, a well-recognized exception to the prospective application of laws is when the statute is a procedural law:
A statute which transfers the jurisdiction to try certain cases from a court to a quasi-judicial tribunal is a remedial statute that is applicable to claims that accrued before its enactment but formulated and filed after it took effect, for it does not create new nor take away vested rights. The court that has jurisdiction over a claim at the time it accrued cannot validly try the claim where at the time the claim is formulated and filed the jurisdiction to try it has been transferred by law to a quasi-judicial tribunal, for even actions pending in one court may be validly taken away and transferred to another and no litigant can acquire a vested right to be heard by one particular court.[23]To trigger the automatic referral to the Department of Agrarian Reform, Chailese requires that:
As observed by the ponencia, Chailese clarified the requisites which will trigger the automatic referral of cases under Section 50-A.[25] Chailese found that Dizon et al. failed to prove the second requisite: that they were farmers, farmworkers, or agricultural tenants. Thus, the requirements for the automatic referral to the Department of Agrarian Reform were not met.[26]
- There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and
- One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.[24]
However, in this case, I agree with the ponencia that both requirements under Chailese were met.
First, respondents' consistent allegations that the dispute is agrarian in nature is on record. The allegations were already present in their Answer before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.[27] They restate these in their Comment filed before this Court.[28]
Second, the ponencia also refers to the Court of Appeals' and the Secretary of Agrarian Reform's recognition of respondents' status as farmers.[29] This fact was never disputed by petitioner. The award of the lands in respondents' favor by virtue of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award also affirms that the dispute is agrarian in nature.[30] Moreover, as mentioned earlier, petitioner herself even filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board a Petition for Cancellation of the Certificates of Land Ownership Award covering the same parcels of land.
Undeniably, the factual context of this case demonstrates that it is impossible to resolve the issue of possession without considering the agrarian nature of the dispute. This is precisely the reason why the amendment in Republic Act No. 9700 was introduced—to clarify that, in resolving agrarian disputes, which principally involve issues on the ownership of lands, incidents relating to who can possess the property will also necessarily arise. To ensure a comprehensive resolution of the issues, the Department of Agrarian Reform's jurisdiction over these types of cases was reaffirmed. We therefore sustain the Department of Agrarian Reform's jurisdiction in this case to the exclusion of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
A mechanical application of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court's jurisdiction over regular ejectment cases in this case would be a betrayal of the primary purpose of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. It would be close to ignoring what is obvious on the records. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law as well as its amendments are social justice measures mandated by the Constitution towards an equitable distribution and ownership of land.[31] A formalistic reading of it, divorced from the case's factual milieu, will not resolve the very core of the issue. This Court must always be conscious of this mandate when deciding cases that ultimately affect those the Constitution and the law intend to protect.
As a final note, I observe that petitioner's filing of multiple cases prevented respondents' full enjoyment of their rights to their parcels of land. The case for the cancellation of the certificates of land ownership award before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board was ultimately sought to dispossess respondents of their properties. Similarly, the complaint for forcible entry intends the same goal.
On the one hand, these legal remedies are available to any litigant for the enforcement of their rights. But when one looks at the power relationship between landlord and tenant, as in this case, it reveals that the ulterior motive is not to win the case, but to add to respondents' burden in defending their rights. The enforcement and defense of rights in our courts and agencies necessarily entail costs, financial or otherwise, and not all are able to bear these burdens equally.
Suits that stifle rights imbued with public interest are frowned upon. In our jurisdiction, strategic lawsuits against public participation or SLAPP suits are recognized as obnoxious schemes that deter the assertion of environmental rights.[32] But the concept of SLAPP suits as generally understood is not exclusive to environmental laws.[33] In legal issues where the public interest is at stake, similar kinds of lawsuits should be met with disapproval. This, too, should apply to agrarian reform cases.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petitions.
[1] Ponencia, p. 4.
[2] Id. at 6.
[3] Executive Order No. 129-A (1987), sec. 13.
[4] Department of Agrarian Reform Rules of Procedure (2003), Rule II, sec. 1.
[5] 502 Phil. 626 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
[6] Id. at 647. Citations omitted.
[7] Rollo, p. 41.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 41-42.
[10] See Ofilada v. Spouses Andal, 752 Phil. 27, 44 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]. Similar to the case at bar, the dispute in Ofilada arose prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9700 in 2009, which amended Republic Act No. 6657 to extend the acquisition and distribution of agricultural lands.
[11] 419 Phil. 285 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
[12] Id. at 303.
[13] Id.
[14] 482 Phil. 104 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
[15] Id. at 126-127. See also Bayog v. Natino, 327 Phil. 1019 (1996) [Per J. Davide Jr., Third Division].
[16] Rollo, p. 43.
[17] 826 Phil. 51 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
[18] Id. at 56-57.
[19] Id. at 61. See Republic Act No. 9700 (2009), Section 19 amended Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657 (1988) by adding Section 50-A.
[20] Id. at 58.
[21] Id. at 62.
[22] Id.
[23] See Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 556, 570 (2002) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
[24] Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon, 826 Phil. 51, 62 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
[25] Ponencia, p. 13.
[26] Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon, 826 Phil. 51, 63 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
[27] Ponencia, p. 15.
[28] Id.
[29] Id. at 15-16.
[30] Id. at 4. See Republic Act No. 6657 (1988). Section 22 on the qualified beneficiaries of the Program.
[31] CONST., art. XIII, sec. 4. The State, shall by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
[32] A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC (2010), Rule 1, sec. 4(g). Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) refers to an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person, institution or any government agency or local government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights.
[33] GEORGE W. PRING AND PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 8-9 (1996). While A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases creates an anti-SLAPP suit remedy by raising it as an affirmative defense, this remedy is not available in agrarian reform cases. However, the policy of social justice and the recognition that agrarian relationships and the disputes that arise from them are imbued with public interest ought to persuade this Court to adopt the same attitude of disapproval. The term SLAPP was first coined by Professors Penelope Canan and George W. Pring. It is defined as "a lawsuit... involv[ing] communications made to influence a governmental action or outcome, which ... resulted in (a) a civil complaint or counterclaim (b) filed against nongovernment individuals or organizations ... on (c) a substantive issue of some public interest or social significance."
CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari (Petition) stems from a complaint for forcible entry (Complaint) filed by petitioner Angelina Dayrit against herein named respondents before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. It assails the January 27, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03121 which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The ponencia resolves to deny the Petition based on the finding that the present case for forcible entry is an agrarian dispute cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its adjudicatory arm, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).[1]
I concur.
I submit this opinion only to further clarify the interplay between the jurisdiction of the first level courts over summary actions for ejectment as conferred by the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980[2] (Batas Pambansa Blg. [BP] 129), and the jurisdiction of the DAR over agrarian disputes, vested by Republic Act No. (RA) 6657,[3] as amended by RA 9700.[4]
Subject matter jurisdiction over possessory actions involving land |
As emphasized by the ponencia, jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court or a tribunal to hear, try and decide a case before it. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for.[5] Hence, as a starting point, reference to the statutes governing jurisdiction over summary actions for ejectment on the one hand, and agrarian disputes on the other, is proper.
Section 33 of BP 129, passed in 1980, states in part:
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:Subsequently, RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, was passed in 1988. RA 6657 vested DAR with primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction involving the implementation of agrarian reform, subject to certain exceptions, thus:
x x x x
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession[.]
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).In sum, Section 50 vests the DAR with original jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. "Agrarian dispute" is defined under the same statute as follows:
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena, and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the power to punish direct and indirect contempts in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.
Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings.
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory. (Emphasis supplied)
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.[6] (Emphasis supplied)
The mandatory referral mechanism under Section 50-A of RA 6657 |
As pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Section 50 was later amended by RA 9700 which was passed in 2009. As its title implies, RA 9700 was passed to strengthen the State's comprehensive agrarian reform program.[7]
Among the amendments implemented through RA 9700 are those which relate to the afore-quoted Section 50 of RA 6657.
Foremost, Section 18 of RA 9700 amended the last paragraph of Section 50 of RA 6657 by carving out an exception to the immediately executory nature of DAR decisions, thus:
SEC. 18. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:More relevantly, RA 9700 also added a new provision, identified as Section 50-A of RA 6657. The provision reads:"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — x x x
x x x x
"Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory except a decision or a portion thereof involving solely the issue of just compensation."
SEC. 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. — No court or prosecutor's office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)] except those provided under Section 57[8] of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, That from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court, and in cases referred by the regional trial court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals.Section 50-A reinforces the primary jurisdiction of DAR "to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters" and its "exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" by creating a mandatory referral mechanism for cases which, on their face, present agrarian reform issues.
In cases where regular courts or quasi-judicial bodies have competent jurisdiction, agrarian reform beneficiaries or identified beneficiaries and/or their associations shall have legal standing and interest to intervene concerning their individual or collective rights and/or interests under the CARP.
The fact of non-registration of such associations with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or Cooperative Development Authority, or any concerned government agency shall not be used against them to deny the existence of their legal standing and interest in a case filed before such courts and quasi-judicial bodies. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under Section 50-A, referral to the DAR shall be mandatory when: (i) there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant. Notably, the conditions that trigger the mandatory referral mechanism mirror the elements of an agrarian dispute as reflected in its statutory definition under RA 6657, that is, any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Through this mechanism, DAR is given the opportunity to make a preliminary determination on the nature of the case so referred precisely to avert situations where cases involving agrarian disputes are resolved by the first level courts, resulting in null and void decisions rendered without jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the preliminary determination of the DAR that a case is not an agrarian dispute does not preclude the courts from later dismissing the case in question for lack of jurisdiction if it later becomes apparent during trial that the case is, in fact, agrarian in nature which must be resolved by the DAR at the first instance. Conversely, a preliminary determination by the DAR that the case is an agrarian dispute does not preclude it from referring the case back to the regular courts if its preliminary determination is later negated by the matters that come to fore during its own proceedings. To stress, jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for. Thus, if further proceedings reveal that the nature of the case differs from how it had been initially characterized, it becomes incumbent upon the adjudicative body concerned to dismiss the case, as any decision rendered without jurisdiction shall be null and void.
Hence, lest there be any confusion, it should be clarified that the mandatory referral mechanism does not limit the jurisdiction of the referring court or DARAB, as the case may be, to subsequently take cognizance of cases properly falling within their respective jurisdictions when the preliminary determination made pursuant to the mandatory referral mechanism is later found to be erroneous. To be sure, a contrary interpretation would effectively defeat the jurisdiction vested by law upon the adjudicative body concerned.
Reconciling David and Chailese
After the passage of RA 6657 and the subsequent amendments set forth in RA 9700, confusion ensued as to whether subject matter jurisdiction over actions for ejectment involving agricultural lands placed under the CARP remained with the first level courts. This confusion appears to stem from an erroneous interpretation of the Court's ruling in David v. Cordova[9] (David) and the seemingly contrary ruling in Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon[10] (Chailese). While these cases are often viewed to be at odds, a cursory reading of these decisions show that they can, in fact, be reconciled.
In David, the Court was called upon to determine whether the MCTC may take cognizance of an action for forcible entry involving public agricultural land. There, petitioner Leonardo David (Leonardo) filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondents Nelson and Danny Cordova (collectively, the Cordovas). The complaint alleged that Leonardo is co-owner of a certain parcel of land denominated as Lot 774. Sometime in 1997, Leonardo purportedly discovered that the Cordovas had forcibly entered Lot 774 and had begun constructing improvements thereon. Subsequently, Leonardo demanded that the Cordovas vacate and cease construction to no avail. Thus, Leonardo filed said complaint before the MCTC.
For their part, the Cordovas averred that Leonardo is not a co-owner of Lot 774, as said lot is owned by the government. They added that Lot 774 forms part of the Dinalupihan Landed Estate which had been placed under the administration of the DAR. On this score, the Cordovas argued that the complaint falls under the jurisdiction of the DAR as Lot 774 had been earmarked for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
The MCTC and RTC were one in finding that Leonardo's complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. However, the CA reversed, noting that Lot 774 was subject of a pending "application for purchase" filed by respondent Danny with the DAR. Leonardo thus filed a Rule 45 petition before the Court assailing the CA's Decision.
The Court ruled in favor of Leonardo and reversed the Decision of the CA. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court held:
Next, the point that the property in dispute is public land. The matter is of no moment and does not operate to divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry involving such property. Indeed, the public character of the land does not preclude inferior courts from exercising jurisdiction over forcible entry cases. We have ruled in the case of Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et al., that the land spoken of in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural or mineral. It is a well[-]known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.Thus, in David, the Court held that the MCTC correctly took cognizance of Leonardo's action for forcible entry. In so ruling, the Court emphasized that in ejectment proceedings involving the issue of physical possession, the need to prevent breach of peace and criminal disorder must be considered. These proceedings are purposely summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances. More importantly, the Court ruled that Leonardo's action falls within the jurisdiction of the MCTC because it neither involved the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter nor qualified as an agrarian dispute.
Moreover, ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings only intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. Our ruling in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals illustrates this point, thus:The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is — who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.Also worth noting is the case of Pitargue v. [Sorilla], wherein, as in this case, the government owned the land in dispute. The government did not authorize either the plaintiff or the defendant in the forcible entry case to occupy the land. Both parties were in effect squatting on government property. Yet we upheld the court's jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession even if title remained with the government.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.
Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical possession because of the public need to preserve the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances.
Thus, the better rule is that even while the power of administration and disposition of public or private agricultural lands belongs to DAR, courts retain jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry involving such lands. To restate this, courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or private agricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession as this issue is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of such lands which should be threshed out in DAR.
In addition, the instant case does not involve the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter nor an agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction of DAR. As such, possessory actions involving the land in dispute rightfully falls within the jurisdiction of the [MCTC].[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, in Chailese, Chailese Development Co., Inc. (CDCI) filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) concerning 10 parcels of land registered in its name. The complaint was filed against 51 defendants. In its complaint, CDCI alleged that the defendants therein were illegally occupying the disputed lots. Eight of these defendants stood as respondents in Chailese.
Respondents filed their answer claiming that the case fell under the jurisdiction of the DAR. Respondents claimed that they were tenants of the disputed lots. However, without their knowledge and consent, the disputed lots were transferred to CDCI in order to avoid compulsory distribution under RA 6657. After a series of motions, the case was eventually set for pre-trial. Meanwhile, RA 9700 took effect which, as discussed, amended RA 6657.
On the basis of the mandatory referral mechanism under Section 50-A, respondents filed a motion seeking to refer the case to the DAR. However, the RTC denied said motion for lack of merit. The CA reversed on certiorari and directed the referral of the case to DAR for proper disposition. CDCI thus filed a Rule 45 petition before the Court assailing such referral.
The Court ruled in favor of CDCI, reasoning as follows:
It is a basic rule in procedure that the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter as well as the concomitant nature of an action is determined by law and the allegations of the complaint, and is unaffected by the pleas or theories raised by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss.To be sure, Chailese did not overturn David. The Court's ruling in Chailese merely clarified what constitutes an agrarian dispute by breaking down its essential elements.
The jurisdiction of the DAR is laid down in Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARL, which provides:Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). x x x.By virtue of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) was designated to assume the powers and functions of the DAR with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases, and matters relating to the implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws.
The exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR over agrarian cases was further amplified by the amendment introduced by Section 19 of R.A. 9700 to Section 50. The provision reads:Section 19. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding Section 50-A to read as follows:In this regard, it must be said that there is no merit in the contention of petitioner that the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9700 cannot be applied retroactively in the case at bar. Primarily, a cursory reading of the provision readily reveals that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 merely highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR to rule on agrarian cases by adding a clause which mandates the automatic referral of cases upon the existence of the requisites therein stated. Simply, R.A. No. 9700 does not deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of the DAR set forth under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Moreover, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, as the amendment is essentially procedural in nature it is deemed to apply to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.
SEC. 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. — No court or prosecutor's office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, that from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court, and in cases referred by the regional trial court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals.
x x x x
Thence, having settled that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 is applicable in this controversy, the Court now proceeds with the examination of such amendment. Based on the said provision, the judge or prosecutor is obligated to automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the following requisites are present:In this case, the presence of the first requisite is satisfied by the allegations made by the respondents in their Answer with Counterclaim.
- There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and
- One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
x x x x
Anent the second requisite, the Court finds that the respondents failed to prove that they are farmers, farmworkers, or are agricultural tenants.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 6657 defines farmers and farmworkers as follows:(f) Farmer refers to a natural person whose primary livelihood is cultivation of land or the production of agricultural crops, either by himself, or primarily with the assistance of his immediate farm household, whether the land is owned by him, or by another person under a leasehold or share tenancy agreement or arrangement with the owner thereof.An agricultural tenancy relation, on the other hand, is established by the concurrence of the following elements enunciated by this Court in the case of Chico v. CA,
(g) Farmworker is a natural person who renders service for value as an employee or laborer in an agricultural enterprise or farm regardless of whether his compensation is paid on a daily, weekly, monthly or "pakyaw" basis. The term includes an individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a pending agrarian dispute and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular farm employment.(1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.Contrary to the CA's conclusion and as opposed to the first requisite, mere allegation would not suffice to establish the existence of the second requirement. Proof must be adduced by the person making the allegation as to his or her status as a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
x x x x
Further instructive is this Court's ruling in the previously cited case of Chico. Therein, the Court held that for the purpose of divesting regular courts of its jurisdiction in the proceedings lawfully began before it and in order for the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the elements of a tenancy relationship must be shown by adequate proof. It is not enough that the elements are alleged. Likewise, self-serving statements in the pleadings are inadequate.
Hence, in light of the absence of evidence to show any tenancy agreement that would establish the relationship of the parties therein, the Court in Chico granted the petition and reinstated the proceedings before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.[12] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As clarified in Chailese, a dispute is agrarian in nature and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the DAR, when: (i) there is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or agricultural tenant. Conversely, when either of these two elements is absent, the dispute is not agrarian in nature and thus remains under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. As explained, these are the very same elements that trigger the mandatory referral mechanism under Section 50-A of RA 6657.
A close reading of the circumstances in David and Chailese shows that the pronouncements therein are consistent with each other. In both cases, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the regular courts as the controversies involved therein were not agrarian disputes.
In Chailese, the Court held that the controversy therein was not an agrarian dispute as respondents therein failed to present proof that they were farmers, farmworkers, or agricultural tenants. Hence the second requirement necessary to vest jurisdiction in the DAR was absent. Albeit not discussed in detail in the Decision, the controversy in David also did not qualify as an agrarian dispute as the Cordovas similarly failed to show that they were farmers, farmworkers, or agricultural tenants. As in Chailese, the second requirement necessary to vest jurisdiction in the DAR was also absent.
The confusion appears to stem from the emphasis placed by David on the summary nature of ejectment proceedings. To quote:
Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical possession because of the public need to preserve the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances.Taken in isolation, this oft-quoted pronouncement in David appears to suggest that the regular courts retain jurisdiction over all summary cases of ejectment, regardless of whether the case involves an agrarian dispute or otherwise. To my mind, this reading of what David holds fails to take into consideration a significant fact — that the dispute in David was not agrarian in nature as the respondents therein were not shown to be farmers, farmworkers, or agricultural tenants. Hence, in David, the MCTC had jurisdiction over the case not because it involved a summary action for forcible entry, but because the dispute therein was not agrarian in nature.
Thus, the better rule is that even while the power of administration and disposition of public or private agricultural lands belongs to DAR, courts retain jurisdiction over actions for forcible entry involving such lands. To restate this, courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or private agricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession as this issue is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of such lands which should be threshed out in DAR.
x x x x
On this point, the following pronouncements we made in Pitargue are enlightening:The question that is before this Court is: Are courts without jurisdiction to take cognizance of possessory actions involving these public lands before final award is made by the Lands Department, and before title is given any of the conflicting claimants? It is one of utmost importance, as there are public lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers, especially in newly opened regions. It also involves a matter of policy, as it requires the determination of the respective authorities and functions of two coordinate branches of the Government in connection with public land conflicts.
Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil Code, either in the old, which was in force in this country before the American occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory action, the aim and purpose of which is the recovery of the physical possession of real property, irrespective of the question as to who has the title thereto. Under the Spanish Civil Code we had the accion interdictal, a summary proceeding which could be brought within one year from dispossession (Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291); and as early as October 1, 1901, upon the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission) we implanted the common law action of forcible entry (Section 80 of Act No. 190), the object of which has been stated by this Court to be "to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims." (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) So before the enactment of the first Public Land Act (Act No. 926) the action of forcible entry was already available in the courts of the country. So the question to be resolved is, Did the Legislature intend, when it vested the power and authority to alienate and dispose of the public lands in the Lands Department, to exclude the courts from entertaining the possessory action of forcible entry between rival claimants or occupants of any land before award thereof to any of the parties? Did Congress intend that the lands applied for, or all public lands for that matter, be removed from the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch of the Government, so that any troubles arising therefrom, or any breaches of the peace or disorders caused by rival claimants, could be inquired into only by the Lands Department to the exclusion of the courts? The answer to this question seems to us evident. The Lands Department does not have the means to police public lands; neither does it have the means to prevent disorders arising therefrom, or contain breaches of the peace among settlers; or to pass promptly upon conflicts of possession. Then its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in order to make proper award, the settlement of conflicts of possession which is recognized in the courts herein has another ultimate purpose, i.e., the protection of actual possessors and occupants with a view to the prevention of breaches of the peace. The power to dispose and alienate could not have been intended to include the power to prevent or settle disorders or breaches of the peace among rival settlers or claimants prior to the final award. As to this, therefore, the corresponding branches of the Government must continue to exercise power and jurisdiction within the limits of their respective functions. The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose, and alienate public lands, therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the exercise of their respective functions or powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace by the police, the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition.
Our attention has been called to a principle enunciated in American courts to the effect that courts have no jurisdiction to determine the rights of claimants to public lands, and that until the disposition of the land has passed from the control of the Federal Government, the courts will not interfere with the administration of matters concerning the same. (50 C.J. 1093-1094.) We have no quarrel with this principle. The determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands is different from the determination of who has the actual physical possession of occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can never be "prejudicial interference" with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if courts were deprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of possession, that threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or might, not right or justice, would rule.
It must be borne in mind that the action that would be used to solve conflicts of possession between rivals or conflicting applicants or claimants would be no other than that of forcible entry. This action, both in England and the United States and in our jurisdiction, is a summary and expeditious remedy whereby one in peaceful and quiet possession may recover the possession of which he has been deprived by a stronger hand, by violence or terror; its ultimate object being to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder. (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) The basis of the remedy is mere possession as a fact, of physical possession, not a legal possession. (Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752.) The title or right to possession is never in issue in an action of forcible entry; as a matter of fact, evidence thereof is expressly banned, except to prove the nature of the possession. (Section 4, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) With this nature of the action in mind, by no stretch of the imagination can conclusion be arrived at the use of the remedy in the courts of justice would constitute an interference with the alienation, disposition, and control of public lands. To limit ourselves to the case at bar can it be pretended at all that its result would in any way interfere with the manner of the alienation or disposition of the land contested? On the contrary, it would facilitate adjudication, for the question of priority of possession having been decided in a final manner by the courts, said question need no longer waste the time of the land officers making the adjudication or award.[13] (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
As clarified in Chailese, RA 6657 vests the DAR with exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. As explained, a dispute is agrarian in nature when: (i) there is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or agricultural tenant. The jurisdiction of the DAR attaches only when these two elements concur.
Hence, the interplay between RA 6657 vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of the first level courts over ejectment cases can be laid out as follows — the first level courts have original jurisdiction over all ejectment cases, except those involving agrarian disputes. Pursuant to the specific provisions of RA 6657, said agrarian disputes fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. The same principle applies with respect to subject matter jurisdiction over ordinary possessory actions. The regular courts have jurisdiction over ordinary possessory actions, except those involving agrarian disputes which fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR.
As aptly stressed by the ponencia, the controlling aspect which determines jurisdiction over ejectment cases is the nature of the dispute.[14] By explicit provision of Section 50-A of RA 6657, DAR is charged with the duty to make a preliminary determination on the nature of the dispute through the mandatory referral mechanism. However, as earlier emphasized, this preliminary determination does not operate to preclude the referring court or DARAB, as the case may be, to subsequently take cognizance of cases properly falling within their respective jurisdictions when the preliminary determination made pursuant to the mandatory referral mechanism is later found to be erroneous.
Contextualizing the Pitargue ruling
It is significant to note that the concerns expressed by the Court in Pitargue v. Sorilla[15] (Pitargue), which had been quoted by the Court extensively in David, were raised in 1952. At such time, the authority of what was known as the Lands Department was limited to the administration, disposition, and alienation of public lands.[16] The Court's observations as to the Land Department's lack of authority to "stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace" were, at the time, well founded.[17]
However, it should be stressed that, at present, the 2021 DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure provide:
Hence, the DARAB and its adjudicators are granted sufficient power and authority to prevent breaches of peace and order arising from opposing possessory claims in agrarian disputes. In this regard, I submit that the concerns raised in Pitargue are sufficiently addressed as the circumstances on which they were based no longer obtain at present.RULE X. Proceedings Before the [Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD)] or [Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)]
SECTION 52. Nature of Proceedings. — The proceedings before the RARAD or the PARAD shall be summary and non-litigious in nature. Subject to the requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedures under the Rules of Court shall not apply.
x x x xRULE XVIII. Direct and Indirect Contempt
SECTION 98. Direct Contempt. — The Board or any of its Members or RARAD/ PARAD may summarily adjudge in contempt any person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of, or so near the Board or any of its Member[s] or the RARAD or the PARAD, as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect to said officials, offensive acts towards others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. The same shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 5,000.00), or in case of inability or refusal to pay the fine, an imprisonment of not exceeding three (3) days shall be imposed.
The judgment of the Board, the RARAD, or the PARAD on direct contempt is immediately executory and not appealable.
SECTION 99. Indirect Contempt. — In the exercise of its quasi-judicial power[s], and as provided by Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, the Board or at least two (2) of its Members or the RARAD or the PARAD, may cite and punish any person for indirect contempt.
Any person may be cited or punished for [i]ndirect [c]ontempt under any of the following grounds:Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the Board, the RARAD, or the PARAD against which the contempt was committed by order or any other formal charge requiring the Respondent to show cause why he should not be cited and punished for [i]ndirect [c]ontempt.
- Misbehavior of any officer or employees in the performance of his/her official duties or in his/her official transaction[s].
- Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, order or decision, including the acts of a person after the judgment or process to re-enter or attempt or induces another to enter into or upon such real property in any manner which disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled.
- Any abuse of, or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings not constituting direct contempt.
- Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.
- Misrepresenting to be an attorney or a representative of a party without authority.
- Failure to obey a subpoena duly served.
- Other grounds analogous to the foregoing.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings [with] the Board, the RARAD, or the PARAD concerned. If the contempt charges arise out of or are related to a principal action pending before the Board, the RARAD, or the PARAD, the Petition for Contempt shall allege that fact, but the said Petition shall be docketed, heard, and decided separately.
In both instances, the Contemnor shall be given a non-extendible period of ten (10) days to submit a verified Answer to the Charge or Petition.
x x x xRULE XVII. Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order/Status Quo
Order
SECTION 94. Preliminary Injunction, When Granted. — A Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Restraining Order, or a status quo order may be granted by the Board or at least two (2) Members or by the RARAD or the PARAD, as the case may be, when it is established, on the basis of allegations in the sworn Complaint or Motion, which shall be duly supported by affidavits of merit, that the acts being complained of, if not enjoined, would cause some grave and irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties in interest so as to render ineffectual the decision which may be in favor of such party. If the Board, the RARAD, or the PARAD finds that it is necessary to post a bond, it shall fix the reasonable amount of the bond to be filed by the party applying for the injunction in favor of the party who might suffer after it is finally determined that the Complainant or Petitioner is not entitled. Upon the filing and approval of such Bond, a Writ of Injunction may be issued.
The Board, the RARAD, or the PARAD may also require the performance of a particular act/s, in which case, it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
x x x x
SECTION 96. Temporary Restraining Order. — A Temporary Restraining Order issued ex-parte, shall be valid only for twenty (20) days from the date the same is received by the Respondent. During this period, the parties shall be required to present evidence to substantiate their respective positions on whether a preliminary injunction shall be granted. The period of twenty (20) days may be extended upon motion of the proper party on valid grounds, for another twenty (20) days from the expiration of the original period. Thereafter, no motion for further extension of the Temporary Restraining Order shall be allowed. After due notice and hearing, and before the lapse of the Temporary Restraining Order, the issue of preliminary injunction or status quo should be resolved. (Additional emphasis supplied)
To reiterate once more, a dispute is agrarian in nature when: (i) there is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and (ii) one of the parties is proven to be a farmer, farmworker, or agricultural tenant. The concurrence of these two elements places the dispute under the jurisdiction of the DAR.
The Complaint presents an agrarian dispute which falls under the jurisdiction of the DAR |
Proceeding from the foregoing, it is clear that the CA correctly ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction since the elements of an agrarian dispute unequivocally concur.
As to the first element, the ponencia aptly notes that respondents have consistently alleged that the issues herein stem from an agrarian dispute, inasmuch as they anchor their physical possession on their respective Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).[18] Moreover, as emphasized by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations, petitioner herself previously filed before the DARAB a Petition for Cancellation of the CLOAs issued in favor of respondents, as well as a Petition for CARP exemption involving the disputed lands. The CLOAs subject of these DARAB cases are the very same ones assailed by petitioner in the present case. The prior filing of the DARAB cases thus shows that petitioner herself recognizes that the issues involved herein are agrarian in nature.
As to the second element, I submit that the subsistence of the CLOAs in the names of respondents sufficiently serve as evidence of respondents' status as tenants, farmers, or farmworkers. To note, Section 24 of RA 6657 specifies those who are qualified to stand as beneficiaries of the CARP, thus:
SEC. 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. — The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:In this connection, Section 24 of the same statute provides that the CLOA serves as evidence of ownership of the land awarded in favor of the qualified beneficiary tenant, farmer, or farmworker. The existence of a valid and subsisting CLOA therefore serves as a continuing recognition of the status of respondents as such.(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
x x x x
Considering that the two elements of an agrarian dispute concur, I find the dismissal of the Complaint proper. Accordingly, I vote to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the January 27, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
[1] Ponencia, p. 16.
[2] AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as "THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980," approved on August 14, 1981, as amended by Republic Act No. 11576, AN ACT FURTHER EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980," As AMENDED, approved on July 30, 2021.
[3] AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as the "COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988," approved on June 10, 1988.
[4] AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT No. 6657, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, approved on August 7, 2009.
[5] Ponencia, p. 8.
[6] RA 6657, Sec. 3(d).
[7] Supra note 4.
[8] Section 57 of RA 6657 prescribes the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Special Agrarian Courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation, and all criminal offenses punishable thereunder.
[9] 502 Phil. 626 (2005).
[10] 826 Phil. 51 (2018).
[11] David v. Cordova, supra note 9, at 645-647. Citation omitted.
[12] Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon, supra note 10, at 60-65.
[13] David v. Cordova, supra note 9, at 646-650.
[14] Ponencia, p. 13.
[15] 92 Phil. 5 (1952).
[16] Id. at 11-12.
[17] See id. at 12.
[18] Ponencia, p. 15.
CONCURRING OPINION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
I agree with the ponencia that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), not the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, has jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint against respondents for forcible entry, considering that the case involves an agrarian dispute. This is in accordance with Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon[1] and the amendment introduced in 2009 by Republic Act No. 9700[2] (RA 9700) to Republic Act No. 6657[3] (RA 6657). Chailese pertinently ordained:
x x x xBy virtue of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) was designated to assume the powers and functions of the DAR with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases, and matters relating to the implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws.
The jurisdiction of the DAR is laid down in Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] CARL, which provides:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). x x x (Emphases added)
x x x x
The exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR over agrarian cases was further amplified by the amendment introduced by Section 19 of RA 9700 to Section 50. The provision reads:
Section 19. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding Section 50-A to read as follows:In this regard, it must be said that there is no merit in the contention of petitioner that the amendment introduced by RA 9700 cannot be applied retroactively in the case at bar. Primarily, a cursory reading of the provision readily reveals that Section 19 of RA 9700 merely highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR to rule on agrarian cases by adding a clause which mandates the automatic referral of cases upon the existence of the requisites therein stated. Simply, RA 9700 does not deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of the DAR set forth under Section 50 of RA 6657. More, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, as the amendment is essentially procedural in nature it is deemed to apply to all actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.
SEC. 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. — No court or prosecutor's office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, that from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court, and in cases referred by the regional trial court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals.
In cases where regular courts or quasi-judicial bodies have competent jurisdiction, agrarian reform beneficiaries or identified beneficiaries and/or their associations shall have legal standing and interest to intervene concerning their individual or collective rights and/or interests under the CARP.
The fact of non-registration of such associations with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or Cooperative Development Authority, or any concerned government agency shall not be used against them to deny the existence of their legal standing and interest in a case filed before such courts and quasi-judicial bodies. (Emphases added)
x x x x
Thence, having settled that Section 19 of RA 9700 is applicable in this controversy, the Court now proceeds with the examination of such amendment. Based on the said provision, the judge or prosecutor is obligated to automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the following requisites are present:
- There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and
- One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
The allegations in petitioner's complaint make a case for recovery of possession, over which the regular courts have jurisdiction. In response thereto, however, the respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim, assailing the jurisdiction of the regular court to rule on the matter on the ground that it is agrarian in nature, which thus complies with the first requisite, viz.:
x x x xAn agricultural tenancy relation, on the other hand, is established by the concurrence of the following elements enunciated by the Court in Chico v. CA,[4] viz.:
Anent the second requisite, the Court finds that the respondents failed to prove that they are farmers, farmworkers, or are agricultural tenants.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 6657 defines formers ... as follows:
(f) Farmer refers to a natural person whose primary livelihood is cultivation of land or the production of agricultural crops, either by himself, or primarily with the assistance of his immediate farm household, whether the land is owned by him, or by another person under a leasehold or share tenancy agreement or arrangement with the owner thereof.
x x x x
x x x (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.Contrary to the Court of Appeal's conclusion and as opposed to the first requisite, mere allegation would not suffice to establish the existence of the second requirement. Proof must be adduced by the person making the allegation as to his or her status as a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
x x x x
The pertinent portion of Section 19 of RA 9700 reads:
x x x If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR x x x.The use of the word "an" prior to "allegation" indicate that the latter qualifies only the immediately subsequent statement, i.e., that the case is agrarian in nature. Otherwise stated, an allegation would suffice only insofar as the characterization of the nature of the action.
Had it been the intention that compliance with the second element would likewise be sufficient by a mere allegation from one of the parties that he or she is a farmer, farm worker, or tenant, the legislature should have used the plural form when referring to "allegation" as the concurrence of both requisites is mandatory for the automatic referral clause to operate.
Further instructive is this Court's ruling in the previously cited case of Chico. Therein, the Court held that for the purpose of divesting regular courts of its jurisdiction in the proceedings lawfully began before it and in order for the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the elements of a tenancy relationship must be shown by adequate proof. It is not enough that the elements are alleged.[5] Likewise, self-serving statements in the pleadings are inadequate.
Section 3 (d) of RA 6657 as amended defines an "agrarian dispute" as:
x x x any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.Here, respondents consistently maintained that the case is agrarian in nature. This consistent argument is well documented in the ponencia itself. Hence, the first requisite is complied with. It is also clear that respondents are tenants-farmers of petitioner.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. (Emphases added)
x x x x
Their action to sneak into the landholdings and petitioner's court case involved incidents arising from their landlord-tenant relationship.[6] This too is amply documented in the ponencia. Thus, the second requisite is present.
Indeed, there would have been no dispute between the parties and no present cases before us (before the Court resolved to deconsolidate G.R. No. 201076 from G.R. No. 201631) had it not been for their agrarian relationship and agrarian contest at the DAR through the DARAB.
Under the 2009 amendment to RA 6657, it is the DAR through the DARAB that has subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioner's ejectment case.
It may be true that respondents had been issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs). Ordinarily, they would have already acquired vested rights of absolute ownership over the landholdings and would have already ceased to be mere tenants.[7] But the CLOAs did not attain finality. Petitioner initiated and in fact won a petition for annulment of these CLOAs at the PARAD level. She also applied for exemption of the landholdings from CARP coverage at DAR. This application has been granted. Just like the CLOAs, nonetheless, the annulment of the CLOAs and the exemption of the landholdings from CARP coverage have not become final and executory. All these incidents mean that the agrarian relationship and agrarian dispute have not been terminated. As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR through the DARAB.[8]
Insofar as the case is concerned, neither the first nor the second level courts had then the benefit of Section 50-A of RA 6657 as amended – they did not have then the mandate to refer the dispute to the DAR for certification as an agrarian or non-agrarian dispute. In any event, our doctrine is that this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or by the courts.[9] As we have consistently held: "Laws can only be amended by a subsequent law, and nothing that parties do in any case can change it. Thus, the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised even for the first time on appeal, not simply because it is jurisdiction over the subject matter, but mainly because it is the law that prescribes it."[10]
THUS, I vote to DISMISS the Petition in G.R. No. 201631 and AFFIRM the January 27, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03121. I also vote to reverse and set aside the April 17, 2007 Decision of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Opol and El Salvador, Misamis Oriental in Civil Case No. 2000-09-16, as well as the December 10, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Cagayan de Oro City in Civil Case No. 2007-116 affirming the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court's (MCTC) Decision.
[1] G.R. No. 206788, February 14, 2018.
[2] AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, OTHERWISE, KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.
[3] AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
[4] 348 Phil. 37, 43 (1998).
[5] See supra note 4.
[6] See Ofilada v. Spouses Andal, 752 Phil. 27 (2015).
[7] See Bumagat v. Arribay, 735 Phil. 27 (2014).
[8] Spouses Amurao v. Spouses Villalobos, 524 Phil. 762, 773 (2006).
[9] See Republic v. Mangotara, 638 Phil. 353 (2010).
[10] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Corporation v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019.