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EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 224945, October 11, 2022 ]

GIRLIE J. LINGAD, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

LEONEN, SAJ.:

Money laundering is committed when the proceeds of an unlawful activity expressly listed under the Anti-Money Laundering Act are transacted, transferred, or moved, and are made to appear as though they originated from legitimate sources. The prosecution for the money laundering offense can proceed independently of the prosecution of the related unlawful activity, but particular elements of that unlawful activity must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeking to reverse the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision[4] convicting Girlie J. Lingad (Lingad) of money laundering as penalized under Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9160, or the Anti-Money Laundering Act.

Lingad was employed in the Olongapo City Branch of United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) from January 1, 1994 until April 19, 2004.[5] Before she left UCPB, she was a marketing associate and branch marketing officer trainee.[6] She handled the opening, terminating, and withdrawing of client accounts and placements.[7] Her position gave her access to the bank's computer system, with User ID "oloma01" and Teller ID No. 2840.[8]

On April 19, 2004, Lingad went on absence without official leave. Later, UCPB requested the Anti-Money Laundering Council to conduct a fact-finding investigation on her transactions. The Council discovered that Lingad had processed four anomalous transactions and left for the United States on April 20, 2004 with her children. The anomalous transactions consisted of unauthorized withdrawals and preterminations of money market placements with the money transferred to accounts in the names of MV2 Telecoms and Lingad's brother.[9]

On October 5, 2006, an Information was filed against Lingad charging her with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9160.[10] It reads:
That on or about July, 2002 and subsequent thereto at Olongapo City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing that the amount of Eighty Three Million, Three Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twenty Eight Pesos and Ninety Seven Centavos (Php83,335,628.97) involves or related to the proceeds of an unlawful activity that is the crime [sic] of qualified theft and violation of Section 33(a) of R.A. 8792 (Electronic Commerce Act of 2000[)], did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously perform an act as a result of which the said accused committed the offense of money laundering referred to in Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, more particularly by means of pre-terminating various accounts of clients without the knowledge and consent of the latter and thereafter crediting the proceeds thereof to fictitious accounts or using the proceeds of pre-terminated accounts to fund maturing accounts earlier pre-terminated without clients' knowledge and consent on the following accounts:

(a) Account: Money Market Placement and PSD Account Nos. 1860-B & 1
Damage to Bank: Php10,405,873.24
Dates Committed: July 3, 2003 and April 23, 2003.

(b) Account: Money Market Placement and PSD Account Nos. 1835-D & 1860-A
Damage to Bank: Php12,438,781.89
Dates Committed: November 4, 2002 to April 10, 2003.

(c) Account: PSD Account No. 1835-E
Damage to Bank: Php11,254,972.00
Dates Committed: August 4-25, 2003

(d) Account: PSD Account No. 2268-B
Damage to Bank: Php4,863,377.67
Dates Committed: December 4-15, 2003

(e) Account: PSD Account No. 2280-A
Deposited to Savings Account No. 218-114488 and then to Account No. 2-130-001576-0 of MV2 Telecoms
Damage to Bank: Php2,000,000.00
Dates Committed: January 9, 2004

to the damage and prejudice of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and the Government of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
Lingad was extradited from the United States.[12] When she was arraigned, she pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.[13]

According to the prosecution, the Anti-Money Laundering Council's investigation revealed that Lingad issued several manager's checks with no sufficient funds and processed unauthorized withdrawals or preterminations of money market and similar placements.[14]

The first anomalous transaction involved one of the money market placements of William Chieng (Chieng) in UCPB. Chieng had two money market placements totaling P22,948,112.44: one for around P10,200,000.00 and the other for around P12,200,000.00.[15] The P10,200,000.00 placement was preterminated on July 3, 2002, but Chieng denied withdrawing the money, and neither was there any signed payment slip for it.[16] Chieng said that he was unaware of the pretermination because Lingad issued him official receipts showing that he still had placements in UCPB.[17]

On April 23, 2003, a manager's check worth P10,405,873.24 was issued in favor of Chieng.[18] That same day, two Premium Savings deposit accounts of Vittsi G. Tanjuakio (Tanjuakio) were preterminated, with a total of P10,405,873.24 withdrawn, but Tanjuakio never signed any payment slip.[19]

The Anti-Money Laundering Council noted that Lingad processed all these transactions, as shown by her Teller and User IDs.[20] It also concluded that the amounts from Tanjuakio's accounts were used to fund the manager's check issued to Chieng.[21]

The second anomalous transaction involved Chieng's money market placement for P12,370,677.50, which was preterminated on November 4, 2002, again without any indorsement from Chieng. On the same day, the money was used to open a savings account in Chieng's name. Later, amounts from this account were transferred to other accounts on different dates, coursed through debit memos where no cash was involved. The debit memos showed transfers of P9,450,000.00 on November 7, 2002 and P133,000.00 on November 15, 2002.[22] On April 9, 2003, Lingad preterminated another one of Tanjuakio's placements worth P12,438,350.00, also without any payment slip from Tanjuakio. On the same date, she opened a Premium Savings Deposit Account No. 1835 under Chieng's name.[23]

The following day, Lingad processed a manager's check worth P12,438,350.00 in favor of Chieng as payment for his placement. Again, the Anti-Money Laundering Council concluded that Lingad used the amounts from Tanjuakio's accounts to fund Chieng's manager's check.[24]

The third anomalous transaction involved Chieng's Premium Savings Deposit Account No. 1835 with the amount of P11,065,541.67.[25] Chieng made this placement on July 30, 2003, with a term of 30 days or until August 29, 2003.[26] However, 11 preterminations amounting to P11,070,000.00 were made from this account between August 4 and 25, 2003, leaving a zero balance as of the last pretermination on August 25, 2003. Chieng said that he issued no payment slips and did not preterminate the placement, noting that Lingad had still issued him an acknowledgment receipt showing his placement was intact.[27] Chieng received his money placement worth P11,254,974.61 through a manager's check processed by Lingad.[28]

The source of funding of the manager's check consisted of preterminations of other accounts not supported by payment slips amounting to P11,254,972.16, all processed by Lingad using her User ID and all done from 1:46 p.m. to 2:38 p.m. The total bank damage amounted to P22,328,022.40.[29]

The fourth anomalous transaction involved Chieng's Premium Savings Deposit Account Nos. 2268-A and 2268-B, with the amounts of P6,519,884.12 and P5,000,000.00, respectively.[30] The investigation revealed six preterminations of these accounts from December 4, 2003 to January 8, 2004.[31] No signed withdrawal slip was shown, and Chieng denied withdrawing these amounts, saying that his placements were still intact.[32] Chieng later withdrew his placements of P5,134,947.62, and thus, a manager's check was issued in his favor.[33] However, a balance of P271,569.95 remained, which was found irregular.[34] The manager's check was presented to another bank for negotiation and was paid by UCPB. In this transaction, UCPB lost P4,863,377.67 in damages.[35]

The audit investigation on Chieng's accounts further revealed that on April 17, 2004, a Saturday, Lingad went to the branch at 9:00 a.m. and signed out at 11:00 a.m.[36] Lingad's computer system was also found as not operational.[37] The prosecution also noted that Lingad and her children flew to the United States without requesting approval and processing her clearance. Chieng has made 30 to 40 placements in UCPB, and the unfunded manager's checks and credited accounts without contra-accounts amounted to P83,698,208.81.[38]

In her defense, Lingad either denied processing the transactions in question or testified that she could not recall making them.[39] She discussed that all the bank transactions she processed were always supervised by bank officers,[40] who would verify and approve them to prevent unauthorized transactions.[41] She also pointed out that she had very limited functions, access to the cash and record vaults, and authority for approving or signature verification.[42] She also argued that even her signature in manager's checks would always need to be conformed to and co-signed by an authorized bank officer, except when none was present.[43]

Lingad added that in December 2003, she informed her superiors that she was intending to migrate to the United States with her family. After 10 years in UCPB, she availed of her retirement plan and was expecting to receive a lump sum plus accumulated sick and vacation leaves. She said that she had no copy of her resignation letter, but all UCPB employees knew she was leaving. She last reported in UCPB on April 16, 2004. On her last day, her co-employees threw her a despedida. The next day, she went to the branch because her superior, Catherine Oh (Oh), had called her in to clarify her turnover sheet. When she arrived, Oh was not there, having only left a message telling her to wait. After waiting for long enough, Lingad left the bank and had lunch with a co-employee.[44]

Lingad claimed that in all of UCPB's internal audits, there was not a single audit finding against her. She was never issued a memorandum of infraction, especially on money matters, and there was no proof that she caused UCPB prejudice and damage.[45]

In an August 8, 2013 Decision,[46] the Regional Trial Court found Lingad guilty of violating Section 4(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act by committing qualified theft and transacting some of its proceeds to make them appear to have come from legitimate sources.[47]

The trial court found overwhelming evidence that Lingad processed all the anomalous transactions. Aside from the prosecution's positive testimonies, the documents pertaining to the transactions bore her signature, initials, User ID, or Teller ID.[48] It found that Lingad's position allowed her access to the bank's computer operation system and cash and record vaults. The User and Teller IDs also worked as an identifier and personal key to the person who would be allowed access to the computer system through a password. This revealed the employee processing the bank transaction in the computer data and printout documents.[49]

The trial court also found that Lingad's denials were self-serving and her other allegations were unsubstantiated. On top of this, her unjustified flight to the United States without proper clearance or turnover of documents was deemed a strong indication of guilt, revealing that she was evading investigation.[50] The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GIRLIE J. LINGAD, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. 9160, otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering [Act], as amended by R.A. 9194 and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years as minimum to thirteen (13) years as maximum; to pay fine of Thirty Four Million Ninety Nine Thousand and One Hundred Ninety Five Pesos and Eighty Five Centavos (Php34,099,195.85); suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of fine; to suffer all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[51] (Emphasis in the original)
In its December 11, 2015 Decision,[52] the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's Decision. It likewise denied Lingad's Motion for Reconsideration in a June 2, 2016 Resolution.[53]

Thus, Lingad filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court.[54] She argues that the prosecution failed to prove that she is guilty of violating Section 4(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.[55] She claims that she is not the culprit as she was not an officer and could not unilaterally approve any transaction.[56] All transactions she processed were reviewed by a superior,[57] she says, adding that her User and Teller IDs could have been used by another employee.[58]

Petitioner adds that it was of no moment that she failed to substantiate her denial since she is not required to prove her innocence. She says that Chieng's testimony also shows that he could have made the withdrawals since he stated that he could not recall it.[59] She says that the prosecution failed to provide conclusive evidence that she opened the fictitious account under Chieng's name.[60] She posits that while denial is the weakest of all defenses, it must be considered in light of all the evidence on record, especially if she is possibly being used as a scapegoat, considering the damage to the bank's reputation due to the anomalous transactions.[61]

Respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment.[62] Maintaining petitioner's conviction, it argues that all the elements of qualified theft and money laundering were proven when it was shown that petitioner had preterminated and withdrawn funds from the accounts of UCPB's clients without their knowledge.[63] Respondent notes that as a marketing associate, she had access and authority to effect transactions under clients' accounts; her claims on who actually did it are unfounded.[64]

Respondent also argues that petitioner's other acts further establish her guilt: placing a sticky substance on the terminals of her office desktop and deleting relevant data to cover her tracks, going on absence without leave, flying abroad without settling her accountabilities, and being extradited from the United States.[65]

In lieu of a reply, petitioner manifested that she would replead and adopt all the arguments in her Petition.[66]

The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner Girlie J. Lingad is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.

We affirm the conviction.

I

At the time petitioner was tried for the offense in 2006, money laundering pertained to the transacting of proceeds of an unlawful activity to make it appear to have originated from legitimate sources.

Section 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 9194 in 2003,[67] reads:
SECTION 4. Money Laundering Offense. — Money laundering is a crime whereby the proceeds of an unlawful activity as herein defined are transacted, thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources. It is committed by the following:

(a)
Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property.
   
(b)
Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property involves the proceeds of any unlawful activity, performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraph (a) above.
   
(c)
Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is required under this Act to be disclosed and filed with the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so.
Thus, under Republic Act No. 9194, the following were the elements of money laundering: (1) there is an unlawful activity—any act or omission, or a series or combination of acts or omissions, involving or directly related to offenses enumerated under Section 3 of the law; (2) the proceeds of the unlawful activity are transacted by the accused; (3) the accused knows that the proceeds involve or relate to the unlawful activity; and (4) the proceeds are made to appear to have originated from legitimate sources.

Under Section 3 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act,[68] qualified theft is one of the unlawful activities from which proceeds could be derived. Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 308, defines and punishes qualified theft:
ARTICLE 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Article 308 states:
ARTICLE 308. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:
  1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;

  2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and

  3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
In People v. Cahilig,[69] this Court enumerated the elements of qualified theft committed with grave abuse of confidence:
  1. Taking of personal property;
  2. That the said property belongs to another;
  3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
  4. That it be done without the owner's consent;
  5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
  6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.[70]
Here, in withdrawing money and preterminating accounts without authority, petitioner transacted proceeds from the crime of qualified theft. By taking advantage of her position, she took money from UCPB clients without their knowledge and consent. Petitioner held a position of trust and confidence, as she handled the opening, termination, and withdrawal of client accounts and placements, and also had access to the bank's computer system.[71] She processed all these transactions using her User ID "oloma01" and Teller ID No. 2840. Intent to gain may be seen from the unauthorized fund transfers to other accounts and the use of a carefully planned scheme to commit the theft.

Petitioner then committed money laundering when she transacted the proceeds of the qualified theft through manager's checks or transferred them to other money market placements to give the appearance that the money markets were still subsisting.

These factual findings were made by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, which both found petitioner to have processed the anomalous transactions. In Tigoy v. Court of Appeals:[72]
The Court accords high respect to the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of the witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of the evidence of the parties as well as its conclusions especially when these are in agreement with those of the Court of Appeals, which is the case here. As a matter of fact, factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally final and conclusive.[73] (Citations omitted)
Against such findings, petitioner's defense of denial and frame-up are self-serving and unsubstantiated. She offers no explanation for why she processed these transactions or how the transactions could not have been hers. She attempts to pass the blame to the bank officers, as they approved all the transactions that she processed. This finger-pointing is weak, unproven, and does not stand against the strong evidence against her. In People v. Amania:[74]
[A]libi and denial ... if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. Parenthetically, we have stressed time and again that these defenses are inherently weak and unreliable as they are easy to concoct and fabricate. In the case of alibi, it is elementary case law that the requirements of time and place be strictly complied with by the defense, meaning that the accused must not only show that he was somewhere else but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.[75] (Citations omitted)
Petitioner, therefore, failed to raise any reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.

II

Money laundering generally involves a predicate offense. A predicate offense is a crime that is a component of another offense. In money laundering, the predicate offense is usually an unlawful activity that generates proceeds of money or property. In this case, for instance, the predicate offense was qualified theft.

However, the predicate offense in money laundering is distinct from the offense of money laundering, such that the two offenses may be prosecuted in separate criminal actions. This Court takes this occasion to clarify the distinction between the money laundering offense and the unlawful activity from which the proceeds come.

Republic Act No. 10365, which amended the Anti-Money Laundering Act in 2013, explicitly states that the prosecution of the money laundering offense shall proceed independently of any action relating to the unlawful activity:
SECTION 5. Section 6 (a) of [Republic Act No. 9160] is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 6. Prosecution of Money Laundering. —

(a)
Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity as herein defined.


(b)
The prosecution of any offense or violation under this Act shall proceed independently of any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity. (Emphasis supplied)
This is also stated in the latest Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9160.[76] The elements of each offense are distinct. Thus, the "elements of the unlawful activity, including the identity of the perpetrators and the details of the commission of the unlawful activity, need not be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt in the case for [money laundering]":
SECTION 4. Prosecution of Money Laundering Cases. —

4.1. Independent Proceedings.

The prosecutions of ML and the associated unlawful activity shall proceed independently. Any person may be charged with and convicted of both ML and the associated unlawful activity.

4.2. Separate and Distinct Elements.

The elements of ML are separate and distinct from the elements of the associated unlawful activity. The elements of the unlawful activity, including the identity of the perpetrators and the details of the commission of the unlawful activity, need not be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt in the case for ML.

4.3. Knowledge.

The element of knowledge may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. The deliberate non-performance of the preventive measures under the AMLA, this IRR, AMLC issuances, and SA's guidelines by a covered person's responsible directors, officers and employees shall be considered in determining knowledge of the commission of ML offenses.

4.4. Rules of Procedure.

The Rules of Court shall govern all proceedings concerning the prosecution of ML. The prosecution of ML and other violations of the AMLA shall be handled by the Department of Justice, through its public prosecutors, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, pursuant to the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

4.5. No ML Case during Election Period.

No case for ML may be filed against a candidate for an electoral office during an election period.
Generally, the elements of predicate crimes must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. This is consistent with Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in all criminal actions, the prosecution must prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[77] Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
However, the unlawful activity involved and the money laundering itself may or may not involve the same perpetrators. To recall, what is punished as an offense under the Anti-Money Laundering Act is the act of laundering the proceeds of an unlawful activity. As presently worded under Republic Act No. 10365:
SECTION 4. Money Laundering Offense. — Money laundering is committed by any person who, knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity:

(a)
transacts said monetary instrument or property;
   
(b)
converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses or uses said monetary instrument or property;
   
(c)
conceals or disguises the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said monetary instrument or property;
   
(d)
attempts or conspires to commit money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c); 
   
(e) aids, abets, assists in or counsels the commission of the money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above; and
   
(f)
performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above.
On the other hand, the unlawful activity refers to an act or omission, or a series or combination of such act or omission, involving or having direct relation to the following:
(i)
"Unlawful activity" refers to any act or omission or series or combination thereof involving or having relation to the following:



(1)
Kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, as amended;




(2)
Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002;




(3)
Section 3 paragraphs B, C, E, G, H and I of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;




(4)
Plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended;




(5)
Robbery and extortion under Articles 294, 295, 296, 299, 300, 301 and 302 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;




(6)
Jueteng and Masiao punished as illegal gambling under Presidential Decree No. 1602;




(7)
Piracy on the high seas under the Revised Penal Code, as amended and Presidential Decree No. 532;




(8)
Qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;




(9)
Swindling under Article 315 and Other Forms of Swindling under Article 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;




(10) 
Smuggling under Republic Act Nos. 455 and 1937;




(11)
Violations of Republic Act No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000;




(12)
Hijacking and other violations under Republic Act No. 6235; destructive arson and murder, as defined under the Revised Penal Code, as amended;




(13)
Terrorism and conspiracy to commit terrorism as defined and penalized under Sections 3 and 4 of Republic Act No. 9372;




(14)
Financing of terrorism under Section 4 and offenses punishable under Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Republic Act No. 10168, otherwise known as the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012;




(15)
Bribery under Articles 210, 211 and 211-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Corruption of Public Officers under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;




(16)
Frauds and Illegal Exactions and Transactions under Articles 213, 214, 215 and 216 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;




(17)
Malversation of Public Funds and Property under Articles 217 and 222 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;




(18)
Forgeries and Counterfeiting under Articles 163, 166, 167, 168, 169 and 176 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;




(19)
Violations of Sections 4 to 6 of Republic Act No. 9208, otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003; 




(20)
Violations of Sections 78 to 79 of Chapter IV, of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended;




(21)
Violations of Sections 86 to 106 of Chapter VI, of Republic Act No. 8550, otherwise known as the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998;




(22)
Violations of Sections 101 to 107, and 110 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995;




(23)
Violations of Section 27(c), (e), (f), (g) and (i), of Republic Act No. 9147, otherwise known as the Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act;




(24)
Violation of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 9072, otherwise known as the National Caves and Cave Resources Management Protection Act;




(25)
Violation of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 2002, as amended;




(26)
Violations of Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, otherwise known as the decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives;




(27)
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law;




(28)
Violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022;




(29)
Violation of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines;




(30)
Violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9995, otherwise known as the Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009;




(31)
Violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9775, otherwise known as the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009;




(32)
Violations of Sections 5, 7, 8, 9, 10(c), (d) and (e), 11, 12 and 14 of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination;




(33)
Fraudulent practices and other violations under Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code of 2000; and




(34)
Felonies or offenses of a similar nature that are punishable under the penal laws of other countries.
These predicate or related crimes are offenses that involve proceeds—any amount or type of money or property—that can be laundered. Section 3(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act defines proceeds as "an amount derived or realized from an unlawful activity." In turn, Section 4 of the law only provides that one commits money laundering when they transact the proceeds knowing that this came from an unlawful activity. It does not require that the money launderer should have committed the unlawful activity. It only states that the money launderer should have known that the proceeds came from an unlawful activity. The offense likewise does not require the identity of the persons who commit the unlawful activity; it only requires that the proceeds come from such activity.

A reading of the listed unlawful activities and the nature of money laundering reveals that money laundering may involve a situation where the predicate unlawful activity is not necessarily committed by the money launderer. The unlawful activity may be a separate crime, possibly committed by a different person.

For example, Person A commits kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, an unlawful activity under the Anti-Money Laundering Act. Person A asks Person B for assistance in concealing the ransom money. Person B knows that it was ransom money, but agrees to keep it in a location unchecked by authorities. In this example, Person A is the only person who may be charged with kidnapping, though Person A may still be charged with money laundering. Person B, however, may be charged with money laundering, but not kidnapping.

Thus, the action for money laundering may proceed independently of any proceeding involving the unlawful activity. A charge for money laundering may still be filed against Person B, and it need not depend on the outcome of the kidnapping charge against Person A. It is not necessary to first obtain a finding of guilt in the kidnapping case before the prosecution of Person B's money laundering offense.

Nonetheless, this Court highlights that an element of the money laundering offense is that the money or property involved constitutes proceeds from an unlawful activity. Necessarily, it must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt that the money or property forms proceeds from an unlawful activity.

Thus, while the criminal action for the unlawful activity may proceed independently of the money laundering charge, and the guilt of the person who committed the unlawful activity need not be determined first, it must still be proven that the money or property in the money laundering offense is proceeds from an unlawful activity. This entails proving beyond reasonable doubt particular elements of that unlawful activity.

In the example above, before Person B can be found guilty of money laundering, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the money forms proceeds from the kidnapping. The prosecution need not prove who committed the kidnapping, but it must still prove that the money was extorted for the release of the person deprived of liberty. It must be proven beyond reasonable doubt that the nature of the proceeds is from an unlawful activity. Otherwise, an element of the offense of money laundering is missing. The act cannot constitute money laundering.

In this case, it was first shown that the money involved is proceeds from qualified theft. The prosecution needed to show that the amounts were taken with intent to gain from third parties by grave abuse of confidence. The prosecution then proved that petitioner, knowing the nature of the amounts as proceeds from qualified theft, transacted it through manager's checks or transferred them to other money market placements to give the appearance that the money markets were still subsisting. Thus, petitioner was charged with and found guilty of money laundering.

The predicate offenses in money laundering differ from the predicate offenses of other crimes, such as plunder or terrorism.

In plunder,[78] the predicate offenses are necessary elements in the crime of plunder because they are perpetrated by the same persons committing plunder. The elements of plunder are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts:

a. through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

b. by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer;

c. by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;

d. by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

e. by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

f. by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.[79] (Citation omitted)
The elements of plunder are clear. The plunderer must have "amassed, accumulated[,] or acquired ill-gotten wealth"[80] through a combination or series of the enumerated criminal acts. They need to have committed any of the listed predicate offenses to be found guilty of plunder. Thus, in plunder, all the elements of the predicate offense need to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Unlike in money laundering, the prosecution of plunder does not proceed independently of the prosecution of the predicate offense.

As for terrorism, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 11479 or the Anti-Terrorism Act states:
SECTION 4. Terrorism. — Subject to Section 49 of this Act, terrorism is committed by any person who, within or outside the Philippines, regardless of the stage of execution:

(a)
Engages in acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person, or endangers a person's life;
   
(b)
Engages in acts intended to cause extensive damage or destruction to a government or public facility, public place or private property;
   
(c)
Engages in acts intended to cause extensive interference with, damage or destruction to critical infrastructure;
   
(d)
Develops, manufactures, possesses, acquires, transports, supplies or uses weapons, explosives or of biological, nuclear, radiological or chemical weapons; and
   
(e)
Release of dangerous substances, or causing fire, floods or explosions[;]

when the purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate the general public or a segment thereof, create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear, to provoke or influence by intimidation the government or any international organization, or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country, or create a public emergency or seriously undermine public safety, shall be guilty of committing terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592, otherwise known as "An Act Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code". Provided, That, terrorism as defined in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights, which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety.
The predicate offenses involved in the commission of terrorism, such as murder,[81] destructive arson,[82] or crimes involving destruction,[83] have a purpose: "to intimidate the general public . . . , create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear, to provoke or influence by intimidation the government or any international organization, or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country, or create a public emergency or seriously undermine public safety[.]"[84] However, like plunderers, terrorists commit the predicate offenses themselves. Thus, the prosecution of the smaller predicate offenses is not independent of the prosecution of the offense of terrorism. The predicate crimes are necessary elements to establish the crime of terrorism.

Again, this differs from the offense of money laundering, where the predicate offense, i.e., the enumerated unlawful activities, may be committed by another person, and need not be committed by the money launderer.

In any case, here, petitioner is only being prosecuted for the offense of money laundering. While the lower courts found that petitioner also committed the separate predicate offense of qualified theft, petitioner shall only be convicted for the offense of money laundering.

Since petitioner is found guilty of the crime of money laundering under Section 4(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Court of Appeals properly imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years as minimum to thirteen (13) years as maximum, along with a fine of P34,099,195.85, all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and payment of costs. Under the Implementing Rules governing at the time petitioner committed the crime:
RULE 14.1. Penalties for the Crime of Money Laundering. —

RULE 14.1.a. Penalties under Section 4 (a) of the AMLA. — The penalty of Imprisonment ranging from seven (7) to fourteen (14) years and a fine of not less than Three Million Philippine Pesos (Php3,000,000.00) but not more than twice the value of the monetary instrument or property involved in the offense, shall be imposed upon a person convicted under Section 4 (a) of the AMLA.
This Court, however, deletes the penalty of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency imposed by the lower courts. This is not a penalty provided for under Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by Republic Act No. 9194, or its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

This Court notes that on July 9, 2019, the Bureau of Corrections wrote a letter informing this Court that petitioner has already served the maximum penalty of the sentence imposed on her and is now due for release.[85] On November 28, 2019, the Public Attorney's Office manifested before this Court that petitioner was transferred from the Correctional Institution for Women to the Olongapo District Jail Female Dormitory in connection with other criminal cases still pending against her.[86]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 11, 2015 Decision and June 2, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36600 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Girlie J. Lingad is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9160, or the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 9194. She is correctly sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years as minimum to thirteen (13) years as maximum, to pay a fine of P34,099,195.85, to suffer all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs.

Nonetheless, since petitioner has fully served the maximum penalty of the sentence imposed on her, she is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless she is confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women for immediate implementation. The Superintendent is directed to report to this Court, within five days from receipt of this Decision, the action taken.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Inting, M. Lopez, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.
Caguioa,* Rosario,* and Marquez,* JJ., on official leave.
Lazaro-Javier, J., see separate opinion.
Zalameda, J., with separate opinion.
Gaerlan,** J., no part.


* On official leave.

** No part.

[1] Rollo, pp. 11-38.

[2] Id. at 40-57. The December 11, 2015 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and concurred in by Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of this Court) of the Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

[3] Id. at 60-61. The June 2, 2016 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and concurred in by Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of this Court) of the Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

[4] Id. at 86-148. The August 8, 2013 Decision was penned by Judge Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde of the Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, Branch 74.

[5] Id. at 40, CA Decision.

[6] Id.

[7] Id. at 41.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 40.

[11] Id. at 41-42.

[12] Id. at 48-49.

[13] Id. at 42.

[14] Id. at 132, RTC Decision.

[15] Id. at 43, CA Decision.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 44.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id. at 45.

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at 96, RTC Decision. The amount of actual money payment was also written as P11,254,972.61.

[29] Id. at 45 and 97.

[30] Id. at 45.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id. at 45-46.

[34] Id. at 46.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id. at 146-147, RTC Decision.

[40] Id. at 46-47, CA Decision.

[41] Id. at 47.

[42] Id. at 48-49.

[43] Id. at 47.

[44] Id. at 48.

[45] Id. at 48-49.

[46] Id. at 86-148, RTC Decision.

[47] Id. at 135-136.

[48] Id. at 147.

[49] Id. at 132.

[50] Id. at 148, RTC Decision.

[51] Id.

[52] Id. at 40-57.

[53] Id. at 60-61.

[54] Id. at 11-38, Petition.

[55] Id. at 24.

[56] Id. at 25.

[57] Id. at 27-28.

[58] Id. at 30.

[59] Id. at 30.

[60] Id. at 31.

[61] Id. at 33.

[62] Id. at 195-209.

[63] Id. at 204.

[64] Id. at 205.

[65] Id.

[66] Id. at 214.

[67] Note that ever since the Anti-Money Laundering Act was amended in 2003, Republic Act No 10365 has further amended Section 4 of the law in 2013 to read:
Section 4. Money Laundering Offense. — Money laundering is committed by any person who, knowing that any monetary instrument or Property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity:
(a) transacts said monetary instrument or property;
(b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses or uses said monetary instrument or property;
(c) conceals or disguises the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said monetary instrument or property;
(d) attempts or conspires to commit money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c);
(e) aids, abets, assists in or counsels the commission of the money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above; and
(f) performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above.
Money laundering is also committed by any covered person who, knowing that a covered or suspicious transaction is required under this Act to be reported to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so.

[68] Republic Act No. 9160 (2002), as amended by Republic Act No. 9194 (2003), sec. 3(i)(8).

[69] 740 Phil. 200 (2014) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[70] Id. at 209.

[71] Rollo, p. 41, CA Decision. Time deposits, premium savings deposits, money market placements, current and savings accounts.

[72] 525 Phil. 613 (2006) [Per J. Azcuna, Second Division]

[73] Id. at 623.

[74] 318 Phil. 579 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].

[75] Id. at 588.

[76] Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9160 (2018).

[77] 824 Phil. 882 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

[78] Republic Act No. 7080 (1991), sec. 2, as amended, states:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.

[79] Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Special Second Division), G.R. Nos. 207340 & 207349, September 16, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66995> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

[80] Id.

[81] REV. PEN. CODE, art. 248 states:
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

[82] REV. PEN. CODE, art. 320 states:
Article 320. Destructive Arson. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordnance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

[83] REV. PEN. CODE, art. 324 states:
Article 324. Crimes Involving Destruction. — Any person who shall cause destruction by means of explosion, discharge of electric current, inundation, sinking or stranding of a vessel, intentional damaging of the engine of said vessel, taking up the rails from a railway track, maliciously changing railway signals for the safety of moving trams, destroying telegraph wires and telegraph posts, or those of any other system, and, in general, by using any other agency or means of destruction as effective as those above enumerated, shall be punished by reclusion temporal if the commission has endangered the safety of any person; otherwise, the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed.

[84] Republic Act No. 11479 (2020), sec. 4.

[85] Rollo, p. 268.

[86] Id. at 282-286.





SEPARATE OPINION


LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

I concur in the conclusion of the esteemed Senior Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Money Laundering as defined in the original version of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001. This law was enacted in 2001 and was the law in force at the time the Information was filed in 2002.

RA 9160 was substantially amended several times by these statutes:
  • RA 11521 entitled "An Act Further Strengthening The Anti-Money Laundering Law, Amending For The Purpose Republic Act No. 9160, Otherwise Known As The 'Anti-Money Laundering Act Of 2001,'" As Amended (approved January 29, 2021);
  • RA 10927 entitled "An Act Designating Casinos As Covered Persons Under Republic Act No. 9160, Otherwise Known As The "Anti-Money Laundering Act Of 2001," As Amended (approved July 14, 2017);
  • RA 10365 entitled "An Act Further Strengthening The Anti-Money Laundering Law, Amending For The Purpose Republic Act No. 9160, Otherwise Known As The 'Anti-Money Laundering Act Of 2001,'" As Amended (approved February 15, 2013);
  • RA 10167 entitled "An Act To Further Strengthen The Anti-Money Laundering Law, Amending For The Purpose Sections 10 And 11 Of Republic Act No. 9160, Otherwise Known As The 'Anti-Money Laundering Act Of 2001,'" As Amended, And For Other Purposes (approved June 18, 2012); and
  • RA 9194 entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 9160, Otherwise Known As The 'Anti-Money Laundering Act Of 2001'" (approved March 7, 2003).
Among these subsequent amendatory laws, however, only RA 9194 and RA 10365 amended Section 4 of RA 9160.

As originally enacted, Section 4 of RA 9160 read:
SECTION 4. Money Laundering Offense. Money Laundering Offense. — Money laundering is a crime whereby the proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted, thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources. It is committed by the following:

(a) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property.

(b) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property involves the proceeds of any unlawful activity, performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraph (a) above.

(c) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is required under this Act to be disclosed and filed with the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so.
This was the definition of money laundering until 2003 when RA 9194 was enacted amending Section 4 of RA 9160, in this wise:
"SEC. 4. Money Laundering Offense. — Money laundering is a crime whereby the proceeds of an unlawful activity as herein defined are transacted, thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources. It is committed by the following:

"(a) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property.

"(b) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property involves the proceeds of any unlawful activity, performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraph (a) above.

"(c) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is required under this Act to be disclosed and filed with the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so."
In 2013, Section 4 was again amended by RA 10365 to read, as follows:
"SEC. 4. Money Laundering Offense. — Money laundering is committed by any person who, knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity:

"(a) transacts said monetary instrument or property;

"(b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses or uses said monetary instrument or property;

"(c) conceals or disguises the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said monetary instrument or property;

"(d) attempts or conspires to commit money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c);

"(e) aids, abets, assists in or counsels the commission of the money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above; and

"(f) performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above.

"Money laundering is also committed by any covered person who, knowing that a covered or suspicious transaction is required under this Act to be reported to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so."
The definition in the amended Section 4 of RA 10365 is the prevailing definition of Money Laundering to date.

Note the permutations of the definition of money laundering in Section 4:

RA 9160
RA 9194
RA 10365
proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted
proceeds of an unlawful activity as herein defined are transacted
any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the  proceeds of any unlawful activity
(a) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property.
"(a) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property.
"(a) transacts said monetary instrument or property; 

"(b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses or uses said monetary instrument or property;

"(c) conceals or disguises the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said monetary instrument or property;

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9160 and its amendments also went through several revisions – 2018, 2016, 2012, 2003.

The 2018 and 2016 versions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations are identical in their provisions on the Prosecution of Money Laundering Cases:
SECTION 4. Prosecution of Money Laundering Cases. —

4.1. Independent Proceedings.

The prosecutions of ML and the associated unlawful activity shall proceed independently. Any person may be charged with and convicted of both ML and the associated unlawful activity.

4.2. Separate and Distinct Elements.

The elements of ML are separate and distinct from the elements of the associated unlawful activity. The elements of the unlawful activity, including the identity of the perpetrators and the details of the commission of the unlawful activity, need not be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt in the case for ML.

4.3. Knowledge.

The element of knowledge may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. The deliberate non-performance of the preventive measures under the AMLA, this IRR, AMLC issuances, and SA's guidelines by a covered person's responsible directors, officers and employees shall be considered in determining knowledge of the commission of ML offenses.
(emphasis supplied)
The 2012 version of the Implementing Rules and Regulations on the foregoing provisions was slightly different in form from the 2016 and 2018 versions, but the substance of the provisions is the same:
RULE 6
Prosecution of Money Laundering

RULE 6.a. Prosecution of Money Laundering. —

(1) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity as defined under Section 3.i of the AMLA, as amended.
(2) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or violation under the AMLA, as amended, without prejudice to the ex-parte application by the AMLC with the Court of Appeals for a freeze order with respect to the monetary instrument or property involved therein and resort to other remedies provided under the AMLA, as amended, the Rules of Court and other pertinent laws and rules.
....
RULE 6.d. Trial for the money laundering offense shall proceed in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

RULE 6.e. Knowledge of the offender that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of an unlawful activity or that any monetary instrument or property is required under the AMLA, as amended, to be disclosed and filed with the AMLC, may be established by direct evidence or inferred from the attendant circumstances.

RULE 6.f. All the elements of every money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA, as amended, must be proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt, including the element of knowledge that the monetary instrument or property represents, involves or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity.

RULE 6.g. No element of the unlawful activity, however, including the identity of the perpetrators and the details of the actual commission of the unlawful activity need be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the offense of money laundering are separate and distinct from the elements of the felony or offense constituting the unlawful activity.
(emphasis supplied)
The Implementing Rules and Regulations was revised twice in 2003 but both 2003 versions contained identical provisions as those above:
RULE 6
Prosecution of Money Laundering

RULE 6.1. Prosecution of Money Laundering. —

RULE 6.1.a. Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity as defined under Rule 3(i) of the AMLA.
....
RULE 6.3. After due notice and hearing in the preliminary investigation proceedings before the Department of Justice, or the Ombudsman, as the case may be, and the latter should find probable cause of a money laundering offense, it shall file the necessary information before the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan.

RULE 6.4. Trial for the money laundering offense shall proceed in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

RULE 6.5. Knowledge of the offender that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of an unlawful activity or that any monetary instrument or property is required under the AMLA to be disclosed and filed with the AMLC, may be established by direct evidence or inferred from the attendant circumstances.

RULE 6.6. All the elements of every money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA must be proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt, including the element of knowledge that the monetary instrument or property represents, involves or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity.

RULE 6.7. No element of the unlawful activity, however, including the identity of the perpetrators and the details of the actual commission of the unlawful activity need be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the offense of money laundering are separate and distinct from the elements of the felony or offense constituting the unlawful activity.
(emphasis supplied)
The 2002 Implementing Rules and Regulations conceived the template that was carried over through to the latest version of these regulations:
RULE 6
Prosecution of Money Laundering

RULE 6.1. Prosecution of Money Laundering. —

RULE 6.1.a. Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity as defined under Rule 3(i) of the AMLA.

RULE 6.1.b. Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or violation under the AMLA without prejudice to the issuance by the AMLC of a freeze order with respect to the deposit, investment or similar account involved therein and resort to other remedies provided under the AMLA.
....
RULE 6.3. After due notice and hearing in the preliminary investigation proceedings before the Department of Justice, or the Ombudsman, as the case may be, and the latter should find probable cause of a money laundering offense, it shall file the necessary information before the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan.

RULE 6.4. Trial for the money laundering offense shall proceed in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.

RULE 6.5. Knowledge of the offender that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of an unlawful activity or that any monetary instrument or property is required under the AMLA to be disclosed and filed with the AMLC, may be established by direct evidence or inferred from the attendant circumstances.

RULE 6.6. All the elements of every money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA must be proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt, including the element of knowledge that the monetary instrument or property represents, involves or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity.

RULE 6.7. No element of the unlawful activity, however, including the identity of the perpetrators and the details of the actual commission of the unlawful activity need be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the offense of money laundering are separate and distinct from the elements of the felony or offense constituting the unlawful activity.
(emphasis supplied)
Given the above-noted permutations in the definition of Section 4 of RA 9160 and the identical guidelines in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9160 on the prosecution of money laundering, I most respectfully disagree with the ponencia on some of the elements of money laundering that it has identified:
1. There is an unlawful activity – any act or omission, or a series or combination of acts or omissions, involving or directly related to offenses enumerated under Section 3 of the law;

2. The proceeds of the unlawful activity are transacted by the accused;

3. The accused knows that the proceeds involve or relate to the unlawful activity; and

4. The proceeds are made to appear to have originated from legitimate sources.
Actus reus

The actus reus or criminal act of money laundering requires an unlawful activity that must ultimately be one of the crimes identified in Section 3(i) of RA 9160, whether of the original or amended versions. To be criminal, the act must refer to the proceeds of any unlawful activity. By proceeds, this would mean the amount derived or realized from any of the unlawful activities mentioned in Section 3(i).

Obviously, the proceeds are not invisible. The proceeds must have physical representations whether electronically or digitally or as physical objects. The law refers to the physical representations as either monetary instrument or property. The monetary instrument of property is not just any monetary instrument or property – it must represent, involve, or relate to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity.

Lastly, there must have been a transaction or an attempt to transact. This act must pertain to the monetary instrument or property that represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity. A transaction pertaining to the monetary instrument or property would be any act establishing any right or obligation or giving rise to any contractual or legal relationship between the parties thereto, in relation to or involving or representing the monetary instrument or property. A transaction also includes any movement of funds (i.e., not any funds but funds that are the monetary instrument or property that represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity) by any means with a covered institution.

I respectfully emphasize the use of the articles an and any in referring to the unlawful activity. It is not the unlawful activity, but an unlawful activity or any unlawful activity. This is important because the use of these articles in the law itself in defining money laundering will identify the essential allegations in the Information for money laundering and the elements that the prosecution will have to prove beyond reasonable doubt.

In this regard, it is enough that the prosecution alleges in the Information that the accused transacted or attempted to transact monetary instrument or property that represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of any of the unlawful activities mentioned in Section 3(i), without necessarily mentioning what this particular unlawful activity is. Of course, there is the prosecutorial discretion to identify the specific unlawful activity, with specific reference to the name of the crime as referenced in Section 3(i), but this allegation and proof are not necessary to obtain a conviction for money laundering. This is because all the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt as the actus reus is that the accused transacted with the monetary instrument or property that represents, involves, or relate to the proceeds of an unlawful activity that falls under any of the named crimes in Section 3(i). Whatever crime may be ultimately proven is superfluous so long as it is an unlawful activity that by definition falls within Section 3(i).

My understanding of the actus reus of money laundering jibes with the text of any of the versions of Section 4. To repeat:

RA 9160
RA 9194
RA 10365
proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted
proceeds of an unlawful activity as herein defined are transacted
any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the  proceeds of any unlawful activity
(a) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property.
"(a) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property.
"(a) transacts said monetary instrument or property; 

"(b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses or uses said monetary instrument or property;

"(c) conceals or disguises the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said monetary instrument or property;

My understanding also jibes perfectly with the contemporaneous construction made by our financing authorities and justice officials on how to prosecute money laundering cases. To repeat what they said in the Implementing Rules and Regulations:
No element of the unlawful activity, however, including the identity of the perpetrators and the details of the actual commission of the unlawful activity need be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the offense of money laundering are separate and distinct from the elements of the felony or offense constituting the unlawful activity. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
All that the prosecution has to allege and prove is that the monetary instrument or property relates to, involves, or represents the proceeds of an or any unlawful activity, and not the unlawful activity, which means a crime or any of the crimes listed in Section 3(i).

This understanding of the actus reus of money laundering, I humbly submit, is consistent with the language of Section 4, the contemporaneous construction given to it by the chief implementors of RA 9160, the avoidance of an acquittal on the basis of a strained and gratuitous burden imposed upon the prosecution, and the avoidance of duplicative and potentially conflicting trials of the same offense when the predicate crime is prosecuted separately and independently from the money laundering case.

It is enough that there is allegation and proof beyond reasonable doubt that the monetary instrument or property in question has a criminal origin which ultimately is linked to or can be characterized by any of the predicate crimes under Section 3(i). Also, to avoid the anomaly of one trial court (i.e., the trial court hearing the money laundering prosecution) from prejudging the guilt or innocence of the accused (whether the same individual as the alleged money launderer or some other person) in the prosecution for the predicate crime, it is enough that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court in the money laundering case declare, that the monetary instrument or property was derived or realized from an unlawful activity found in Section 3(i).

Thus, there is no need to establish proof that would obtain conviction for a specific predicate crime. There is also no need to allege a specific predicate crime and be bound to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, to the exclusion of any other unlawful activity as listed in Section 3(i). It is enough that the unlawfulness of the source of the proceeds is shown beyond reasonable doubt, that is, the criminal act and criminal mind involved in an unlawful activity.

Let me respectfully illustrate. Accused A is prosecuted for money laundering of the proceeds of an unlawful activity perpetrated by Accused B. The unlawful activity is not mentioned in the Information, but since unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) is alleged in the Information, the prosecution can present evidence to prove what this unlawful activity is. The thrust of the prosecution evidence in the money laundering case is an unlawful activity arising from selling illegal drugs. Meantime, Accused B is prosecuted for the sale of illegal drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165 as amended. The prosecution for this crime falters. This is because of the requirement that the statutory witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 were not present to witness the buy-bust operation itself and the photo-taking and inventory of the drugs. Accused B is acquitted. In the money laundering case, it is enough that the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the proceeds were derived or realized from an unlawful activity. Since the selling of drugs is unlawful, the actus reus is established, though this predicate crime itself was not proven beyond reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction in the criminal case against Accused B.

The focus therefore is on the unlawfulness of the activity from which the proceeds were derived or realized.

To respectfully illustrate further - Accused A is charged with money laundering. The proceeds were realized from an unlawful activity involving the siphoning of money from the bank's customers. Accused A and Accused B were charged with qualified theft. Eventually, the trial court acquitted them of qualified theft but found them guilty of estafa. The trial court in the money laundering prosecution cannot acquit them of this crime simply because there is no proof beyond a reasonable doubt of qualified theft. It is enough that Accused A is proven guilty of deriving or realizing proceeds from an unlawful activity that is listed in Section 3(i), i.e., fraud. It does not matter that it is qualified theft or estafa. What is important is that the proceeds were from an unlawful activity that was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Thus said, my understanding of the actus reus of money laundering unfortunately conflicts with the ponencia’s position that "the particular elements of that unlawful activity must still be proven beyond a reasonable doubt."

As I have stressed, what the law requires as money laundering is that there was a transaction involving the proceeds of an unlawful activity or any unlawful activity as listed in Section 3(i), whatever unlawful activity could ultimately be found against the accused. The prosecution is not tied to allege and prove a particular unlawful activity, so as to be burdened to prove the elements of that particular unlawful activity. What the prosecution is duty-bound to allege and prove is an unlawful activity from any of the unlawful activities in Section 3(i), so long as in the end, the prosecution discharges its burden to prove an unlawful activity from the menu of unlawful activities.

The proof also has nothing to do with proof that must amount to a conviction had this predicate crime been tried alongside money laundering. It is enough that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the unlawfulness of the source of the proceeds, that is, the criminal act and criminal mind involved in an unlawful activity, though for some reason, a judgment of conviction cannot be obtained for such unlawful activity.

Mens rea

I also humbly submit that there is only one criminal mental element or mens rea in a money laundering prosecution. This is the scienter, or criminal knowledge of the unlawfulness of the source of the proceeds. This requisite knowledge does not require the accused to have been a participant in an unlawful activity or any of the unlawful activities. The accused does not have to share in or be responsible for the criminal act and mental elements of an unlawful activity. The only knowledge demanded of the prosecution to prove is the accused's knowledge that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of an unlawful activity.

In this regard, there is no need to prove that the proceeds are made to appear to have originated from legitimate sources.

For this is not even required by any of the versions of Section 4 of RA 9160. So long as the accused knows that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of an unlawful activity, that is enough. The transactions the accused does involving the monetary instrument or property do not have to be characterized as evincing the specific intent of the accused to make the monetary instrument or property appear to be clean. If the accused has engaged in transactions as defined by RA 9160, and intended to do these acts in the sense of voluntarily executing them, even without the specific intention to achieve the particular result of making the proceeds look clean, provided the other elements are present, the accused has committed money laundering.

Application to the present case

The ponencia correctly affirmed the conviction of petitioner for money laundering. She derived proceeds from an unlawful activity that under Section 3(i) could either be qualified theft or fraud. The prosecution theorized its case on the basis of qualified theft, a particular criminal activity listed in Section 3(i). That is all right. The choice is part of its prosecutorial discretion. But, as I have explained, this is unnecessary. In any event, it is clear that the proceeds were realized from an unlawful activity. Petitioner transacted monetary instruments relating to the proceeds of her unlawful activity. She knew of course that the monetary instruments related to the proceeds of her unlawful activity. She was after all the sole perpetrator of her unlawful activity.

In transacting the monetary instruments, did she specifically intend to clean the proceeds? Or was she transacting to elude detection until such time that she was able to put the proceeds under her control, regardless of whether the proceeds would appear clean or remain obviously dirty? Was she sophisticated enough to harbor the specific intention of making the proceeds come out clean? What motivation did she have to make the proceeds appear clean when she was ready to fly to the United States?

None of these concerns, however, should matter. Whether she specifically intended to make the proceeds appear to be clean is irrelevant. It is not an element of money laundering.

To conclude, the prosecution need not be required to prove to a moral certainty the particular elements of that unlawful activity. As I have stressed, the proof is to the unlawfulness of the origin of the proceeds, and therefore, any unlawful activity under Section 3(i) will do, no specific reference to an unlawful activity at the outset is necessary, and any unlawful activity to which the proceeds have been derived as determined at the end of the trial would suffice. Additionally, the proof does not have to amount to a conviction for a specified unlawful activity. It is enough that the unlawfulness of the origin of the proceeds is established beyond reasonable doubt by proving the criminal act and mental elements constituting the unlawfulness, regardless of the presence of circumstances or defenses meriting an acquittal if the unlawful activity were being tried on its own.

Too, there is no need for the prosecution to establish that the proceeds are made to appear to have originated from legitimate sources. This imposes a burden upon the prosecution that the law does not require. It is therefore unfair as it is unnecessary.





S E P A R A T E  O P I N I O N


ZALAMEDA, J.:

It has been said that money laundering is probably as old as money itself. In the past, however, nobody looked at it as a crime. It was more the predicate offense that was looked at than what was done with the proceeds of that crime.[1]

The ponencia denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari of Girlie J. Lingad (petitioner) and affirmed the Decision dated 11 December 2015 and Resolution dated 02 June 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that upheld the conviction of petitioner for money laundering as penalized under Section 4 (a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9160 or the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), as amended by RA 9194. Ultimately, the ponencia found that petitioner was correctly sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years as minimum to thirteen (13) years as maximum, to pay a fine of P34,099,195.85, to suffer all accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs. Nonetheless, since petitioner has fully served the maximum penalty imposed, her immediate release was ordered, unless she is confined for any other lawful cause.[2]

I concur with the denial of the petition. However, I am writing this opinion to highlight an issue where the ponencia and I diverge, particularly the elements of money laundering, and to further elucidate the relationship between money laundering and the underlying unlawful activity.

The proceeds' appearance of
legitimacy is not an element of
money laundering; unlawful
activity is not synonymous with
predicate offense


In finding petitioner guilty, the ponencia laid down the following elements of money laundering under Section 4(a) of AMLA: (1) there is an unlawful activity – any act or omission, or a series or combination of acts or omissions, involving or directly related to offenses enumerated under Section 3 of the law; (2) the proceeds of the unlawful activity are transacted by the accused; (3) the accused knows that the proceeds involve or relate to the unlawful activity; and (4) the proceeds are made to appear to have originated from legitimate sources.[3]

However, I submit that the fourth component, i.e., the proceeds are made to appear to have originated from legitimate sources, is not an element of the offense. Section 4 of AMLA, as originally enacted, reads:
SECTION 4. Money Laundering Offense. — Money laundering is a crime whereby the proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted, thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources. It is committed by the following:

(a) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property.

(b) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property involves the proceeds of any unlawful activity, performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraph (a) above.

(c) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is required under this Act to be disclosed and filed with the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so.[4]
In 2003, RA 9194 further amended Section 4 to read:
SECTION 4. Money Laundering Offense. — Money laundering is a crime whereby the proceeds of an unlawful activity as herein defined are transacted, thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources. It is committed by the following:

(a) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property.

(b) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property involves the proceeds of any unlawful activity, performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraph (a) above.

(c) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is required under this Act to be disclosed and filed with the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so.[5]
These two versions are applicable to petitioner's case as the relevant acts were alleged to have been committed from 2002 to 2004.[6]

The language used in the quoted provisions may give the impression that, to sustain a charge of money laundering, the proceeds must be made to appear to have originated from legitimate sources. However, I submit that the proceeds' appearance of legitimacy is not an element of the offense.[7] As shown in the quoted provisions, such requirement is not in the sub-paragraphs of Section 4 enumerating the punishable acts. The apparent legitimacy of the proceeds is mentioned only in the sentence defining the crime of money laundering. Thus, "[i]t is merely a description of the outcome of the whole transaction, and is in no way related to the criminal intent (or lack thereof) of the person accused of money laundering[.]"[8]

This conclusion is supported by the House of Representatives' deliberations on House Bill No. 3083, which eventually became RA 9160, thus:
REP. ROMAN: x x x [I]s this really what we want that we have to require evidence to show that the purpose is to disguise? Or do we just want a description of the natural consequence of converting the proceeds of an unlawful activity into something? Because if we want to say that it is being concealed in order to disguise and thereby make it appear as if it came from legitimate sources, we are either talking of a person who is an accomplice or a principal by direct, indirect, by indispensable cooperation so he may be also liable for two crimes, one the predicate crime and one for money laundering.

x x x x

CHAIRMAN LOPEZ: In other words, the last clause that it is for the purpose of furthering the criminal activity is not necessary if he knows that the proceeds came from illegal activity and he allows it to move, the proceeds to be transported or rather to transact business with the proceeds, then we can already infer from that that the intention was really to allow it, to allow it to move in the financial system in order to make it appear that it is legitimate.

REP. ROMAN: Yes, Mr. Chairman, although I'd like to say na hindi naman sa hindi kailangan iyun kaya gawin lang natin descriptive instead of making it an element, we make it descriptive thereby making it appear as if the proceeds came from legitimate activity. So we are just saying that it is the natural consequence instead of saying, for the purpose of, there's a world of difference because from an evidence point of view pag sinabi mong for the purpose of, you gonna prove it.

CHAIRMAN LOPEZ: So let's make that on record when we deliberate on that on the floor so that will form part of the intention of the lawmaking body.[9] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the proceedings of the bicameral conference committee for the precursor bills of RA 9160, it was stressed anew that the purpose of the offender, whether to conceal or make the proceeds appear legitimate, is immaterial:
SEN. PANGILINAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may be allowed. My understanding of the elements of the crime of money laundering are the following. There are three elements. First is knowledge that the proceeds came from an unlawful activity. Second is that there is a transaction or there is an attempt to transact such proceeds. And third, that the said attempt or the transaction itself is for the purpose of concealing and disguising.

REP. ROMAN. Mr. Chairman, that's not what we want. Otherwise, prosecution will be extremely difficult. Even if you...You cannot prove the purpose from direct evidence. You can only prove it from circumstances attending the transaction. Eh, kung sabihin lang noong testimonya niya, it was not the purpose, di ala nang element na iyon. Ang ginagawa natin, sinasabi nating malinaw na iyon ang intensyon mo sapagkat nakaw iyan o masamang pera iyan, eh, bakit mo ipinapasok sa isang legal na environment.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LOPEZ). Congressman Moreno.

REP. MORENO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In fact, I am glad that this was discussed because this one is one of those instances where we are, in fact, outperforming, even the United States. Because in the United States, money laundering to constitute as a crime requires intent, and intent either to pursue or further an unlawful activity or to conceal xxx the origin or receive, etcetera, or to evade the payment of taxes or to evade reporting requirements. But in our version, Mr. Chairman, and I'm saying this as a... since this has already been agreed and to make sure that this is clearly understood also that intent here will no longer be relevant with just financial transaction, proceeds of an [unlawful activity] and knowledge as the elements of the crime of money laundering under this section, Mr. Chairman.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)
By committing any of the enumerated acts under Section 4 of AMLA, the offender becomes liable for money laundering, regardless of the offender's purpose or the outcome of his or her acts. Even if the offender failed to make the proceeds appear legitimate, he or she may still be held liable for money laundering under Section 4(a) of AMLA so long as the offender transacted or attempted to transact the proceeds of an unlawful activity.

Notably, in the latest version of Section 4, as amended by RA 10365, the condition of apparent legitimacy was already deleted in the provision:
SEC. 4. Money Laundering Offense. — Money laundering is committed by any person who, knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity:

(a) transacts said monetary instrument or property;

(b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses or uses said monetary instrument or property;

(c) conceals or disguises the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said monetary instrument or property;

(d) attempts or conspires to commit money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c);

(e) aids, abets, assists in or counsels the commission of the money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above; and

(f) performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above.

Money laundering is also committed by any covered person who, knowing that a covered or suspicious transaction is required under this Act to be reported to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so.
Thus, I submit that money laundering under Section 4(a) of AMLA, as originally enacted and as amended by RA 9194, only has the following elements:
  1. An unlawful activity, as defined under Section 3 of the law, has been committed.

  2. The accused transacts, or attempts to transact, any monetary instrument or property representing, involving, or relating to the proceeds of the unlawful activity.

  3. The accused knows that the monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of the unlawful activity.
The enumerated elements track the language of the law and include an attempt to transact the proceeds, as well as money or property relating to the proceeds of the unlawful activity.

As to the first element, i.e., the existence of an unlawful activity, I wish to highlight the distinction between the unlawful activity and the predicate crimes enumerated under Section 3 of AMLA. The term "unlawful activity" is not synonymous with the predicate offense.

As originally enacted, the law defines unlawful activity as "any act or omission or series or combination thereof involving or having relation to" the enumerated crimes and offenses.[11] RA 9194 amended the definition to "any act or omission or series or combination thereof involving or having direct relation to" the predicate offenses.[12] In the latest version of the definition, as amended in 2021 by RA 11521, the original language in RA 9160 was reinstated, i.e., "any act or omission or series or combination thereof involving or having relation to" the predicate offenses.[13]

Thus, the unlawful activity is not necessarily the predicate offense; it could simply be an act or omission involving or having relation to the predicate offense. This distinction was emphasized during the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee for the original law.[14] Otherwise put, the term unlawful activity casts a wider net.

There is a conflict between the
interpretation in the ponencia
and the IRR of AMLA on the
required quantum of evidence for
the unlawful activity


As to the first element, the ponencia discussed that money laundering generally involves a predicate offense. A predicate offense is a crime that is a component of another offense. In money laundering, the predicate offense is usually an unlawful activity that generates proceeds of money or property. In this case, for instance, the predicate offense was qualified theft.[15]

In this regard, the ponencia declared that it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt that the money or property were the proceeds of an unlawful activity. In doing so, particular elements of the unlawful activity must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, although the guilt of the person who committed the alleged unlawful activity need not be determined first.[16] As applied to this case, the ponencia ruled that the prosecution needed to show that the amounts were taken with intent to gain from third parties by grave abuse of confidence.[17]

It is significant to underscore that this interpretation in the ponencia as to the quantum of evidence for the unlawful activity appears inconsistent with the less rigid requirement under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of AMLA. Rule 6.7 of the 2002 IRR of RA 9160, Rule 6 (B) of the 2016 IRR, and Section 4.2, Rule 9 of the 2018 IRR of AMLA (latest IRR) all provide that the elements of the unlawful activity need not be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt in the money laundering case, thus:
2002 IRR:

RULE 6
Prosecution of Money Laundering

x x x x

RULE 6.6. All the elements of every money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA must be proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt, including the element of knowledge that the monetary instrument or property represents, involves or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity.

RULE 6.7. No element of the unlawful activity, however, including the identity of the perpetrators and the details of the actual commission of the unlawful activity need be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the offense of money laundering are separate and distinct from the elements of the felony or offense constituting the unlawful activity.[18] (Emphasis supplied.)

2016 IRR:

RULE VI.
Prosecution of Money Laundering Cases

RULE 6. Prosecution of Money Laundering Cases. —

A. Independent Proceedings. — The prosecution of money laundering and the unlawful activity shall proceed independently.

Any person may be charged with and convicted of both money laundering and the unlawful activity.

B. Separate and Distinct Elements. — The elements of money laundering are separate and distinct from the elements of the unlawful activity. The elements of the unlawful activity, including the identity of the perpetrators and the details of the commission of the unlawful activity, need not be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt in the case for money laundering.[19] (Emphasis supplied.)

2018 IRR:

RULE 9
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing

SECTION 4. Prosecution of Money Laundering Cases. —

4.1. Independent Proceedings.

The prosecutions of ML and the associated unlawful activity shall proceed independently. Any person may be charged with and convicted of both ML and the associated unlawful activity.

4.2. Separate and Distinct Elements.

The elements of ML are separate and distinct from the elements of the associated unlawful activity. The elements of the unlawful activity, including the identity of the perpetrators and the details of the commission of the unlawful activity, need not be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt in the case for ML.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)
As will be discussed at length below, I submit that the ponencia's interpretation is consistent with the predicate offense-primary offense dynamic in the law and the Constitutional requirement for proof beyond reasonable doubt prior to any conviction.[21]

The second element of money
laundering requires the proceeds
to be traced to one of the
predicate offenses in Section 3 of
AMLA; the existence of the
predicate offense must be
established beyond reasonable
doubt


It is indispensable that the existence of a predicate offense must be established, and that money or property be ultimately traced to a specific predicate offense. This is because the first element requires proof of an unlawful activity involving or having relation to a predicate offense. Notably, the law does not cover all unlawful activities or crimes. Section 3 of AMLA enumerates the specific crimes that may give rise to an unlawful activity. Also, the second element requires the transaction of the proceeds of an unlawful activity which, again, must be related to one of the predicate offenses.[22] Thus, by the very nature of the offense of money laundering, the nexus between the money or property and the predicate offense must be established.[23]

To illustrate, simple theft is not a predicate offense for money laundering, but qualified theft is. Therefore, to prove that the money transacted is from an unlawful activity covered by the law, the prosecution must prove that the money forms proceeds of qualified theft. It is not enough that the money was stolen. The prosecution must adduce evidence on the qualifying circumstances under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, such as grave abuse of confidence.

This example shows that, by enumerating specific predicate offenses, and by requiring that the money or property be proceeds of those crimes, the very definition and essence of money laundering necessarily requires proof that a covered predicate offense has been committed and that the proceeds relate to the predicate offense.

Proof of these matters must be beyond reasonable doubt. As held in People v. Ganguso,[24] every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be proved beyond reasonable doubt:
An accused has in his [or her] favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his [or her] guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he [or she] must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he [or she] is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his [or her] behalf, and he [or she] would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.[25]
Notably, requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the predicate offense is not entirely novel. AMLA is similar to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1612, or the Anti-Fencing Law, in that both criminalize transacting with proceeds of a predicate offense separately and independently from the predicate crime.[26] Moreover, in both laws, the perpetrator of the predicate offense is not necessarily the fence or money launderer.[27] Hence, the former need not be identified before prosecuting the latter.

Jurisprudence sets out the elements of fencing as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself [or herself] or for another.[28]
As shown above, the elements of fencing and money laundering are substantially similar. Prosecution for fencing also requires proof that a predicate crime has been committed, and that the accused dealt with the proceeds of such predicate crime.

Case law on fencing has long acknowledged that the first element, i.e., the commission of robbery or theft, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. As such, evidence for the elements of robbery or theft must meet the required standard of proof; otherwise, the accused cannot be convicted for fencing.

For instance, in Tan v. People,[29] the Court acquitted the accused because the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that theft was committed. The Court ruled that there was no sufficient proof of unlawful taking of another's property. Complainant therein did not report to the authorities the alleged commission of theft or any loss resulting from the incident. The extra-judicial confession of the supposed theft was also held insufficient, it having been given without the assistance of counsel and unsupported by evidence of corpus delicti.

Similarly, in Lim v. People,[30] the Court reversed the conviction of the accused due to insufficient proof that theft had been committed. Particularly, the elements of theft on ownership of property by another and unlawful taking were not established. Thus, the Court ruled that the first element of fencing was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, thus:
After a careful and thorough review of the records, we are convinced that the trial court erred in convicting herein petitioner.

On the first element, we find that the prosecution failed to establish that theft had been committed.

Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code has been defined as the taking of someone's property without the owner's consent, for his personal gain, and without committing any violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. The elements of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

While the CA correctly ruled that conviction of the principal in the crime of theft is not necessary for an accused to be found guilty of the crime of fencing, we disagree with its ruling that the prosecution sufficiently proved the DPWH's ownership of the Komatsu Grader.

x x x x

In fact, the prosecution even failed to conclusively establish that the grader had been stolen. xxx

x x x x

From the foregoing, we find that the CA erred in affirming the trial court's findings and in convicting herein petitioner. It is necessary to remember that in all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime. Furthermore, the information must correctly reflect the charges against the accused before any conviction may be made.

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the first and third essential elements of the crime charged in. the information. Thus, petitioner should be acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt.[31]
Conversely, however, successful prosecutions for fencing show that the standard of proof for the predicate offense is not insurmountable. Indeed, the Court has sustained fencing convictions after finding that the commission of theft or robbery was proved beyond reasonable doubt, even when the theft or robber was unidentified.[32] The commission of the predicate crime may be established through circumstantial evidence, such as the testimony of the victim, documentary evidence of ownership, reports made to law enforcement, and the like.[33]

Another crime that requires a predicate offense is plunder. It may be worth mentioning that some aspects of the predicate crimes under AMLA were patterned after RA 7080, or the Plunder Law, as amended.[34] Section 4 of the Plunder Law provides that "[f]or purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[35] We explained the meaning of the foregoing provisions of the Plunder Law. We clarified that while Section 4 only requires proof of pattern of criminal acts showing unlawful scheme, it does not do away with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court ruled, thus:
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy —
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. — For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his [or her] favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent [persons] are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his [or her] ordinary affairs has confidence that his [or her] government cannot adjudge him [or her] guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his [or her] guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he [or she] is charged.[36]
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, in his Separate Opinion, emphasized that the quantum of proof required to prove the predicate crimes in plunder is the same as that required were they separately prosecuted.

Applying Estrada by analogy, the quantum of proof for the unlawful activity under AMLA should be the same as in all other crimes – proof beyond reasonable doubt.

All told, the Court's discussions in this case clearly conflict with the requirement under the IRR that the elements of the predicate crime need not be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. However, this is not a proper time to resolve the constitutionality of Rule 6.6 of the IRR because it appears that its validity was not raised at the earliest opportunity and its constitutionality is not the very lis mota of the case.[37] Nevertheless, to avoid confusion or misinterpretation, it would best serve the interests of the public, law enforcement, and the State's prosecution arm if the latest IRR were to be amended to reflect the principles enunciated in this case.

Prior conviction for the
predicate offense is not
necessary to sustain a conviction
for money laundering; the
existence of the unlawful activity
and the predicate offense may be
established beyond reasonable
doubt in the money laundering
case


Notwithstanding the need to prove the commission of a predicate offense beyond reasonable doubt, I emphasize that prior conviction for the predicate offense is not required.

As the ponencia aptly pointed out, RA 10365, which amended RA 9160, explicitly states that the prosecution of the money laundering offense shall proceed independently of any action relating to the unlawful activity. In other words, it is sufficient that the elements of the predicate offense be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt in the money laundering case. There is no need for a prior and separate conviction for the predicate offense.

I wish to add, however, that the distinction between money laundering and the unlawful activity was first recognized in the 2001 version of the law, or before petitioner's commission of the offense from July 2002 onwards.[38] As originally enacted, AMLA already treated money laundering and its predicate crime as two separate offenses that may be separately prosecuted. The law only mandated that the prosecution for the predicate offense, if any, must be given precedence, thus:
SECTION 6. Prosecution of Money Laundering. —

(a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering and the unlawful activity as herein defined.

(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or violation under this Act without prejudice to the freezing and other remedies provided.
Thus, at the time petitioner committed the offense, the applicable legal framework already recognized the distinction between the two offenses.

Relatedly, case law also provides that a prior conviction for theft or robbery is not necessary to prosecute fencing.[39] Thus, prosecution for money laundering is similar to that for fencing in that the commission of the predicate offense may be established in the money laundering or fencing case itself. The two proceedings are independent of each other.

Corollary to this, in violations of RA 9208, or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons, as amended, which also involve predicate or related crimes, the offense of trafficking in persons may be filed simultaneously with other felonies or offenses, as long as the elements of said crimes are present. Jurisprudence states that when an act violates two or more different laws and constitutes two different offenses, a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under the other.[40] Applying this by analogy to AMLA, the prosecution under a predicate offense is not a bar to a prosecution under AMLA.

Any judgment in the prosecution
for the predicate offense does not
bind the outcome of the money
laundering charge, and vice
versa


Since the proceedings for the predicate offense and the money laundering charge are separate and independent from each other, it is necessary to examine the interplay between the two proceedings and their effect, if any, on each other.

For instance, a judgment of conviction or acquittal for the predicate offense may be rendered while the money laundering case is pending or before it is filed. Conversely, a judgment may also be rendered in the money laundering case prior to the institution of a case for the predicate offense or while the latter is pending. In either case, it may be argued that the judgment of conviction or acquittal in one case should bind the other; otherwise, there would be two conflicting decisions on the guilt or innocence of the accused.

On this point, I submit that any judgment in the predicate offense cannot be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the money laundering case. The reverse is also true – a conviction or acquittal in the money laundering case is not binding on the case for the predicate offense.

Indeed, there are several factors affecting the success or failure of a prosecution, including the evidence and witnesses available at the time the case was instituted, the court's appreciation of such evidence and testimony, the speed of trial, or even the strategies employed by the defense lawyers and prosecutors. An accused may be acquitted due to failure to prosecute, the unavailability of certain pieces of evidence during trial, or sheer mistakes in case handling. These conditions may not be present in the other case.

Unless joined, no two trials would have the same circumstances. Thus, at most, the judgment, of acquittal or conviction in one case may only be presented in evidence in the other case. However, such judgment would not control judicial discretion. The court is free to render a judgment taking into account the decision in the other case vis-à-vis all the other pieces of evidence before the court.

Notably, Congressional records show that the framers of RA 9160 were conscious of the independence of the two proceedings. The inclusion of a proviso on the relationship between the two cases was even suggested. However, ultimately, the legislature omitted any provision making the judgment in one case binding on the other:
SENATOR JAWORSKI. Mr. President, as manifested by this representation during the period of interpellations and was welcomed by one of the sponsors, I would like to propose an amendment on page 6, line 5, Section 7 of the bill. After the word "Act", add the phrase PROVIDED, THAT ANY DISMISSAL OR ACQUITTAL OF THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY UPON WHICH THE CHARGE OF MONEY LAUNDERING IS PREDICATED, WITH THE POSITIVE DECLARATION THAT NO SUCH UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY WAS COMMITTED, SHALL CAUSE THE TERMINATION OF THE PROSECUTION FOR MONEY LAUNDERING IN WHATEVER STAGE.

THE PRESIDENT. What is the view of Senator Pangilinan on this proposed amendment?

x x x x

SENATOR PANGILINAN. Just a clarification, Mr. President.

If we add this particular provision, do we take it to mean that if there is an acquittal because of failure to prosecute, for example, or an acquittal because of failure to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt, this acquittal in specific cases will not mean the dismissal of the money laundering case?

x x x x

THE PRESIDENT. May the Chair suggest that we state it positively. The dismissal for failure to prosecute or acquittal for insufficiency of evidence shall not bar the prosecution of money laundering under this Act.

SENATOR JAWORSKI. That is correct. Mr. President.

x x x x

SENATOR ANGARA. The proposed amendment of Senator Jaworski should clearly state that the acquittal is on the basis of a clear determination by the judge that the accused did not commit the crime.

THE PRESIDENT. After trial on the merits.

SENATOR ANGARA. That is correct, Mr. President.

x x x x

SENATOR RECTO. We were discussing during the huddle earlier that I would have no problem with the positive declaration of a judge that the accused is innocent of a crime or of an unlawful activity. But in the event that a prosecutor mishandles the prosecution and the person may have been really innocent of the crime and there is no positive declaration now because the trial did not continue, I do not think that that should be the fault of the accused.

May I hear from Senator Angara? What would be his comment on this?

SENATOR ANGARA. Mr. President, the fact that the accused was already acquitted by reason of any other ground is already a powerful argument for saying that the second case of money laundering should already be dropped. But we cannot put that kind of rule in the law. We were suggesting that Senator Recto just express—and we are already expressing it—that the intent of this law is that an acquittal in the predicate crime would be a powerful argument or reason for seeking a dismissal of the money-laundering case, and that is our clear and unequivocal intent.[41] (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, at most, a conviction or acquittal in one case is simply another piece of evidence that must still be weighed and subjected to judicial scrutiny, taking into account the body of evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense. In other words, acquittal in the predicate offense does not result in an automatic acquittal in the money laundering case.

The independence of money
laundering from its predicate
offense is recognized by law and
consistent with international
standards


Notably, the separability of money laundering and its predicate offense is consistent with international norms and standards. The Model Legislation on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Model Legislation)[42] developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Monetary Fund provides that prior conviction for the predicate offense is not necessary:
(2) Knowledge, intent or purpose required as constituent elements of the offence may be inferred from objective factual circumstances. In order to prove the illicit origin of the proceeds it shall not be required to obtain the conviction of the predicate offence.[43]
While the Model Legislation is merely a guide for crafting money laundering laws, its provisions represent international best practice. The Model Legislation incorporates the requirements under various international instruments[44] to which the Philippines is a party, as well as the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF).[45]

The FATF is an inter-governmental body that develops policies against money laundering and terrorist financing, among others.[46] Its framework of measures, called the FATF Recommendations, is recognized as the international standard for anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing.[47] The FATF Recommendations, together with their Interpretive Notes and applicable definitions, comprise the FATF Standards.[48] The Philippines is part of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, which seeks to ensure the adoption and enforcement of the FATF Recommendations.[49]

In its Interpretive Note to Recommendation 3 (on Money Laundering Offence), the FATF explicitly recommended dispensing with the requirement of a prior conviction:

a.
[T]he offence of money laundering should extend to any type of property, regardless of its value, that directly or indirectly represents the proceeds of crime When proving that property is the proceeds of crime, it should not be necessary that a person be convicted of a predicate offence.





x x x x




7
Countries should ensure that:



(a) The intent and knowledge required to prove the offence of money laundering may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.[50]
Thus, consistent with the Court's interpretation, one may be convicted of money laundering without need of a prior conviction for the predicate offense.

I refer to these international standards as the Philippines is still in the "gray list" of countries being monitored by FATF due to deficiencies in our anti-money laundering measures.[51] The Anti-Money Laundering Council aims to have the Philippines removed from the list on or before January 2023.[52] Thus, while the language of the law ultimately controls Our decision, prudence requires Us to be conscious of these international norms and standards, and to not depart from them whenever possible.

Banks should be reminded of
their fiduciary duty


As a final note. I find the facts of this case alarming. It appears that petitioner, a marketing associate and branch marketing officer of a universal bank, was able to siphon off significant amounts of money entrusted by accountholders and depositors Records show that she was able to pre-terminate money market placements without the approval of accountholders, issue official receipts reflecting outstanding placements when in fact there was nil balance or the true amount is less than what was reflected in the document, open unauthorized savings account of depositors, and transfer money from clients' accounts to her brother's account, among others. The trial court also found that her position , allowed her to access the bank's computer operation system, cash, and record vaults. Ultimately, the prosecution determined that the proceeds of her illegal activities amounted to P83,335,628.97.[53]

To my mind, these findings suggest weak internal controls of the bank. The fraud triangle consists of pressure, opportunity, and rationalization. The most important element in fraud prevention is opportunity.[54] Here, it appears that there is not enough segregation of duties in the bank that gave petitioner a clear opportunity to accomplish her illegal activities. As we said in Philippine National Bank v. Pike,[55] the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family, considering that the business of banking is imbued with public interest due to the nature of their functions. The stability of banks largely depends on the confidence of the people in the honesty and efficiency of banks. Thus, banks should be reminded that the law imposes on them a high degree of obligation, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of banking.

Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition and affirm the Decision dated 11 December 2015 and Resolution dated 02 June 2016 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 36600. Petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a) of RA 9160 or the AMLA, as amended by RA 9194, and was correctly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years as minimum to thirteen (13) years as maximum, to pay a fine of P34,099,195.85, to suffer all accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs. Nonetheless, since petitioner has fully served the maximum penalty imposed, I concur with the order for her immediate release, unless she is confined for any other lawful cause.


[1] Wouter H. Muller, Christian H. Kalin, John G. Goldsworth, Anti-Money Laundering International Law and Practice (2007), p. 3.

[2] Ponencia, p. 22.

[3] Id. at 9.

[4] Emphasis supplied.

[5] Emphasis supplied.

[6] Ponencia, pp. 3-5.

[7] JOSE MARI BENJAMIN F. U. TIROL, THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, (2nd ed., 2007) at 64.

[8] Id.

[9] Id. at 64-65, citing House of Representatives, Transcript of Committee Meetings, Joint Public Hearing of the Committees on Banks and Financial Intermediaries, Economic Affairs, and Justice, pp. 49 and 60-61 (11 September 2001).

[10] Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 1175 and House Bill No. 3083 (Anti-Money Laundering Bill), 28 September 2001, pp. 110-112.

[11] RA 9160, Sec. 4 (i).

[12] RA 9160, as amended by 9194, Sec. 3 (i). Emphasis supplied.

[13] RA 9160, as amended by RA 11521, Sec. 3 (i).

[14] Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 1175 and House Bill No. 3083 (Anti-Money Laundering Bill), 28 September 2001, pp. 127-128.

[15] Ponencia, p. 11.

[16] Id. at 17.

[17] Id.

[18] 2002 IRR.

[19] 2016 IRR.

[20] Latest IRR.

[21] CONSTITUTION, Article III, Secs. 1 and 14; See Daayata v. People, 807 Phil. 102 (2017).

[22] Record of the Senate, Vol. I, No. 24, p. 852 (25 September 2001):
Senator Cayetano. Mr. President, after a brief huddle with almost everyone, I think we now understand the process clearly. As I said, I cannot overemphasize the need for clarity in the process itself before we can even talk about some of the sections here.

Having said that, Mr. President, let me now go to some concepts.

The definition of "Anti-Money Laundering Act," Mr. President, involves the presence of proceeds from an unlawful activity. Am I correct?

Senator Pangilinan. That is correct as well as the knowledge.

Senator Cayetano. So, am I also correct, for instance, that if there were no proceeds from an unlawful activity, there will be no anti-money laundering violation. Am I correct, Mr. President?

Senator Pangilinan. That is correct because the second element is, there is an attempt to transact or there is a transaction involving the proceeds.

[23] Record of the Senate, Vol. I, No. 24, p. 864 (26 September 2001):
Senator Angara. There must be a clear-cut statement that the ordinary course of transaction or banking dealings should not be covered by this law. As the gentleman said, only transactions that can be traced to a predicate crime is covered.

The President. Yes, that is right.

Senator Angara. And that is why it is important to reassure our people that the ordinary course of banking dealings and transactions will not be covered by this.

[24] 320 Phil. 324 (1995).

[25] Id. at 335.

[26] JOSE MARI BENJAMIN F. U. TIROL, THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, (2nd ed. 2007) at 31.

[27] See People v. De Guzman, 297 Phil 993, 998 (1993); "The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft."

[28] Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 249196, 28 April 2021.

[29] 372 Phil. 93 (1999).

[30] 797 Phil. 215 (2016).

[31] Id. at 225-241. Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.

[32] See Estrella v. People, G.R. No. 212942, 17 June 2020; Dimat v. People, 680 Phil. 233 (2012); Ong v. People, 708 Phil. 565 (2013).

[33] See Estrella v. People, G. R. No. 212942, 17 June 2020; Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 304 Phil. 219 (1994); Cahulogan v. People, 828 Phil. 742 (2018); Francisco v. People, 478 Phil. 167 (2004); Ong v. People, 708 Phil. 565 (2013); Capili v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 577 (2000).

[34] Transcript of the Joint Meeting of the Committee on Banks, Financial Intermediaries, Committee on Justice and the Committee on Economic Affairs (28 August 2001), p. 34.

[35] 421 Phil. 290 (2001).

[36] Id. at 358-359.

[37] DENR Employees Union v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, 19 January 2021.

[38] Ponencia, pp. 2-5

[39] See Lim v. People, 797 Phil. 215 (2016).

[40] People v. Lalli, 675 Phil 126, 157 (2011).

[41] Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 24, pp. 45-47 (27 September 2001).

[42] Model Legislation on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Model Legislation) issued on 01 December 2005 <https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/pdf/amlml05.pdf> (visited 8 August 2022).

[43] Model Legislation, supra at Art. 55.2.1 (2).

[44] These include the United Nations Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

[45] Introduction to the Model Law, pp. 2-4 <https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/pdf/amlml05.pdf> (visited 08 August 2022).

[46] FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, Introduction, pp 7-8 <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf> (visited 9 August 2022).

[47] Id.

[48] Id. at 8.

[49] FATF, APG <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#APG> (visited 09 August 2022).

[50] Id. at pp. 38-39.

[51] FATF, Jurisdictions under increased monitoring <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-june-2022.html> (visited 09 August 2022).

[52] Philippine Star, Philippines making gains in resolving anti-money laundering issues <https://www.philstar.com/business/2022/08/04/2200060/philippines-making-gains-resolving-antimoney-laundering-issues (visited 09 August 2022).

[53] Ponencia, pp. 2-6.

[54] LEONARD W. VONA, THE FRAUD AUDIT, RESPONDING TO THE RISK OF FRAUD IN CORE BUSINESS SYSTEMS (2011), pp. 8-11.

[55] 507 Phil. 322 (2005).

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